Truman Library, PSF–Subject
file, “Atomic Energy—Expansion of the Fissionable”
Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National
Security Council (Lay) to the President
top secret
Washington, May 20, 1952.
Pursuant to your authorization, each member of the Special Committee of the
National Security Council on Atomic Energy has reviewed and restated his
position regarding the Special Committee’s recommendation for the planned
additional expansion of the atomic energy program, in the light of the
request by Senator Maybank, of the Senate
Appropriations Committee, as reported by Mr. Dean in his attached letter of May 8, 1952.1
The replies of each member of the Special Committee are enclosed herewith for
your consideration.
[Annex 1]
Memorandum by the Secretary of
State to the Executive Secretary of the National
Security Council (Lay)
top secret
Washington, May 14, 1952.
- Subject:
- Secretary of State Position on the Atomic Energy Commission’s
Expansion Program.
Reference: Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of
the National Security Council to the Secretary of State dated May 14,
1952, entitled “Expansion of the Atomic Energy Program”.2
- 1.
- In accordance with the request contained in the referenced
memorandum, I have reviewed the position of the Department of State
on the planned expansion program of the Atomic Energy Commission in
the light of current and possible future developments on the
international front.
- 2.
- The planned expansion program will not begin to give results in
the form of additions to the United States atomic weapons stockpile
until about 1956. Nevertheless, in the opinion of the Department,
the planned expansion program is essential to the national security
to cover the period roughly from 1956 on, when the atomic
capabilities of the USSR will presumably be substantial. A U.S.
capability to deal repeated atomic blows at the USSR production
potential together with a sufficient quantity of atomic weapons for
battlefield use may then be an essential factor serving not only as
a deterrent to possible Soviet aggression but also as additional
reasonable assurance of victory for the United States and the free
world should a war be thrust upon us. The planned expansion program
will help achieve this capability. It is the view of the Department
of State that the planned expansion program should go
forward.
[Annex 2]
Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the
Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)
secret
Washington, 16 May 1952.
- Subject:
- Expansion of the Atomic Energy Program
- 1.
- I refer to your memorandum of 14 May 1952, subject as above, which
forwarded a letter from the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission
dated 8 May 1952 and requested a review and restatement of position
regarding the atomic energy expansion program which was recommended
to the President on 16 January 1952 by the Special Committee of the
National Security Council on Atomic Energy.3
- 2.
- I have reviewed my position on this expansion program as stated in
my memorandum to you dated 11 December 1951 and reaffirm my strong
support for the program.4
- 3.
- The objective of the Department of Defense in recommending the
program for expansion of atomic energy production facilities, now
under consideration in the Congress, is to afford the United States
a greater advantage from this powerful weapon in any conflict with
the Soviet Union or any other active enemy of the United States. To
achieve this aim, we place no limit on the extent of the use of
atomic or any other weapons, nor do we believe that the use
[Page 935]
of large numbers of atomic
weapons against an enemy would have an adverse effect on neutrals or
potential allies.
- 4.
- Military requirements for atomic weapons are formulated by the
same process as are requirements for any other weapons. The
individual Services calculate their needs, based on missions
assigned them by approved war plans, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
adjust and balance these needs as best possible to assure maximum
effectiveness of the combined military resources.
- 5.
- Prior to formulation of the atomic weapons requirements, upon
which the currently recommended expansion has been based, the
Department of Defense has not stated a pure atomic military
requirement irrespective of raw material resources and production
capabilities. Previous military requirements have been stated only
within the availability of source materials as predicted by the
Atomic Energy Commission and balanced production facilities designed
to convert source materials into fissionable materials under an
economically operated program.
- 6.
- In the past, the predicted availability of uranium ore has been
the limiting factor in programs for the development of processing
capacity. This factor no longer obtains. It is now clear that, under
an aggressive ore procurement policy, we can base fissionable
material production capacity on the requirements for the end
product, rather than on the availability of raw materials.
- 7.
- The expansion program now recommended is the result of a carefully
calculated analysis of the role of atomic weapons in augmenting our
military capacity. It has been developed from this analysis that, in
addition to strengthening and extending the strategic role of atomic
weapons, atomic developments in both weapons and delivery systems
have demonstrated the feasibility of a highly effective tactical
application. This application would include delivery by both land-
and carrier-based fighter, fighter-bomber and light bomber aircraft,
as well as by guided missiles, guns and rockets. These tactical
applications, as progressively developed and supported by an
adequate stock of fissionable materials, will go far toward
providing the free world a means of balancing the superior manpower
and the advantage of surprise and initiative held by the Communist
forces. Military requirements for atomic weapons as determined today
are based on broad and flexible applications. They arise, primarily,
from the necessity of meeting Communist aggression by more extensive
use of our superior industrial and scientific resources rather than
by attempting to match our potential enemy man-for-man. To do so
requires a definite minimum number of atomic weapons. This minimum
requirement cannot be obtained too soon. We recognize that, with any
degree of expansion that might be conceived, results in terms of
additional weapons over
[Page 936]
those to be provided by the present program cannot be attained for
several years. This fact, however, does not in any way reduce or
otherwise affect the need.
