Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Atomic Energy”

Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze) to the Secretary of State¹

top secret

[Washington,] June 9, 1952.

Problem

To determine the desirability of proceeding with the thermonuclear test now scheduled for December 1952.²

Discussion

The problem can be considered in terms of four of its aspects:

• An international agreement not to conduct further tests as a part of a disarmament program;
• An international agreement as a means of avoiding the successful development of thermonuclear weapons by either side;
• The desirability of a test before the United States is prepared to produce weapons and at a time when any successful test in the thermonuclear field may have a significant effect on Soviet decisions;
• The effect of the Presidential election on the decision to proceed with a test in December.

1. An International Agreement as Part of the Disarmament Program

The proposal that the United States offer to enter into an agreement with the USSR that neither will carry out any future atomic or thermonuclear tests has been advanced in the context of the work of the U.N. Disarmament Commission. It is urged that we need to determine whether there is any possibility of agreement with the USSR, and to do that we must come forward with a simple proposal on a vital matter, uncomplicated by the qualifications relating to inspection and verification that have accompanied all of our previous proposals in the disarmament field.

There is no reason to suppose that the conclusion of a bilateral agreement on one specific matter would provide any reliable indication of the possibility of reaching agreement on other questions. The Soviet Union presumably looks at each proposition on its merits, just as we should and do.

On the merits, the proposal that we agree to forego any further tests does not seem designed to be a step toward the regulation and limitation of armaments.

Such an agreement would not bring a halt to thermonuclear development programs, and each side would attempt to put itself in a position that would assure the greatest probability of being able rapidly to manufacture successful weapons in the event of a violation of the agreement. The arms race would not end; it would merely be somewhat more concealed.

It is possible that having had 27 tests as against 3 Soviet tests we would have some continuing advantage in such a concealed technological arms race. If the Soviets made this estimate of the situation, it is doubtful whether they would accept the proposition. They would probably either reject it overtly on these grounds as being manifestly unfair, or would couple the proposition with an absolute prohibition on the use of atomic weapons which we would be unable to accept.

On the other hand, the state of Soviet art may be such that they might consider an agreement prohibiting further tests would slow down our thermonuclear developments while permitting them to close the gap in their own development to a point where they would be ready to test such a weapon and go rapidly into production once a test were made. If such a Soviet estimate turned out to be correct, they might accept the agreement and we might find that we had suffered a substantial loss in position without having made any substantial step forward to a comprehensive and satisfactory program for the control and regulation of armaments.

If an agreement were concluded, we would be a little less sure that we were pursuing the most desirable lines of development, but other aspects of the armaments picture would remain unchanged. Ground forces would be unaffected, and positions vital to the West would continue under threat in Asia, the Middle East and Europe. Both sides could go on building up their stockpiles of atomic weapons and increasing their capabilities for delivery.

If there is any widespread belief that some kind of an agreement with the Kremlin on some subject would be a signal that further agreements were possible, then it would certainly be undesirable to conclude an agreement to conduct no more tests. An agreement of that sort might merely lull the gullible and mislead the men of hope and good will. This is a particularly clear danger in view of the fact that it would seem to be impossible to be sure that the method for detecting tests now in use would in all circumstances give us notice of any Soviet tests. If a real premium is put on concealment, it would probably be possible to devise tests that would escape detection. To provide adequate assurance that Soviet tests would be known to us, some form of inspection and verification within the USSR would probably be required.

It is conceivable that there might be merit in a broader proposal involving simultaneously (a) an agreement for no more tests (present detecting techniques eventually to be supplemented when the appropriate stage of verification is reached under (c) below); (b) an agreement prohibiting aggression and prohibiting the use of atomic weapons in the absence of aggression; and (c) an agreement providing for the immediate and continuing implementation of a system of census and verification, all as first steps toward a comprehensive program for the regulation and limitation of armaments. It is doubtful, however, whether such a broad program could be proposed or negotiated in an election year.

2. An International Agreement as a Means of Avoiding Further Thermonuclear Development

Apart from the arguments discussed in the preceding section, the desire for an international agreement that will somehow halt the full development of a thermonuclear program by the Soviets or ourselves appears to come from a deep sense of disquiet at the prospect that science will soon cross the threshold of discovery into a new period of horribly destructive power.

Those who hold these views treat the ability to manufacture successful thermonuclear weapons as much more than a development of capability different in degree; it is regarded as a development of capability different in kind.

The destructiveness of thermonuclear weapons is portrayed as something so devastating that the whole nature of military action is radically altered and the prospect of permanently contaminated atmosphere is held up in horror before the mind’s eye. While thermonuclear weapons would have great destructive power, it appears to be possible to develop atomic weapons of far greater power than any tested to date, and it also appears that some of the more lurid claims for thermonuclear weapons are exaggerated.

