Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

OCB files, lot 62 D 430, “POW’s 1953”

Paper Approved by the Operations Coordinating Board¹

top secret

[Washington,] October 14, 1953.

National Operations Plan to Exploit Communist BW Hoax, Mistreatment of POW’s and Other Atrocities Perpetrated by Communist Forces During the Korean War

objective

To develop an integrated national program which will effectively expose the nature of Communist motives, character, methods and ambitions by coordinated exploitation of all available materials on the Soviet fabrication of bacteriological warfare propaganda, the character of Communist exploitation and mistreatment of prisoners of war and other atrocities perpetrated by the Communists during the Korean War.

I. Requirements:

a. To establish in authoritative fashion, without supplying the Communists with further propaganda opportunities, the falsity of Communist charges that the United States engaged in bacteriological warfare in Korea and Communist China.

b. To neutralize unfavorable publicity concerning the U.S. treatment of its returned prisoners of war and to undermine Communist propaganda exploitation of any necessary disciplinary or penal actions taken against any repatriated U.S. prisoner of war.

c. To make clear in the United States that this government does not condone cowardice or treasonable acts on the part of its military personnel and that those individuals who avoided capture, or who, having been captured, withstood Communist pressures, are more to be praised than those who, even though they were subjected to limited physical or mental duress, succumbed to Communist pressures and collaborated in the germ warfare hoax.

d. To provide for the necessary medical treatment and protection from U.S. public scorn of military personnel who succumbed to Communist pressures under excessive duress while also providing for appropriate explanations and information output with respect to punitive action against those who are found to have been guilty of treasonable acts.

e. Through objective, factual information output, expose all provable cases of atrocities or mistreatment and violations of the existing rules of war which may be ascribed to the Communists, both against prisoners of war and other military personnel in Korea.

II. Actions Currently Completed or Under Way:

a. As a result of experience gained from Operation Little Switch, it has been agreed by all agencies that no distinctive medical or psychical treatment or segregation should be accorded to returned prisoners of war on the basis of apparent collaboration as revealed in Communist propaganda.

b. Considerable material has been obtained from psychological warfare, medical, psychiatric, or sociological interrogation of such prisoners while these personnel were enroute from the Far East Command to the United States. Additional material will be sought as required.

c. It has been agreed that specific depositions denying participation in bacteriological warfare and outlining the conditions and forms of duress by which such confessions were obtained are to be acquired from the personnel involved and transmitted to the OCB for the Department of State and other agencies as appropriate, for their use.

d. It has been determined that the Department of Defense will obtain such other information and intelligence materials as may be desired and make them available to all interested executive agencies of the Government immediately upon receipt.

e. A special panel of intelligence and information officers has been established to provide documentary and intelligence material required by the U.S. United Nations Delegation, and this panel is apparently operating effectively.

f. A special panel of the Operations Coordinating Board which had been established to prepare a national plan for the exploitation of Communist mistreatment of U.S. prisoners of war, has been dissolved and a new panel constituted to plan for and coordinate all aspects of the POW exchange.

g. The Department of Defense has agreed to make available to the Operations Coordinating Board all material which has been or may be collected concerning any aspect of this problem.

h. The Department of Defense has also agreed to prepare story and White Paper material, radio, TV and movie material for such utilization as may be required.

i. The Department of Defense has released an announcement outlining its position with respect to distinction between those prisoners who succumbed to duress, those who refused to do so, and those who collaborated openly.

j. The Department of Defense has made available to the Department of Justice all pertinent information on possible subversive elements involving U.S. military personnel returning from Korea.

