Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, “IAEA Policies”
Draft Memorandum by the Consultant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs (Smith)1
The question has arisen as to whether the pooling concept of the document handed on March 19 to the Russians should be a sine qua non of Russian participation in any International Atomic Energy Agency.
[Page 1543]After the Lodge presentation next month in the UN it is possible that the Russians may take a position that an Agency without the pooling concept such as Lodge will outline is much more to their taste, that they would immediately like to join in the 8-power negotiations. The United Kingdom and Canada have indicated informally that in this event they would be opposed to a firm requirement that the negotiations go back to the March 19 pooling concept.
This position seems to conform to the position taken by the National Security Council on August 12.2 The policy then taken was to set up an Agency which would not have a pooling function but the charter of which could be so drawn as to permit Soviet participation under proper safeguards.
Therefore, if the Soviets seek to participate in the formation of an Agency which does not have a pooling function, it is recommended that the United States should then probe the Soviet intentions in the matter of contributions of information and amounts of material which they would earmark (rather than transfer to) the Agency. This probing operation could probably be conducted in parallel with negotiations with the other seven powers to actually set up the Agency. Then after the Agency had been established, if the Soviets had indicated a real interest in participating seriously they might be taken into the Agency.
However, the Soviets, after the Lodge presentation, may take the position that the proposed Agency is entirely different from that originally suggested by President Eisenhower and seek to make propaganda capital out of this allegation. In this event it is recommended that the United States take the position that in the absence of Soviet participation we were proceeding with a slightly different type of Agency. But at any time that the Soviets indicated a serious intent to participate and expressed their wish to enter into a pooling arrangement, the United States was agreeable to such a move.3
- Addressee(s) not indicated on the source text, but see footnote 3 below.↩
- See the memorandum of discussion at the 210th meeting of the National Security Council, Aug. 12, p. 1482.↩
On Oct. 28, Gerard Smith drafted a memorandum for the file which reads as follows:
↩“Admiral Strauss called to say that he agreed with the October 27 memorandum with the exception that he thought it was naive to expect that the Soviets would honor any commitment merely to earmark material for an agency. I pointed out that we would require assurances even to the extent of physical inspection, but this was not good enough for him. He did say, however, that this was a matter for us to decide and not for him.
“I then put to him Phil Farley’s suggestion that if the Soviets wanted to negotiate on the October 6 type of Agency, we should agree if it was understood that material earmarked for specific projects of the Agency would be ponied up by all countries having fissionable material and physically held by the Agency. Strauss said ‘that’s bully’ and seemed to see no objection in the proposal. I should discuss this matter in the morning with Bowie, Patterson, the United Kingdom, and Canada.” (Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, “IAEA Policies”)
The Oct. 6 document under reference is “Preliminary Outline of an International Atomic Energy Agency”, a paper used by the United States as a basis for discussion with friendly nations in Washington. A copy of this eight-page paper is in Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 88, “IAEA–1954”.