The revulsion at the development of a thermonuclear capability is, however, certainly understandable, but the confrontation that has led us to put so much of our energy and such quantities of our resources into the atomic and thermonuclear programs will not be altered by a standstill arrangement. Before we can contemplate the prospect of slackening our determination to convert our technological superiority into new weapons of increased destructiveness, we would require a far broader alteration of present conditions.

There is, also, another facet to the probable outcome of the tests that are planned. If the U.S. atomic capability is dramatically increased in the near or medium term through the development of thermonuclear weapons, this accretion of effective power may serve as an instrument for securing the objectives expressed in NSC 68³ without war. Even with very great risks of war, we might conclude that it was necessary to use our newly increased power as a lever for accomplishing our objectives if we believed that time would run against us in the future and its direction could not be reversed by any action on our part.

At such time as we might decide to use a temporary and massive power advantage, it would probably be necessary and desirable to hold out alternatives to the USSR, one of which would certainly have to encompass a comprehensive program for the regulation and limitation of armaments.

It might therefore be said that if no real progress toward disarmament can be achieved now, rapid and successful development in the thermonuclear field might create the conditions for arriving at general disarmament in the future. In any case, it is clear that a standstill agreement on further tests would not have the effect of terminating scientific development in the thermonuclear field; it would only add an element of some uncertainty to the course of the development, perhaps to our disadvantage.

3. Desirability of a Test in 1952 Before the United States is Prepared to Produce Weapons

Various factors converge which might make 1952 a climactic year. These include the Japanese Peace Treaty and the security arrangements with Japan; the apparent impasse in the Korean armistice negotiations; and the contractual relations agreement with Germany, the EDC Treaty, and the amendment of the North Atlantic Treaty commitments to cover Western Germany.

The two years since the communist attack on Korea have been a period of foundation-building for the West which is about to begin paying off in terms of production and a steadily improving state of readiness. For the Soviet system it has been a period of continued, intensive, and large-scale military build-up. These political-military developments may lead the Soviet rulers to estimate that if they are going to become involved in general war within the next several years, 1952 is probably a better year than 1953 or subsequent years are likely to be.

The successful explosion of a thermonuclear device could accentuate the danger that the Soviet rulers might decide to force a showdown on a major issue and to move militarily if the West did not accept terms satisfactory to them, for it would indicate that within a relatively short time (a year or two) the West might develop a thermonuclear capability which, together with other developments, the USSR might believe would radically alter the relationship of forces between East and West. It would thus be in Soviet eyes an additional factor weighing on the side of a decision to move militarily against the West before this relationship becomes radically altered to the advantage of the West. It may be that the Kremlin has already discounted our thermonuclear development, but we cannot assume that the Soviets would regard such a development only as one of degree.

The situation would be very different if thermonuclear developments could be so arranged as to give us a substantial thermonuclear capability concurrently with or shortly after the first test. In this way an important new deterrent would be created at or about the same time as the test. In any event it would be highly advantageous for political reasons to hold the period between the first test and the development of a substantial capability to the shortest time consistent with the rapid development of thermonuclear weapons.

To reach a decision as to the desirability of a test before the United States is able to produce weapons, it is therefore necessary to know how much the development weapons would be retarded by a delay of the test now planned for this fall, and to weigh this retardation against the disadvantages which may be involved in the test of a non-weapon type. From the information available, the proposed test in the fall appears to be one that will have considerable importance to future developments. If that is, in fact, the case, the test should not be delayed on political grounds.

4. The Desirability of a Test Before January 20, 1953

It is important that the President be able to react promptly and decisively and with confidence of national support to Soviet political or military actions following our first thermonuclear test and that he be in a position to announce the test in a manner best calculated to forestall further Soviet action and to best present the position of the United States.

These considerations suggest that there should be consultation with the new President after the election or with the two candidates before the election. If, as a result of such consultation, there is found to be a strong objection to a test prior to the beginning of the new President’s term, it would be desirable to postpone the test. In the absence of a strong objection, however, the test should be carried out in December as now planned.

The complicated physical arrangements required to conduct the test constitute an additional reason for continuing to plan on the basis of a December date, since it would probably be impossible to advance the time if a later date were now decided upon.

The public announcement of the test and the statement of U.S. policy concerning this new development will be of great importance. If the test is held in December, it would be desirable for the newly-elected President to associate himself with the announcement and statement.

Conclusions

We should plan to proceed with the test in December, unless it is determined that, without retarding the thermonuclear program, the test could be delayed until such time as the U.S. is believed to be able to produce thermonuclear weapons.

If consultations with the newly-elected President or the two candidates reveal a strong objection to a test in December, it should be delayed until after January 20, 1953.

We should seek to associate the newly-elected President with the announcement and statement to be made in connection with a test in December.

1. A handwritten notation on the margin indicates that the Secretary had returned the source text.
2. Regarding U.S. nuclear and thermonuclear testing between 1952 and 1954, see the editorial note, p. 881.
3. For text of NSC 68, “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security”, Apr. 14, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. i, pp. 234–292.