Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1

S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 148, “Solarium”

Memorandum to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay) ¹

top secret

Washington , July 22, 1953.

• Subject:
• Project Solarium

• Reference: NSC Action No. 853–c²

In accordance with NSC Action No. 853–c, summaries of Project Solarium presentations and written reports, prepared by the NSC staff and concurred in by Solarium Task Force representatives, are submitted herewith as a basis for discussion by the Council at its meeting on July 30, together with a summary of the principal points made during discussion following the presentation to the National Security Council on July 16, 1953.

As background, there follows a brief summary of the instructions to the Task Forces defining the three alternative policies which they were asked to develop:

[Here follow summary instructions which appear at the beginning of the summaries of the Task Force presentations included in the enclosure.]

[Enclosure]

Summaries Prepared by the NSC Staff of Project Solarium Presentations and Written Reports

top secret

[ Washington , undated.]

Task Force A

1. Mission

a. As directed, the policy of the U.S. would be:

(1) To maintain over a sustained period armed forces to provide for the security of the United States and to assist in the defense of vital areas of the free world;

(2) To continue to assist in building up the economic and military strength and cohesion of the free world; and

(3) Without materially increasing the risk of general war, to continue to exploit the vulnerabilities of the Soviets and their satellites by political, economic and psychological measures.

b. For purposes of analysis and study by the Task Force, it is assumed that this policy would be interpreted and administered on the following bases:

(1) Time can be used to the advantage of the free world; if we can build up and maintain the strength of the free world during a period of years, Soviet power will deteriorate or relatively decline to a point which no longer constitutes a threat to the security of the United States and to world peace.

(2) In seeking to deter and oppose further expansion by the Soviet bloc, the policy would include the utilization of military operations, as necessary and feasible, even at the grave risk of general war. However, an attempt would be made to localize such military operations as far as possible.

2. Method of Approach

Task Force A arrived at the conclusion that there are areas in which significant improvements could be made within the framework of NSC 153/1.³ The Task Force believed that we have reached a critical point in the application of our grand strategy, and in the Soviet situation, which marks a phase line. Task Force A believes the U.S. is today in a position to assume the strategic offensive in its conflict with Soviet Communism. The U.S. should move forward from today’s phase line to rectify imperfections in our strategy; give it new confidence, boldness and constructiveness; recapture flexibility; effect better integration; and improve implementation. It is felt that the policy thus revised would give the greatest assurance as against other possible alternatives for the successful disintegration of the Soviet threat without recourse to general war, and without increasing the risk of general war.

3. Analysis of the Soviet Threat

The Soviet Union has developed a strong and dangerous military posture serving political leadership we recognize as hostile, resentful of American power, dedicated to aims incompatible with our security. The threatening quality of this military posture arises from the strength and disposition of these forces, coupled with the attitude of the Soviet political leaders, and above all, their ideological commitment to the destruction of western capitalism in processes which involve at some point the use of violence. Soviet predominance in eastern and central Europe makes impossible a restoration of normal conditions of full stability to Europe as a whole, and has contributed extensively to the development of the military posture we find disturbing. Furthermore, the possibility exists that additional nations will be brought under communist control through the activities of indigenous communist factions, acting with or without overt support from Moscow. In addition to the military threat posed by conventional Soviet armaments there is increasing evidence that the Soviet Union is developing a strong capability in the field of weapons of mass destruction. If this process continues unimpeded, the Soviet leaders will soon have it in their power to inflict massive damage on the cities, industries and facilities of this country and its major allies, although presumably not without suffering retaliation in kind.

4. Basic Objectives of U.S. Policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Threat

a. Assure the security of our country in the light of the Soviet military posture.

b. Prevent further Soviet expansion through seizure of additional countries by local communist minorities.

c. Reduce the area under Soviet control, first and foremost in the satellite area in central and eastern Europe. In addition, in the long term, bring about a situation in which China would no longer be dominated by a regime allied with Moscow in a framework of ideology hostile to the U.S.

