Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Review of NSC 68 & 114”

Memorandum by Robert W. Tufts of the Policy Planning Staff

top secret

[Washington,] May 21, 1952.

Memorandum Concerning Review of U.S. Political–Military Strategy

1. An NSC drafting committee has now completed a first draft of a study entitled: “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security: A Preliminary Reappraisal of NSC 68 and 114 Policies”.¹ This is in response to NSC Action 575c, October 17, 1951, which “Directed the Senior NSC Staff to submit for Council consideration at the earliest practicable date a reappraisal of the policies and programs set forth in the NSC 68 and 114 Series, including a revision of Part I of NSC 114/2 and in the light of (1) Further analysis of Soviet atomic capabilities as indicated by the recent explosion of another atomic bomb in the U.S.S.R., (2) the current evaluation of the net capability of the U.S.S.R. to injure the continental United States.”

2. There has been a further analysis of Soviet atomic capabilities, but the project to arrive at a net evaluation of the net capability of the U.S.S.R. to injure the continental United States has not yet been completed. Nevertheless, the Steering Committee of the NSC Senior Staff decided that it was necessary to proceed on a preliminary basis with the work called for by NSC Action 575c.

3. The drafting committee has not had access to a large body of information which relates directly and significantly to a reappraisal of NSC 68 and 114 policies. This includes information relating to the atomic tests scheduled for this fall; to the problem of civilian defense; to the tactical uses of atomic weapons; and to accomplishments in the field of research and development which may greatly affect both our defensive and offensive potentialities. Largely because of its lack of access to this information but partly for other reasons which are not self-evident, the present draft study is almost wholly irrelevant to the major issues on which this Government must take decisions within the coming months. It would be, in S/P’s opinion, positively harmful for the NSC to proceed with the consideration of the present draft study with a view to its eventual approval as a reappraisal of NSC 68 and 114 policies.

4. The paper does not consider, for example, such questions as:

a. The risks associated with this fall’s atomic tests;

b. The implications—in terms of relative military strength—of successful tests;

c. The exploitation of a radical shift in our favor in power ratios;

d. The implications of the foregoing for political and military policies;

e. A reconsideration in light of the above of our objectives in peace and war and the conditions of a peaceful settlement;

f. The relation to the foregoing of the actual and potential strength of our civilian defenses and of accomplishments in the field of research and development.

5. The paper also does not consider the relation of such specific problems as Berlin and Germany, Iran, Indochina, and Korea to our general strategy, even though much work has been going on through NSC channels which indicates that developments in such specific situations may have a strong and perhaps decisive influence on the conduct of our general strategy.

6. In light of the information available to it, S/P believes that the General Conclusions of the draft study are inadequate, misleading in some respects, and inaccurate in others.

7. In S/P’s opinion, there is a need for a high-level review of national political-military strategy in the light of developments since the completion of NSC 68 and foreseeable future developments. This review should be made by a group having access to the relevant information. When NSC 68 was prepared, the State–Defense Working Group had very little to go on and broke almost entirely new ground. Now there has been much thought on many aspects of the problem and it is important for one group to draw together all the bits and pieces in order to see what they add up to. It should be possible to define our problems and to make recommendations with much greater precision than was possible two years ago. Such a group should include representatives of State, Defense, and JCS and should be able to consult as necessary with other departments and agencies, notably AEC, and with private citizens who have knowledge of importance to the group’s work (such as the participants in Project East River).²

8. S/P believes that the present NSC project should be dropped after discussions with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Executive Secretary of the NSC and if necessary the President and after agreement with them on the setting up of a group to make a review of the kind indicated above.

1. Not printed; a copy of this 62-page study is in the S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167, “NSC 114.” The reappraisal of the NSC 68 and 114 Series under reference culminated in NSC 114/3, infra.
2. Project East River was sponsored by the Federal Civil Defense Administration, the National Security Resources Board, and the Department of Defense to evaluate the vulnerability of the United States to atomic attack and the steps needed to reduce this threat. The Project published 10 volumes during the summer and autumn of 1952, and all parts except III and IV were released to the general public in January 1953. An exhaustive review and discussion of Project East River, “The Strategy of Civil Defense” is in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. IX, September 1953.