The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Department of Defense interest in
the use of atomic weapons,2 referred to
me as a member of the Special Committee on Atomic Energy, have been reviewed
carefully by my colleagues on the Atomic Energy Commission and myself. Our
views on this statement are attached hereto.
There are a number of important matters raised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
that deserve special comment by the Commission. It is, therefore,
recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff statement be reviewed in the
light of these remarks and the statements of the Atomic Energy Commission
responsibilities set forth in the attached statement.
The Commission notes with particular concern the Joint Chiefs statement that
“The present system of divided responsibility for the storage, surveillance,
maintenance and security of the stockpile of atomic weapons is inimical to
the best interests of the United States.” This is considered to be an
assertion unsupported by evidence. It is the view of the Commission that the
“best interests of the United States”, in so far as atomic weapons are
concerned, is measured directly in terms of readiness to deliver effectively
atomic attack when ordered. The actions taken by the Commission to effect
the maximum degree of readiness are set forth in detail in the attached
statement.
In consonance with the Commission policy to provide those weapons required by
the JCS to meet their standards of
operational readiness, the AEC is prepared
at any time to work out a plan with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject to
Presidential approval, to provide the reservoir of additional weapons in
DoD custody that may be required.
[Enclosure]
The Views of the Atomic Energy Commission on the
JCS Statement of Department of
Defense Responsibilities in the Use of Atomic Weapons
1. The Atomic Energy Commission has considered carefully the statement of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff views on the responsibilities of the
Department of Defense in the use of atomic weapons and record herewith
their views on this statement. Although most of the areas defined as
responsibilities of the DoD do not
conflict with the responsibilities of the AEC, there are some specific points that do and others that
require clarification, and the important issue of transfer of custody of
atomic weapons is raised.
2. Referring to the statement of views of the JCS, the last sentence, paragraph 3, and the last sentence,
paragraph 5c(2), quoted below, probably should be clarified in order
that these statements may not be misinterpreted as being in conflict
with responsibilities of the NSC in
advising the President regarding the use of atomic weapons contemplated
in the NSC study dated 27 April
19512 now pending:
“The Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot, therefore, agree to any other
agency interposing itself between them and the President in
submission to him of recommendations for a military course of
action; nor could they agree to any such other agency having a
voice in determining how, when, and where such military
operations are to be conducted.”
“Therefore, the decision as to where, how, and what numbers, and
in what types atomic weapons will be employed must be made by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the President as the Commander
in Chief of the Armed Forces; ….”
Presumably the JCS have
taken into consideration the NSC paper
referred to, and the intent of their statements concerns initial
recommendations to the President regarding the use of atomic weapons.
The words, “how, when, and where” are widely inclusive, however, and by
inference are in conflict with the NSC
statement referred to above which states:
“In the event of a positive decision, the President will
authorize the Secretary of Defense to use atomic weapons under such conditions as may be
specified.”
The “conditions” referred to here presumably would have
been determined by the President upon advice of the NSC and conceivably might place
restrictions on “when and where” atomic weapons would be used.
[Page 949]
3. The JCS have stated the DoD responsibility for determining weapons
requirements in paragraph 5a(1). The Commission of course agrees that it
is the responsibility of the DoD to
estimate the number of weapons needed to implement war plans, and is
glad to note the further statement that such requirements should be
reviewed in the terms of their impact on the national economy.
Presumably the first point in such a review would be the present and
potential production capacity of AEC
plants. This would continue the present common sense practice whereby
formal and informal discussions of needs and capabilities occur between
the DoD and the AEC before annual requirements are frozen. It is the
Commission’s opinion that it is appropriate for the JCS to determine these requirements in
terms of numbers of weapons and desired yields, but that the
determination of the production rates and production goals for
fissionable material to meet these requirements is a responsibility of
the AEC. In this connection therefore,
the Commission wishes to differ on one point in paragraph 5a(1). The
relevant portion reads:
“The basic development of requirements for complete weapons which
in turn establishes the production program, including the
production goals and production rates of fissionable material,
has its genesis in war plans and is, therefore, a responsibility
of the Department of Defense.”
and is repeated in paragraph 5a(3):
“The present arrangement is to state these requirements in terms
of weapons three years in advance, and thereafter as production
objectives in terms of annual rates of production of fissionable
material.”
