600.0012/9–2754

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick) to the Acting Secretary of State1

secret
  • Subject:
  • Soviet Motivations in Publishing Atomic Pool Correspondence
[Page 1525]

It appears most likely that the Soviets were motivated by the following considerations in taking the initiative in publishing the atomic pool correspondence:

1.
To show a willingness to negotiate: The USSR now claims there is no problem which cannot be solved by negotiation. To counter US charges that the USSR was entirely negative on the atomic pool proposals, the Soviets probably felt that, through publication of the lengthy correspondence (which most people would not read in detail) the impression could be given that the USSR had, in fact, been willing to negotiate the atomic pool question and continues to stand ready to negotiate.
2.
To gain public support for the Soviet proposal for “banning the bomb”: The Soviet documents (which give every indication of having been prepared originally with an eye to publication) are full of statements regarding the horrors of nuclear warfare, and they reiterate the Soviet proposal for banning the use of nuclear weapons. Through publication of the documents the Soviets could hope to gain public support for their stand, especially in neutralist and uncommitted areas. Publication would also lay the groundwork for further emphasis on the Soviet plan to “ban the bomb”.
3.
To bring talks on the atomic pool under the aegis of the UN: It is to Soviet advantage to bring the whole atomic pool question under the aegis of the UN, where opportunities for obstruction are greater. Publication of the documents in conjunction with UN debate on the subject would help to open the matter to UN involvement.
4.
To point up weapon development potential of pool: The Soviet memoranda claim that the use of atomic energy under the US plan would also result in production of materials useful for weapon development. While we contest this, there is some technical basis for the Soviet claim, and they may hope to capitalize on this point in future propaganda.

  1. Drafted by Walter J. Stoessel of EUR/EE.