Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, “IAEA Policies”
Memorandum of Conversation, by Philip A. Farley of the Office of the Consultant to the
Secretary of State for Atomic Energy
Affairs
secret
Washington, October 4,
1954.
- Subject:
- International Atomic Energy Agency
[Page 1528]
- Participants:
- Mr. E.E. Tomkins, British
Embassy
- Mr. George P. de T.
Glazebrook, Canadian Embassy
- Mr. P.J. Farley, S/AE
Mr. Tomkins said that he had
called to present a note stating preliminary U.K. views as to participation of the USSR in negotiations
concerning the International Atomic Energy Agency (see attached copy of
note).
Mr. Farley asked whether the U.K. note reflected preference on the part of the U.K. for the original outline of the Agency as
transmitted to the USSR on March 19.1 Mr. Tomkins said that he understood the preference of the U.K. to be for the revised outline, setting
forth a more modest scope for the Agency’s work. Mr. Glazebrook said that the Canadian
preference was also for the outline presently under discussion rather than
the March 19 outline.
Mr. Farley said that the problem of replying to the
Soviet note of September 22,2 together with related question of USSR participation in
the negotiations relating to the Agency, was now under consideration in the
Department of State. He indicated his understanding, on the basis of the
U.K. note, that it was the U.K. view that further discussions and a better
understanding should be sought with the other five countries who have agreed
in principle to proceed with organization of an Agency prior to any move to
bring the USSR into the discussion. Mr. Tomkins said that this was indeed the U.K. intent.
Mr. Tomkins pointed out that the
U.K., as indicated in the note, agreed
that the preliminary outline of an International Atomic Energy Agency
prepared by the US was acceptable as a basis for discussions with the other
countries principally involved.
[Attachment]
The British Embassy to
the Department of State
secret
[Washington, undated.]
We should ourselves prefer the revised outline not to be communicated to
the Russians at this stage. If the Russians later participate, it may
then be thought better to revert to something on the lines of the March
outline, i.e. with definite provision for storage of nuclear material
when the Agency comes into existence, rather
[Page 1529]
than “at a later date”. Meanwhile we agree that
the eight should proceed on the basis of the revised outline.
In our view, therefore, the U.S. Note should aim at obtaining a positive
reply as to whether or not the Russians are prepared to collaborate in
the work of the Agency, whose objectives, functions and general
organization they already know, but should not commit us to the revised
outline.
When the revised outline is handed to the other five sponsoring powers
they could be told that discrepancies between this and the March outline
are due to Soviet withdrawal from the project. One of the main
objectives of the President’s proposal was to establish a pool of
nuclear material to which the U.S.A. and Russia as two of the main
producers would contribute. When one of the two main contributors
withdrew, the plan was modified since there appeared no longer to be
sufficient justification for the complicated storage and security
provisions which the pool would require. If the Russians later convinced
us of their willingness to join, we might wish to revert to something
nearer to the President’s original conception of the Agency. Meanwhile
work could continue on the modified plan, of which the Russians should
not be informed.
If the Russians should later learn of the revised outline and refer to it
in debate, the discrepancies between this and the outline handed to them
in March could be explained on the lines of para. 3 above.
