Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

330.13/1–1154: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations¹

confidential

Washington, January 11, 1954—4:41 p.m.

314. Disarmament Commission.

1. Dept’s present thinking is that regardless of outcome of informal discussions with Soviet Union concerning procedures for discussing President’s proposal, DC should meet at least once in January.²

2. Any US statement before DC could be confined to a factual report on approach of US to Soviet Union concerning time, place and manner of discussing President’s proposals. After January 25 meeting with Molotov US might make further report to DC.

3. If this course followed USUN would confer with at least dels of the UK, France, Canada, China and USSR in advance of meeting in order to assure that meeting will be confined to factual report and that no one will prematurely raise questions of immediate appointment of a subcommittee or identity of States principally involved.

Dept would appreciate your views on foregoing.³

Dulles

1. Drafted by Dulles with the aid of Wainhouse and Bechhoefer of UNA.
2. This view had been conveyed to the Secretary of State in a memorandum of Jan. 8, by David Key of UNA. In his memorandum, Key wrote, inter alia, “Much of the beneficial results of the President’s initiative in the General Assembly might be lost unless a factual report is made to the Disarmament Commission within a reasonable time, indicating that we are moving ahead with the President’s proposals.” (330.13/1–854)
3. Deputy Representative to the United Nations James Wadsworth replied in telegram 334 from New York, Jan. 13, that the proposed meeting of the Disarmament Commission “seems to us undesirable” since other members of the Commission had not expressed any impatience and in any case could be informally kept abreast of developments and seemed to understand the importance of informal U.S.–USSR discussions whereas “Even a factual report on US approach to Soviet Union conceivably might have adverse effect on informal discussions and we are not certain that we could assure meeting would be confined to factual report.” (330.13/1–1354)