5. Suggested U.S. Policy with regard to the USSR

“With the assistance of Allies to achieve through progressive steps and without undue risk of war, but recognizing that the threat of war must not inhibit our unfolding courses of action, a stop to Soviet expansion; the diminution and progressive retraction of Soviet control over its East European Satellites and Red China; the discrediting of Soviet power and Communist ideology as effective instruments of Soviet foreign policy; and a maximum contribution to the increase in internal stresses and conflicts within the Soviet system; to the end that the Soviet rulers will be forced to accept the necessity of adjusting their objectives to those of peaceful co-existence with the free world.”

6. Other Elements in the World Situation

There are two other basic factors in the situation which must be considered. One is the rising discontent and resentment against the West, particularly in Asia, and the demands for rapid social and economic change which characterize the so-called socio-economic “revolution” which exists throughout the world. This exists quite apart from Soviet-Communist threat but is effectively exploited by Communism. The second is the reduction of the bi-polarity which has dominated the world situation since 1945, and is indicated by a decline in U.S. prestige and leadership during the past several years, growing independence of action by other free nations and, on the Soviet side, developments which have had a somewhat comparable effect in weakening Moscow’s range of influence. Both of these considerations must be met with positive and constructive policies which utilize, rather than oppose them. They point to the crucial importance which may attach to courses of U.S. action in the immediately forthcoming period. Thus Task Force A sees, in this regard:

a. As the first principle, the U.S. to avoid policies which give impression it is solely pursuing aims which have essentially wartime objectives and that it feels war is inevitable;

b. As the second principle, the U.S. to create the impression of steadiness and reliability in formulation and implementation of foreign policy; and

c. As the third principle, the positive emphasis of U.S. policy to be placed on strengthening U.S. position with other free world countries and in the creation of strength and confidence in free world.

7. Courses of Action Proposed

a. Maintenance of U.S. strength

The risk of general war is not high. Acceptance, however, of a calculated risk that the Soviet Union will not resort to war, which would lead to a reduction in our defense establishment cannot be accepted. Our military program should continue to be related to Soviet military capabilities for general war, and not become captive to the zigzags of Soviet political policy. The Task Force came to the tentative conclusion in regard to present mobilization plans that the portion of the economy proposed for allocation to the war effort in the event of full mobilization is too high to be realistic (a peak of 66 percent of the gross national product) and recommended study by the responsible agencies.

b. Peripheral war may be increasingly unlikely in the near and mid-term future. However, U.S. efforts to prepare military, political and psychological deterrents to aggression should include:

(1) Considering the question of announcing that the U.S. will feel free to use atomic weapons in case of local aggression in the future and,

(2) Emphasizing the development of indigenous forces capable of maintaining internal order within countries which are likely targets.

c. There is need to generate increased public understanding on the vital importance today of military power as an instrument of policy for peace, its deterrent value and its confidence building aspects.

d. NSC 153/1 courses of action to support the objectives of military preparedness are accepted in general with the following additional recommendations:

(1) It will be necessary to commit resources not yet programmed for security purposes in order to build up the continental defense of the U.S. rapidly.

(2) The possibility that our governmental processes may inhibit a policy of immediate retaliatory action in an atomic war should be studied.

(3) The external political-military aspect, with particular reference to western Europe, of the effect of Soviet possession of a massive destructive capability in time of tension approaching a war crisis should be studied.

(4) The danger of disruption of our civilian population through mass exodus from target areas in time of rising tension with Russia should be investigated.

(5) A new over-all look should be taken at the whole impact of special weapons on our security program (including mobilization base, manpower reserves, civilian defense, etc.) from the standpoint of 5 or more years from now.

(6) NSC 153/1 is defective in providing a human resources policy. Such should be given status by the NSC of the same order as policy concerning industrial resources.

(7) NSC 153/1 is unclear as to the extent the U.S. security program and policies depend on allies.

(8) Study should be initiated to include:

a. Clearer determination of the extent of the dependence of our over-all security program on allies.

b. Continuation of the stress in our forward strategy of collective security.

c. Recognition of, and establishment of U.S. policy regarding, the dependence of our allies upon us for maintenance and replacement of equipment in peacetime.

d. Face up to the very substantial logistical dependence of our allies on the U.S. in case war should come and a balancing of our programs and plans accordingly.