III. Specific Programs or Additional Actions Required:

a. A specific program of U.S. action to discredit the Soviet bacteriological warfare campaign. (Title: Basic Plan For U.S. Action to Discredit the Soviet Bacteriological Warfare Campaign.) This program will integrate the aspects of completed, continuing, and new actions which relate to this purpose, including especially the bacteriological warfare aspects of prisoner of war experience.

b. A specific program to exploit to the maximum degree appropriate all provable cases of atrocities or mistreatment and violations of the existing rules of war which may be ascribed to the Communists, both against prisoners of war and other military personnel in Korea. (Title: National Plan For Exploiting Communist Mistreatment of U.N. Prisoners of War.) This program will integrate the aspects of completed, continuing and new actions which relate to this program.

c. A specific program to exploit to the maximum all evidence pertaining to U.S. personnel in Korea captured by the Communists who steadfastly withstood Communist coercion, threats of death—and other forms of physical and mental pressure, without falsely confessing to actions which could be used by the Communists against the interests of the United States; such personnel to be given appropriate public recognition by citation and decoration of their courage and devotion to the national interest and to their duty, and that such recognition by citation and decoration be given thorough exploitation in the United States and abroad as a significant reflection of the morale and discipline of United States military personnel, and of the values of American national life. The citation should in each case provide a detailed account of the physical and mental pressures used by the Communists in their efforts to obtain “confessions” or statements from U.S. personnel, and the responses of the Americans to these pressures.

d. A domestic program to re-establish that the United States does not condone cowardice or treasonable acts on the part of its military personnel and to establish an understanding of the disposition of the several categories of U.S. military personnel returning from Korea.

e. Material required by the Department of State for the United States United Nations Delegation and United States delegations to other international bodies should continue to be provided.

f. All other materials required for the implementation of these programs and obtainable from military sources should be obtained by the Department of Defense and provided to other interested agencies.

g. All of these requirements and programs should be coordinated by a single authoritative point of contact.

IV. Recommendations: (To become actions when approved by OCB)

a. That the Operations Coordinating Board note the actions already completed and approve the two specific programs called for in III a. and III b., above.

b. That the Board note the requirements in III c. and III d., above, and designate the Department of Defense as the action agency.

c. That the Operations Coordinating Board designate a member of the OCB staff as a single point of contact to provide for the coordinated exploitation of all these programs; that this officer will act as Chairman for an interdepartmental working group; that the Department of Justice be invited to sit with this group; and that the Chairman act as the point of contact to receive all requests for information and disseminate all information obtained to the interested agencies.

d. Member agencies should advise this group with respect to policies to be followed in the implementation of this plan.

e. That the Department of Defense and other agencies provide to this point of contact all pertinent information collected to date, that this provision continue in the future, and that the departments or other agencies undertake to satisfy requirements for further information submitted to them by the designated point of contact only.

Tab “A”

Paper Approved by the Operations Coordinating Board

secret

[Washington], October 14, 1953.

Basic Plan for U.S. Action to Discredit the Soviet Bacteriological Warfare Campaign

1. Problem and Opportunity

a. Through manufactured “evidence”, ostensible confessions extracted from U.S. prisoners of war by physical and mental torture, investigations and reports by pseudo-scientific groups, and intensive propaganda hammering, the Communists have achieved in the Free World, as well as within the Soviet orbit, some degree of belief in their allegations that the United States has engaged in bacteriological warfare in Korea and Communist China.

b. While various U.S. Government agencies have made efforts at counter-action, the U.S. Government has not supplied the world with authoritative documentation to refute the charge, and to exploit this example to discredit Soviet propaganda in general.

c. While the various agencies of the U.S. Government have separately accumulated extensive amounts of information about this Soviet campaign, the current return of prisoners of war in Korea provides very important additional information especially useful as specific propaganda and as foundation for the development of concerted U.S. action on this matter.

2. Definition of General Objective

a. Under the supervision of the Operations Coordinating Board to assure integration with overall U.S. foreign and military policy, and to assure government-wide integration of action on this subject, the U.S. Government will undertake at once a program utilizing documented evidence to expose the false and fabricated character of Communist propaganda in general and Communist bacteriological warfare charges in particular, as a demonstration of the insidious nature of Communist propaganda and the brutal and destructive character of Communist methods.

b. The purposes of this program will be:

(1) To discredit this example of Soviet propaganda so effectively that it can be used throughout the Free World and the Soviet orbit to demonstrate the viciousness and falsity of Communist propaganda in general.

(2) To undo and reverse any belief in their allegations which they may have achieved.

