600.0012/11–1654: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State
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Delga 238. Verbatim text. Re meeting with Vyshinsky on peaceful uses atomic energy.
1. At meeting yesterday afternoon co-sponsors draft res reached agreement on treatment Soviet amendments (see Delga 236)1 and authorized me present group’s views to Vyshinsky. I saw Vyshinsky at 8 p.m. accompanied by McSweeney and De Palma. We were joined in his office by Zarubin, Sobolev and interpreter.
[Page 1561]2. Re Soviet amendments (see Delga 230)2 I explained co-sponsors had unanimously decided first Soviet amendment unacceptable because such words as “by all means” and “only” were obviously intended to encompass questions which should be dealt with in disarmament framework and not confused with peaceful uses. I then reported that cosponsors had proposed as substitute for this amendment the following, to be inserted as second para in preamble: “Desiring to promote the use of atomic energy to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind and to ameliorate their living conditions”.
3. Concerning second Soviet amendment I reported co-sponsors found it unacceptable because they understood “the corresponding states” to mean only US–USSR, leaving out 8–power negotiations. I said that if USSR really meant to refer to both sets of negotiations, this already covered by last preambular para our res which begins “Noting that negotiations are in progress, etc.”
4. On third substantive Soviet amendment, making agency responsible to GA and SC, I said co-sponsors agreed with USSR that we should not employ language tending prejudge relationship agency to UN, but they felt that Soviet amendment prejudged relationship by specifying agency should be responsible to GA and SC. It was therefore unacceptable. I added that in effort meet Soviet point, co-sponsors were willing delete from para A–1 of our res words “similar to those of the specialized agencies”.
5. Re last Soviet amendment, which would invite all other states desiring to participate, I reported co-sponsors found it unacceptable because raised question of invitations to several “ineligible” states and also question as to meaning of “states”.
6. I also told Vyshinsky that co-sponsors had decided to add as last preambular paragraph of our res “recognizing the desirability that the agency, under the aegis of the UN, make the fullest possible contribution towards the principles and purposes of the UN”.
7. In course of 50 minute discussion Vyshinsky asked why we could not agree to words “by all means” in his first amendment, explaining that all he was trying to say by this language was that we should promote energetically the peaceful uses of atomic energy and not that this should be done by all methods. He said he was not trying to put anything over on us and was not referring to a prior ban on atomic weapons.
[Page 1562]I pointed out that our substitute paragraph had same effect. Vyshinsky implied that his point might be met by inserting some word like “energetically” in our substitute paragraph.
8. Speaking of his second amendment, Vyshinsky said he was willing delete word “corresponding” and merely refer to fact that “… the states should continue their negotiations …”. I said it was still ambiguous because not clear whether reference was to US–USSR negotiations or those of 8-powers. Vyshinsky said he was referring to both sets of negotiations.
I then suggested his point could be met by modifying last preambular paragraph our original resolution to read “noting that negotiations are in progress and should continue for the establishment, etc.” Vyshinsky said he could accept this if we further modified paragraph to read “and should continue with the aim of reaching an agreement for the establishment, etc.” I pointed out his extra words were unnecessary since to continue the negotiations for the establishment of the agency obviously implied that agreement had to be reached. He said he would think this over.
9. Most interesting point emerged from Vyshinsky’s explanation his next amendment, making agency responsible to GA and SC. Both Vyshinsky and Sobolev insisted they not trying prejudge agency’s relationship to UN, but merely seeking assure that agency would operate in framework SC in respect to matters which under charter are responsibility of SC. He said he was willing modify this amendment to read about as follows “Recommends that the agency should be established as an agency responsible to the GA and, when cases arise concerning the security of any state, to the SC.” He said this language was taken from the Soviet note of September 22, 1954.
When I pointed out that this still specified that agency would be responsible to SC and GA and was therefore unacceptable, he admitted this was his intent and stressed that USSR concerned over danger arising from possible “leakages” or illegal diversion of fissionable materials produced in connection with peaceful applications.
I replied that his remarks had given me a much clearer understanding of his intentions. I pointed out, however, that I had said in my statement that there would undoubtedly be some relationship with the SC since SC would have to consider any abuses of peaceful applications atomic energy affecting security any state. I said I thought we had met his point by deletion reference specialized agencies our first operative paragraph, but he said this only met him about “one-fourth of the way.”
10. We then got into a discussion of the veto with Vyshinsky asserting US clearly intended use it to protect its vital interests, [Page 1563] which is only reason USSR had used it. I asked him what vital Soviet interest had been protected by veto in Guatemala case. He merely laughed.
11. In explanation his last amendment Vyshinsky did not seem particularly concerned with Communist China, but with number of states ruled out by our formula. Vyshinsky asked how we justified exclusion certain states when in preamble our resolution we said “… that all nations should cooperate in promoting the dissemination of knowledge, etc.”
I repeated we regarded such “states” as Communist China, East Germany and Outer Mongolia as ineligible. Then I asked if by his amendment he meant to invite certain individuals in their personal capacity. He replied that possibility might be considered, but did not clarify point.
12. Soviet group was affable and relaxed throughout and kept up running commentary in Russian, trying find alternative or more acceptable language. From their preliminary reactions I was impressed by apparent strong Soviet desire climb aboard this bandwagon.
At end of meeting Vyshinsky said he was acting under instructions his government to speak honestly and frankly to US representatives even if not always possible reach agreement. I said I always had believed in speaking frankly. Friendly atmosphere prevailed to end when Vyshinsky personally ran elevator down to lobby and saw me to door.
- Delga 236 from New York, Nov. 15, transmitting an account of the meeting that day of representatives of the cosponsors, is not printed. (310.5/11–1554)↩
- Delga 230 from New York, Nov. 12, containing the text of Soviet suggested amendments to the seven-power draft resolution, is not printed. (600.0012/11–1254) The Soviet amendments were subsequently circulated as UN doc. A/C.1/L.106 and Rev. 1.↩