8. Costs

a. The main internal threat seen by Task Force A is the danger of lack of constancy in our security program. A creeping disarmament might prove even more dangerous than was the outcome of post World War II demobilization. Positive actions must be initiated to draw public support so as to link various components of the Soviet threat with the services, sacrifices, tax-payments, etc., which the U.S. people need to provide to meet that threat.

b. It is difficult to see how the military build-up of ourselves and our allies programmed until the end of last year can in fact be effected under current forward budget planning.

c. Out of a summation of those factors which are likely to add up to an increase, it is estimated that the cost of Task Force A’s course of national policy will exceed during the build-up period the funds allocated to the security program as currently contemplated in the most recent budget planning.

d. In the long run the Task Force program will cost not materially less than about 40 billion annually and may be somewhat higher. There appears no other realistic solution than to maintain a see-through constancy of preparedness until we have had a long continued demonstration that the spirit and intent of Soviet communism has changed—or even longer, until we effectively regulate armaments.

9. Maintenance of the Economy

a. After studying the ability of the economy to sustain the security load, Task Force A concludes that there is no question that our country has the economic capacity to provide a high plateau of preparedness—certainly the program envisaged by Task Force A—over a sustained period (interpreted as 10 years or more).

b. The real threat from the economic standpoint, arises not so much from the absolute cost of security as from other dangers which include:

(1) The effect on adequate legislative action of the unprecedented absolute cost of the peacetime security program.

(2) The effect of possible economic recession.

(3) Lack of economic readiness for mobilization, general war, and atomic attack on the U.S.

c. NSC 153/1 fails to provide directives or policy guidance for those preparatory economic and industrial mobilization arrangements within the executive branch which are consistent with its stated policy of military readiness.

d. On the national debt, the main question is whether it is likely to become so high as to be a threat to the strength of the U.S., but any likely threat existent in the debt does not seem comparable to the Soviet threat.

e. It is seriously questioned that in the face of an unbalanced budget and the current security need in an economy operating at around full normal capacity, there is any urgent economic argument for reducing the total of federal taxes. The continuation of taxes at the present or higher levels is recommended. The U.S. seems certainly to have the tax structure, debt situation, and general fiscal capability to sustain the security load which seems likely under the program of Task Force A. The tax problem appears to be primarily a political and psychological problem. This makes it part of the problem of gaining public support for an adequate program for security.

f. It is questioned that the economic policy expressed in NSC 153/1 is based on a completely correct estimate of the true nature of the economic threat to the U.S. way of life under the policy contained in that paper. It is recommended that the economic portions of NSC 153/1 be restudied.

10. Maintenance of Free Political Institutions

a. U.S. objectives in this field should continue to be:

(1) The assurance of the vitality and soundness of our own institutions.

(2) The creation of adequate public understanding and support for our policies with relation to Soviet power, and

(3) The provision of appropriate safe-guards against subversion through methods consistent with the maintenance of a vital and democratic system.

b. There is considerable apprehension abroad that American governmental processes and public life are falling extensively under the influence of psychological and political trends which Europeans regard as totalitarian in nature. It is felt that the full significance of this development has not yet been generally appreciated by our government and public. Unless a drastic reversal of this impression can be achieved the long-term psychological consequences must be expected to be extremely serious; so much so as to nullify a good portion of whatever positive measures the U.S. Government may take to offset the Soviet danger.

11. Strengthening the Free World

a. Success in strengthening the free world is of an especially great significance in the case of the national policy supported by Task Force A, because there is much less of the element of unilateral U.S. action involved than in the suggestions made by other Task Forces.

b. Task Force A’s case rests on a proposition that the free world can construct a system far superior than that of our enemies. If it is done while maintaining the necessary posture of military strength, the back of the Soviet problem will be broken.

c. Major Courses of Action:

(1) A strong drive to develop a greater sense of common purpose and mutual interest with countries outside the Soviet Orbit.

(a) Repose an increasing degree of responsibility on our NATO allies to determine what they are prepared to do for their own defense.

(b) Promote economic expansion by trade liberalization in Western Europe, off-shore procurement of military end items, interchange of technical know-how, stimulation of American private investment, and maximum use of the International Bank and the Export-Import Bank.

