330.13/5–1352

The Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Dear Mr. Secretary: Reference is made to a proposed message from the Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the United Nations, authorizing the United States Representative on the Disarmament Commission to make a statement on the United States’ position with respect to a system of disclosure and verification, including atomic energy.1 The proposed message, which representatives of the Department of State assured the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 23 April 19522 was intended to be in consonance with national policy, included the following statement:

“I can state without equivocation that, if agreement can be reached upon an effective system for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, the U.S. would be prepared to proceed through all stages of such a system before agreement had been reached on a system of effective international control of atomic energy.”

It appears to the Department of Defense that acceptance by the United States of the proposed language in the foregoing quoted statement would constitute an extension of the policy contained in NSC 1123 and would permit a degree of atomic disclosure which, in the opinion of this Department, would jeopardize the security of the United States, unless there was prior agreement to and development [Page 927] of the control procedures encompassed within the United Nations plan or any other plan equally as effective.

At the request of Mr. Nash, who had been furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the proposed message, Mr. Hickerson agreed on 29 April 1952 not to dispatch the message.

The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which I am in general agreement, are forwarded herewith. In view of the great importance of the question involved, it is recommended that there be undertaken through the machinery provided by the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments, or perhaps through the National Security Council, the establishment of this Government’s position on the relationship between the proposed system of disclosure and verification, the plan for international control of atomic energy and an international program for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments.

Sincerely yours,

Robert A. Lovett

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)

top secret
  • Subject:
  • United States Position on Regulation of Armaments and Armed Forces.

1. Reference is made to a proposed message from the Secretary of State to the United States Delegation, United Nations, authorizing the United States Representative on the Disarmament Commission to make a statement on the United States position with respect to a system of disclosure and verification, including atomic energy. This proposed statement was discussed at length with representatives of the Department of State on 23 April 1952. At that time the representatives of the Department of State assured the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the proposed statement is intended to be in consonance with national policy.

2. It is requested that you note particularly the first sentence of paragraph 4 of the proposed statement, which reads:

“I can state without equivocation that, if agreement can be reached upon an effective system for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, the US would be prepared to proceed through all stages of such a system before agreement had been reached on a system of effective international control of atomic energy.”

[Page 928]

3. United States policy on disarmament is contained in NSC 112. When the President approved this document, he specifically approved a statement of Basic Principles and the Conclusions. These Principles, together with the initial Conclusion, are listed in the Appendix hereto4 for ready reference. The Basic Principles may be summarized as follows:

a.
A system of disclosure and verification is but one facet of the larger problem of the regulation of armaments and armed forces;
b.
United States security demands that the first step in the regulation of armaments be achievement of international agreement on at least the general principles involved; and
c.
The international control of atomic energy must be based on the United Nations Plan, or a no less effective plan.

The initial Conclusion states in substance that a system of disclosure and verification logically would be the first step in the implementation of an agreed international program for the regulation of armaments.

4. It appears to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that acceptance by the United States of the language in the proposed Department of State message would seem to constitute a change in basic United States policy. It would go even beyond the statement made by Mr. Acheson to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 [19] November 1951, in which he said that the United States would agree to the determination by the Disarmament Commission, as an administrative matter, when disclosure should progress from one stage to the next.5 It should be borne in mind that the rules of voting procedure for the Disarmament Commission do not require unanimity, and thus the United States would be denied the power of the veto to prevent the progress of disclosure from stage to stage if at any time circumstances are such as to prejudice United States security.

5. Acceptance of the philosophy underlying the proposed message would commit the United States:

a.
To take disclosure and verification out of the framework of control and regulation of armaments and armed forces;
b.
To pursue a system of disclosure as an end in itself;
c.
To disclose data concerning its complete atomic energy program, including details of design and fabrication of atomic weapons, to an international agency which has no authority, no control, no ownership of facilities, but merely a right of inspection. This inspection might in practice be considerably circumscribed by a State entering into the arrangement solely in order to serve its own ends, thus nullifying the effectiveness of the system;
d.
To disclose, in effect, all current results of research and development programs including guided missiles, bacteriological warfare, and chemical warfare, among others; and
e.
To abrogate the United Nations Plan for the control of atomic energy without the substitution of another for it.

6. The course of action described in paragraph 5 above would appear to require permissive legislation from the Congress. This would require justification before the Congress of a plan for the United States to make complete disclosures of atomic data to an agency which does not possess adequate powers and authority for the exercise of control. From the military point of view the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that this degree of atomic disclosure to such an agency is not justifiable.

