Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 151 Series

Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)¹

top secret
NSC 151/2

Washington, December 4, 1953.

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on Disclosure of Atomic Information to Allied Countries²

References:

A.

NSC 151 and 151/1³

B.

NSC Action Nos 725, 799, 869, 895, 912 and 974⁴

C.

Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, “Armaments and American Policy,” dated July 28, 1953⁵

D.

Memo for Senior NSC Staff from Executive Secretary, subject, “Armaments and American Policy,” dated February 4, 1953⁶

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator at the 173rd Council meeting on December 3, 1953 adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 151/1, subject to the changes which are set forth in NSC Action No. 974–a.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy contained in NSC 151/1, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith, and directs its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

Also enclosed for Council information is the Second Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Armaments and American Policy of the NSC Planning Board, as amended by the Planning Board.⁷

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure 1]

Statement of Policy by the National Security Council on Disclosure of Atomic Information to Allied Counties

1. Subject to appropriate revision of existing legislation, and to the extent consistent with security considerations, the United States should increase its disclosure to selected allied governments of information in the atomic energy field.

2. The objectives of greater disclosure to our allies are to:

a. Enable them to participate intelligently in military planning for their own defenses and in combined operations with the United States.

b. Inspire them to act with the United States in crises and thus give the United States greater freedom of action to use atomic weapons as required.

c. Enable them to provide more effective non-military defense, such as continuity of government and civil defense, and thus decrease the military and industrial burdens on the United States in the event of war.

d. Continue their cooperation in U.S. atomic energy programs, particularly uranium ore procurement.

e. Continue and if possible increase their nuclear research and development and their contribution to free world development vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc.

3. The information to be made available through appropriate U.S. governmental channels, to the extent required to achieve the above objectives, should include but not be limited to the following categories, provided disclosure is consonant in each case with considerations of security.

a. Weapons Effects. Such information should no longer be limited to the unrealistic nominal weapon concept (the 20 KT bomb) but should reflect the existence of a family of weapons ranging from relatively small yields to the very large. It need not be directly related to existing stockpile weapons, but should clearly reflect a range of yields available to different delivery systems.

b. Tactical and Strategic Use of Atomic Weapons. NATO countries should be given an approximation of the kilotonnage and the numbers of weapons within various yield ranges which will be available for tactical support of NATO forces in the event of war; the tactical use to which the United States would put atomic weapons; the estimated military results from such use; and, in broad terms, those expected results from strategic atomic operations which should influence NATO planning.

c. Soviet Atomic Capabilities Including Stockpile and Delivery. Such information should include estimates of the total kilotonnage available to the Soviet Union as well as the concept of the wide range of yield of varying types of atomic weapons. These data should be as precise as intelligence considerations permit.

d. Military and Non-Military Defense Techniques Related Specifically to Atomic Weapons. Such information should include military defense practices, techniques and capabilities against atomic attack as well as complete interchange of information on civil defense.

e. Scientific and Technical Atomic Energy Information. Such information, materials and equipment should be made available on a classified basis to selected allied countries, particularly to facilitate the procurement of uranium ore. Unclassified information, materials and equipment should be made available to friendly countries to maintain Free World leadership in basic scientific research and development.

4. a. It must be assumed that the rate of leakage to the Soviet Union of atomic information disclosed to allied nations would be very high. This factor has an important bearing on the precise nature of the information to be made available under paragraph 3 above.

b. Because information on the tactical and strategic use of atomic weapons is of relatively high sensitivity, the appropriate U.S. governmental channel for making it available, referred to in paragraph 3 above, is specifically designated as the mechanisms established under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and such information should be kept strictly in military channels. Once removed from the Restricted Data category, this information would appropriately become subject to the procedures, practices, and regulations of the State–Defense Military Information Control Committee.

5. Except as may subsequently be determined to be in the national interest, information in the following categories should not be made available to any foreign governments:

a. Manufacture and Design of Atomic Weapons. Detailed scientific and technical information concerning the manufacture and design of atomic weapons.

b. Numbers of Atomic Weapons. Figures relating to the existing or past U.S. stockpile of weapons.

c. Total Atomic Capability. Information in precise terms respecting the total capability of the United States.

d. Deployment. Details as to the deployment of atomic weapons, except as required to obtain the consent of a country to deployment within that country.

6. Appropriate legislation to carry this policy into effect should be sought.

[Enclosure 2]

Second Report of the ad hoc Committee on Armaments and American Policy (as Amended by the NSC Planning Board)on Disclosure of Atomic Information to Allied Countries

Present Practices

1. In examining whether the United States should increasingly share atomic information with our allies it is necessary first to describe the nature and extent of such sharing at the present time. Five general categories of information can be identified and are discussed below.

a. Consultation on the use of atomic weapons and on the use of allied bases for atomic operations.

. . . . . . .

b. Atomic weapons information.

(1) Restricted Data information on atomic weapons is specifically excluded from the purview of the State–Defense Military Information Control Committee (SD–MICC) which is the agency of this Government having cognizance over the disclosure of military security information to foreign countries. (The terms of reference and the operations of this Committee are set forth in Annex A, paras. 6–22, and in the Appendix thereto.) Steps have recently been taken to make available to NATO a modicum of information concerning atomic weapons. By authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the information cited below is released to allied commanders and certain key staff officers in SHAPE on a strictly need-to-know basis and under the security classification of Top Secret. Data as to numbers are defined as being purely planning assumptions and not as representing stockpile capabilities or actual United States planning allocations. The following types of information are furnished:

(a) As of—————there are—————atomic weapons available for tactical use in defense of Western Eurasia.

(b) All weapons are assumed to be air burst.

(c) Weapons will be retained in custody of U.S. commands.

(d) There is flexibility as to type of weapon (air–artillery) within the number allotted.

(e) The nominal weapon yield is 20 KT.

(f) Various means of delivery available to NATO during FY 1954 (Air Force–Navy–Army) giving specific numbers of each and type of delivery they can accomplish.

(g) Responsibility for determining military significance of target, target approval, and weapon expenditure rests with SACEUR.

(h) Type of tactical support which could be expected from SAC on call.

(i) Instruction in the defense against atomic weapons.

(2) There was recently instituted a NATO special weapons school for senior NATO officers at Oberammergau, Germany, the purpose of which was to give such officers a basic orientation on the principles of employment of atomic weapons in support of land operations. A summary of the subject matter contained in the course is attached as Annex B.