Fundamentally, the principal technical feature
influencing the yield of atomic weapons is core design in terms of
fissionable material content. Production rates of fissionable material
to meet requirements for weapons in terms of numbers and yields is
established properly, therefore, by these technical considerations. As
the responsible agency for nuclear design, the AEC is the appropriate agency, subject to approval of the
President, to establish production rates of fissionable material to meet
atomic weapon requirements. Further, the JCS statement implies that the entire AEC production effort is directed solely
toward weapon requirements. Whereas this certainly is now very nearly
so, it may not always be the case and other factors than weapon
requirements will determine total material production rates.
4. The most important AEC responsibility
in the weapons development field is to assure that progress in the
development and utilization of nuclear energy is advanced to the maximum
extent and
[Page 950]
kept ahead of
similar effort in other nations, and to do this by directing its effort
toward new and radical development and the application of these to
specific military uses. The Atomic Energy Act directs, and the country
expects, the Commission to assume this responsibility—one that is far
broader than the fulfillment of a status only as producer for the
military, and one that requires Commission participation in matters
stated by the JCS to be strictly
military.
5. The AEC cannot accept as unilateral
the responsibility of the DoD for the
establishment of technical characteristics and requirements for atomic
weapons. Rather, it is appropriate for the AEC to maintain a status of advisor to the DoD in these matters. To arrive at military
requirements, all factors that bear on methods of conducting warfare
must be considered. Most of these factors, either in a particular system
or in over-all requirements, stem from military operational concepts and
considerations, and it is from these, therefore, that military
characteristics and requirements must largely be determined. In atomic
weapons, one predominant factor among these is the body of
characteristics fixed by their basic nuclear design. Maximum
exploitation of the potential capabilities of nuclear type weapons will
require that the advice of the AEC in
their development and utilization continue to be made available to the
Military. Hence, it would appear that in the field of engineering of
basic nuclear development into weapons and in the establishment of
weapons characteristics and requirements, the AEC should assume a role of technical advisor for the
DoD.
6. The current arrangement between the AEC and the DoD for the
operation of the weapon storage sites, under which important
responsibilities have been delegated to the DoD, is explicit evidence of AEC agreement with the principles set forth in paragraph
5d(1) regarding physical security of weapons. It appears worthwhile to
point out, however, that the last sentence of this paragraph, quoted as
follows, is subject to misinterpretation.
“In any event, the stockpile has grown to such proportions that
problems of surveillance, maintenance and security are beyond
the present capability of the AEC.”
The AEC has pursued
vigorously all means of fostering the technical capability of the
military establishment in handling atomic weapons. To this end more and
more responsibility for maintenance, surveillance and security has been
delegated to the DoD. Had another course
been taken, the AEC would have provided
within its own organization the means for performing these necessary
functions.
[Page 951]
7. We assume that paragraph 5d(2) of the JCS paper which discusses exchange of scientific and
technical information with other nations is not intended to affect
exchanges of restricted data under the Technical Cooperation Program
established by the Modus Vivendi,3 exchanges in the raw materials procurement
program, and exchanges of commonly held data under the tripartite
declassification program involving Great Britain, Canada and the United
States.
8. We interpret paragraph 5d(2) as dealing only with exchanges under the
recent amendment to Section 10 of the Atomic Energy Act (P.L. 235–82nd
Congress).4 That
amendment authorizes the Commission, subject to the approval of the
President, to communicate certain scientific and technical information
to another nation “when in its unanimous judgment the common defense and
security would be substantially promoted and would not be endangered.”
Restricted data on the design and fabrication of atomic weapons is
excluded. The amendment requires that the written recommendations of the
National Security Council must be submitted to the President before he
makes his determination.
9. In view of this latter requirement, we think that the JCS view that the imparting of each item of
information be contingent upon the unanimous approval of the American
members of the Combined Policy Committee should not be accepted.
Similarly since the members of that Committee will have a voice in any
recommendation made by the NSC to the
President, there is no necessity for a requirement that exchanges
“should be accomplished through the Combined Policy Committee (CPC).” Such a requirement is
administratively undesirable. Once the President has approved an
exchange of scientific and technical information under the amendment,
the responsibility for accomplishing the exchange is and should continue
to be an administrative function of the Commission. The JCS state that such “information should be
limited to carefully circumscribed, scientific and technical data, the
area of which has been the subject of precise definition.” With this,
the Commission is in disagreement for two reasons. First, it establishes
different criteria than that specified in the statute. Second, it may
well be the advantage of the United States to engage in considerably
broader exchanges of information than indicated by the JCS. Should this occur, the Commission will
be duty bound to insist that appropriate methods be established to
accomplish such interchanges.