(c) Develop a dramatic concept, inspiring to both industrialized and underdeveloped countries, and involving private initiative, to establish programs for the economic development of materials and markets in underdeveloped areas.

(d) Review and revise East-West Trade policies. Substantially the same course is recommended as that outlined in Alternative⁴ of NSC 1524 except as to the policy to be applied to communist China.

(e) Make a major effort to reduce and liberalize barriers to imports into the U.S.

(2) A more selective approach to building strength in the Far East and the Middle East.

(a) Many of the countries in these areas do not posses the ingredients from which strength can be built.

(b) A few of them do possess the necessary potential. We should therefore concentrate on making the most of the potentialities of such countries.

(3) A vigorous attack on the most troublesome situations which are blocking progress to strengthen the free world.

(a) Free Europe. An integrated foreign policy with regard to Western Europe is recommended as a vital component of an effective national strategy for the U.S. to meet and thwart Soviet designs.

(b) Germany. The future of Germany is, in a large part, the determinant of the future of Europe. A new approach to the problem of German reunification is recommended which can exploit and intensify present Soviet internal stresses and achieve, in due course, the first major roll back of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe. Specifically, the Task Force proposes the following course of action, in three parts:

i. As first part, the preparation, as a matter of urgency, of a strong and plausible U.S. negotiating position on the reunification of Germany in which our stated negotiating objectives are:

(A) A reunified, sovereign, independent Germany with a democratic form of government.

(B) The provision of realistic safeguards to prevent the Soviet-Communists from holding any abnormal advantages over the West in respect to Germany.

(C) The provision for Germany to have military forces except for any form of atomic or other weapons of mass destruction.

(D) As a maximum position, the removal of all foreign occupation forces from Germany, or as a minimum position the concentration of foreign forces in enclaves capable of direct supply by sea.

(E) Discussion of and conclusion if possible of an Austrian peace treaty (with its implications for the Soviet military position in Hungary and Roumania) and discussion aimed at withdrawal of Soviet forces in Poland.

(F) Intention to maintain closest contact with West German opinion and to have West and East German representatives participate in the negotiations among the four powers.

ii. As the second part, the disclosure and advocacy of this position, first with the British and French Governments, next with the German Government and leaders of important parties, and finally, with the Soviet Government at the coming Four Power Meeting this autumn.

iii. As third part, independent of but concurrent with the steps regarding reunification, efforts to effect the early and direct rearmament of West Germany. In order not to prejudice negotiations for reunification, this rearmament should take place outside the EDC and outside NATO, but with the concurrence of the NATO Council.

(c) France. The weakness and unsatisfactory performance of France lies at the root of many of most serious problems faced by the U.S. in Europe. This has not been adequately faced by the Government in the past. As a major and urgent recommendation, it is suggested that U.S. policy should be to repose responsibility on France, and to initiate this policy by removing, progressively and tactfully, the support from the U.S. to which she now looks to bail her out of perennial crises. There should be a carefully worked out course which focuses world opinion at French responsibilities; informs France of our intent gradually to cease supporting French overcommitments; makes clear our intent to regain independence of U.S. action now inhibited by French fears; but stresses our intent to continue to help France in situations she cannot realistically meet alone. High level discussions are needed.

(d) Weakening of U.S. Prestige and Leadership in Europe. In order to correct and alleviate the following is recommended:

i. Continuity of U.S. actions which fit into a plausible and persuasive totality of policy or national strategy.

ii. Greater emphasis put by the U.S. Government on prior discussion with interested European Governments before taking specific actions affecting them (though not compromising any essential U.S. positions).

iii. Clarify worries as to future U.S. intentions.

iv. Reduce direct interference by the U.S. in European National affairs by involving ourselves directly in only the major and vitally important problems and dealing with them on a high level.

v. Reduce U.S. technical staffs and missions.

vi. Understand the divergent assessments of the Soviet threat made by Western Europe and avoid pressing for a rate of military build-up in Europe which too greatly exceeds the natural intentions or capabilities of Europeans.

