Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 120 Series

Report to the President by the National Security Council¹

secret
NSC 120/2

Washington, January 16, 1952.

Note by the Executive Secretary on Communication of Data to Canadians Concerning New Ore Refinery

References:

A.

NSC 120² and NSC 120/1³

B.

Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 16, 1952³

C.

Public Law 235, 82nd Congress

At the 111th meeting⁴ with the President presiding, the National Security Council, the Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce, the Director of Defense Mobilization and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, considered and adopted the reference draft report on the subject (NSC 120/1), subject to the addition of a sentence at the end of paragraph 3 to take account of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff circulated by the reference memorandum and appended hereto. The report, as amended and adopted, is enclosed.

Accordingly, the National Security Council, the Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce, the Director of Defense Mobilization and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, submit the enclosed report to the President for his consideration in response to NSC 120 as a written recommendation pursuant to subsection 10 (a) (3) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as amended by Public Law 235, 82nd Congress.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure]

Report by the National Security Council on Communication of Data to Canadians Concerning New Ore Refinery

1. At the direction of the President, the National Security Council, with the participation of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of Defense Mobilization, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, has considered the letter to the President from the Atomic Energy Commission, dated December 19, 1951,⁵ and the report attached thereto⁶ in which the Commission requested that the President act favorably in accordance with the provisions of Sections 10 (a) (3) and 5 (a) (3) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as amended by Public Law 235, 82nd Congress, so as to permit a proposed arrangement whereby:

a. The Atomic Energy Commission may communicate to the Canadian Government such restricted information as may be necessary to enable the Canadians to design, construct and operate a uranium ore refinery incorporating the most recent U.S. technology, and which would be capable of processing all Canadian ore concentrates to a product meeting specifications as a feed to the U.S. metal production chain.

b. The Atomic Energy Commission may authorize a U.S. company to assist the Canadians in this program.

2. In this connection the National Security Council notes that:

a. The Atomic Energy Commission has unanimously adjudged that the common defense and security would be substantially promoted and would not be endangered if the Commission enters into and carries out the specific arrangements referred to in their letter of December 19, 1951 and more specifically described in the report attached thereto.

b. The proposed arrangement does not involve the communication of restricted data on design and fabrication of atomic weapons.

c. The proposed arrangement does not involve a nation threatening the security of the United States.

d. The restricted data involved will be limited and circumscribed to the maximum degree consistent with the common defense and security objective in view, and in the judgment of the Atomic Energy Commission and under the conditions specified in the report attached to the Commission’s letter of December 19, 1951, the recipient nation’s security standards applicable to the data involved are adequate.

e. This exchange of restricted information will be limited, under the proposed arrangement, to processes involving current and presently contemplated United States refineries and will not involve processes of entirely different natures which may be developed in the future. Within the above limitation, this proposed arrangement envisions a continuing exchange of restricted information between the Canadians and the Atomic Energy Commission in those phases of development, design and operation which will allow the Canadians to operate at the highest possible efficiency the uranium refinery or refineries which will be constructed by the Canadians.

3. The National Security Council also notes the degree of security sensitivity of the restricted data involved and the adequacy and sufficiency of the security safeguards undertaken to be maintained by the Canadians, as described in the Atomic Energy Commission’s letter of December 19, 1951 and the report attached thereto. In addition, it is noted that the detailed agreement will contain an understanding that the Canadian Government will not reveal any of the data to any other nation.

4. Under these conditions the National Security Council concludes that the proposed arrangement will be advantageous to the security of the United States from the viewpoint of domestic, foreign and military policies.

Recommendation

5. The National Security Council, with the participation of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of Defense Mobilization, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, therefore recommends that the President determine that:

a. The proposed arrangement, under the conditions specified above and by the Atomic Energy Commission in its letter of December 19, 1951 and the report attached thereto, would substantially promote and would not endanger the common defense and security of the United States, giving specific consideration to the security sensitivity of the restricted data involved and the adequacy and sufficiency of the security safeguards undertaken to be maintained by the recipient nation.

b. The common defense and security will not be adversely affected by the Atomic Energy Commission’s authorizing a United States contractor or contractors to assist the Canadians in carrying out the proposed arrangement, under the conditions specified by the Commission in its letter of December 19, 1951 and the report attached thereto.

Appendix

Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

secret

Washington, 16 January 1952.

• Subject:
• Communication of Data to Canadians Concerning New Ore Refinery

Reference: NSC 120/1

In considering both a memorandum from the Chairman, Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission with respect to NSC 120, and NSC 120/1, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed the following views which are forwarded for the information of the National Security Council. “The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the memoranda referenced above^* and NSC 120/1 and have determined that the proposed arrangement would not endanger, but would substantially promote the common defense and security of the United States. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the detailed agreement should contain an understanding that the Canadian Government will not reveal any of the data to any other nation”.

For the Secretary of Defense:

K. R. Kreps

Colonel, USAF, Deputy Director
Executive Office of the Secretary

1. By memorandum of Jan. 17, Executive Secretary Lay informed the National Security Council that President Truman had on that day made the determination recommended in paragraph 5 of this report and had so advised the Atomic Energy Commission. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 120 Series)
2. For NSC 120, Dec. 21, 1951, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. i, p. 794.
3. Not printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 120 Series)
3. Not printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 120 Series)
4. Jan. 11.
5. The reference letter was circulated in NSC 120, Dec. 21, 1951; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. i, p. 795.
6. Not printed.
7. The memorandum initiated by Chairman, Military Liaison Committee to Atomic Energy Commission with respect to NSC 120, and a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense requesting the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to NSC 120/1. [Footnote in the source text. Neither memorandum is printed.]