(3) None of the information mentioned above is deemed to include Restricted Data and, accordingly, the sharing of it with NATO allies has not required amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

c. Scientific and technical atomic energy information. The extent to which scientific and technical atomic energy information is shared with other countries at the present time is set forth in Annex A, paras. 46–75.

d. Civil defense. The extent of cooperation with other countries in the civil defense field where information concerning atomic weapons is involved is severely limited. A brief summary of the present situation is set forth in Annex C.

e. Atomic energy intelligence cooperation.…

Objectives To Be Sought in a Program of Greater Disclosure of Atomic Information to Allied Countries

2. To the extent consistent with security considerations, to communicate to selected allied governments knowledge of atomic matters, excluding detailed scientific and technical information concerning the fabrication and design of atomic weapons, sufficient to:

a. Enable them to participate intelligently in the military planning required for their own defenses and in the conduct of combined operations in which those governments serve as active and important allies of the United States.

b. Inspire them to act in concert with the United States in the event of crises, thus tending to permit freedom of action for the United States to employ atomic weapons as the over-all situation may dictate.

c. Enable them to provide an effective program of non-military defensive measures, such as continuity of civil government and adequate civil defense to minimize the effects of enemy attacks on lives, property and industrial production, thus decreasing the military and industrial burdens on the United States in the event of war.

d. Continue their cooperation in programs relating to atomic energy, particularly uranium ore procurement.

e. Continue and if possible increase their nuclear research and development, and their contribution to aggregate free world development vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc.

Categories of Information Relevant to These Objectives

3. Introduction. The list which follows is not intended to be exhaustive but indicative of categories of classified information which it is thought necessary to make available to selected allied governments in order to carry out the objectives stated above.

a. Additional information in connection with diplomatic consultations on the use of atomic weapons. It is not believed that there are any specific categories of information which are required primarily to alleviate difficulties in this aspect of the problem. Information as may be disclosed in the atomic weapons field in connection with NATO planning could be drawn upon.

b. Additional information in the military field.

(1) Weapons effects. Information in this category should not be tied to the now unrealistic nominal weapon concept but should reflect the existence of a family of weapons ranging from the relatively small yields to the very large. Such information need not be directly related to existing stockpile weapons but should clearly reflect the weapons family concept, and a range of yields available to each delivery system.

(2) Numbers of atomic weapons. Apart from the fact that numbers per se are not very meaningful any longer in view of the diversity of size and yield of weapons now in the stockpile, there would seem to be no need for NATO members or other countries to be informed of the extent of our total atomic capability in precise terms. NATO countries should, however, be given an approximation of the kilotonnage and the numbers of weapons within various yield ranges which would be committed to support of NATO in the event of war for tactical use and the estimated military results to be expected from such tactical use, and also from strategic use.

(3) Tactical and strategic use of atomic weapons. In order to have an integrated picture of the full effect of planned NATO operations in the event of war, NATO countries should be given information concerning both the tactical use to which the United States would put atomic weapons and, in broad terms, the estimated results desired from strategic atomic operations.

(4) Soviet atomic capabilities including stockpile and delivery. Information in this category should include estimates of total kilotonnage available to the Soviet Union as well as the concept of the wide range of yield of varying types of atomic weapons. These data should be as precise as intelligence considerations will permit.

(5) Military and non-military defense techniques related specifically to atomic weapons. This category should include information on military defense practices, techniques, and capabilities against atomic attack as well as complete interchange of information on civil defense.

c. Additional scientific and technical atomic energy information. The United States should make scientific and technical information, material assistance, and equipment available on a classified basis to selected allied countries (particularly to facilitate uranium ore procurement). The United States should make similar unclassified items available to friendly countries to maintain Western leadership in basic scientific research and development.

d. Additional atomic energy information for civil defense. It is not believed that additional atomic information specifically designed for civil defense purposes is required provided the kinds of information listed in b and c are made available.

e. Additional atomic energy information for intelligence purposes. It is not believed necessary that additional atomic energy information be disclosed to other nations primarily for intelligence purposes provided the kinds of information listed in b and c above are made available.

Security Problem

4. A program of disclosure of the types of information outlined above gives rise immediately to a number of security problems.

a. Should it be assumed that any and all of the foregoing information if disclosed to a number of friendly countries would in a relatively short period of time become known to the Soviet Union?

(1) It must be assumed as a practical matter that the rate of leakage to the Soviet Union of atomic information disclosed to allied nations would be very high. If this is so, it seems clear that this factor has an important bearing on the precise nature of the information that should be permitted in the above listed categories.

b. How sensitive is the information involved?

(1) By excluding at the outset detailed scientific and technical information concerning the fabrication and design of atomic weapons, it would appear that the types of information indicated above in the military field would not constitute information of very high sensitivity. Information on tactical and strategic use of atomic weapons, however, is of relatively high sensitivity and should be handled under appropriate military security classifications and under security procedures consonant with such classification including a rigid application of the criterion of need-to-know.

(2) With regard to scientific and technical information in the general field of atomic energy, it is not likely that any of the types of information suggested above would carry a very high classification. As information concerning nuclear power reactors becomes more widely disseminated, particularly to industry in this country, it is highly unlikely that it will be advisable to assign any great sensitivity to, or controls over, such information. Certain research reactor designs have already been declassified and are available to the public. A general trend toward more openness is clearly discernible in the nuclear power reactor field. As to sensitivity of materials and equipment which it is suggested should be made available to other countries for research reactors and reactors designed for power production, it would be necessary to insure that these materials and equipment were not transshipped behind the Iron Curtain. Control of material and equipment, however, are rather more readily devised and more dependable than controls over information and ideas.

c. What channels of communication should be used in exchanging these various categories of information?

(1) Information on tactical and strategic use of atomic weapons should be handled through mechanisms established under the Joint Chiefs of Staff and kept strictly in military channels. Once removed from the Restricted Data category this information would appropriately become subject to the procedures, practices, and regulations of the State–Defense Military Information Control Committee which is the agency of this Government having cognizance over the control of military security information to foreign countries.

(2) Programs for technical cooperation with other countries in the atomic energy field generally should be handled by the Atomic Energy Commission.

(3) Civil defense interchange should be handled by the FCDA.

(4) Non-military information such as decrease of urban vulnerability, continuity of government, etc., should be handled by ODM.

(5) Intelligence cooperation would continue to be handled by the CIA.

(6) Weapons-effect information should be handled through the above channels as appropriate in each case.

(7) Diplomatic consultations with other governments concerning the use of atomic weapons and the use of bases for atomic operations should continue to be handled, as in the past, by the Department of State in consultation with the Department of Defense.

d. What security standards should be required of recipient nations? With respect to military information concerning atomic weapons, the security standards and practices applicable to other fields of classified military information should apply (SD–MICC). With respect to information involved in a program of cooperation in the general atomic energy field, the Atomic Energy Commission should establish security requirements consonant with the sensitivity of the information involved.

