Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

G/PM files, lot 68 D 349, “Use Policy 1950–1955”

Memorandum by R. Gordon Arneson¹ to the Secretary of State

top secret

[Washington,] June 10, 1952.

• Subject:
• Resolution of the Responsibilities of the AEC, the JCS, the Departments of Defense and State With Respect to Various Atomic Weapon Matters Requiring Presidential Decision

Background

On February 8, 1952 the Acting Executive Secretary of the NSC transmitted to the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the AEC for consideration and appropriate recommendation to the President a JCS paper setting forth the JCS views on the Department of Defense interest in the use of atomic weapons (Tab A).² This paper had been transmitted to the Executive Secretary by Secretary Lovett with his concurrence.

It was the initial view of the working group of the Special Committee of NSC that the JCS paper was so wide of the mark in some of its assertions that an effort should be made through discussion to get it rewritten. It was hoped that by this procedure the issues could be put in proper perspective prior to bringing the matter to the attention of the principals. To this end the draft views of the Department of State on the JCS paper were prepared (Tab B).³ This paper has not been circulated to the other members of the working group of the Special Committee inasmuch as the meetings designed to bring about a modification in the JCS views have never been called.

Meanwhile the AEC has given its reactions to the JCS paper. These views are attached as Tab C.⁴

It now seems unwise to attempt to persuade the JCS to withdraw and rewrite its paper. The views of the Department of State with respect to the JCS paper could be made a matter of record as are those of the AEC. It would appear, however, that the most important and useful point to concentrate on is to get agreement as to the substantive recommendations which should be made to the President by the NSC Special Committee on the issues raised by the JCS paper. It is thought that the most desirable next step would be for you to meet with the Chairman of the JCS, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the AEC, and the Executive Secretary of NSC with a view toward making appropriate recommendations to the President.

Four issues are involved:

1. The procedures whereby the President may most effectively obtain advice whenever he is called upon to decide on the use of atomic weapons and to decide other related matters such as the deployment of atomic weapons;

2. The manner in which atomic weapon production programs should be established;

3. The question whether an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 should be sought which would enable the military to transmit to other nations such information on atomic weapons as is essential for the conduct of combined military operations and which would also permit the exchange of fissionable material or weapons material to the extent necessary to further such operations; and

4. The question whether a portion of the national stockpile of atomic weapons should be turned over to the complete custody of the military.

Discussion

1. The Procedures Issue. You will recall that more than a year ago a staff study was prepared (and circulated to the members of the working group of the Special Committee) outlining procedures whereby the President might most effectively obtain advice whenever he is called upon to decide on the use of atomic weapons.⁵ This study, with certain changes, is attached as Tab D.⁶ The views of the JCS and the Department of Defense on this study have never been received unless the tabbed JCS paper may be considered in part responsive. While formal comments of the AEC have not been received, I understand from discussions with the Commission that it is in general accord with the procedures outlined.

Other Presidential decisions short of decisions on use, such as proposed deployments of atomic weapons (non-nuclear and/or nuclear components), have as a matter of practice been taken by the President only after he has received the advice of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the AEC. It would appear highly desirable and timely that these procedures, both as regards Presidential decision on use and on actions involving the deployment of atomic weapons, should now be firmly established.

2. Atomic Weapon Production Programs. It is suggested that existing procedures be continued with, however, some clarification as to the respective responsibilities of the agencies directly concerned. As is evident from the JCS paper and the AEC views (Tabs A and C respectively) the chief difficulty here lies in defining the respective roles that the JCS and the AEC should play in the process. As in any other military requirement field, it is clear that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should state the purely military requirements for atomic weapons. The JCS asserts, however, that its responsibility should extend to determining the fissionable materials production goals, production rates, and the means for attaining them. The JCS paper asserts that it is a unilateral responsibility of the Department of Defense to determine how many and what types of atomic weapons are needed for the defense and security of the United States. This assertion overstates the case. More properly its responsibility should be to establish military requirements for numbers and types of atomic weapons needed for the defense and security of the United States. Once such military requirements are established, the President, with the advice of the Special Committee of NSC, determines the nation’s atomic weapon program only after all factors, both military and non-military, have been taken into account.

