Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 195th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 6, 19541May 6, 1954
[Extracts]
eyes only
The following were present at the 195th meeting of the National Security Council: The President of the United States, presiding; the [Page 1424] Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Navy; General Ridgway for the Secretary of the Army; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the White House Staff Secretary; Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.
. . . . . . .
Mr. Cutler then reminded Secretary Dulles that he wished to discuss with the Council the subject of the recent series of H-bomb tests at the Pacific proving grounds. Secretary Dulles replied that he indeed wanted to bring the Council up to date on these developments. He said that he had made a statement to a restricted group at the recent NATO meeting which was designed to clarify the position of the United States with respect to the use of nuclear weapons.2 He said he wished a copy of this statement to be placed in the records of the National Security Council since this statement officially put our allies on notice regarding our views on the use of these weapons.
Secretary Dulles said that, subsequent to the delivery of this statement at the NATO meeting, he had received a letter from Anthony Eden discussing the statement. Secretary Dulles read portions of the Eden letter and pointed out that Mr. Eden was holding strongly to the idea of consultation between the United States and the United Kingdom prior to any decision to use atomic weapons. In effect, said Secretary Dulles, this was indication of the British desire to get themselves into a position to veto the use of atomic weapons by the United States; whereas, in fact, Secretary Dulles had intended his NATO statement on the subject to constitute the “consultation with our allies” which was called for.
Secretary Dulles then referred to a conversation he had had at Geneva with Molotov regarding further steps to carry out the President’s plan for the developing of peaceful uses of atomic [Page 1425] energy.3 Molotov had called on him, and had stated in effect that until a ban on the use of atomic weapons was agreed upon, there was no use in having further conversations regarding peaceful uses of atomic energy. Secretary Dulles then read his reply to Molotov’s statement, in which he suggested that continuing the conversations looking to the creation of an agency for exploring peaceful uses might pave the way for the solution of the more difficult problem. However, in view of Molotov’s attitude, the United States would now feel free to go ahead and discuss peaceful uses without the Soviet Union.
Secretary Dulles pointed out his belief that it would have been a mistake to let the American public know that the Soviet Union had thus virtually rejected the President’s proposal. Popular reaction in this country would have been pretty violent.
Secretary Dulles said that the other major issue which he wanted to discuss was that of an international moratorium on further atomic and thermonuclear tests. This subject had first come up in a talk with Eden in London on April 13 [12 ?], and there had been further discussion of the subject with Eden at Geneva.4 The UK strongly favored a moratorium on further tests. As far as he could see, said Secretary Dulles, the present series of U.S. tests put us a lap ahead of the USSR. If this was so, and we could secure a moratorium which could really be policed, it would place us in a much better position from the point of view of propaganda and our posture vis-à-vis the free world. It would certainly help us to meet the vicious attacks on us as warmongers by Soviet propaganda. Of course, continued Secretary Dulles, he was in no position to make any judgment as to the technical issues involved in accepting a moratorium, but it would certainly be advantageous to do so from an international point of view.
Admiral Strauss then spoke to this issue. He said he had hoped to be able to inform the Council that the last test in the current series had been completed, but weather conditions had made this impossible, and a few more days would be required. With respect to a cessation of further tests, he pointed out that the current series had been of the utmost importance and had advanced our knowledge of nuclear weapons in a great variety of ways. It isn’t necessary to have further tests in order to increase the potential destructiveness of our stockpile of atomic weapons, but to discontinue the tests would certainly deny us the prospect of advances in knowledge which would significantly increase the number of weapons available to us in terms of available raw materials. Also, commented [Page 1426] Admiral Strauss, while a team of international scientists might be able to detect a Soviet violation of an agreement to cease further tests, there was no infallible means of assuring such detection.
The President said to Admiral Strauss, “You mean that if the Russians went ahead despite agreement not to, the effect would be to put us behind them in the procession.” In answer to the President, Admiral Strauss merely commented on what might have happened to us if we had agreed earlier, say in 1950, to a cessation of tests.
Secretary Wilson expressed great skepticism regarding the moratorium, and said there was nothing we could do about it if the Russians did violate their agreement.
The President said he had a rather different view. The Soviets were always talking big about outlawing atomic weapons, though of course they did nothing whatever about it. Accordingly, we could put them on the spot if we accepted a moratorium. If they violated their agreement we would go ahead promptly and conduct new tests ourselves. The President did express with great emphasis the necessity we were under to gain some significant psychological advantage in the world. Everybody seems to think that we’re skunks, saber-rattlers and warmongers. We ought not to miss any chance to make clear our peaceful objectives.
Secretary Dulles pointed out that if the Soviets broke the moratorium agreement and this was certified by the team of neutral scientists, the Soviets might, of course, gain a technical advantage, but they would lose enormously in terms of world condemnation of their violation.
Secretary Wilson then inquired whether the moratorium envisaged would be complete, or would extend only to large weapons. Secretary Dulles replied that that would be something that we would have to decide upon. Secretary Wilson pointed out that if atomic weapons of a certain range of magnitude were subject to the moratorium, there would be serious repercussions on the development of our thermonuclear capability. Admiral Strauss confirmed this by stating that such a prohibition would prevent any further thermonuclear experiments. The President said he realized this, but that after all, the Soviets had exploded only one thermonuclear weapon and the United States was ahead of them in this field.