Legal Obstacles to a Policy of Greater Disclosure

5. With respect to non-atomic information, statutory protection of security information is provided by certain sections of the Espionage Act and the Internal Security Act. These statutes impose penalties on the wrongful disclosure of information to foreign countries. Except in the case of atomic energy information, administrative discretion is exercised by executive agencies with respect to the substance of communication with foreign countries and the procedures involved. With regard to atomic energy information, an additional barrier, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, exists. The effect of the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 is set forth in Annex A, paras 23–45 and 60–70.

6. It seems clear that some amendment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 will be necessary if the objectives set forth above are to be achieved.

Recommendations

7. It is recommended that:

a. To the extent consistent with security considerations, a policy of greater disclosure of information in the atomic energy field, excluding detailed scientific and technical information concerning the fabrication and design of atomic weapons, to selected allied governments be adopted which would achieve the following objectives:

(1) Enable them to participate intelligently in the military planning required for their own defenses and in the conduct of combined operations in which those governments serve as active and important allies of the United States.

(2) Inspire them to act in concert with the United States in the event of crises, thus tending to permit freedom of action for the United States to employ atomic weapons as the over-all situation may dictate.

(3) Enable them to provide an effective program of non-military defensive measures, such as continuity of civil government and adequate civil defense to minimize the effects of enemy attacks on lives, property and industrial production, thus decreasing the military and industrial burdens on the United States in the event of war.

(4) Continue their cooperation in programs relating to atomic energy, particularly uranium ore procurement.

(5) Continue and if possible increase their nuclear research and development, and their contribution to aggregate free world development vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc.

b. The categories of information listed in 3 above be accepted as indicative of the types of information to be made available in order to carry out the policy and objectives stated in 7–a.

c. In proposing legislation in this field, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense should ensure that it is consistent with the policy and the objectives set forth in 7–a.

• Ad Hoc Committee:
  • State—R. Gordon Arneson (Chairman), Edmund A. Gullion
  • Defense—Lt. Col. Edwin F. Black
  • AEC—Roy B. Snapp
  • CIA—Dr. Ralph Clark
  • PSB—Dr. Horace S. Craig
  • FCDA—John DeChant
  • Executive Secretary Carlton Savage (Acting)

Annex A

Paper Prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee on Armaments and American Policy

secret

[Washington, undated.]

Exchange of Atomic Energy Information with Foreign Countries

scope of paper

1. Purpose and Limits. The purpose of this paper is to examine statutory provisions governing the communication of classified information by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense to foreign countries, current programs concerned with the communication of such information, and the relationships among present laws and programs respecting this matter. Special consideration will be given to barriers to further communication under present arrangements.

2. The desirability of modifying existing arrangements to permit increased communication with foreign countries will not be assessed in the present paper.

3. Outline. Arrangements in the field of military security information will be discussed first, then arrangements respecting restricted data atomic energy information. A summary comparison of both fields and their relationships will be presented at the conclusion of this paper.

pertinent statutes

4. Penalties and Restrictions. Statutory protection of security information is provided by certain sections of the Espionage Act, the Internal Security Act, and the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. All of these statutes impose penalties on the wrongful disclosure of information to foreign countries. In addition, the Atomic Energy Act raises special procedural barriers to communication with foreign countries in the atomic energy field and entirely excludes particular categories of information in that field from such communication.

5. Except in the case of atomic energy information respecting which statutory barriers have been imposed, full administrative discretion is exercised by executive agencies with respect to the substance of communication with foreign countries and the procedures involved. Existing arrangements for the exchange of military security information are outlined in the sections immediately following.

state–defense military information control committee

6. Extent of Authority. The State–Defense Military Information Control Committee (SD–MIC), established in 1948 as successor to a similar State–War–Navy Information Control Committee, is the agency of this Government having cognizance over the disclosure of military security information to foreign countries. In March 1951, the Secretaries of State and Defense established in Washington a permanent joint secretariat for the SD–MIC. This secretariat is the focal point in the United States for receiving and processing all requests from United States agencies and activities for authority to release military security information to NATO countries and other countries receiving United States military aid.

7. Under the policies established by SD–MIC, the JCS retain control of strategic planning and guidance information, and specified categories of information may be released through military attaché channels as authorized by the chief of intelligence of the service concerned.

8. Functions. The SD–MIC and its secretariat provide guidance to United States agencies and activities by the issuance or approval of directives which specify in detail what categories of information and what degree of classification within those categories may be released to each specific foreign country. Procedures, delegations of authority, channels for such releases, and the conditions under which releases may be made under existing agreements or treaties between the United States and the nation concerned are prescribed in detail.

9. Procedures and restrictions are designed to insure that no military security information is released to any country until it has been determined that the release conforms to existing authorizations approved by SD–MIC. These authorizations are established only after careful consideration by the various Government agencies concerned. Delegations of authority are limited to specified categories or areas of information and include provisions for referring doubtful questions to higher authority.

10. Restricted data as defined in the Atomic Energy Act are excluded from all such releases by established regulations.

11. Basic Principles. The SD–MIC and the agencies concerned operate on the general principle that military security information will not be disclosed until a number of conditions have been met. Disclosure must be consistent with laws and policies of this Government with regard to atomic energy information and other information to which special restrictions or procedures apply. Military security of the United States must permit disclosure, and disclosure must be consistent with the foreign policy of this country toward the foreign country concerned. The foreign country involved must have a definite need-to-know the information requested, and the information disclosed must be limited to that necessary to accomplish the purpose of the release.

12. Benefits for U.S. It is also necessary that disclosure of the information result in benefit for the United States. Benefits may be in the nature of a specific quid-pro-quo, such as the disclosure to this country of information held by the foreign country. They may also be of a more general nature, such as the furthering of United States military policy for defense of the Western Hemisphere, the North Atlantic area, or other strategic areas, or such as the increase or maintenance of the military potential of the country receiving the information, where this is advantageous to the United States. (See Appendix for examples of permitted disclosures of military weapons information.)

templer–burns agreement

13. Basic Policy. The Templer–Burns Agreement is an understanding reached in 1950 in meetings between a British delegation headed by General Templer and a United States group composed of representatives of the Departments of State and Defense and chair-manned by General Burns to the effect that the two countries should adopt substantially identical policies in regard to the exchange of classified military information between each other and disclosure of such information to other countries.