3. Amendment of the Act. This proposal is long overdue. It is evident in connection with NATO planning that our military authorities are presently under considerable handicap in that they are unable to discuss in any useful way the role of atomic weapons in combined operations.⁷ This creates an unnatural non-atomic sort of world which does not comport with reality. The precise text of the amendment which the Department of Defense would sponsor is not yet in hand, but it is understood that present Defense thinking is concerned with the type of information involved in military planning. I understand that the proposal of the JCS paper that there should also be a simplified procedure for the exchange of information in the scientific and technical fields designed as a substitute for the recent amendment to the Act has now been withdrawn.

4. Military Custody of Weapons. The proposal that a portion of the national stockpile of atomic weapons be turned over to the custody of the military would appear to be consonant with the trend toward deployment of atomic weapons to overseas bases. In the interests of readiness to use in the event a decision to use is made by the President, it would appear highly desirable that atomic weapons be deployed to overseas bases as soon as the necessary facilities and the necessary political arrangements can be negotiated. Moreover, with the steady increase in the size of the atomic weapon stockpile there would appear to be good reason to have additional numbers within the continental limits of the United States under the control of the military. From the technical point of view, the AEC must continue to have access to the complete stockpile in the interest of maintaining quality control and in order to make such modification and improvements in stockpile models as technical advances may make possible. Placing atomic weapons under the custody of the Department of Defense in order to increase readiness to use must be accompanied by clearly established procedures by means of which authority to use would be sought. The procedures set forth in Tab D are designed to this end. The question as to what portion of the national stockpile should be turned over to the custody of the military is one which will require further careful study. If a decision in principle is taken, it is suggested that the AEC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff be directed to work out together specific proposals in this regard for the consideration of the President with the advice of the Special Committee.

Recommendations

With the concurrence of Mr. Matthews and Mr. Nitze, I recommend:

A. That you meet with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Executive Secretary of NSC and endeavor to secure agreement on the recommendations which follow for submission to the President.

B. That the following resolution be made of the issues that have been raised by the JCS paper:

1. Procedures on use. That the recommendations contained in the attached staff study (Tab D) be submitted to the President for his approval and that existing procedures whereby the Special Committee advises the President on other actions short of use, such as the deployment of atomic weapons, be continued.

2. Establishment of atomic weapon production programs. That the JCS be charged with responsibility for stating the military requirements for the numbers and types of atomic weapons needed for the defense and security of the United States and that thereupon atomic weapon production programs should be established by the President after taking into account the views expressed to him by the other agencies concerned, namely the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of State, and the Office of Defense Mobilization, in order that all other aspects of such programs can be given proper weight.

3. Legislation. That the JCS proposal for legislation which would permit, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the approval of the President, communication to another nation of such information on atomic weapons as is essential for the conduct of combined operations and for the actual exchange of fissionable material or weapons material to the extent necessary to further such combined operations should be actively pressed; and, accordingly, that the Department of Defense should bring the matter up for the early consideration of the President with the advice of the Special Committee.

4. Military custody of atomic weapons. That the proposal that a portion of the national stockpile of atomic weapons be turned over to the custody of the military be agreed in principle subject to further study and the submission of specific proposals by the AEC and the JCS as to the portion of the national stockpile which should be so turned over, such study to be made available to the Special Committee in order that it may make its recommendations thereon to the President before final decision.

That the foregoing agreement in principle be subject to the understanding that the procedures as set forth in Tab D will be followed when the President is called upon to decide on the use of atomic weapons and subject to the understanding that the Special Committee of NSC will advise the President on closely related matters such as the deployment of atomic weapons.

R. Gordon Arneson

1. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs.
2. For text of the JCS paper, see p. 864.
3. Infra.
4. See Dean’s memorandum of May 27 and its enclosure, p. 947.
5. See the draft memorandum by Arneson, dated Apr. 24, 1951, Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. i, p. 820.
6. For the revised study, dated June 11, 1952, see p. 973.
7. For documentation on the role of nuclear weapons in NATO planning, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 482 ff.