Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

511.00/12–853: Circular telegram

The Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (Washburn) to Certain Diplomatic Posts¹

confidential

Washington, December 8, 1953—6:42 p.m.

Usito 164. InfoGuide: President’s UN Speech.² This is Joint State–Defense–USIA message.

1. Essential that all recipients make maximum effort to insure that President’s historic offer of sharing the benefits of peaceful use of atomic energy with the entire world achieves the sharpest and most lasting impact.

2. While premature to speculate on nature of any detailed plan, essential for all media to carry and cross-report the wide variety of comment, both in US and abroad, which will be generated as result this offer. In so doing media should strive to serve as international forum, of balanced comment, aiming at widest possible coverage.

3. Speech makes clear humanity now shares present danger but has also capability changing situation to one of hope. Do not minimize grim picture delineated first part of speech. Important that sense of urgency aroused by the President be accurately reflected, yet be offset by offer to take tangible first step towards international use of AE for peaceful purposes which will strike massive blow against root causes of war and international tension.

4. Stress that atom-sharing concept is product of maturing plans, reflects continuity of dynamic policy stemming from April 16 speech,³ and is aimed at breaking international log jam on disarmament proposals.

5. While the bid to the Soviet Union to join in “private conversations” must be underscored, the speech under no circumstances should be interpreted as “psychological warfare”. Nor do we commit Soviet Union to an early reply, keeping in mind the delicacy and difficulty of any ensuing negotiations. To avert the pitfall that the issue of global war or peace depends on the immediate fate of the proposal, we continue to present it as a step forward in steady long range effort in UN and elsewhere as appropriate, to establish a basis for eventual disarmament, including prohibition of atomic weapons, when settlement of other issues and consequent relaxation of world tension permits. The proposal demonstrates the sincerity of our purpose but we avoid committing ourselves or others to achieve an early agreement at the expense of a fully dependable disarmament plan.

6. In line with foregoing our objectives are:

a. To impress upon world opinion, seriousness with which the US seeks world security through reduction of the arms burden.

b. To follow up 16 April impact by making another breach in the Soviet’s near monopoly of “peace” propaganda. Hitherto Soviets have benefitted by simple, though spurious, approach while West has been handicapped in explaining rather complex proposals. Speech fills this latter gap, and by stress on Atomic Energy Authority and A-Bank proposal will help combat previous Soviet atomic propaganda.

c. To give to the peoples of Russia dramatic evidence of US peaceful intentions, while making clear at same time US resolve to resist aggression by all means at its disposal.

d. To seek to persuade the enslaved peoples of satellite Europe that their best interests will be served through international cooperation and understanding, which can be enhanced by international acceptance of the President’s proposals.

e. To convince our NATO partners, and other friends that we are ready to take positive, vigorous steps to achieve world peace and security by the sharing of peaceful benefits of atomic energy and by eventual disarmament.

f. To convince neutrals less directly involved in the cold war that we aim to achieve a peaceful world in which the threat of global atomic war is removed and that our offer provides a new approach to the economic development which many of them so desperately seek.

7. Of equal importance with foregoing is exercise of appropriate safeguards to avoid in our output:

a. Any stimulation of false optimism regarding immediately realizable substantive disarmament.

b. Any impression that the proposals are “cold war” maneuvers and are purely propagandistics.

c. Any impression that we are offering a final proposal whose rejection would increase the danger of global [war].

d. Any indication that we have abandoned UN atomic energy control plans. Commentary might refer (1) to the US position supporting the UN plan or any other equally effective plan, (2) to Secretary Dulles’ September 17 statement at UNGA that our joint proposals are not immutable, but any proposal must meet essential tests of adequate safeguards.

Washburn

1. Drafted by Berding, Phillips, and Colonel Hirsch of OCB; cleared by Allen Haden of USIA, Sanger, Montgomery, Robert Murphy, Raine, Meyers, Stegmeier, Godel, and Gordon Arneson of S/AE; and sent to 69 posts.
2. Reference is to President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” address before the UN General Assembly on Dec. 8. The speech is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 813–822. For documentation on this speech, see pp. 845 ff.
3. See the unnumbered circular airgram, Apr. 22, p. 1669.