7. The possible effects of the proposed Department of State message might seriously jeopardize the security of the United States. The Soviet Union has been assisted in becoming a formidable military menace by a number of things it has obtained from the Western World. Its TU–4, the backbone of its long-range air force, was copied from a B–29 illegally interned following a forced landing in Soviet territory. Its jet engine in the MIG–15 is a development of a British 3500–lb. thrust jet engine given the Soviets after the war. The implosion principle was obtained by the Soviets through the espionage of Fuchs. It is likely that the Soviets have obtained a gunsight from an F–86 which made a forced landing in an area under Soviet control. From the military viewpoint, it would be most unwise for the United States to make a further addition to this growth in Soviet military knowledge by agreeing to exchange with the Soviet Union complete data on the design and fabrication of atomic weapons. It is in this area that the United States possesses qualitative as well as quantitative superiority and, in all likelihood, would be giving up far more than it could hope to receive in return. Accordingly, the disclosure of such data by the United States might well have the effect of advancing the date when the Soviet Union would be capable of approaching atomic parity with the United States.

8. The Department of State representatives in their discussions with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed the opinion that the President’s speech on 7 November 19516 with respect to a plan for reducing armaments constituted a change in the United States policy set forth in NSC 112. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied carefully the text of the President’s radio address of that date and are unable to arrive at the same interpretation placed upon it by representatives [Page 930] of the Department of State. The President, after describing the several parts of the disarmament program, said:

“Such a program would have to be agreed upon by all the countries having substantial military power and ratified according to their own constitutional practices.”

This statement would seem to imply that an enforceable multilateral treaty or convention, embodying at least the general principles for a program of control and regulation of armaments, would be entered into by the participating nations.

9. With respect to atomic weapons, the President in his radio address stated:

“… the plan already approved by a majority of the United Nations fits right into this present proposal of ours for the control and reduction of armaments … atomic energy would be controlled under the provisions of the United Nations plan. We continue to support this plan as it now stands …”

It should be noted that the United Nations Plan, among other things, provides for the following:

a.
A strong and comprehensive international system of control and inspection;
b.
Such an international system of control and inspection should be established by treaty or convention. The system of control should become operative only when those Members of the United Nations necessary to assure its success by signing and ratifying the treaty have bound themselves to accept and support it;
c.
The treaty should include establishment in the United Nations of an international control agency possessing adequate powers and properly organized, staffed, and equipped; and
d.
The treaty should embrace the entire program for putting the international system of control and inspection into effect.

10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware that if the Department of State is able to negotiate agreement upon an effective system for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, if necessary before agreement has been reached on a system of effective international control of atomic energy, it will have succeeded in creating the conditions which well might result in a fundamental, and perhaps even a major, alteration in the Soviet system. As a tactic, therefore, it might be desirable to make some concession from established policy. The danger to the United States seems to lie in the extent to which disclosures can be agreed to and still not impose intolerable or unacceptable risks upon United States security interests. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, are strongly of the opinion that the United States should not be committed to make disclosures of atomic data beyond Stage III prior to reaching agreement on an effective system for control of [Page 931] atomic programs. It is in Stages IV and V that the United States presently possesses, to a maximum degree and in the area of greatest sensitivity, qualitative as well as quantitative superiority.7

11. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a course of action which would possibly lead to the disclosure of the Atomic Energy Program beyond Stage III, even if accompanied by such process of verification as might be granted by the USSR, would jeopardize the security of the United States unless there is prior agreement to and development of the control procedures encompassed within the United Nations Plan or any other plan equally as effective. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced that reliance upon any other safeguard would be illusory.

Recommendations

12. a. In light of all of the foregoing, and in any event, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as military advisors to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, recommend urgently against any course of action under which the United States might offer to proceed beyond Stage III of any system of disclosure and verification in advance of prior agreement on the other features of the United Nations Plan, including its terms of control of atomic energy;

b. With specific reference to the proposed message from the Secretary of State to the United States Delegation, United Nations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that it not be dispatched, and further that, in the interests of national security, any instructions to the United States Delegation reflect the views outlined in the foregoing; and

c. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you inform the Department of State of the substance of these views.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Omar N. Bradley

Chairman
  1. The subject message has not been found in Department of State files.
  2. A copy of the Department of State informal draft substance of discussion at the State–JCS meeting of Apr. 23 is in State–JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417.
  3. For text of NSC 112, “Formulation of a U.S. Position With Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments,” July 6, 1951, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. i, p. 477.
  4. The appendix, entitled “Excerpt from NSC 112”, is not printed.
  5. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 3, 1951, pp. 879–889, or Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. i, pp. 309–320.
  6. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951, pp. 623–627.
  7. Reference is to the stages set forth in UN doc. DC/C.2/1, Apr. 5, 1952; for text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. i, pp. 346–356.