[Page 952]
10. In connection with the statements in the JCS paper regarding the communication of atomic weapons
information to another nation, the above-mentioned amendment to Section
10 of the Act again should be noted. That amendment excludes exchange of
information on design and fabrication of atomic weapons. Additional
legislation may be required to permit the JCS to communicate such information essential for the
conduct of combined operations and for the actual exchange of
fissionable or weapons material to the extent necessary to further such
combined operations. It is understood that such legislation is
contemplated by the DoD. In any event,
the Commission should be kept informed of such exchanges of information
to the extent necessary to permit it to discharge intelligently its
responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act to consider questions of
declassification of restricted data. The Commission will also need to be
informed of such exchanges of information in order to function
intelligently in its sphere of cooperation with other nations.
11. The Commission notes with concern and as an assertion unsupported by
evidence the JCS statement that “the
present system of divided responsibility for the storage, surveillance,
maintenance and security of the stockpile is inimical to the best
interests of the United States.” It is the view of the Commission that
the “best interests of the United States,” in so far as atomic weapons
are concerned, is measured directly in terms of readiness to deliver
effectively atomic attack when ordered. The Commission has acted
positively and without reservation within the framework of the Act and
the expressed policies of the President to provide the maximum degree of
readiness for the execution of its responsibilities both in normal and
emergency conditions.
12. The emergency plan for transfer of atomic weapons has been kept under
constant review in order that weapons may be transferred with rapidity
and without confusion. Tests of this plan have been carried out to the
satisfaction of both the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project and the
Commission, from which it may be concluded that no delay in weapon
readiness will result in its execution. In carrying out its field
service or stockpile responsibility the AEC has employed the DoD to
do most of the actual work involved in order that the technical
capability of the military personnel may be developed to the maximum.
Weapons for training assembly teams and delivery crews have been
furnished as requested by the DoD, and
recently the entire stockpile of weapons has been made available for
this purpose under a plan as proposed by the military. Every request of
the DoD for war reserve weapons for
strategic deployment has been met. In this connection the Commission
recently has stated its desire to provide weapons to the DoD
[Page 953]
for deployment anywhere on the
globe to meet operational readiness commitments. The Commission
therefore, has taken all steps within its power to provide a degree of
readiness consistent with the best interests of the United States.
13. The question of the custodial responsibility for the war reserve
stockpile of atomic weapons has been raised several times in the past.
Decisions in the matter have been influenced by the technical capability
of the military establishment to assume this responsibility and by the
considerations of policy involving international and domestic affairs.
It is the view of the Commission that the DoD is now capable of assuming completely the
responsibility for maintenance, surveillance and security of war reserve
weapons, including both nuclear and non-nuclear components. The
Commission recognizes that the policy questions involving the
relationship of the responsible custodian to domestic and international
affairs still exist.
14. The JCS have expressed a need for “a
reservoir of finished weapons in complete custody of the military” in
order to increase operational flexibility and military readiness. As
pointed out above the Commission recently has stated to the Secretary of
Defense its desire to provide weapons to the DoD for this purpose. It is not now known to the AEC however how many weapons in the custody
of the DoD will satisfy these
requirements. The Commission is prepared to discuss this matter fully at
any time desired by the JCS. Inherent in
any decision in this regard is the requirement that the AEC retain custodial control of a portion
of the stockpile. This will form a reserve pool of weapons and provide a
standby stock of weapons available for carrying out major modification
and modernization programs and other desirable activities in connection
with the stockpile as a whole.
15. Custodial responsibility for stockpiled weapons involves maintenance
of the weapons, performance of routine functional surveillance,
introduction of minor modifications and the preservation of the physical
security of the weapons and the storage sites. These responsibilities
must be assumed by the DoD upon any
transfer of custodial responsibility. In addition, arrangements must be
agreed upon to permit the AEC to have
access to the entire stockpile of weapons in certain cases, and to
assure that the AEC is provided with
information obtained in surveillance operations which is required to
carry on the AEC quality control
program. In this way the AEC could
continue to have available a basis for directing needed improvements in
current and future manufacture and required modification and major
stockpile retrofit, thus insuring the continued availability of weapons
of the most advanced design.
