Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

600.0012/3–554

The British Embassy to the Department of State¹

confidential

Aide-Mémoire

Mr. Dulles and Mr. Eden agreed in Berlin that study of the Soviet proposal for a ban on the use of atomic weapons and the preparation of any reply thereto should be undertaken jointly by United States, United Kingdom, French and Canadian Governments. No reply to the Soviet proposal need be made until the Soviet Union and its associates are in a position to reply to the Aide Memoire on President Eisenhower’s proposals, which is still to be finally agreed, but thought should now be given as to what the reply should be.

2. It is Mr. Eden’s view that the Western Powers could not without grave risk to their security agree to the Soviet proposal because

(I) Unless the Western Powers are free to strike with the weapons of which they have a preponderance, they will be placed at a serious disadvantage in war in view of the Soviet preponderance of conventional weapons.

(II) Russian fears that the Western Powers might use atomic weapons against any aggression are the most powerful deterrent against such aggression.

(III) No ban on the use of weapons of mass destruction would be acceptable except as part of a disarmament treaty providing for a substantial balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments under an acceptable system of controls and safeguards.

3. On the assumption that these are also the views of the United States, Mr. Eden suggests that the reply to the Soviet proposal should take the line that the Western Powers are second to none in wishing to see weapons of mass destruction eliminated. They certainly agree that the disarmament system for which we are working should provide for the prohibition of the production, storing and use of atomic weapons. They have always maintained this and it has been provided for in every General Assembly resolution on disarmament. But the United Nations has also made it clear that world security can only come about through balanced disarmament and that security will not be achieved by singling out one aspect of disarmament for preferential treatment. Our desire is to prevent war of any kind, not any particular type of war and the Soviet Government cannot expect us to deprive ourselves of the weapons in which we have a preponderance unless they are also prepared to deprive themselves of the weapons in which they have a preponderance. We should be interested to know if the Soviet Union agrees that this question of the prohibition of the use of weapons of mass destruction should be considered in connexion with reductions in conventional armaments. We still maintain that progress towards disarmament should be in the basis of the resolutions of the General Assembly, of which the most recent provides that the whole disarmament programme, including the elimination and prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, should be carried out under effective international control and in such a way that no State would have cause to fear that its security were in danger.

Washington, March 5, 1954.

1. This communication was delivered to Arneson by E. E. Tomkins, First Secretary, British Embassy. Arneson’s memorandum of his conversation with Tomkins, dated Mar. 8, reads as follows: “In accepting the attached Aide-Mémoire from Mr. Tomkins, I said that, on the basis of a quick reading, the points made therein appear to be well taken; however we would not be in a position to comment usefully on the points made for some time. For the present our immediate objective was to see what sort of response we would get from the Soviets on the atomic pool proposal, a substantive paper which we hoped could be given to Ambassador Zaroubin fairly soon.” (600.0012/3–554)