Admiral Strauss went on to point out how unfortunate it would be if the United States appeared to be stopping these tests because of pressure. Moreover, he asked that before the United States agrees to the terms of any moratorium, time should be provided to permit full evaluation of the results of the current series of tests, which would conclude this week. It might be that our people would [Page 1427] agree after this evaluation that no additional tests would be necessary for perhaps a year’s time. This decision was in any event of the utmost importance and should not be hastily made.
Admiral Radford commented that a great many high officials in the United States Government had no idea what tremendous progress we have made in the field of nuclear weapons in the last six weeks. No hasty decision regarding a moratorium should be made. This should await the preparation of a detailed study upon which the Council could base a decision.
The President agreed that of course no hasty decision should be taken, but if we have actually reached the limits of efficiency in our atomic weapons, it might give us a tremendous psychological advantage over the enemy if we could propose a moratorium on future tests.
Secretary Wilson again pointed out to the President that the issue of further tests related not to the efficiency and size of our atomic weapons, but to the actual numbers.
Mr. Cutler then inquired of Admiral Strauss how long it would take to evaluate fully the results of the current series of tests. Admiral Strauss replied that the process would take not less than thirty days.
The Vice President expressed himself as in agreement on this problem with the point of view of the Secretary of State. The Council should bear in mind that the United States was at the moment taking a “hell of a licking” on the propaganda front. An offer of this sort would certainly help. The Vice President believed that the Soviets needed to continue their tests more than we needed to continue ours. This being the case, and we make the offer, they will presumably turn it down. We would gain a net advantage. If, on the other hand, they did accept the offer, we would be obliged to deduce that their program is further advanced than we had previously believed. This in itself would constitute very valuable intelligence information. Furthermore, the Vice President said, he assumed that even though we entered into a moratorium, we would continue to develop our research in the field of nuclear weapons even though the tests themselves were stopped. In any event, we must all bear in mind the fact that the potentialities of the hydrogen bomb are so terrible that every effort must be made to avoid another world war. Conceivably the proposed moratorium might help to avoid such a war.
Secretary Wilson replied by pointing out to the Vice President that, unhappily, you couldn’t go very far in your research program without resorting to tests.
To these and other objections to the proposal by Secretary Wilson, the President again summarized his belief that the United [Page 1428] States required to put itself in a better posture before the world. If the Russians agreed to accept a moratorium and then welshed on it, our position in Britain, for instance, would be tremendously improved. Secretary Dulles added that the basic cause for the British weakness with regard to Southeast Asia was their obsession over the H-bomb and its potential effect on the British Isles. We are losing ground every day in England and in other allied nations because they are all insisting we are so militaristic. Comparisons are now being made between ours and Hitler’s military machine. Speaking with great conviction, Secretary Dulles insisted that we could not sit here in Washington and develop bigger bombs without any regard for the impact of these developments on world opinion. In the long run it isn’t only bombs that win wars, but having public opinion on your side. In sum, the net advantage to us of a moratorium would be very great indeed.
Admiral Strauss said that he must remind the Council that we had made similar proposals to the Russians in 1946, and they had kicked us in the teeth. Why don’t we, therefore, keep stressing this failure to respond? Haven’t the Russians supplied the world with sufficient evidence of breaches of faith? The list of these was almost endless.
The President agreed with much that Admiral Strauss had said, but pointed out that there was one thing missing from his analysis. The world is much more terrified now than it was in 1946. The long list of Russian violations of agreements wasn’t as physically terrifying to people as was the prospect now of atomic warfare.
Mr. Cutler then suggested that the whole problem of the moratorium be studied as a matter of urgency by the Departments of State and Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, with the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency. As soon as the study was complete it should be brought to the attention of the Council.
At the conclusion of the discussion, Secretary Dulles asked if he might have a look at the statement which Defense and AEC proposed to issue at the conclusion of the current series of atomic tests. Admiral Strauss had a copy of the proposed statement and handed it to Secretary Dulles, who then read it aloud to the Council. The President suggested limiting the statement simply to say that the safety zones which had been established for the conduct of the tests were no longer in force and had been lifted.
The National Security Council:5
. . . . . . .
- f.
- Noted that the Secretary of State had presented to the recent NATO meeting in Paris a statement on the United States position [Page 1429] regarding nuclear weapons, a copy of which was made available for the Council files.
- g.
- Noted, as read at the meeting, the statement which the Secretary of State had made to the Soviet Foreign Minister at Geneva in response to the latter’s reply to the President’s proposals for peaceful uses of atomic energy.
- h.
- Requested the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, with the assistance of the Director of Central Intelligence, to report to the Council as soon as possible and not later than June 3, 1954 on the desirability of an international moratorium on further tests of nuclear weapons.
Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for appropriate action. The action in c above subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense. The action in e above subsequently transmitted to the Operations Coordinating Board. The action in h above subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of Central Intelligence.
. . . . . . .
- Prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on May 8. The meeting was largely devoted to a report by Secretary Dulles on the Geneva Conference and the Indochina situation and related discussion. For the portion of the memorandum recording consideration of those matters, see vol. xiii, Part 2, p. 1481.↩
- For text, see vol. v, Part 1, p. 509.↩
- See the memorandum of conversation by Merchant, May 1, p. 1413.↩
- See telegram Dulte 43 from Geneva, May 2, p. 1418.↩
- The paragraphs which follow constitute NSC Action No. 1106. Paragraphs a–e deal with the Geneva Conference and Indochina.↩