Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

330.13/9–1752

Memorandum of Conversation, by Lincoln P. Bloomfield of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs Planning Staff

top secret

[Washington,] September 17, 1952.

• Subject:
• Work of the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament.

• Participants:
• McGeorge Bundy—Secretary, Panel of Consultants
• Lincoln P. Bloomfield—UNA/P

Note: Much of what Mr. Bundy reported to me he later repeated in a meeting with Messrs. Sanders, Bechhoefer, Meyers, Warren Chase, Niemeyer and myself.

Mr. Bundy reported as follows:

1. The five members of the Panel think “astonishingly alike” on the problems they have considered. The general framework of their considerations has been the place of disarmament in its overall policy setting. They have had very intensive discussions, but their thinking requires more shape before it can be “crystallized”.

2. In Bundy’s words, the Panel is “unable to persuade itself that disarmament is not of major importance”. In their opinion, the arms race is becoming increasingly dangerous, and the Government is not currently taking all necessary steps to meet that danger. The Panel feels that our overall policies should rest on an acute awareness of this danger, but at the same time they are unsure that they could recommend any positive steps which would carry assurances of success in their undertaking.

3. These premises have led the Panel to the conclusion that limitation of armaments should become a central part of the purposes of U.S. policy to a far more meaningful extent than at present.

4. Because, in the view of the Panel, this is not now the case but should be and perhaps will be in the future, it is essential that we keep our public positions on disarmament extremely fluid. We must not foreclose the possibility of limited agreements in the future by pushing ourselves into rigid positions today because of tactical necessities. They feel that so long as genuine negotiations are impossible, some hardening of our public position is inevitable, but we should resist the tendency to allow the situation in the UN to snowball out of manageable proportions and should keep to a minimum statements on this subject which are too specific. In this connection, they feel that real agreements can only be developed outside of the publicity attending United Nations discussions and, repeating their earlier thought, in an atmosphere in Washington of the highest policy awareness of the imperatives of this problem with full understanding of the need for quid pro quos.

5. The Panel sees its principal task as conveying this awareness to the Government, if only by indicating their own reading of the high spots of this problem. They are unhappy with the paradoxical security situation which makes it impossible for them freely to exchange ideas and thoughts with the UNA Disarmament Staff which has the action responsibility in the Department for this problem, and they intend to recommend that whatever group is charged with this responsibility in the Department be located considerably closer to the summit both for this reason and because of the central importance of the problem.

6. I inquired about their deliberations on the specific tasks we had set forth for them. Regarding a “Non-atomic Baruch Plan”, they felt one would be possible to develop, but would be an unhelpful exercise. If agreements ever become possible, reliance will have to be placed on “broad safeguards against big violations” rather than on any detailed blueprint. Regarding the UN Atomic Energy Plan, they felt that it was originally developed at a time when there was considerable political flexibility and an acceptance of the need for tight technical controls. By contrast, there is now very little political flexibility which leads them to conclude that a “loose” technical approaches the only one possible. They feel that the UN Plan is out of date, largely because it bears the stigmata of protracted unsuccessful negotiations. At the same time, they feel it would be undesirable to attempt to make minor changes in the Plan in order to make it more “realistic” with concomitant propaganda advantage, since this might prejudice any really meaningful revisions at a more propitious time. It is their feeling that no understanding will be possible in this area unless it is a part of a larger political understanding.

7. The Panel wishes us to know that its members are available for individual or collective consultation on current aspects of our task, at the pleasure of the Department.

Lincoln P. Bloomfield