14. The following basic policy is stated in this agreement:

“The United States and the United Kingdom are agreed that it is in the interests of both countries that there should be a full and frank interchange to the greatest practicable degree of all classified military information and intelligence, except in a limited number of already declared fields, it being understood that either Government may subsequently declare any newly-developed fields or projects as excepted upon due notification to the other Government.”

. . . . . . .

supplemental agreements

18. Security. A security agreement between the United States and United Kingdom chiefs of staff provides that the chief of staff of each country will make every effort to maintain the military security classification established by the authorities of the other country with regard to military information originating in that country or established jointly by the two countries, and that such information will not be disclosed to a third country without mutual consent.

19. Commonwealth Countries. Agreed policy with respect to the release of military information to British Commonwealth countries relaxes provisions of the security agreement to meet the special needs of the United Kingdom with respect to such countries. Special arrangements are set up for a very free exchange of information among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, with the areas of information carefully indicated. Somewhat more restricted agreements are provided with regard to other Commonwealth countries, and drastic restrictions are imposed with respect to a few Commonwealth countries.

20. Joint Board. A United States, United Kingdom, Canadian Military Information Board has been established to resolve problems arising in connection with the disclosure to fourth countries and to NATO of “combined military information,” which term is defined in the agreement establishing the Board. The agreement deals only with combined information and does not prevent any one of the three countries from releasing to NATO its own classified military information.

21. Other Agreements. There are in existence a number of other agreements and treaty arrangements involving the release or exchange of specific categories of classified military information with other countries. These include security agreements between the United States and Australian departments of defense, the United States and Canadian departments of defense, and among the parties to NATO. Restricted data atomic energy information are excluded from these arrangements.

22. Relation to Atomic Energy Act. Any proposed revision of the Atomic Energy Act to modify present provisions in regard to the classification and handling of atomic energy information should be examined in terms of the extent to which the atomic energy information involved could, or would have to, be released to foreign countries under the agreements outlined above. Adjustment of these agreements might be necessary in some cases.

provisions of the atomic energy act

23. Restricted Data. The enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 created a special category of security information—“Restricted Data”—to provide additional protection for information in the atomic field, which was thought to be especially sensitive and vital to the national security. Section 10(b) (1) defines this special category as follows:

“The term ‘restricted data’.… means all data concerning the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons, the production of fissionable material, or the use of fissionable material in the production of power but shall not include any data which the Commission from time to time determines may be published without adversely affecting the common defense and security.”

24. In contrast with other laws concerned with the security of information, the Atomic Energy Act imposes special limitations on communication with foreign countries and specifies in detail procedures that must be followed in certain cases. Relevant provisions of the Act are quoted in the following paragraphs.

25. Policy and Principles. Provisions of the Act establishing the framework for communicating atomic energy information to foreign countries are as follows:

“Sec. 10. (a) Policy.—It shall be the policy of the Commission to control the dissemination of restricted data in such a manner as to assure the common defense and security. Consistent with such policy, the Commission shall be guided by the following principles:

• “(1) That until Congress declares by joint resolution that effective and enforceable international safeguards against the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes have been established, there shall be no exchange of information with other nations with respect to the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes; and
• “(2) That the dissemination of scientific and technical information relating to atomic energy should be permitted and encouraged so as to provide that free interchange of ideas and criticisms which is essential to scientific progress.”

26. To the foregoing “principles,” which were included in the Act as originally enacted, a third was added by amendment of the Act in October 1951:

“(3) Nothing contained in this section shall prohibit the Commission, when in its unanimous judgment the common defense and security would be substantially promoted and would not be endangered, subject to the limitations hereinafter set out, from entering into specific arrangements involving the communication to another nation of restricted data on refining, purification, and subsequent treatment of source materials; reactor development; production of fissionable materials; and research and development relating to the foregoing: Provided:

• “(1) that no such arrangement shall involve the communication of restricted data on design and fabrication of atomic weapons;
• “(2) that no such arrangement shall be entered into with any nation threatening the security of the United States;
• “(3) that the restricted data involved shall be limited and circumscribed to the maximum degree consistent with the common defense and security objective in view, and that in the judgment of the Commission the recipient nation’s security standards applicable to such data are adequate;
• “(4) that the President, after securing the written recommendation of the National Security Council, has determined in writing (incorporating the National Security Council recommendation) that the arrangement would substantially promote and would not endanger the common defense and security of the United States, giving specific consideration to the security sensitivity of the restricted data involved and the adequacy and sufficiency of the security safeguards undertaken to be maintained by the recipient nation; and
• “(5) that before the arrangement is consummated by the Commission the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has been fully informed for a period of thirty days in which the Congress was in session (in computing such thirty days, there shall be excluded the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days).”

27. Unauthorized Disclosures. The provisions of sections 10(b) (2), (3), and (4) prohibit and impose special penalties respecting espionage and sabotage involving restricted data and with respect to disclosure of restricted data “to any individual or person.… with intent to injure the United States or with intent to secure an advantage to any foreign nation.” The term “person” is defined in sec. 18 (c) to include “any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, trust, estate, public or private institution, group, the United States or any agency thereof, any government other than the United States, any political subdivision or any such government, and any legal successor, representative, agent or agency of the foregoing, or other entity but shall not include the Commission or officers or employees of the Commission in the exercise of duly authorized functions.”

28. Relation to Other Laws. The relation of sec. 10 to the provisions of other laws is stated in sec. 10 (b) (6) as follows:

“This section shall not exclude the applicable provisions of any other laws, except that no government agency shall take any action under such other laws not consistent with the provisions of this section.”

communication with foreign countries

29. Barriers. It is apparent, from review of the pertinent provisions of the Act quoted above, that the Act in itself establishes formidable barriers to the exchange of atomic energy information with other countries. It can also be seen that there are provisions in the Act which make the administration of the intended controls over restricted data quite difficult in practice. These matters will be noted in succeeding sections.

30. Basic Policy. The basic policy and intent of the Act with regard to dissemination of atomic energy information are quite clear. Sec. 10(a) states that: “It shall be the policy of the Commission to control the dissemination of restricted data in such a manner as to assure the common defense and security.” This policy is, in effect, a restatement with respect to control of restricted data of the “paramount objective” of the Act, which, as stated in sec. 1(a), is also that of “assuring the common defense and security.”

31. Principles. Although the basic statement of policy is clear, the Act amplifies this policy statement with a number of overlapping principles having a bearing on exchange of information with foreign countries.

