The attached memorandum suggests that the Soviet Union will seek to prevent
or delay the establishment of an effective international atomic energy
agency. I recommend that the U.S. pursue the following main courses of
action in order to achieve maximum progress despite Soviet delays:
I am anxious to have your comments on these suggested courses of action.
S/AE would presumably make appropriate
arrangements with the AEC on the respective
roles of State Department and AEC in
performing the specific tasks envisioned in this program.
I am stating my personnel requirements on the basis of the assumptions
contained in this memorandum.
[Annex]
Memorandum
- Subject:
- Peaceful Uses of the Atom
A. Soviet Tactics during General
Assembly discussions.
- 1.
- Ambassador Lodge,
after his first meeting with Mr. Vishinsky,
stated his firm conviction that the Soviet Union would vote for
practically any resolution which we put forward. He therefore saw no
need for any bargaining—except possibly to satisfy the co-sponsors
of our resolution—because we held all the trump cards. The entire
negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well
as the vote in the First Committee, proved the complete accuracy of
Ambassador Lodge’s
diagnosis.2
- 2.
- The Soviet viewpoint as contained in the statements of Mr.
Vishinsky, and Mr.
Sobolev after
Vishinsky’s death,3 give a strong indication as to
probable Soviet tactics in connection with future negotiations after
General Assembly action has been completed. The balance of this
memorandum deals with these probable tactics and an explanation of
possible motives for such tactics.
B. Probable Soviet tactics in
connection with negotiations for an International Agency.
- 1.
- The Soviet representatives in their statements in the First
Committee in connection with the item on peaceful uses of the atom,
stressed three objections to present plans of the United States. It
is suggested that all three objections foreshadow a general Soviet
tactic of seeking to delay the establishment of the agency.
Ambassador Lodge, in his
opening statement,4
described in one simple sentence the underlying objective of the
United States: “The
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thought that has governed all our suggestions is that what we
propose to do is feasible—is do-able.” The Soviet Union apparently wants
to make certain that this objective will not be realized.
- 2.
- The first fundamental Soviet objection to the suggestions of the
United States was that incorporated in the first Soviet amendment to
the Joint Resolution—an amendment that received affirmative votes
only from the Soviet bloc. It provided that the international
agency, when created, should be responsible to the General Assembly
and “in cases provided for by the Charter of the United Nations” to
the Security Council. While this amendment would not necessarily
have required the negotiating states to secure the consent of either
the General Assembly or of the Security Council to the Charter of
the agency prior to its taking effect, nevertheless Mr.
Vishinsky made it plain that he interpreted
this paragraph to have such an effect. He cited the General Assembly
resolution of January 24, 1946, creating the United Nations Atomic
Energy Commission, as a UN decision that should govern the
relationship of the new Agency to the United Nations. In practice,
this would mean that the negotiating parties would make a report to
the Security Council and the General Assembly, and the report would
be considered by those agencies. The Soviet Union could veto the
approval of the report by the Security Council. Even if the approval
of the Security Council were unnecessary—and the specific wording of
the Soviet amendment might be so construed—General Assembly approval
of an agency which, in effect, was controlled by the Great Powers
might not be possible, and in any event would result in great
delays. It is even possible that the Soviet representatives foresaw
a situation where to avoid delay we would accede to Soviet wishes
and thus secure immediate approval by the Security Council. We need
not consider whether the Soviet thinking actually went into as great
detail as indicated here. (From observation of Soviet staff
operations on this subject, we believe that Soviet planning was more
precise and more subtle than indicated above.) In any event,
however, it is clear that the chief effect of this tactic would be
delay.
- 3.
- The second Soviet tactic was to object to the small number of
states participating in the negotiations by describing them as a
small and exclusive club and advocating participation by all states
in the negotiations. The Soviet Union never incorporated this
objection into a specific amendment, for the probable reason that
the first choice of the Soviet Union would not be to expand the
number of negotiators but to reduce them from nine to two—the Soviet
Union and the United States. Failing in that objective, the Soviet
Union doubtless found propaganda advantages in urging the expansion
of the number of negotiators. While the primary motive of the
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Soviet Union in taking
this tactic was doubtless purely one of propaganda, nevertheless the
effect of the Soviet suggestions once more would be to delay the
negotiations.
- 4.
- The third Soviet tactic, which probably received the greatest
stress, was to seek to create an impression that the United States
was narrowing down and limiting the scope of the President’s
proposals. In Mr. Vishinsky’s initial statement
he asked the question: “Can you tell us why it is that the present
United States proposal for the organization of international
cooperation in developing peaceful uses of atomic energy narrows down the volume, scope, and form, of
such cooperation as compared to previous proposals, and especially
in relation to the technical and economic assistance to be offered
underdeveloped countries?” A careful reading of Mr.
Vishinsky’s second intervention shows
clearly that the Soviet Union recognizes as well as the United
States, that we are a long distance from abundant electric power
utilizing atomic fuel. Why then would the Soviets seek to focus the
entire debate on the phase of peaceful uses of atomic energy that
was most remote in point of time? One, although not the only reason,
for this Soviet position again seems to be delay—the desire to avoid
at all costs a situation where the agency will actually have
achievements to its credit in 1955. This could be assured if the
agency concentrated on projects which at present are not
scientifically or economically feasible.