(e) The Unification of Western Europe.

i. U.S. policy on this is unclear. A study by the Executive Branch is recommended to formulate guidance on the broad form and scope of the future politico-economic systems in Europe which would be most desirable from the standpoint of the U.S. national interest.

ii. Greater progress toward European unity and cohesion can now be best achieved by relaxation of direct and overt U.S. pressures to such an end.

(f) Economic Expansion.

i. Considerable economic expansion within Europe and in world trade backed by expanding markets is an essential element to building strength in Europe. This may be aided by certain careful relaxations of certain East-West trade policies.

ii. Of even greater importance is the energetic development of alternative sources of raw materials within the free world. Specific projects to this end should be pushed and supported.

(g) Colonialism. The U.S. finds itself in the anomalous position of being identified in Asia as imperialist and the supporter of Western European colonialism and in Europe as hastening the break-up of colonial relationships. This necessitates increasing coordination within the U.S. Government to assure that each pertinent decision to take a specific action reflects wise and comprehensive evaluation of both aspects of the colonial problem.

(h) China.

i. A major objective of the U.S. is to bring about changes in China to eliminate its present threat to free world security, with the ultimate objective of the development in China of an independent government friendly to the U.S. and the free world. The following general policies are proposed:

(A) Regard Communist China consistently as a hostile power and maintain political and economic pressures short of outright military intervention against her until Korea and Indochina are settled to our satisfaction.

(B) Maintain the island chain off the East Asian mainland within U.S. strategic defenses.

(C) Foster the prestige and power growth of Japan as a dominant power in Asia friendly to the U.S.

(D) Continue support of Formosa, to provide not only for its self defense, but, for the existence of an effective strategic reserve for possible offensive action in an expanded war situation in the Far East.

(E) Hold South Korea and support its indigenous forces while seeking the political unification of Korea.

(F) In Southeast Asia, provide major assistance to France and Indochina to effect a favorable solution to the Indochinese war.

(G) Concentrate our major aid and political efforts on helping build strength in selected countries where a basis for such development already exists, and restricting our assistance to others to a very moderate effort aimed at assisting in creating the basic elements of political maturity.

ii. An interim post-armistice policy toward China would involve:

(A) No recognition or treatment of Communist China as other than a hostile power by the U.S. until settlement of Korea and Indochina.

(B) Continuance of U.S. total embargo on trade until Korea and Indochina are settled.

(C) Every feasible effort to secure continuance of present restrictions on trade and other relations by other free nations until Korea is settled.

(D) Keep issues out of UN insofar as possible, with a flat stand of no discussion of China’s entry into UN until Korea and Indochina are settled.

(i) Japan.

i. Our policy should be directed toward making that country a main bulwark of free world in the western Pacific. It is necessary that a program be developed which will enable Japan to make her way in the world after U.S. extraordinary expenditures there are greatly induced. We shall have to be prepared to give substantial economic aid if the Korean war should end before such a program is developed.

ii. Further policies include: Promotion of Japanese trade in the Southeast Asia area, recognition of the necessity that Japan must trade actively with the mainland of China if she is to maintain economic strength, and removal of barriers to imports of Japanese goods into the U.S. and other free world nations.

(j) India and Pakistan. It is possibly unwise to attempt to build up substantial military strength in this area. Stepped up special economic aid of a development nature would have a most important psychological effect.

(k) Indochina.

i. Communist control of Southeast Asia would critically endanger U.S. and free world security interests. The immediate key to retraction of Communist strength in the area is Indochina. This problem involves as much our policy problems with France as our opposition to Communist advance. We must at the highest political level seek the following commitments from France:

(A) To make specific announcement regarding the future relationship of the Associated States with the French Union in order to promote popular support and leadership within Indochina for the war effort.

(B) To recognize and fulfill her obligations for the successful defense of Indochina as a crucial front in the struggle of the West against Communist advance.

(C) To regain the military initiative against the Viet Minh with revitalized and aggressive military and political leadership.

(D) To provide sufficient French forces in addition to creating effective indigenous forces to bring the Indochina war to an early conclusion, with the recognition that she will not be able to function as the keystone of NATO as long as Indochina remains a drain on her resources.