32. Section 10(a) (3) (1) expressly bars discussion with foreign countries of data on the design and fabrication of atomic weapons; this appears to be the only absolute prohibition in the Act with respect to any area of information. Section 10(a) (1) prohibits exchanges on information relating to use of atomic energy for “industrial purposes,” but such information may be included in exchanges made under the special procedure established in sec. 10(a) (3), which under specified conditions, permits exchanges involving data on “refining, purification, and subsequent treatment of source materials; reactor development; production of fissionable materials; and research and development relating to the foregoing.”

33. The dissemination of scientific and technical information, according to sec. 10(a) (2), should be “permitted and encouraged,” but presumably not if it reveals information that is otherwise barred. Scientific and technical information may be transmitted to foreign countries under sec. 10(a) (3) procedure, but in the case of the United Kingdom and Canada, it may also be exchanged to some extent under an existing technical cooperation program consistent with provisions of the Act and established prior to the enactment of the Section 10(a) (3) amendment.

34. The Act is silent on the specific question of communicating data on the utilization of atomic weapons to foreign countries, but as is the case with scientific and technical data, communication of weapons data appears to be limited to that information that does not reveal data, such as weapons design and fabrication data, otherwise prohibited.

35. Declassification. Although declassification procedure theoretically offers a means for communicating data to foreign countries, the Commission must be able to determine that the information removed from the restricted data category “may be published without adversely affecting the common defense and security.” While this determination does not necessarily mean that declassifed data will be published, it does means of course, that they are removed from statutory protection. Furthermore, declassification of data amounts to giving to allied countries no more preference than to unfriendly ones.

36. Ambiguity of Principles. Much of the difficulty in administering requirements of the Act respecting communication of information to other countries has arisen from the basic ambiguity and internal conflicts of the “principles” discussed above. This difficulty was explained by the Senate report on the Act, which stated:

“The problems are especially difficult because vital objectives in a sense compete with or are in direct conflict with one another. The common defense and security require control over information which might help other nations to build atomic weapons or power plants (until effective international safeguards are established) and, at the same time, sufficient interchange between scientists to assure the Nation of continued scientific progress. Section 10 expressly states these policy considerations of opposite tendency and attempts to frame a program that will reconcile their apparent divergence.”

37. Existing programs involving the exchange of scientific and technical data will be discussed in succeeding sections of this paper. The problem of communicating restricted data on atomic weapons to foreign countries will be discussed briefly at this point since such data are not included in existing programs either of the DOD or the Commission. The issues that arise in the case of weapons data are similar in a number of respects to those arising generally in communicating restricted data to foreign countries.

atomic weapons data

38. Interpretation of “restricted data.” The restricted data category established by the Act includes all data falling within the statutory definition regardless of whether the data be originated by the Commission, by other Government agencies, or even privately. The Act states that the term “restricted data” means “all data concerning the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons, the production of fissionable material, or the use of fissionable material in the production of power.” Interpretation of this definition and its application in specific cases have been the source of continuing disagreement between the DOD and the Commission. The two agencies have attempted to draw a mutually satisfactory line of demarcation consistent with the Act between restricted data and military security information. However, disagreement persists in a few important areas, such as weapons effects information.

39. In general, the Commission has maintained that the definition is clearly a broad one and was intended to include all data concerning atomic weapons if such data have security significance. The DOD maintains that the phrase “manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons” was surely intended to protect information concerning design and fabrication of such weapons but was not necessarily intended to bring under the restricted data classification as much classified military information concerning the military use of atomic weapons in connection with military operations as the Commission believes is demanded by the statute.

40. Lack of Flexibility. Whatever the exact limits of the restricted data category, the Act places under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission the control of the dissemination of some information in which the DOD, as the agency having basic responsibility for the national defense, has primary interest. This difficulty is intensified by the fact that the Act does not give the Commission any flexibility with respect to classification of restricted data other than to declassify them (and the Commission can declassify only those data that it determines may be published without adversely affecting the common defense and security). The Commission may not transfer information from the restricted data category to any other category of security information. Furthermore, sec. 10(b) (6) is intended, in the words of the Senate report on the Act, to prohibit “any agency from placing information in a restricted category … once such information has been released from the category by official action of the … Commission.”⁸

41. The interest of the DOD in the control of restricted data is reflected in sec. 2(c) of the Act, which requires the Commission to keep the Military Liaison Committee (with the DOD) fully informed concerning a number of matters including “the control of information relating to the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons.” Furthermore, the Act specifically provides for appeal by the Secretary of Defense to the President in the event that “any action, proposed action, or failure to act of the Commission on such matters is adverse to the responsibilities of the Department of Defense.” However, while providing some recognition of the responsibilities of the DOD, such an appeals procedure is clearly no remedy for problems arising from the Act itself.

42. Barrier to Communication. Although there is no provision in the Act which in so many words prohibits the communication to foreign countries of restricted data concerning the utilization of atomic weapons, it appears, as noted above, that communication of such data is barred to the extent that the data are revelatory of other information that may not be communicated. For example, since sec. 10(a) (3) (1) bars discussion of data on weapons design and fabrication, data on utilization of weapons that reveals information on their design and fabrication may presumably not be made available even to allied countries.

43. While there is possibly an area of restricted data concerning the utilization of atomic weapons that does not reveal information in prohibited areas and that might be communicated to allies under present provisions of the Act, it is likely that such an area would at best be limited, and certainly it would by no means approach the extensive collaboration with allied countries permissible in other areas of military information.

44. Effects. The inhibiting effects of the Act on communication of information to foreign countries extend into existing arrangements for the exchange of military information with the United Kingdom, Canada, and other allied countries. With considerable uncertainty existing as to the extent of authority to communicate data in the atomic weapons field, atomic energy restricted data have been excluded from existing arrangements for exchanges of military information with other countries. At the same time, the increasing impact of atomic weapons on military weapons systems and military operations is leading to a situation wherein atomic weapons activities and military operational activities are becoming practically inseparable.

45. Should it be considered desirable to seek revision of the Act to clarify authority respecting communication of atomic weapons data to foreign countries, any proposed amendment should be examined in terms of its relationships with other provisions of the Act to assure that such relationships would not prove to be continued barriers. For example, if the restricted data category were abandoned completely but there remained in the Act a bar to the communication to foreign countries of information on the design and fabrication of atomic weapons, such a prohibition might still operate as a barrier to communication on utilization of weapons.

technical cooperation with u.k. and canada

46. Modus Vivendi. The existing Technical Cooperation Program for exchanging scientific and technical information with the United Kingdom and Canada is based on the modus vivendi agreed to by those countries and the United States January 7, 1948. This agreement, which superseded wartime agreements, provided for the continuation of the tripartite Combined Policy Committee as the instrument of the three countries “for dealing with atomic energy problems of common concern”; laid the basis for continued collaboration in the raw materials field; and stated:

“It is recognized that there are areas of information and experience in which cooperation would be mutually beneficial to the three countries. They will therefore cooperate in respect to such areas as may from time to time be agreed upon by the CPC insofar as this is permitted by the laws of the respective countries.”

