330.13/4–2854
Memorandum of Conversation, by Howard Meyers of the Office of
United Nations Political and Security Affairs
secret
Washington, April 28,
1954.
- Subject:
- United States Position on Scope of Disarmament Commission’s
Subcommittee Meetings and on Atomic Energy Control Plan.
- Participants:
- Miss Barbara Salt, 1st
Secretary, British Embassy
- James McCardle, 2nd Secretary, Canadian
Embassy
- Jean de la Grandville, Counselor, French Embassy
(4/29)
- Ward P. Allen
EUR
- Howard Meyers
UNP
Miss Salt, Mr. McCardle and Mr. de la
Grandville came in separately on request, in accord with a
previous commitment to keep their embassies informed regarding U.S.
attitudes towards various aspects of the impending London meetings of the UN
Disarmament Commission’s subcommittee of five. We explained that we expected
the views set forth below would be reviewed at the working party meetings in
London commencing May 10.
We stated that the United States believes that the subcommittee deliberations
should include consideration of the atomic energy control problem, because
of the US desire to be able to concentrate discussion in the US-Soviet
bilaterals insofar as possible on the President’s December 8 proposals, the
need to maintain a proper relationship between the atomic and non-atomic
aspects of disarmament in the subcommittee meetings, and the adverse
reaction of world opinion should we attempt to exclude the atomic energy
control question from the subcommittee’s deliberations. We explained that
the US has for some time been reviewing general policy toward disarmament;
hoped to conclude this review in the near future; and would not wish to
imply that the fact of the review necessarily would bring about any changes
in past US positions. Prior
[Page 1400]
to
this time, we had to be prepared to express our views on atomic energy
control in the Disarmament Commission subcommittee, if asked, and the
attached position, which was handed them, was governmentally approved.
We added that these views were being presented now in order to give the
British, Canadian and French governments advance indication of the US
attitude on these matters before the working party meetings in London.
None of the embassy representatives had any notable comments to make and
expressed appreciation for this information.
[Annex]
Position Paper
confidential
[Washington, undated.]
Position on UN Control Plan1
We think it is obvious that any acceptable disarmament system must
maintain the necessary inherent relationship between the international
control of atomic energy and international regulation of armed forces
and other forms of armaments. Further, we believe that such disarmament
program, both as regards its atomic and non-atomic elements, must meet
one fundamental test: that of effective safeguards to ensure compliance
of all nations and to give adequate warning of possible evasions or
violations. (See Secretary’s September 17, 1953, statement to GA.)2 The
proposals which US has introduced in UN in past, whether individually or
in conjunction with UK and French
Governments, have all been designed to meet those tests. We have said
before and emphasize again that beyond insistence on these principles,
US is not inflexible in its attitude nor do we believe that our
proposals are necessarily the only ones which meet these criteria. In
fact, we are constantly reviewing our disarmament positions to examine
present validity of our past proposals in light of recent developments.
We hope that other states will do likewise. We assure the members of
subcommittee that we will seriously examine any new proposals made by
others and that we will put forward any ideas as we develop them.
This position conforms in substance to GA
resolution of January 11, 1952,3 which
established DC, and which in para. 3
directed
[Page 1401]
Commission to be
ready to consider any proposals or plans for control that may be put
forward involving either conventional armaments or atomic energy.
Commission was further directed that “Unless a better or no less
effective system is devised, the UN plan for the international control
of AE and the prohibition of atomic
weapons should continue to serve as the basis for the international
control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and
the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.”
In particular, we require from USSR a clear and detailed explanation of
its attitude on those elements basic to a system which will ensure that
nuclear weapons will be effectively prohibited as part of a general
disarmament program. Furthermore, we believe it is incumbent on Soviet
Union to explain its views on question of effective safeguards for all
elements of a comprehensive disarmament plan, since this problem has
been principal point at issue in past between USSR and other members of
this subcommittee.
