It appears to the Department of Defense that acceptance by the United States
of the proposed language in the foregoing quoted statement would constitute
an extension of the policy contained in NSC
1123 and would permit a
degree of atomic disclosure which, in the opinion of this Department, would
jeopardize the security of the United States, unless there was prior
agreement to and development
[Page 927]
of
the control procedures encompassed within the United Nations plan or any
other plan equally as effective.
At the request of Mr. Nash, who had
been furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the
proposed message, Mr. Hickerson agreed on 29 April 1952 not to dispatch the
message.
The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which I am in general agreement,
are forwarded herewith. In view of the great importance of the question
involved, it is recommended that there be undertaken through the machinery
provided by the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments, or perhaps
through the National Security Council, the establishment of this
Government’s position on the relationship between the proposed system of
disclosure and verification, the plan for international control of atomic
energy and an international program for the regulation, limitation, and
balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)
top secret
Washington, 30 April, 1952.
- Subject:
- United States Position on Regulation of Armaments and Armed
Forces.
1. Reference is made to a proposed message from the Secretary of State to
the United States Delegation, United Nations, authorizing the United
States Representative on the Disarmament Commission to make a statement
on the United States position with respect to a system of disclosure and
verification, including atomic energy. This proposed statement was
discussed at length with representatives of the Department of State on
23 April 1952. At that time the representatives of the Department of
State assured the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the proposed statement is
intended to be in consonance with national policy.
2. It is requested that you note particularly the first sentence of
paragraph 4 of the proposed statement, which reads:
“I can state without equivocation that, if agreement can be
reached upon an effective system for progressive and continuing
disclosure and verification, the US would be prepared to proceed
through all stages of such a system before agreement had been
reached on a system of effective international control of atomic
energy.”
[Page 928]
3. United States policy on disarmament is contained in NSC 112. When the President approved this
document, he specifically approved a statement of Basic Principles and
the Conclusions. These Principles, together with the initial Conclusion,
are listed in the Appendix hereto4 for ready reference. The Basic
Principles may be summarized as follows:
- a.
- A system of disclosure and verification is but one facet of
the larger problem of the regulation of armaments and armed
forces;
- b.
- United States security demands that the first step in the
regulation of armaments be achievement of international
agreement on at least the general principles involved;
and
- c.
- The international control of atomic energy must be based on
the United Nations Plan, or a no less effective plan.
The initial Conclusion states in substance that a system
of disclosure and verification logically would be the first step in the
implementation of an agreed international program for the regulation of
armaments.
4. It appears to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that acceptance by the United
States of the language in the proposed Department of State message would
seem to constitute a change in basic United States policy. It would go
even beyond the statement made by Mr. Acheson to the General Assembly of the United Nations on
20 [19] November 1951, in which he said that the
United States would agree to the determination by the Disarmament
Commission, as an administrative matter, when disclosure should progress
from one stage to the next.5 It should be borne in mind that the rules of voting
procedure for the Disarmament Commission do not require unanimity, and
thus the United States would be denied the power of the veto to prevent
the progress of disclosure from stage to stage if at any time
circumstances are such as to prejudice United States security.
5. Acceptance of the philosophy underlying the proposed message would
commit the United States:
- a.
- To take disclosure and verification out of the framework of
control and regulation of armaments and armed forces;
- b.
- To pursue a system of disclosure as an end in itself;
- c.
- To disclose data concerning its complete atomic energy
program, including details of design and fabrication of atomic
weapons, to an international agency which has no authority, no
control, no ownership of facilities, but merely a right of
inspection. This inspection might in practice be considerably
circumscribed by a State entering into the arrangement solely in
order to serve its own ends, thus nullifying the effectiveness
of the system;
- d.
- To disclose, in effect, all current results of research and
development programs including guided missiles, bacteriological
warfare, and chemical warfare, among others; and
- e.
- To abrogate the United Nations Plan for the control of atomic
energy without the substitution of another for it.
6. The course of action described in paragraph 5 above would appear to
require permissive legislation from the Congress. This would require
justification before the Congress of a plan for the United States to
make complete disclosures of atomic data to an agency which does not
possess adequate powers and authority for the exercise of control. From
the military point of view the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that this
degree of atomic disclosure to such an agency is not justifiable.
