600.0012/1–754
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)
- Participants:
- The Secretary
- Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
- Mr. Merchant—EUR
During a call by the British Ambassador on the Secretary on a different subject, the Secretary raised the question of the forthcoming talks with the Soviets on atomic energy matters. He said that he was anxious to receive the ideas of the British Government. The Secretary then went on to say that a US group, including representatives from the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission had met with him yesterday on this subject.1 He said there were several points of substance involved which he would like to raise since their solution would be helpful in deciding matters of procedure.
The first point, the Secretary said, related to the extent to which the talks developed into a discussion of atomic weapons as opposed to being confined to the narrower issue of the President’s proposal for the establishment of a “bank” for peaceful purposes. He said we couldn’t refuse to let the Russians talk on the bigger question as [Page 1331] their reply suggests they desire to and indeed he himself in a press conference had agreed that the President’s proposal did not confine any discussions to the narrower point of the “bank”. The Secretary said, however, that all United States authorities were persuaded that no acceptable over-all scheme could be found for abolishing atomic weapons by some single step. We would not be justified in relying on the Soviets’ unsupported word and it seemed impossible to devise any adequate system of inspection and control until the Soviet system itself was changed and the Iron Curtain disappeared. This led him to the conclusion that any discussion of abolition or control of atomic weapons at this time was visionary and probably had significance only in the propaganda field. Nevertheless it seemed to him that we should let the Russians talk but should ourselves try to get down to a discussion of the President’s suggestion for a “bank”.
By making a start at working together in this field the possibility existed that a relationship might develop which would lead to bigger things. The US, the Secretary said, doubts the utility of discussing lengthily the larger question of banning or abolishing atomic weapons at this time.
As his second point, the Secretary raised the question as to whether any discussion of atomic weapons should be linked directly with conventional weapons. He said that the general feeling on the US side was to continue to tie the two together. In this connection there were two points of apparent significance in the Kingsbury Smith interview with Malenkov. Malenkov appeared to revert to the earlier Russian position of placing a ban in sequence with control of atomic weapons rather than agreeing that the two acts or agreements be simultaneous. Malenkov also made the point that the abolition of atomic weapons must involve or be accompanied by conventional disarmament. In any event the Secretary said that it was our feeling that it would be unwise to disconnect conventional weapons and atomic weapons.
The Secretary said that his third point related to how these talks were handled. Should it be through a Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission or through diplomatic talks? He added that the US inclined to the latter. In answer to the Ambassador’s query as to how he visualized diplomatic talks being conducted, the Secretary said he assumed we would meet here in the Department with the Russians. He went on to say that he was not rigid in his preference but that it appealed to him, first, because the atmosphere, tradition, and background of the United Nations Disarmament Commission would make it more difficult to focus on the President’s specific proposal of a “bank” and, secondly because in diplomatic talks it would be easier to control the number of [Page 1332] those participating. At the UN so many nations assert an interest in any subject that it is hard to keep numbers down. He emphasized that at the start it was essential that any talks with the Russians be kept small and private.
The fourth point which the Secretary said he wished to raise was the question of what countries would participate. He said that the US preference was to limit the talks to the Soviets, the British and ourselves. He noted that this raised problems, particularly with respect to the French. Others also have claims and such countries as Belgium and Canada should at a later stage participate. The British Ambassador noted that South Africa would soon displace the Belgian Congo as the largest supplier of fissionable material and he referred to an understanding with the Belgians regarding the provision of material for military as opposed to civilian use. The Secretary reverted to the serious problem which the exclusion of France would create, notwithstanding the fact that France had neither atomic weapons nor raw material. He expressed the fear, however, that exclusion could have serious effects on French attitudes which might be reflected in the Berlin Conference and in France’s future action on EDC. He concluded by stating his tentative conclusion that the United States should alone carry on at this preliminary stage talks with the Soviet Union designed to find out when, where and with whom they wanted to meet. He said that the British would be kept currently informed and that time could thereby be consumed until the Berlin meeting opened at which he would have the opportunity to talk personally to Mr. Eden. The Secretary indicated that he would probably see Ambassador Zarubin in the next few days and expected that the Soviet Ambassador would be in a fishing or probing expedition.
The British Ambassador said that he could answer a few of the last questions raised by the Secretary on instructions which he had recently received from Mr. Eden. He said that the latter had no objection whatsoever to the United States discussing procedure alone with the Russians either before or at Berlin. Mr. Eden was anxious, however, that the atomic talks should not get mixed into the Berlin Conference itself. Moreover, he did want to participate in any talks on substance. The Ambassador went on to say that London had not indicated any preference as between the UN or diplomatic talks as the forum. His Government, however, felt that if the talks were held within the UN framework then there should be two Subcommittees of the Disarmament Commission established (possibly with identical membership), one of which would consider the President’s “bank” proposal and the other would deal with disarmament, both conventional and atomic. Ambassador Makins went on to say that if diplomatic talks were decided upon as opposed to the UN, the [Page 1333] British Government suggested participation by the US, the UK, Canada and the USSR. The Ambassador indicated that he had been somewhat surprised himself at the exclusion of France.
In reply the Secretary reminded the Ambassador of the danger that France might move into the relationship with the Soviet Union which existed during the spring of 1947. He recalled that this relationship was only broken by the fact that tactically the Soviet Union found itself embarrassingly straddled between the French position and Germany with the result that the British and ourselves by throwing our full weight to France in such matters as the Saar succeeded in pulling her back. The Secretary said that he was sure that the Soviets at Berlin would try to re-establish some such relationship with France and that this was an important reason why he was anxious to avoid any appearance of public rebuff to France at this time on the matter of these atomic talks. He would prefer to stall and thereby avoid this possible difficulty. Ambassador Makins said that this line of reasoning seemed very sound. He mentioned that the British were anxious that the Canadians as well as themselves be kept currently informed and assumed that the Secretary had this in mind. The Secretary acquiesced.
The Secretary then pointed out the impossibility of proceeding with our defense plans if we had to treat atomic weapons as something separate from conventional weapons. It would create chaos in our defense planning, if we had to maintain such separation because of the threat of a banning of the use of atomic weapons. He noted that there could be no confidence in the Soviets abiding by any agreement to ban atomic weapons and he elaborated on the physical impossibility of establishing an adequate and acceptable inspection system over all of the Soviet Union, as indicated by the experience of the Swiss-Swedes in North Korea.
The Ambassador then asked if he were correct in understanding that the United States was contemplating no current move in the United Nations on this matter. The Secretary confirmed this understanding.
- See the memorandum of conversation, supra.↩