600.0012/12–2253: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

secret
priority

750. For the Secretary. Due to mechanical difficulty code machine immediately after dispatch Embtel 745,1 could not complete detailed report interview with Molotov.

[Page 1304]

Molotov had nothing to add orally to text he handed me2 but drew my attention to concluding paragraphs, in particular Soviet willingness to take part in conversations suggested by President and announcement Soviet intention to propose in such conversations fact renunciation use atomic weapons (both paragraphs of which are carried in black type in Soviet press today). Although text was clear on this point I thought it prudent to inquire of Molotov if Soviet proposal for renunciation use atomic weapons was in any way a precondition for talks to which he replied it was not and Soviet Government was merely announcing that it intended to make this proposal during the talks and that it would be considered along with and at same time with proposal of United States or any other participating country. I endeavored to ascertain from Molotov whether Soviet Government had any views as to how these private conversations could take place …3 whether through diplomatic channels or under aegis UN since President’s speech had offered both alternatives. Molotov said he had nothing to add to text of statement but left impression that this was not considered a very important point. Text of statement, however, would indicate a preference for government-to-government conversations by reference to “the Soviet Government has always attached importance to direct conversations between governments.” I believe, however, they are awaiting specific suggestions from us as to place and manner of conversations.

Document as whole obviously was most carefully drawn up by Soviet Government and as propaganda document is well-constructed with many points of appeal to world public opinion. While maintaining standard Soviet position concerning necessity abolition atomic weapons, etc., the declaration does, however, reflect a slight shift in Soviet proposal to this end. Previously they had insisted on abolition plus or followed by international inspection under SC veto whereas now, a step on that path, they propose Geneva-type renunciation of its use leaving governments still in possession of military stockpile atomic weapons. Declaration makes quite clear that Soviet Government will raise this proposal in conversations and will undoubtedly insist that it be discussed “simultaneously” along with President’s or other substantive proposal on this subject.

Reaction towards substantive part President’s proposal was to be anticipated in that in Soviet eyes it was probably regarded as means of maintaining superiority of US in military stockpile but arguments used against it are not unskillful from point of view of [Page 1305] public opinion. In general statement is noticeably free from vituperation and makes serious response to President’s proposal.

Chief substantive element of Soviet position will be proposal for immediate conclusion agreement renunciation use atomic weapons without any safeguards such as inspection etc. I assume that this will be unacceptable to us. It would not appear to have much effect on global atomic war since any aggressor cold-bloodedly planning sneak attack would hardly be restrained by piece of paper. Its effect, however, would be extremely important on problem dealing with local aggression since inhibition on retaliation effect use of atomic weapon would remove what is clearly one of strongest deterrents to use of conventional arms in local situation such as Chinese intervention Indochina. Perhaps chief problem we face in talks will therefore be to counter unacceptable Soviet proposal on this point without adverse propaganda effect. On procedure, statement puts next move up to us as to proposals on form, composition and place of conversations which President proposed and Soviets have now accepted.

Incidentally, Soviet press does not carry full text President’s speech but only those parts (2 from New York repeated Department 284)4 which I transmitted to him on December 9.

Bohlen
  1. Supra.
  2. See footnote 4, supra.
  3. Ellipsis in the source text.
  4. Not printed.