(3) To cause the Soviet bacteriological warfare propaganda campaign to so boomerang that it will not be reasserted.

(4) At the proper stage of success in such U.S. counter-action, to use this example to the maximum for the broad purpose of general destruction of the effectiveness of the Soviet propaganda effort.

3. Guiding Considerations

a. The objectives defined above differ sharply from the view that the Soviet campaign has been overdone to the point of self-exposure, that its true character will in time be naturally apparent, and that the best U.S. course is to let the Soviet campaign run out without concerted and positive U.S. counter-effort. The statement of objective established here is a conclusion that U.S. interest now requires concerted positive counter-effort.

b. The Soviet bacteriological warfare campaign is based on the inhuman mental and moral breakdown of a small number of the U.S. personnel who have been captured in Korea. In this connection it is necessary to note that Soviet methods of psychological coercion are capable of compromising most individuals whom they are determined to break. Whether this reason is justification for the action of any individual is a matter strictly for agencies of military or civil justice, as the case may be. However, there is a possibility of conflict between the general propaganda objectives of the U.S. Government and the need for disciplinary or penal action in individual cases. This plan will not attempt to prejudge individual cases but the following considerations will be carefully weighed in each case prior to initiation of penal or disciplinary action.

(1) The overall propaganda objectives of the U.S. action set forth here are best served by the avoidance of punishment of military or civilian personnel who have been so exploited by the Soviet bacteriological warfare propaganda campaign.

(2) If the risk of adverse propaganda effect cannot be avoided in cases of clear necessity for disciplinary or penal action, the employment of public or publicly known investigations and proceedings should be kept to the minimum required under law.

4. Courses of Action

a. The assembly of additional information and the development of detailed courses of positive action by U.S. departments and agencies will be accomplished by an inter-agency task force, as provided in paragraph 5.

b. The processing of information will include:

(1) The identification and detailed study of the sources and methods used by the Soviets in the development of the subject matter of this campaign.

(2) The identification of the propaganda mechanisms and targets used by the Soviets as a basis for specific U.S. counter-action. Special attention will be given to the identification of those influential persons and specialized opinion groups throughout the Free World who have been especially susceptible to this campaign.

c. The development of the U.S. positive action program will assume the following general framework of timing, approach, mechanism and target selection:

(1) On the basis of the best current operational judgment, without waiting for completion of an exhaustive analysis of the total problem, counter-propaganda and efforts to induce credence in U.S. innocence of the BW charges, and the falsity of those charges, will be initiated as a matter of urgency against persons and groups where the Soviet campaign has been especially effective.

(2) A dignified, continuing flow of corrective factual information will be launched widely throughout the world, under overt U.S. responsibility, increasing in tempo, intensity, and subject coverage as the development and evaluation of information is accomplished. Covert supplement to such overt action will be added as appropriate.

(3) The analysis of Soviet treatment of captured personnel will be completed as a matter of high priority, the results to be used as appropriate for both general propaganda and official action through diplomatic instrumentalities and official international organizations.

(4) A special effort will be made to carry U.S. propaganda to the people of the Soviet orbit, by overt and covert means, wherever possible with the cooperation of other Free World governments and especially by the neutralist nations.

(5) As appropriate, a campaign will be launched by overt and covert means to neutralize, over-ride, and destroy the Soviet propaganda instrumentalities which purvey the myth, giving priority attention to those which are currently and effectively active.

(6) The concentrated attention of official and non-official U.S. facilities will be directed to the development of methods for successful personal resistance to the Soviet techniques of psychological coercion.

5. Implementation

a. Under the chairmanship of a member of the OCB Staff as its representative, an inter-agency working group is established to monitor the development and execution of this plan. The membership will be representatives designated by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the United States Information Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of Foreign Operations, and representatives of such other agencies, on a continuing or ad hoc basis, as the membership herein designated may determine. Major aspects of such development and execution will be referred for OCB or NSC action as appropriate.

b. All departments and agencies of the U.S. Government will contribute to the procurement and assembly of information and the provision of operational facilities, as determined by the working group, including the selective extraction of additional material from or other use of returned prisoners of war.

c. In the development and execution of the positive action program, the primary responsibility of participating departments and agencies will be to advise the working group with respect to policies to be followed in the implementation of this plan. In addition, with collateral participation and support from other departments and agencies as determined by the working group with the approval of the OCB, specific responsibilities include:

(1) USIA: To develop and conduct the overt propaganda actions indicated above.

