Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, “NSC Papers, 1953–1955”

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

top secret

[Washington,] June 23, 1954.

• Subject:
• Department of State Views on the Proposed Moratorium on Tests

The following views are submitted in response to NSC Action No. 1106–h of May 6.¹

I. The Proposal

On April 2 Prime Minister Nehru proposed in the Indian Parliament a “Standstill Agreement” covering at least the test explosions then being conducted in the Pacific. The Nehru proposal was referred to the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations. The matter, however, has not been raised in the London meetings.

The United Kingdom has shown solid interest in a “hydrogen bomb” moratorium. Churchill will probably raise this question during his visit to Washington.

II. Technical Effects of a Moratorium

A. On the United States Program.

The Atomic Energy Commission has concluded that “a temporary limitation or moratorium on megaton weapons would, under certain conditions, not damage our program.” These conditions are:

1. That testing be permitted up to 100 kilotons.

2. That the moratorium end in January 1956 in the absence of clear and substantial progress in disarmament negotiations.

3. That in the meantime preparations for large-scale testing be continued and such fact be publicly known.

4. That monitoring be accomplished by on-the-spot surveillance conducted by properly equipped observers located as close as safety permits to the site of the test shots.^*

5. That precise shot time and altitude be given in advance to such observers.

Chairman Strauss believes that such a moratorium would be advantageous only if covered by a dependable agreement which cannot be expected from the present Soviet government. If an affirmative decision for propaganda purposes is made, he points out the conditions which should be attached.

Atomic Energy Commissioner Thomas E. Murray submitted supplementary views expressing the opinion that long-range detection methods would be adequate to police a moratorium guarded by points 1 and 2 above.

Such an agreement would depend in no way on Soviet good faith, and the conclusion that the United States weapons program would not be disadvantaged is not contingent on the USSR’s maintenance of such agreement.

The Department of Defense has concluded that any test moratorium would be to the technical disadvantage of the United States because until an acceptable formula for the elimination of nuclear weapons from the armaments of all nations can be devised and implemented, the security of the United States will depend in a large measure upon continued and intensive application of our scientific engineering and industrial capacity in this field.^‡

B. Technical Effects on the USSR.

The Soviets have conducted a total of seven tests in three series as compared with 47 tests by the United States. Three of the Soviet 1953 tests utilized thermonuclear reactions. The yield of one shot is estimated at 1 megaton by CIA.

The Soviets appear to have a family of weapons ranging from small (5 kilotons) through standard (50 to 80 kilotons) to 1 megaton.

If the Soviets desire to produce and stockpile higher yield weapons, for example 10 megaton, further tests would almost certainly be required. It is expected that such further tests will be conducted during the coming summer. If completed successfully, the USSR could forego tests for a substantial period of time without seriously affecting its total nuclear capability.

III. Monitoring and Policing

Two systems of monitoring any test moratorium have been suggested: (1) long-range detection by scientific techniques and (2) on-the-spot surveillance by qualified and properly equipped observers.

1. Long-range Detection by Scientific Techniques.

A. Certainty of Detection.

Any nuclear explosion in the USSR larger than 100 kilotons would be detected by long-range methods. If the USSR detonated a high yield device at a remote spot, such as in the Antarctic, there is less assurance that it would be detected.

B. Capability to Estimate the Yield of a Test Shot.

It is agreed that long-range detection is insufficient to give a precise measurement of the size of any explosion. The margin of error of yield measurement spreads over several hundred percent. In the mid-range (20 to 100 kilotons) a reasonable measure of precision is a range of plus–100 percent and minus–50 percent. In the megaton range, the margin widens substantially.

2. On-the-spot Surveillance.

Properly equipped observers stationed as close as compatible with safety and having advance knowledge of the exact time and altitude of the burst could clearly establish any substantial violation of a permissible testing ceiling.

IV. Psychological/Political Effects

A. Advantages.

An American offer to agree on a test moratorium or an American acceptance of such a proposal made by another nation would constitute a major propaganda stroke. It would be received with approval and supported by the great majority of the governments and peoples of the non-communist world. A summary refusal by the USSR to agree to such a proposal would meet sharp criticism. The Russians would also be criticized if they carried out large-scale tests during an international discussion of a test moratorium.

American support for such a moratorium would be strong evidence against communist charges that the United States seeks to terrorize and dominate the world. If the Soviets conducted large-scale tests after such an American move had been made, their aggressive intent would become clearer.

Specifically, American initiative on this score should substantially improve relations with the United Kingdom. It would measurably improve relations with India and Japan. It would be greeted with a great sense of relief by people all over the world who abhor the idea of atomic war and out of ignorance fear that continuing larger and larger thermonuclear testing may result in some global catastrophe.

B. Disadvantages.

American initiative at this time looking to a test moratorium might imply some admission of fault or some recognition that large-scale testing is illegitimate.

Although opinions differ as to whether or not the Soviets would accept any testing moratorium proposal, it is agreed that the USSR would seek to exploit such a change in United States policy to support their repeated call for a ban on the use of all nuclear weapons.

As first reactions wore off, and popular and governmental discussions of the proposal developed, there would be a growing feeling, even in the non-communist world, that the moratorium would have little value unless it constituted the first step toward a world-wide agreement restricting or prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

The hopes of avoiding nuclear war which the American move would have raised would be sufficiently widespread so that if the United States refused to take the “next step” and agree to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, it might find itself in an international political position more difficult than that existing before the moratorium was proposed. This points up that a massive U.S. propaganda effort is an essential concomitant to any American move looking toward a test moratorium. A keynote for such a propaganda drive would be to appropriate for the United States the word “disarmament” as the Soviets have appropriated the words “peace” and “democracy”. A strong American propaganda drive will be required in any event to counter the expected Soviet Stockholm Appeal type of propaganda drive urging outlawing the use of atomic weapons.

Conclusion

On the assumption

1. that the United States continues to oppose a total abolition of atomic weapons except as part of an effective general disarmament program and

2. that it would be contrary to the military interests of the United States to have a moratorium on tests unless its duration were limited to January 1956; unless explosions under 100 kilotons were tolerated; and unless there were “on the spot” controls; it is concluded that it would be a mistake for the United States to agree to such a moratorium.

The reasons for this conclusion are:

A. The proposal implies, or would be generally taken to imply, acceptance of the thesis that there is something morally wrong in explosions in excess of a certain power. It would be difficult effectively to answer a Soviet counter-proposal that the maximum be greatly reduced, or that all atomic explosions be banned.

B. The terms of the temporary moratorium, not only as to its tolerable limit and inspection, but notably as to its duration, i.e., to January 1956, are “hand tailored” to fit the present stage of United States technical development and, presumably, to embarrass the Soviet Union. This could readily be made apparent, and if there were counterproposals for a moratorium of longer or indefinite duration, we would find it awkward to explain our position.

C. In the unlikely event that a temporary moratorium were accepted, as proposed, the result would create a “climate”, such that in fact no resumption could occur without then accepting a propaganda disadvantage which would more than offset the initial propaganda advantage.

Recommendation

It is recommended:

A. That the United States not agree to a testing moratorium.

B. That Churchill be advised of this position and the reasons therefor.²

John Foster Dulles

1. See footnote 5, p. 1428.
2. Since this presumably would involve disclosure of Restricted Data, Congressional approval would be required. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. In view of the Atomic Energy Commission’s subsequent conclusion that under certain conditions a moratorium agreement would not prejudice the United States weapons development program, the Department of Defense may want to submit further views on this point. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. Churchill was so advised at a meeting on June 25. (Memorandum of a meeting; 700.5611/6–2754)