Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

600.0012/7–954

The Department of State to the Embassy of the Soviet Union¹

top secret

Memorandum

The United States has further considered the draft declaration of January 30 and Aide-Mémoire of April 27 delivered by the Soviet Union to the United States.² The United States wishes to make the following comments:

i.

1. The President’s speech of December 8, 1953 to the United Nations General Assembly pointed out the dangers of the atomic armaments race and stressed the desire of the United States to remove these dangers by any effective method which includes adequate safeguards against violations and evasions. The United States would welcome any system of disarmament which would serve to protect the peoples of the world from the threat of war and relieve them of the heavy burden of military defense in a manner consistent with their security.

2. The United States is also aware of the difficulties which have been experienced since 1946 in trying to negotiate a disarmament plan. From that date until the present, the United States has persistently sought, alone and in concert with other nations, to find ways of easing the burden of armaments and of lessening the threat of war. In the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission from 1946 through 1948, in the Commission for Conventional Armaments from 1947 through 1950, in the special meetings of the Six Permanent Members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1949 and 1950, and in the United Nations Disarmament Commission since 1951, the overwhelming majority of nations was able to reach agreement—the Soviet Union alone prevented progress.

3. Despite this discouraging record, the President, in his address on December 8, stated that the United States, heeding the resolution of November 28, 1953 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, was “prepared to meet privately with such other countries as may be ‘principally involved’ to seek ‘an acceptable solution’ to the atomic armaments race which overshadows not only the peace but the very life of the world.”

ii.

4. In his address, the President also stated that the United States would carry into these talks a new proposal for an international atomic energy agency to expedite the use of atomic energy to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. In its memorandum of March 19,³ the United States explained in more detail its views on the method for converting this conception into a practical reality. The Aide-Mémoire of April 27 of the Soviet Union appears to misconstrue completely the purpose of this specific proposal.

5. This proposal was intended to make a beginning toward bringing to the peoples of the world the peaceful benefits of atomic energy. This offer by the United States to join with other nations having atomic facilities to furnish fissionable material and atomic energy technology for the common benefit, would provide a new opportunity for international cooperation. Successful cooperation in the implementation of the President’s proposal would surely result in an improved atmosphere, which, in turn, could significantly improve the prospects for genuine, safeguarded international disarmament. The proposal itself was not put forward as a disarmament plan.

6. The Soviet Aide-Mémoire of April 27 states in effect that the USSR will not cooperate in steps to achieve peaceful benefits of atomic power for the world until the United States agrees to a ban on the use of atomic weapons. The primary reason given for this position is that under the President’s United Nations proposal, stockpiles of weapon grade material could continue to increase after the international agency had been established. Yet the Soviet proposal for a ban on weapons’ use would not in any way prevent such increases in stockpiles. Accordingly, the United States cannot agree that the Soviet position provides a valid objection to proceeding at this time with steps for promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

7. The Soviet Union also appears to assume that any form of peaceful utilization of atomic energy must necessarily increase stocks of materials available for military purposes. In reality, however, ways can be devised to safeguard against diversion of materials from power producing reactors. And there are forms of peaceful utilization in which no question of weapon grade material arises.

8. The United States believes that the nations most advanced in knowledge regarding the constructive uses of atomic energy have an obligation to make it available, under appropriate conditions, for promoting the welfare of peoples generally. At the present stage of nuclear technology, the United States believes that it is now possible to make a beginning in this direction. Accordingly, the United States will feel free to go ahead with its proposal with other interested nations, even though the Soviet Union does not wish to pursue it at this time. If at a later time the Soviet Union should decide to take part in any such discussions, the United States will continue to welcome such participation.

iii.

9. The Soviet Union refers to its proposal of January 30 for an international agreement calling for unconditional renunciation of the use of atomic, hydrogen and other forms of weapons of mass destruction. The United States has thoroughly and earnestly considered this proposal in accordance with its oft-declared policy to examine with an open mind all suggested approaches to the problem of disarmament.