(2) The Department of State: To develop and conduct the aspects of the campaign to be accomplished through the instrumentalities of diplomatic action or official U.S. interjection of this issue where appropriate into official international bodies, with particular attention to the benefits and limitations of discussion of these issues, in international bodies.

(3) The Department of Defense: To furnish the working group and participating agencies, as rapidly as possible, the material obtained from returned prisoners of war. With the cooperation of the CIA, the FBI, and such medical agencies as appropriate, the Department of Defense will analyze the experience of captured U.S. personnel with Soviet methods of personality destruction, the responsibility for devising counter-techniques to be separately determined and assigned by the OCB.

(4) CIA: As a matter of special emphasis in its intelligence responsibilities, to identify, describe, and evaluate the Soviet effort, instrumentalities and targets, and to provide such intelligence for the purpose of determining tactical priorities; and to plan and conduct all covert operational aspects of the general program.

Tab “B”

Paper Approved by the Operations Coordinating Board

confidential

[Washington], October 14, 1953.

National Plan for Exploiting Communist Mistreatment of U.N. Prisoners of War

i. objectives

1. It is in the national interest that the full story of Communist mistreatment of POWs be made known to the American people. Implementation of any plan to inform the American audience must take account of certain foreign policy considerations. Any official campaign directed to overseas audiences should be developed by the OCB working group on the basis of a full evaluation of the evidence. U.S. efforts should be directed initially at making information available and stimulating public discussion of this evidence through private channels in the United States. Where use of such materials will contribute to the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives abroad or in international bodies, they should be so utilized.

2. In general, it should be the purpose of the United States Government in its programs for exploiting Communist mistreatment of UN POWs to:

a. Provide the American people with an accurate sober account of the treatment accorded U.S. and other UN personnel captured by Communist forces in Korea, particularly with respect to the cynical Communist efforts to intimidate and pervert these prisoners for political ends as a part of the whole Communist conspiracy against the Free World.

b. To disseminate the substantive materials on a global basis when such dissemination is to our advantage.

c. Educate U.S. troops regarding the U.S. experiences in the POW field in the Korean war, and develop guidances appropriate for their conduct as prisoners in possible future hostilities.

d. To negate the effect of Communist propaganda developing from their mistreatment of POWs.

e. To educate U.S. military personnel concerning the nature of the Communist conspiracy with regard to mistreatment of POWs and to increase their fighting spirit.

f. To inform the American public and peoples of the Free World why UN soldiers are still missing after the completion of the prisoner of war exchange.

g. With regard to the POW and BW issues, to support and reinforce political actions and propaganda materials flowing from the activities of the U.S. delegation to the 8th Session of the UN General Assembly.

h. To minimize the attention given to UN personnel refusing repatriation or returning as Communist sympathizers.

i. To contribute to the determination of the free peoples of the world to fight Communism.

ii. operations

3. The exploitation of Communist mistreatment of prisoners of war, and the illegal retention of those not returned during the prisoners of war exchange, is a positive and dynamic project which can achieve definite psychological gains. To be successful, the program must be one of continued and coordinated actions rather than a single-shot saturation effort. In exploiting atrocities, the program should emphasize actual atrocities and omit cases of malnutrition, lack of medical care, and other hardships common to both Communist troops and prisoners of war. At the same time, the program should not generate war hysteria or take on the nature of a rabble rousing campaign. Foreign exploitation of the program should emphasize the implications, for all individuals and nations, of the cynical and calculated way in which Communists exploit POWs to serve their political interests and that this, among other things, justifies the resolute opposition of the American people to Soviet Communist and Communist aggression.