It was also agreed that classified information in the atomic energy field would not be disclosed “to other governments or authorities or persons in other countries without prior due consultation.”

47. An annex to the modus vivendi recognized special arrangements for cooperation among the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries in a limited number of areas of research and of raw materials development. Recognition of these areas of Commonwealth cooperation did not involve agreement to the release by the United Kingdom and Canada to other Commonwealth countries of information furnished by the United States under the modus vivendi.

48. Base for Program. The modus vivendi was entered into on the basis of agreement within the executive branch of this Government, and after consultation with the legislative branch, that the United States could properly enter into such an undertaking provided that this Government was satisfied that it would be in the interest of the national security to do so. The program of technical cooperation entered into under the modus vivendi was also based on the Governmental decision that such a program was justified by and consistent with the paramount objective of the Atomic Energy Act and the basic policy of the Act relating to control of information.

49. Areas of Cooperation. The Technical Cooperation Program has from the beginning been limited in its scope. When the modus vivendi was entered into by the three countries, they also agreed on the following nine areas in which it appeared at the time that cooperation would be mutually beneficial: (1) declassifiable subject matter; (2) health and safety; (3) isotopes; (4) nuclear and extra-nuclear properties of the elements; (5) detection of distant nuclear explosions; (6) reactor materials; (7) extraction chemistry; (8) design of power reactors; and (9) low-power reactors. General definitions were agreed to for these areas.

50. No new areas have been added since the original agreement, and at the present time, only six of the areas under the original arrangement are active.

51. Active Areas. The six active areas are health and safety, isotopes, detection of distant nuclear explosions, reactor materials, extraction chemistry, and low-power reactors. Area (1) has never been utilized since it pertains to information that has largely been declassified. The opening of area (4)—properties of the elements—has been a topic of almost continuous discussion over the last five years, but agreement has not been reached as to opening this area to active cooperation. Cooperation was initiated but has been abandoned in area (8), power reactors. Activity in area (5), detection of distant nuclear explosions, is very limited since little can be done without involving matters relating primarily to weapons.

52. Topics Within Areas. The nine areas of cooperation have been considered by this Government to be general areas, and acceptance of them was not considered to constitute a commitment to exchange any particular information within any of the areas. In the implementation of the program, the active general areas have been further defined to include specific topic for cooperation.

53. Particular proposals for exchange are reviewed to assure that they fall within these topics and that they conform to an administratively established criterion that has been stated as follows:

“While recognizing that a distinction between atomic energy matters of military significance and of non-military significance cannot be clearly made, all exchanges under this program shall be governed by the general criterion that information directly and primarily related to weapons or to the design or operation of plants for the production of weapons materials or weapons parts is not subject for discussion.”

Basic metallurgy of plutonium is also excluded from discussion.

54. Since the policy has been to exclude exchanges of information in the production field, exchanges have been confined to the fields of research and development.

55. Activities Under Program. The principal activities under the program fall into the following categories: visits by official scientific representatives of the cooperating countries for classified discussions with the scope of the active areas of the established program; irradiations of special materials and equipment in reactors; the transfer of classified research and development reports; and the making available of isotopes and instruments.

56. Administration. General supervision of the program is the responsibility of a subgroup of the CPC known as the Sub-group of Scientific Advisers on Technical Cooperation. United States membership on this body includes representatives of the AEC and the DOD. With respect to day-to-day activities under the program, the DOD has primary responsibility for cooperation under the area relating to detection of distant nuclear explosions, and the Commission has primary responsibility for the remainder of the program. In practice, both AEC and the DOD must agree as to the propriety of specific exchanges. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is kept fully informed on activities under the program.

57. Limitations on Program. In recommending amendment of the Atomic Energy Act to provide, in the section 10 amendment, a procedure for exchanging information with foreign countries under special circumstances, Joint Committee stated in its report:

“The committee of course intends that the section 10 amendment have no retroactive but only prospective application.… In particular, the existing technical cooperation arrangement of the United States with Great Britain and Canada, which has its roots in the War-time partnership between the three countries, remains unaffected.”

58. This statement provides clear Congressional endorsement for continuation of the Technical Cooperation Program at least in the limited areas covered by the existing agreement with the United Kingdom and Canada. However, there may be some disagreement as to whether specific activities should be undertaken under the Technical Cooperation Program or under the procedure established by the section 10 amendment.

59. Expansion of the program, should such be considered desirable, would not only raise a further question as to the relationship of the program to the sec. 10 amendment but would also involve a previous commitment to the Joint Committee. In 1949, when the program was under discussion by the three countries, the Secretary of State advised the Joint Committee that “continuation would not involve any expansion of the present nine areas of cooperation.” In view of this statement, the addition of new areas to the program would require full prior consultation with the Joint Committee. As a practical matter, justification for such an expansion would probably have to be based on findings similar to those required by the sec. 10 amendment.

section 10 amendment

60. Background. In 1951 there arose the need to exchange information with the Canadians in the field of feed materials processing. This information could not be exchanged under the Technical Cooperation Program, and in view of the prohibition of sec. 10(a) (1) of the Atomic Energy Act on exchange of information with respect to use of atomic energy for industrial purposes, there was doubt as to the authority of the Commission to enter into a new arrangement covering this matter. The Commission placed the problem before the Joint Committee, and a Committee-sponsored amendment was enacted in October 1951.

61. The section 10 amendment authorizes exchanges of information in all fields of the Commission’s operations from the refining of feed materials through the production of fissionable materials but expressly prohibits exchanges of information on the design and fabrication of weapons. Information concerning the utilization of weapons is not mentioned in the amendment.

62. Exchanges Under Amendment. Two exchanges have been undertaken under the sec. 10 amendment, one with Canada and one with the United Kingdom. A third exchange is expected to be completed in the near future.

63. Practical Difficulties. While the amendment establishes a legal basis for exchanges of information with any country except, of course, one threatening the security of the United States, it interposes a number of obstacles in the way of such exchanges.

64. In the first place, the amendment establishes a cumbersome procedure involving review by the National Security Council, approval by the President, and submission to the Joint Committee for a 30–day waiting period. This procedure not only creates a considerable administrative burden but also makes the authority under the amendment unavailable for emergency use.