C. Soviet motivation.
- 1.
- As set forth above, the primary Soviet tactics seem fairly
clear:—support the General Assembly action, thus giving an
appearance of Soviet participation in international cooperation;—see
to it that the international cooperative effort has no tangible
results in the immediate future. The motivation for the tactic of
jumping on the bandwagon is clear enough. It is part of the “new”
Soviet line of co-existence. The other part of the Soviet plan
requires considerably more analysis.
- 2.
- The most obvious motivation for Soviet efforts to delay and
sabotage the implementation of the President’s proposals relate to
world propaganda. Any success in international cooperation in this
field would inevitably be linked to the initiative of the United
States and would redound to the credit of the United States. In and
of itself this would be sufficient to explain the dual Soviet
technique of jumping on the bandwagon and then preventing the
bandwagon from going forward.
- 3.
- A second motivation closely allied to the first may stem from the
Soviet reaction to the decision, several times reiterated by the
President, to “proceed with like-minded states in establishing an
international agency” regardless of the Soviet attitude. The Soviet
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tactics, if
successful, might entangle the negotiations to such an extent that
the United States would not be in a position to proceed
expeditiously with like-minded states.
- 4.
- A third and more subtle motivation, however, may exist in the
relationship between peaceful uses of the atom and the question of
disarmament. Mr. Vishinsky and Mr.
Sobolev both go to great lengths in
claiming that there was no feasible method to prevent power reactors
from producing “weapon-grade” materials. This was a part of the
larger point which they constantly stressed, that it was not
possible to divorce peaceful development of the atom from the
general subject of disarmament.
A careful study of the Soviet statements in the disarmament item in the
UN indicates the distinct possibility that the Soviet Union may be
moving toward a proposal for the complete cessation of the production of
any fissionable materials for any purpose. If this is the Soviet
disarmament line, its corollary would be that as few countries as
possible should possess fissionable materials.
While this possible motivation cannot be excluded, its relation to the
immediate Soviet tactics seems a trifle remote. It is suggested that the
primary Soviet purpose is to create the appearance of a desire to
cooperate but in fact prevent any tangible accomplishments which would
redound to the credit of the United States.
D. Suggested U.S. counter
tactics.
1. From the above analysis of the Soviet tactics and motivations it seems
essential that the United States move forward as rapidly as possible to
secure tangible achievements during 1955 in the direction of carrying
out the President’s proposals.
2. The first move, of course, would be to secure agreement on a Charter
or statute of the international organization. It will be necessary to
include the Soviet Union among the states negotiating this Charter. This
makes practically certain endless exchanges of notes with little or no
progress.
3. We must, therefore, look toward other means of progress. The progress
which we anticipate in 1955 was set forth in considerable detail in the
statements of Ambassador Lodge. It included (a) providing technical training for
nationals of other countries; (b) distribution of technical libraries
and information; and (c) making research reactors and certain classified
material available to other countries.
If the international agency were in existence it would have some role in
connection with all these programs. Since it probably will not be in
existence, the United States must carry out these programs under
agreements with beneficiary states. From the standpoint of public
relations it is essential that the announcement of
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these achievements must be correlated
with the announcements of Soviet intransigence in negotiations to
establish the agency. World public opinion must realize that the
international agency would have played a considerable role in connection
with each of these tangible achievements if the Soviet Union had not
obstructed the establishment of the international agency.
We must be in a position to report to the Tenth General Assembly (a)
tangible achievements either by the international agency, the United
States, or both, along the lines set forth above; (b) the establishment
of an efficiently functioning agency which is assuming responsibility
for parts of the functions set forth above or, in the alternative,
impressive efforts on our part to establish the agency—efforts which
were frustrated by the Soviet Union.
4. The achievement of a program of this nature in 1955 will require a
tremendous effort on the part of the United States. This will include
(a) multilateral negotiations, including the Soviet Union, to establish
an international agency; (b) bilateral negotiations with a number of
countries in order that research reactors may be placed in these
countries. This type of bilateral negotiation must be sharply
differentiated from negotiations with countries which are large
suppliers of uranium and other materials associated with atomic fission;
(c) “consultations” with any state that has ideas in connection with the
formation of the agency.
The Secretary of State, in his opening address to the General Assembly on
September 23, 1954, said: “I would like to make perfectly clear that our
planning excludes no nation from participation in this great venture. As
our proposals take shape, all nations interested in participation and
willing to take on the responsibilities will be welcome to join with us
in the planning and execution of this program.” Ambassador Lodge, on November 15,5 under departmental instructions, reaffirmed
this position and stated: “The governments engaged in the current
negotiations intend to consult those governments which indicate an
interest in participating in the agency before the agreement
establishing the agency is submitted for ratification. Views expressed
by the governments so consulted will, of course, be seriously taken into
account.” While the volume of “consultations” in Washington can be
reduced through appropriate instructions to our Missions abroad,
nevertheless whenever technical problems are raised it will be necessary
for our missions to communicate with the Department of State and for the
Department of State to be in touch with the Atomic Energy Commission. We
may thus envisage a large number of “consultations”. The United States’
objective in these consultations will be to assure
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interested states that their
ideas—regardless of their merit—are receiving our attention.
(d) The arrangements for the International Conference must be worked out
in such a manner as to conform to this program.