4. In order to focus national and world-wide attention on this issue and to stimulate continuing press coverage, a person of national television prominence should initiate the program of exploitation of Communist mistreatment of UN prisoners of war in a televised panel discussion at the earliest practicable date with a selected group of prisoner of war returnees and atrocity investigators. This television broadcast should be preceded by calculated rumors and hints that such a program is coming and will contain previously classified material which has now been downgraded and released by the Department of Defense.

5. The program will then be kept alive and followed up by:

a. Illustrated talks to domestic civic organizations, clubs and similar groups by selected prisoner of war returnees.

b. Domestic radio and television interviews of selected prisoner of war returnees by radio and television commentators.

c. Domestic magazine and newspaper articles by-lined by prisoner of war returnees.

d. Official domestic news releases of incidents and factual data as compiled, including official photographs.

e. Exploitation by the U.S. delegation to the UN.

f. Appropriate distribution of the stories to foreign audiences.

6. The following tasks will be performed:

a. The Operations Coordinating Board will:

(1) Accomplish over-all coordination of plans and, as appropriate, timing of activities of the Department of State, Department of Defense, CIA, FOA and USIA.

(2) Advise action agencies of necessary changes in plans and activities.

b. The Department of State will:

(1) Furnish national foreign policy guidance to participating agencies, to the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, and to U.S. missions abroad;

(2) Provide the U.S. delegation to the UN and U.S. missions abroad with available documented information on atrocities and prisoners of war illegally retained by the Communists;

(3) Furnish the Department of Defense with all available current information concerning:

(a) Foreign reaction to the program of exploiting Communist mistreatment of prisoners of war;

(b) Communist intentions regarding prisoners of war being illegally held since the completion of the prisoner of war exchange;

(4) Coordinate as appropriate with foreign governments for additional exploitation of Communist atrocities against prisoners of war.

c. The Department of Defense will:

(1) Take all necessary action to insure that the American people receive factual information through all media in order to achieve the objectives set forth in paragraph 2, supra;

(2) Prepare the script and select the personnel to participate in the initial telecast referred to in paragraphs, supra;

(3) Take necessary action to implement the follow-up phase of the program as indicated in paragraph 5a through 5d;

(4) In cooperation with other governmental agencies, assist in the development of a coordinated over-all effort to exploit Communist mistreatment of prisoners of war;

(5) Cooperate with the Department of State and USIA to insure coordination of domestic exploitation of Communist mistreatment of prisoners of war with exploitation arranged by the Department of State through foreign governmental and/or information agencies;

(6) Provide the Department of State, the USIA, and CIA with available documented information on Communist atrocities against prisoners of war;

(7) Maintain continuing liaison with the Department of State and CIA to procure all available current information concerning:

(a) Foreign reaction to the program of exploiting Communist mistreatment of prisoners of war;

(b) Communist intentions regarding U.S. prisoners of war being illegally retained since the completion of the prisoner of war exchange;

(8) Collect and make available to all agencies all exploitable military information concerning Communist atrocities against prisoners of war.

d. The Central Intelligence Agency will:

(1) Utilize available means to procure and appropriately distribute current information concerning:

(a) Communist atrocities against prisoners of war;

(b) Number, location and identity of UN prisoners of war being illegally held by the Communists since the completion of the prisoner of war exchange;

(2) Utilize available means to procure current information to support the accomplishment of the objectives stated in Section I;

(3) Assist in determining Communist reaction to the program;

(4) Make available to participating agencies all other information pertinent to the program.

e. The U.S. Information Agency will:

(1) Provide world-wide distribution of information appropriate to the support of the program of exploiting Communist mistreatment of UN prisoners of war;

(2) Assist in determining foreign reaction to the program.

f. The Foreign Operations Administration will:

(1) Participate in this program in such fashion as from time to time appears feasible.

1. This paper was circulated to OCB members by Col. Byron K. Enyart, USAF, Acting Deputy Executive Officer, under cover of a memorandum of Oct. 14, which indicated that the OCB had approved the paper on that date. (OCB files, lot 62 D 430, “POW’s 1953”) For information on the establishment and functions of the Operations Coordinating Board, see the editorial note, p. 1736.