65. Secondly, the information to be exchanged must be “limited and circumscribed to the maximum degree consistent with the common defense and security objective in view.” The meaning of this requirement will, of course, have to be ascertained in individual cases. However, in view of this requirement it is not clear that the sec. 10 amendment would be useful for establishing areas of continuing cooperation with other countries or that it would be useful for conducting exploratory discussions with other countries.

66. Thirdly, the Commission must be able to make the finding that the recipient nation’s security standards applicable to the data communicated to that nation are adequate. While this finding can be made with respect to exchanges susceptible to narrow compartmentalization, it would probably be very difficult at the present time to make such a finding with respect to a foreign country’s security standards over-all.

67. Comparability of security standards has been the subject of a series of conferences and exchanges of visits among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. This country has also undertaken to assist Belgium in security matters.

68. Unresolved Problem. An unresolved problem confronting the Commission having a bearing on the sec. 10 amendment is that raised by countries supplying source materials to the United States. The desire of such countries to participate in possible industrial benefits of atomic energy is reflected in contractual arrangements. For example, the agreement with Belgium states:

“9. As regards the use of the above mentioned ores as a source of energy the following arrangements shall apply:

“(a) In the event of the Governments of the United States of America and of the United Kingdom deciding to utilize as a source of energy for commercial purpose ores obtained under this agreement the said Governments will admit the Belgian Government to participation in such utilization on equitable terms.”

Whether communication of information necessary in connection with achieving “equitable participation” can be accomplished under present provisions of the Act is not yet resolved.

data in raw materials field

69. Programs. Cooperation in the raw materials field with the United Kingdom and Canada, which is carried on under the modus vivendi with those countries but not as part of the Technical Cooperation Program, includes exchange of certain information relating to exploration for and beneficiation of ore. In addition, in order to make possible explorations for source materials by other countries and to facilitate the extraction and processing of materials by countries involved in the supply program, the Commission communicates to such countries information in the raw materials field, such as geological and mineralogical data and information respecting the extraction, recovery, and beneficiation of materials. Furnishing such information is essential to assure an adequate raw materials supply. Restricted data are involved in certain of these exchanges.

70. Protection of Information. When security information is transmitted, it is with the understanding that the recipient country will accord it adequate protection. The Commission has helped certain countries develop appropriate personnel security, document security, and physical security arrangements. It should be noted that where information on processing is involved, the information exchanged relates only to that process suitable to the kind and grade of ore to be processed; general access to processing data is not permitted.

joint declassification program

71. Purpose. Since 1947, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada have cooperated in a program for controlling the declassification of commonly held information in the atomic energy field. The program was undertaken in order to assure comparability of treatment of such information by the three countries with a view to forestalling the declassification by one of the countries of information considered sensitive by another. This program does not serve as a medium for exchange of information among the countries.

72. Conferences. The joint declassification program has been implemented through a series of annual joint conferences, the last of which took place at Chalk River, Canada, in April 1953. United States representatives at the conferences generally include the Director and Deputy Director of Classification of the Commission and members of the Committee of Senior Responsible Reviewers.

73. As a result of these conferences, a Joint Declassification Guide has been established and is kept up-to-date. The conferences provide an opportunity for mutual consideration by the three countries regarding interpretations of the declassification guide and proposals for its revision.

74. Limitations. The standard terms of reference for the conferences state: “No classified information not already known to all parties concerned will be discussed.” The commonly held information which can be discussed is largely that remaining from the period of wartime cooperation and that shared under the Technical Cooperation Program.

75. As the pool of joint wartime information diminishes and as advances are made in areas in which there is now no communication among the three countries, the usefulness of the joint declassification program is being seriously restricted, and the assurance of comparable treatment of information by the three countries is being reduced. Under these circumstances there is a real possibility that one nation may reveal information without fully realizing its significance.

summary

76. Statutory protection of security information is provided by certain provisions of the Espionage Act, the Internal Security Act, and the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. In according special treatment to atomic energy information, the Atomic Energy Act created the restricted data category and imposed a number of barriers on communication with foreign countries. Except in the case of atomic energy information respecting which such barriers have been imposed, full administrative discretion is exercised by executive agencies both with respect to the substance of communication with foreign countries and the procedures involved. Information may not be transferred from the restricted data category to any other category of security information.

77. Consistent with the provisions of the Internal Security Act, an extensive system for exchange of military security information with other countries is in effect. The Departments of State and Defense, through the State–Defense Military Information Control Committee, exercise primary control over such exchanges. The degree of disclosure permitted respecting military security information under existing arrangements varies from almost unrestricted disclosures to the United Kingdom and Canada to practically no disclosure except as specifically authorized in the case of countries not allied to the United States by mutual defense or military assistance agreements.

78. Separated from other security information by the Atomic Energy Act, restricted data are defined by the Act to include “all data concerning the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons, the production of fissionable material, or the use of fissionable material in the production of power.” The Act establishes the basic policy that dissemination of restricted data shall be controlled by the Atomic Energy Commission in such a manner as to assure the common defense and security. The Commission may declassify restricted data the publication of which it determines would not adversely affect the common defense and security.

79. With respect to communication of restricted data to foreign countries, the Act completely excludes disclosure only in one area, design and fabrication of atomic weapons. However, this prohibition together with other provisions, which are to some extent ambiguous and conflicting, have the effect of greatly restricting communications in other areas as well.

80. The Commission and the DOD have attempted to draw a mutually satisfactory line of demarcation consistent with the Act between restricted data and military security information, but disagreement persists in a few areas as to what specific information falls into the restricted data category. As a result of uncertainty as to the extent to which the Act permits communication to foreign countries of such information as restricted data on utilization of atomic weapons, the inhibiting effects of the Act on interchange of information extend into agreement for exchange of military information with the United Kingdom, Canada, and other allies, and restricted data are excluded from the approved areas of exchange under such agreements.

81. The principal continuing program for exchange of classified scientific and technical data in the atomic energy field is the Technical Cooperation Program with the United Kingdom and Canada, which was established under the modus vivendi with those countries and which permits exchanges only within strictly delimited areas. Activities in this program are carried on under the general supervision of the Subgroup of Scientific Advisers (which includes representatives of the DOD and the Commission) of the tripartite Combined Policy Committee. Not as part of the Technical Cooperation Program but also under the modus vivendi, data in the raw materials field are exchanged with the United Kingdom and Canada. Under the Commission’s raw materials program, specialized data in the raw materials field are also communicated from time to time to other countries involved in the supply program.

82. Other exchanges of information are permissible under the Act through a cumbersome procedure involving review by the National Security Council, the President, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. However, even after review and approval by these parties, exchanges under this procedure may be made only on a limited and circumscribed basis.