7. The possible effects of the proposed Department of State message might
seriously jeopardize the security of the United States. The Soviet Union
has been assisted in becoming a formidable military menace by a number
of things it has obtained from the Western World. Its TU–4, the backbone
of its long-range air force, was copied from a B–29 illegally interned
following a forced landing in Soviet territory. Its jet engine in the
MIG–15 is a development of a British 3500–lb. thrust jet engine given
the Soviets after the war. The implosion principle was obtained by the
Soviets through the espionage of Fuchs. It is
likely that the Soviets have obtained a gunsight from an F–86 which made
a forced landing in an area under Soviet control. From the military
viewpoint, it would be most unwise for the United States to make a
further addition to this growth in Soviet military knowledge by agreeing
to exchange with the Soviet Union complete data on the design and
fabrication of atomic weapons. It is in this area that the United States
possesses qualitative as well as quantitative superiority and, in all
likelihood, would be giving up far more than it could hope to receive in
return. Accordingly, the disclosure of such data by the United States
might well have the effect of advancing the date when the Soviet Union
would be capable of approaching atomic parity with the United
States.
8. The Department of State representatives in their discussions with the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed the opinion that the President’s speech
on 7 November 19516 with
respect to a plan for reducing armaments constituted a change in the
United States policy set forth in NSC
112. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied carefully the text of the
President’s radio address of that date and are unable to arrive at the
same interpretation placed upon it by representatives
[Page 930]
of the Department of State. The President,
after describing the several parts of the disarmament program, said:
“Such a program would have to be agreed upon by all the countries
having substantial military power and ratified according to
their own constitutional practices.”
This statement would seem to imply that an enforceable
multilateral treaty or convention, embodying at least the general
principles for a program of control and regulation of armaments, would
be entered into by the participating nations.
9. With respect to atomic weapons, the President in his radio address
stated:
“… the plan already approved by a majority of the United Nations
fits right into this present proposal of ours for the control
and reduction of armaments … atomic energy would be controlled
under the provisions of the United Nations plan. We continue to
support this plan as it now stands …”
It should be noted that the United Nations Plan, among
other things, provides for the following:
- a.
- A strong and comprehensive international system of control and
inspection;
- b.
- Such an international system of control and inspection should be
established by treaty or convention. The system of control should
become operative only when those Members of the United Nations
necessary to assure its success by signing and ratifying the treaty
have bound themselves to accept and support it;
- c.
- The treaty should include establishment in the United Nations of
an international control agency possessing adequate powers and
properly organized, staffed, and equipped; and
- d.
- The treaty should embrace the entire program for putting the
international system of control and inspection into effect.
10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware that if the Department of State
is able to negotiate agreement upon an effective system for progressive
and continuing disclosure and verification, if necessary before
agreement has been reached on a system of effective international
control of atomic energy, it will have succeeded in creating the
conditions which well might result in a fundamental, and perhaps even a
major, alteration in the Soviet system. As a tactic, therefore, it might
be desirable to make some concession from established policy. The danger
to the United States seems to lie in the extent to which disclosures can
be agreed to and still not impose intolerable or unacceptable risks upon
United States security interests. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the
military point of view, are strongly of the opinion that the United
States should not be committed to make disclosures of atomic data beyond
Stage III prior to reaching agreement on an effective system for control
of
[Page 931]
atomic programs. It is in
Stages IV and V that the United States presently possesses, to a maximum
degree and in the area of greatest sensitivity, qualitative as well as
quantitative superiority.7
11. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a course of
action which would possibly lead to the disclosure of the Atomic Energy
Program beyond Stage III, even if accompanied by such process of
verification as might be granted by the USSR, would jeopardize the
security of the United States unless there is prior agreement to and
development of the control procedures encompassed within the United
Nations Plan or any other plan equally as effective. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff are convinced that reliance upon any other safeguard would be
illusory.
Recommendations
12. a. In light of all of the foregoing, and in any event, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, as military advisors to the President, the Secretary of
Defense, and the National Security Council, recommend urgently against
any course of action under which the United States might offer to
proceed beyond Stage III of any system of disclosure and verification in
advance of prior agreement on the other features of the United Nations
Plan, including its terms of control of atomic energy;
b. With specific reference to the proposed message from the Secretary of
State to the United States Delegation, United Nations, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff recommend that it not be dispatched, and further that, in the
interests of national security, any instructions to the United States
Delegation reflect the views outlined in the foregoing; and
c. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you inform the
Department of State of the substance of these views.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Omar N.
Bradley
Chairman