(E) To permit the U.S. to take an active part in the development and training of the indigenous forces.

ii. There is great danger that France, contemplating the eventual loss of her present position in Indochina, will lose the will to continue that costly war. We should therefore undertake the support of a substantial part of the cost of stepping up action. In return we should insist that France and the Associated States contribute to the maximum extent of their capabilities.

(l) The Middle East. Task Force A recommends the following:

i. A greater content of reserve, impartiality and objectiveness in our overt dealings with Middle East problems with a clear willingness to assist where needed and when asked.

ii. A greater effectiveness in advancing economic development, specifically in the resettlement of the Arab refugees from Palestine, and on the Tigris–Euphrates project. UN agencies, especially the World Bank, should be the vehicles used, to allay local suspicions of direct American interference.

iii. A relaxation of pressures to form the Middle East Defense Organization until greater political maturity in the area is reached. Some small arms aid to assist in the creation of forces to maintain internal order may be provided, but should not be administered by large American military missions.

iv. Continuation of moderate assistance to the Point IV type to such countries in the area where it can help the slow development of political maturity and stability.

(4) A continuation of our foreign aid programs.

12. Reduction of Soviet Power

Under the broad objective of reducing Soviet power, stated in NSC 153/1, lie the dual aims of reducing both the ability and the intent of the Kremlin to exercise this power so as to threaten free world security. These aims must be pursued simultaneously. Vulnerabilities of the Soviet Bloc should be exploited by various covert and overt means. The U.S. should seek to convince the Kremlin of the fallacy of the fundamental concepts upon which their policies are based, while simultaneously trying to persuade the Soviet leaders that it is not too late to turn back from their present course.

13. Establishment of International Order

The UN [U.S.] should continue to take an active and helpful part in all UN proceedings. Our participation in the U.S. [UN] in recent years has been marked by an excessive zeal with too little recognition of world realities. This tendency should be corrected.

14. The Development of Sound Negotiating Positions with the USSR

Various changes in the Soviet Union policy demonstrate significant fluctuations of Soviet policy in the direction of a more disarming posture. The U.S. must be careful how we treat such relaxations of the Soviet attitude. It is extremely important that we do not appear to show ourselves as the people who want the cold war to continue, or the people who appear to lag behind the Soviet leaders in their readiness to effect the solution of outstanding problems by negotiation. We must have an effective stance with relation to the problem of negotiation. Any conceivable progress toward a more peaceful world will actually require at some point, and in some respects, formal agreement with the Soviet Union. Positions of strength as a background for negotiation must be built with the understanding that some concessions may be necessary to achieve results, although not at the expense of our overall position of strength.

Appendix

Summary of suggested actions by the Government in areas of Congressional legislation and proposed further studies.

1. Recommended Congressional actions:

a. A tax program yielding revenues at about the fiscal 1953 level.

b. Modification of existing tariff laws to liberalize restrictions upon imports into the U.S.

c. Passage of proposed legislation for the simplification of customs regulations.

d. Standby legislation, at an appropriate time, for economic stabilization.

2. Recommended further studies:

a. Restudy industrial mobilization plans with a view to bringing estimates of the proportion of the economy which can be diverted to prosecution of global war realistically into line with what U.S. economy under full wartime mobilization controls can provide.

b. Appraise the defense program as viewed from five years hence anticipating the changes in our defense programs which will be occasioned by new weapons, techniques and tactics, and ensuring that they are taken into account back through the logistical chain into the mobilization base.

c. Manpower policy and plans to give better assurance of provision of quantity and caliber of personnel required and to assure, for a period of full mobilization, that the manpower program is consistent with the industrial program and the program for continental and civil defense.

d. A study of the future maintenance costs of allied military equipment and a program of aid by the U.S. to meet the costs not capable of being borne by certain of our allies.

e. A study of the logistical dependence of allies upon the U.S. in time of war, and provision for their needs in U.S. plans.

f. Development of an economic program for Japan to assist in restoring that country to economic stability after present extraordinary expenditures by the U.S. in connection with the Korean war are greatly reduced.

g. A new policy and plans for the reunification of Germany, including military plans for changed requirements for the deployment of U.S. forces in Europe.

h. A study of the extent of dependence of our military program on allies and the relationship of this dependence to priorities in allocation of resources.

i. Suggestions for inclusion of added topics in studies now being undertaken concerning U.S. continental defense.

j. A study as to the mid-term or long-term systems of political and economic organizations in Europe best meeting U.S. interests and providing a context into which liberated satellites may fit. This study is to provide long range guidance for U.S. policies.