83. Examination of the need for communication of information to foreign countries, a matter not within the scope of this paper, is also important in identifying problems in this area. The statutory barriers and the programs discussed in this paper do, however, indicate the present limits within which such needs as may arise must be met.

Appendix to Annex “A”

Military Weapons Information

1. Disclosure to Foreign Nations. Under the cognizance of SD-MIC permitted disclosures of military weapons information to foreign nations follow the general pattern shown in succeeding paragraphs. It must be remembered that these permitted disclosures are not automatic. Each disclosure must conform to all the policies, procedures, conditions and limitations established or approved by SD–MIC. Except for the routine disclosure of information of low sensitivity which clearly falls within the scope of delegated authority, each disclosure must be approved by SD–MIC after having been coordinated with and approved by interested agencies. Further limitations are indicated in the following paragraphs.

2. United Kingdom and Canada. Disclosure of military weapons information of all classifications through Top Secret including weapons research and development information is permitted.

Note: British Commonwealth Nations are considered as separate nations. United States information disclosed to either United Kingdom or Canada will not be passed on to other Commonwealth nations except as agreed by the United States pursuant to policies established by the Templer–Burns Agreement and the United States–United Kingdom and United States–Canada security agreements.

3. NATO Nations. Any disclosure made must be determined to be essential to the achievement of North Atlantic Treaty defense objectives. When determined to be essential to NATO defense objectives, disclosure of military weapons information of all classifications through top secret is permitted. Weapons research and development information is excluded except information pertaining to new equipment which has reached the engineering test (pilot model) stage of development.

Note: Military information in certain categories of higher sensitivity is not released to NATO nations but is made available to non-United States members of SHAPE and its major commands on a strict need-to-know, highly restrictive, and compartmentalized basis. Restricted data atomic energy information can be made available only to United States members of these headquarters.

4. Australia and New Zealand. United States disclosure of military weapons information classified no higher than secret is permitted. Weapons research and development information is excluded.

Note: Specific agreements with United Kingdom and Canada concerning United Kingdom or Canadian release of information of United States origin to Commonwealth nations permit release by United Kingdom or Canada to Commonwealth nations of certain United States research and development information. For example: The United Kingdom may release to Australia such United States research and development information on guided missiles as is necessary for the development of United Kingdom-Australian guided missile program.

5. Other Allied Nations. Disclosure of military weapons information to other nations allied to the United States through specific mutual defense, military assistance or Western Hemisphere defense arrangements is limited to information classified no higher than confidential which pertains to weapons already furnished or programmed to be furnished these nations individually and which is deemed necessary for the adequate use or production of the weapons.

6. All Other Nations. No disclosure of classified military information is permitted unless its release is approved by SD–MIC.

[Here follow Appendixes “B” and “C”, a description of the Senior Officers’ Course at the NATO Special Weapons School (Oberammergau, Germany), and a paper discussing “The Foreign Civil Defense Relations”.]

Annex D

August 7, 1953.

Collaboration with the UK on Atomic Energy Intelligence

1. Close collaboration is maintained with the UK Atomic Energy Intelligence Organization on intelligence against the common enemy, i.e. the Soviet Bloc. Interchange in this field is reasonably complete for both raw intelligence information and finished intelligence reports, including a copy of the periodic JAEIC report, “Status of the Soviet Atomic Energy Program” with required security deletions (latest issue NSIE 1–B). In addition an extensive interchange of semi-finished intelligence (working papers and evaluation and interpretation of bits of evidence) is carried out through the medium of memoranda and personal contacts. The usual restrictions on source and operational information, of course, apply.

2. The legal restrictions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 as amended are encountered only when the analysis or interpretation of the intelligence information is made in terms of U.S. practices. Section 10 of the Act was amended in October 1951 to allow the communication of certain categories of Restricted Data to foreign governments when the common defense and security would be promoted. Elaborate and cumbersome procedures were established for obtaining authorization for the transmission of this material. The law specifically forbids the communication of Restricted Data on the design and fabrication of atomic weapons. When an urgent intelligence requirement has existed, the provisions of the law have been utilized to obtain the necessary authorization for the transmission of the Restricted Data.

3. Two points are most important in considering this matter.

a. Atomic Energy intelligence information on the Soviet Bloc is not Restricted Data. Only when U.S. practices are introduced in processing or interpreting the data does it become Restricted Data.

b. The requirement for the transmission of Restricted Data for atomic energy intelligence purposes must not be confused with the question of the technical interchange of atomic energy information between the U.S. and UK Atomic Energy Programs. The intelligence requirement for the communication of Restricted Data is relatively small and occurs mostly in the area of collaboration on scientific methods of intelligence collection.

4. While the full and free collaboration in atomic energy intelligence is handicapped to some extent by the restrictions of the Atomic Energy Act, in most cases satisfactory collaboration could be obtained within its framework.…

1. Copies to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Directors of the Bureau of the Budget and Central Intelligence, the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.
2. For related documentation, see pp. 1 ff.
3. NSC 151, May 8, is printed on p. 1150. NSC 151/1, Nov. 23, 1953, is not printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 151 Series)
4. For NSC Action No. 725, see footnote 6, p. 1114; for NSC Action No. 799, see footnote 4, p. 1174; for NSC Action No. 869, see footnote 3, p. 1185. NSC Action No. 895, Aug. 27, and Action No. 912, Sept. 17, 1953, neither printed, merely noted oral reports to the NSC by C. D. Jackson. NSC Action No. 974, taken at the 173d meeting of the NSC on Dec. 3, 1953, constituted adoption of NSC 151/1, with amendments, as NSC 151/2. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Records of Action”)
5. See footnote 2, p. 1184.
6. This memorandum transmitted the Report of the Panel of Consultants, p. 1056.
7. Regarding the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee, see the memorandum by Lay, Mar. 12, p. 1134. The Ad Hoc Committee forwarded its Second Report to the NSC on Oct. 27, 1953 (memorandum by Lay to the NSC, Oct. 27, and enclosure). On Nov. 18, Lay transmitted to the NSC Planning Board a draft statement of policy on “Armaments and American Policy—Disclosure of Atomic Information to Allied Countries”, which had been prepared by the Senior Staff on the basis of the Ad Hoc Committee’s Second Report. This draft statement, along with the Second Report itself, were then transmitted by Lay to the NSC on Nov. 23, as NSC 151/1 and subsequently amended by NSC Action No. 974, as noted in footnote 4, above. Copies of the Lay memoranda of Oct. 27 and Nov. 18, with enclosures, are in S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, “Armament (NSC 151)”.
8. Ellipses are in the source text.