330.13/5–2152
The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)1
My Dear Mr. Secretary: I have received your letter of May 21, 1952,2 relating to a working paper intended for submission in Committee I of the Disarmament Commission, entitled, “Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces”, RAC (NS) D–4.3
In the light of the urgent political necessities for proposals in this specific field, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France jointly submitted a paper on this subject in Committee I of the Disarmament Commission on May 28, 1952. A copy of the working paper is enclosed. The submission of the paper was made through statements by the representatives of the three sponsoring governments. A copy of the statement of Ambassador Cohen, the United States Deputy Representative, is also enclosed.4
The paper, as submitted, is in some aspects altered in form from the original working paper which was the subject of your letter and of the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff accompanying your letter. We have sought, in the revised paper and Ambassador Cohen’s statement, to follow as closely as possible the chief points contained in your letter and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum. We believe that most of these points were, to a considerable extent at least, taken into consideration in the original paper.
All alterations were fully discussed on an informal basis with representatives of the Department of Defense. Some were made in order that the paper might be submitted as a tripartite working paper rather than solely by the United States. We believe that the paper, as submitted, is in full conformity with NSC 1125 and the President’s address of November 7, 1951 on the subject of disarmament.6
[Page 983]The memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff accompanying your letter, in my opinion, raises some problems which should be considered carefully. In enumerating the disadvantages to Western democracies of a proposal such as that contained in the working paper under review, the memorandum suggests, among others the following considerations.
“5. e. Merely advancing the proposal will have a serious impact on United States as well as on world opinion. It may so fix the minds of the people in the Western nations upon relaxation of the armament burden as to have a catastrophic effect upon the rearmament program and conceivably on the conduct of present hostilities in Korea; it would probably delay arms programs; it might even bring about a degree of disarmament on the side of the West alone, thus imperiling the gains which have thus far been made only by heavy sacrifice;
“i. The concept of the proposal seems postulated upon the theory that reduction in armaments will lessen world tensions. Actually, a limitation of armed forces which bears no relation to strategic considerations may prove to be an invitation to aggression;”.
In paragraph 6, the memorandum implies or suggests that the submission of the paper “would not be consistent with the security interests of the United States.”
It should be emphasized that the suggestion on the numerical limitation of armed forces does not stand alone, but is merely one criterion for a comprehensive program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments, as set forth in NSC 112 and in the President’s address of November 7, 1951. It was intended that the paper be introduced solely for the purpose of initiating discussion of this important aspect of the program. Under such circumstances we did not consider that the introduction of this paper could have consequences for the present rearmament program or the hostilities in Korea beyond those of the program as a whole.
In connection with subparagraph i, we recognize that a limitation of armed forces which bore no relation to strategic considerations might well prove to be an invitation to aggression. Therefore the paper sought to indicate the relation of limitations to strategic considerations, and was meant to serve as a basis for discussion within the policy expressed in NSC 112. In connection with the first sentence of subparagraph i, however, we call your attention to the statement of the President, of November 7, 1951, which seems to indicate a different view from that expressed in the memorandum. The President said, “We believe deeply that discussions of this question in the United Nations can and should begin now, even though tensions are high. Indeed, one way to reduce these [Page 984] tensions is to start work on such proposals as the one we are now making.”
It is our understanding of NSC 112 that the Government decided to go forward with proposals for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, because on balance it was considered to be to our advantage. We assume that the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not intended to call into question the policy determinations of the National Security Council and the President, expressed in NSC 112 and that our respective staffs will continue their work on the details of a program based on such policy determinations.
I greatly appreciate the excellent cooperation which we have received from the Department of Defense in connection with this matter.
Sincerely yours,
- Drafted by Bechhoefer on June 11, and cleared by S/AE and, in draft, by Ambassador Cohen and Ferguson of S/P. It was transmitted to the Secretary for his signature by Assistant Secretary Hickerson by memorandum of June 11. (330.13/5–2152)↩
- Ante, p. 941.↩
- RAC (NS) D–4, Apr. 30, 1952, is not printed. (Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, “RAC (NS) Documents”)↩
- The working paper (UN doc. DC/10) and the statement by Ambassador Cohen are not printed here, but see footnote 2, p. 954.↩
- For text, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. i, p. 477.↩
- For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951, pp. 623–627.↩