Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

600.0012/5–2654

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of Defense (Anderson), the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss), and the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles)

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[Washington,] May 26, 1954.

With a view to enabling our Committee to make a recommendation to the President as directed by the NSC, I have dictated four questions to which I think we should seek the answers and on the basis of the replies then I think a policy could be arrived at.

I suggest that you consider these questions and give me your views in relation to those matters which are distinctively within your several jurisdictions. If you prefer, we can have a meeting.

John Foster Dulles

[Annex]

¹

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[Washington], May 28, 1954.

1. Assuming that there could be an effective arrangement to limit future experimentation to explosions of under X² tons, would this be to the technical advantage of the United States?

2. If this would be to the technical disadvantage of the United States, would that disadvantage be overcome by a propaganda advantage and by betterment of allied relations?

3. Is it possible technically to set up arrangements which would dependably expose any violation of an agreement to limit the magnitude of explosions?

4. If questions 2 and 3 may be answered in the affirmative, can we assume that it would be possible to negotiate an arrangement with the Soviets which would permit explosions up to an agreed maximum without the Soviet getting an advantage from constantly urging a lower limit than what we could accept down to the agreed abolition which they seek? Is there a logical or public relations stopping point between no top limit and to all abolition?

1. The source text offers no explanation for the discrepancy in the dates of the covering memorandum and the annex.
2. “X,” rather than a number, appears in the source text.