PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “NSC 153–162, Sept–Dec, 1953”
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)1
- Subject:
- Review of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 162/1)2
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views regarding the amended draft statement of policy proposed by the National Security Council Planning Board entitled “Review of Basic National Security Policy” (NSC 162/1).
2. In their memorandum for you, dated October 6, 1953, subject as above,3 the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their comments and recommendations regarding the preceding draft statement of policy on this subject, NSC 162. They note that NSC 162/1 incorporates the amendments agreed to by the Council after consideration of the various proposed revisions to NSC 162, except for that one pertaining to subparagraph 8–a (1) of NSC 162 (subparagraph 9–a (1) of NSC 162/1). The Joint Chiefs of Staff assume that, in general, it would not be appropriate to reiterate those revisions recommended by them in their memorandum dated October 6, 1953, which have not been incorporated in substance in the amended draft policy statement. However, they do recommend that subparagraph 9–a (1) of NSC 162/1, which now reads,
“A strong military posture, with emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power;”
be changed to read,
“A strong military posture to include the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power;”
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended this wording in their memorandum for you dated October 6, 1953.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also recommend that:
- a.
- In the third line of subparagraph 9–a (2) of NSC 162/1, the word “or” be changed to read “and”. It is essential that the U.S. have forces adequate to accomplish both functions, not one or the other.
- b.
- In the last sentence of subparagraph 35–a of NSC 162/1, the last eight words which read “and cannot be furnished by the United States” be deleted. As written, the sentence is illogical because the word “largely” is not entirely consistent with the last clause. Furthermore, the statement is inexact since the U.S. can and may have to furnish ground forces despite our desire to avoid doing so (i.e., as in Korea).
4. With respect to subparagraph 15–b of NSC 162/1, part of the revision recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been accepted and a part rejected, with the result that, while the sense of the subparagraph as now drafted is not entirely clear, it appears to lead to the conclusion that current NATO objectives with respect to the defense of Western Europe in the event of general war [Page 564] cannot be achieved, a conclusion which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider not to be justified at this time. The impact of this conclusion upon our European NATO partners, should it become known, will be readily obvious. In order to remove the possibility of such an interpretation, and in the interest of arriving at phraseology which would reflect the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and at the same time be acceptable to the NSC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that subparagraph 15–b of NSC 162/1 be deleted and the following subparagraph substituted. (For convenience, that part of the subparagraph which has been changed is indicated by underscoring.4):
“b. In Western Europe the build-up of military strength and the progress of economic recovery has, at least partially, remedied a situation of glaring weakness in a vital area. NATO and associated forces are now sufficient to make aggressive action in Europe costly for the USSR and to create a greater feeling of confidence and security among the Western European peoples. However, even though significant progress has been made in building up these forces, the military strength in Western Europe is presently not sufficient to prevent a full-scale Soviet attack from overrunning Western Europe. Even with the availability of those German forces presently planned within the framework of EDC, present rates of defense spending by European nations and present rates of U.S. military assistance certainly could not be expected to produce forces adequate to prevent the initial loss of a considerable portion of the territory of Western Europe in the event of a full-scale Soviet attack. Therefore, since U.S. military assistance must eventually be reduced, it is essential that the Western European states, including West Germany, build and maintain maximum feasible defensive strength. The major deterrent to aggression against Western Europe is the manifest determination of the United States to use its atomic capability and massive retaliatory striking power if the area is attacked. However, the presence of U.S. forces in Western Europe makes a contribution other than military to the strength and cohesion of the free world coalition.”
5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed and are in general agreement with the policy considerations and conclusions which have been added to the draft statement of policy.
6. Subject to the revisions recommended in paragraph 2, 3 and 4 above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that NSC 162/1 is acceptable as a statement of policy to supersede NSC 153/1.5
Brigadier General, USA
Secretary
- The source text is accompanied by a covering memorandum from Lay to the National Security Council dated Oct. 28 with copies sent also to the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Directors of the Bureau of the Budget and Central Intelligence; the Chairmen of the Council of Economic Advisers, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator. In this memorandum Lay indicated, inter alia, that the memorandum was being circulated in connection with consideration of NSC 162/1 by the Council at its meeting on Oct. 29, 1953. For the memorandum of discussion at the 168th meeting of the NSC on Oct. 29, see p. 567. NSC 162/1 is not printed. For text of NSC 162/2, Oct. 30, see p. 577.↩
- Not printed.↩
- See footnote 3, p. 517.↩
- Printed here as italics.↩
- Dated June 10, p. 378.↩