Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

600.0012/12–1153: Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions¹

secret

Washington, December 11, 1953—5:39 p.m.

Usito 173. InfoGuide: President’s UN Speech. This is joint State–Defense–USIA message. Further to Usito 164, December 8.²

In follow up exploitation of President’s speech it should be kept in mind that definitive answers to detailed questions will only be reached through the private conversations which the speech invited. Consequently, speculation on such points is to be avoided.

Following is guidance on some general points which may be useful in follow-up of speech:

1. Relations of President’s Proposal to UN (Baruch) International Atomic Energy Control Plan:³

President’s proposal is major effort to break impasse on disarmament; a practical proposal which U.S. determined to explore through UN and elsewhere as appropriate. In no way is it to be construed as negating or replacing other plans or programs toward this end, but shld help give new life to UN Disarmament Commission’s efforts, and serves to reaffirm U.S. determination to explore every possible solution of present impasse.

(FYI: As President’s proposal is flexible and subject to development and modification during “private conversations” not to U.S. interests to develop, or comment on, comparisons with other plans at this time).

2. Re USSR Participation in Plan:

a. As one of states “principally involved”, USSR must participate in “private conversations” re development of plans to expedite peaceful use of atomic energy if any real progress to be made in breaking log-jam on international control of atomic energy by concentrating on potentialities in peaceful uses fissionable material.

b. Whether or not USSR participation in the plan itself is also a prerequisite to plans further development and implementation will largely be resolved after “private conversations” with states “principally involved” have taken place.

(FYI: The question of practicability of proceeding without the USSR in implementation of plan for peaceful use atomic energy cannot be decided by the U.S. alone, but will depend in part upon the result of discussions and attendant exchange of views with other governments. For present, U.S. position is open, hence, it is important to avoid use of material speculating whether or not implementation of President’s conception is contingent upon Soviet participation in plan development.)

3. Re USSR Acceptance or Rejection of Invitation to Participate in “Private Conversations”:

a. Recognize it may take considerable time for USSR to seriously consider and reply. This regard, follow White House statement December 9.⁴

b. It could be tempting to enter into polemics replying to current comment Soviet and satellite press and other similar semi-official or official comments. This not to our interests as it might give support to assertion that primary motivation President’s offer is psychological warfare. Hence, this regard confine comment to official statement of U.S. or other friendly Governments.

c. In event USSR accepts invitation to discussions, U.S. will be pleased and is as Pres said prepared to meet instantly.

d. In event Soviets reject invitation, follow official statements, further guidance will be upcoming.

(FYI: Bohlen has made most serious representations to USSR indicating U.S. grave concern and steadfast hope that USSR can see why clear to join us in this major effort.)

Smith

1. Drafted by Phillips of P and Meyers of UNA; sent to 67 missions.
2. Not printed.
3. Documentation on the “Baruch Plan” is in Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. i, pp. 757–1106 passim.
4. Reference is presumably to a White House press release of Dec. 10 containing a brief statement by Presidential Press Secretary James C. Hagerty. On Dec. 9, a Moscow radio political commentator had said: “It is clear that the United States does not want to bring about an international détente. The warmongering speech of President Eisenhower and the attitude adopted in the United Nations by the United States delegation proves this sufficiently.” In partial response to this comment, Hagerty stated: “We do not believe that immediate reactions to President Eisenhower’s atomic proposal necessarily represent the considered decision of the Soviet Government. After all, the President always recognized that his suggestion would require thoughtful study. Therefore any 24-hour reactions by Soviet officials or by Soviet propaganda media cannot be accepted as anything more than stopgap interim statements. We are still very hopeful that the Soviet leaders will recognize the President’s proposal for what it is—a serious and feasible first step toward atomic peace.” Both the Hagerty statement and the Soviet comment are printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 21, 1953, p. 851.