10. In the opinion of the United States, any effective plan for disarmament must provide satisfactory answers to two fundamental questions:

a. First, will the plan result in an actual reduction or elimination of national armaments in a manner consistent with the security of each nation? A paper promise not to use weapons will not enable the nations safely to reduce their armaments. The very existence of any weapon poses the possibility of its use, despite promises not to do so, which can be broken without notice.

b. Second, will the plan materially reduce or eliminate the danger of aggression and warfare? If any plan would, in fact, tend to increase the danger of resort to war by a potential aggressor, it would not accomplish the basic purpose of disarmament.

11. The Soviet Union’s proposal of January 30 fails to meet either of these basic tests, or to offer any hope for beneficial results in the disarmament field:

a. It would leave unimpaired existing armaments and continued armament production. This is clear from the terms of the Soviet proposal itself. There would be only an exchange of promises not to make use of weapons which are still retained. There could be no certainty that these assurances would be observed. The maintenance of stocks of weapons and the continued manufacture of weapons would bear ominous witness to the danger that the assurances might be disregarded.

b. The danger of aggression and war would not be lessened if the Soviet proposal were put in effect. Indeed, it could be increased, since the deterrent effect upon a potential aggressor of the existence of nuclear weapons would doubtless be lessened if his possible victims had undertaken an obligation not to use them. Such an aggressor might be tempted to initiate an attack in the hope that the ban would prevent or delay the use of such weapons in the defense of his victims. Yet, the aggressor with nuclear weapons would be in a position to repudiate his past assurances and employ nuclear weapons whenever it suited his interests. Thus, such a plan might merely serve to induce aggression and weaken its victims.

12. Not only does the Soviet proposal fail to meet the necessary tests of any effective plan to prevent atomic warfare, but it would in fact harm the chances of adoption of any such effective plan. For surely the Soviet proposal, if it were accepted, would tend to create the deceptive impression that the danger of atomic warfare had somehow been limited and weaken the vigilance of the people regarding a threat which had, if anything, increased. This false sense of security could discourage further efforts to achieve genuine disarmament under effective safeguards, which would actually enhance the security of all, reduce the danger of war, and lighten the heavy burden of armaments.

iv.

13. The United States reaffirms, as it did in the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on November 17, 1950, that, whatever the method used, aggression itself is the gravest of all dangers. Only if there is aggression will the world be exposed to the horrors of modern war.

14. The signatories of the United Nations Charter have undertaken solemn assurances not to commit aggression. In conformity with its historic traditions, the United States will never violate that pledge. But, as indicated, the United States is convinced that the only truly effective way to ensure that aggression will not take place and that nuclear weapons will not be used in war is to adopt a safeguarded, balanced system of disarmament. Such a system could materially reduce the chance of successful aggression, and thereby minimize the risk of any aggression at all.

15. The United States continues to believe that a solution of the armaments problem is essential. Despite its inability to accept the Soviet proposal, the United States is ready at all times to discuss acceptable measures for effective disarmament under proper safeguards. It is prepared to do so either in the continuation of private exchanges or in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. In view of the urgency of disarmament, the United States will welcome such a continuation if the Soviet Union considers it a useful means for seeking a common approach to this problem.

16. The United States also hopes that, in the light of the foregoing, the Soviet Union will wish to comment further on the concrete proposal submitted by the United States on March 19, 1954. In any event the United States is prepared to renew with the Soviet Union at any time the talks on the President’s proposal.

Washington, July 9, 1954.

1. Drafted by Bowie and Gerard Smith. A typewritten notation on the source text reads: “Handed to Amb. Zarubin by Mr. Merchant on July 9, 1954.” On July 2, Bowie had forwarded the draft text to Secretary Dulles for approval. The memorandum of transmittal indicated that the draft reply “is based on the draft you approved earlier, together with further revisions to take account of the comments from France, the U.K. and Canada as well as Defense and AEC. It has the concurrence of Mr. Merchant, Mr. Smith and myself. If you approve the draft, it will be retyped for delivery to the Soviets.” Dulles initialed an “OK, JFD” on the memorandum of transmittal. (600.0012/7–254) On July 8, Gerard Smith presented advance copies of the reply to representatives of the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and Belgium; memoranda of his separate conversations with these representatives are in file 600.0012/7–854.
2. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 4, 1954, pp. 479 and 482–484.
3. See the memorandum of conversation, Mar. 19, p. 1376.