- 8.
- Expansion of production facilities to meet this goal is not more
important than expanded efforts to assure greater deliverability of
atomic weapons. However, the expansion of production facilities of
the Atomic Energy Commission is not influenced by the imponderables
which are inherent in providing greater probability of delivery on
target. The expansion program provides only an increase in the
atomic ammunition. These imponderables include Soviet offensive
capability; Soviet capability to destroy our delivery capabilities;
weather conditions which will exist over targets; and the
reliability of intelligence as related to target information. As a
result of a study of these factors, the Department of Defense
considers the recommended expansion program to be the most feasible
way in which to provide our Armed Forces with the greatest possible
military power and within the minimum period of time.
- 9.
- Two important questions have arisen as to the extent and timing of
the recommended expansion and its effect upon over-all military
requirements for conventional munitions and forces. With respect to
timing, the proposed program, if approved and initiated at an early
date, will provide the Armed Forces with their absolute minimum
requirements of atomic weapons by numbers and types approximately
five years earlier than will the present program. The respective
dates are 1960 and 1965. As far as can be determined now, the
five-year difference may mean the difference between victory and
defeat.
- 10.
- We can complete the proposed plant expansion in about five years
at an average cost of less than a billion dollars a year. The
tremendous addition to the power of the United States resulting from
the product of these new plants will be out of all proportion to
their dollar cost. As a dividend payable in more peaceful times, the
energy content of the fissionable material from these plants should
be a substantial supplement to the natural fuel resources of this
country—resources which our other defense preparations are depleting
at an alarming rate. It is impossible to determine with precision
what level of expenditure will assure the nation’s security, but I
know of no better insurance against the risk that our other military
preparations prove insufficient than to build up our atomic plant
capacity to the level justified by the uranium prospects. In the
light of present day costs of preparing for, to say nothing of
fighting a war, the premium for such insurance appears to be quite
modest.
- 11.
- Concerning the effect of this recommended expansion upon current
budgets of the Department of Defense, it is to be borne in
[Page 937]
mind that a large part of
our current budget is for the expansion of our capability to deliver
atomic weapons and the integration of that capability into our
over-all fighting potential. The strength, compositions and
equipment programs of the Armed Forces, as provided for in current
budgets, are based on a progressive program of supplementing and, in
part, replacing conventional weapons systems by atomic weapons
systems. Clearly, to accept any reduction in our planned and
programmed fighting potential in anticipation of ultimate
replacement by an atomic weapon potential yet to be achieved would
be to gamble recklessly with the security of the nation.
[Annex 3]
Memorandum by the Chairman of the United States
Atomic Energy Commission (Dean) to the Executive Secretary of the National
Security Council (Lay)
Washington, May 16, 1952.
Re: Expansion of the atomic energy program
Reference is made to your letter of May 14, 1952, which in turn
referenced my letter to you of May 8, 1952 relative to the request of
the Independent Offices Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations
Committee to secure a review by the members of the National Security
Council of the expansion program.
As the Commission representative on the NSC Special Committee, I can state to you at this time that
the AEC position with reference to the
importance, the feasibility and the cost of this program is the same as
when the matter was presented to the National Security Council earlier
this year. Nothing has occurred which would change our recommendations.
As indicated in my letter of May 8, 1952, however, we believe that the
total estimated capital cost for the program will be less than our
original estimate.
[Page 938]
[Annex 4]
The Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization
(Steelman) to the Executive
Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)
Washington, May 16, 1952.
Dear Mr. Lay: At the time of the consideration by the
National Security Council of the planned additional expansion of the
atomic energy program, former Defense Mobilizer Charles E. Wilson personally
participated in an active role. He also directed studies of the
feasibility of the program in terms of its impact upon the economy and
upon our mobilization effort.
Since that time, it has become increasingly clear that this program can
be integrated into the future plans for expansion of various segments of
the mobilization effort. Its impact upon materials, power supply, and
manpower have been taken into consideration in the estimates of over-all
feasibility made by the several mobilization-planning agencies.
I am, therefore, able to re-affirm the original approval of the program
on feasibility grounds which was given by this office when it was
considered by the Security Council.
Sincerely yours,