Task Force B

1. Mission

As directed the policy of the U.S. would be:

a. To complete the line now drawn in the NATO area and the Western Pacific so as to form a continuous line around the Soviet Bloc beyond which the United States will not permit Soviet or Satellite military forces to advance without general war;

b. To make clear to the Soviet rulers in an appropriate and unmistakable way that the United States has established and is determined to carry out this policy; and

c. To reserve freedom of action, in the event of indigenous Communist seizure of power in countries on our side of the line, to take all measures necessary to reestablish a situation compatible with the security interests of the United States and its Allies.

2. Method of Approach

a. The policy is, in final analysis unilateral.

b. An Aggression which would bring on general war would be no trifling border incident but armed aggression that would be clearly recognized as such by the President and the people of the U.S. as well as the free world as a whole.

c. General war is defined as a war in which the U.S., assisted by those allies it might have at the time, would apply its full power whenever, however, and wherever necessary to defeat the main enemy, and to achieve its other war objectives.

d. Alternative “B” furnishes a new frame for the fabric of U.S. policy, but does not replace the myriad of threads that now go to make up that fabric. Alternative “B” would accept may of the concrete recommendations of Alternatives “A” and “C”, modifying them only as necessary to accommodate one new premise: The warning of general war as the primary sanction against further Soviet Bloc aggression.

e. Alternative “B” requires the U.S. to maintain for the foreseeable future the military capability necessary to meet the Soviet Union in general war. This is an expense that must be borne by any policy that purports to insure the security of this country. Any suggestion is rejected that there is a place in the atomic age for a U.S. military establishment having less offensive power than that which the rulers of the Soviet Union must regard as an unacceptable risk in war.

f. Alternative “B” is essentially a means for bringing the full measure of U.S. power into play to deter Soviet aggression over an extended period. It is proposed as a support, rather than a substitute for existing policies. Within its framework, there is room for great flexibility in the conduct of U.S. policy in all of its other aspects; for example, as regards treatment of individual countries in Western Europe, or as regards competition between Asia and Europe for U.S. attention.

3. Analysis of the Soviet Threat

a. The United States must accept as fact that the nations of the free world are confronted with a Soviet-Communist philosophy and program of conquest which, if unchecked, will result in the loss of their independence and the destruction of their free institutions.

b. The U.S. policy of reacting to Soviet pressures and aggressions as they have appeared at one point or another on the periphery has not been entirely successful. It will be less so in the future. Overriding atomic considerations confront the U.S. with two major alternatives: either a preventive war while the U.S. has a wide lead in atomic weapons or the adoption of a policy that will do most to insure the longest possible period of peace. Preventive war is rejected. The second alternative presupposes that changes within the Soviet Bloc, and in the balance of basic forces in the world, can be made to serve the cause of freedom. Alternative “B” is based on the latter consideration.

4. The Line of No Aggression

a. No satisfactory close-in line was found which would include only the “minimum” areas necessary to U.S. security, without consideration of present obligations, sentiment or past associations. The U.S. now depends on its overseas alliances for a most important, perhaps critical, part of its military capability. Hypothetical gains of freedom of action would become meaningless.

b. No line was found which would exclude any large areas as not absolutely vital to U.S. security, while not discarding the overseas military bases which are so very important for the present, and without banding large industrial resources to the Soviet Union. It is proposed that the line be drawn along the borders of the present Soviet Bloc, filling the gaps in the Middle East and South Asia which are not covered by current NATO and other commitments, as well as clearing up final uncertainty as to U.S. intentions under these alliances.

c. The “Two Worlds Concept” is rejected as undesirable and impractical.

d. The policy of Alternative “B” is, therefore, restated as follows:

(1) That any advance of Soviet Bloc military forces beyond the present borders of the Soviet Bloc be considered by the United States as initiating general war in which the full power of the United States will be used as necessary to bring about the defeat of the USSR and the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc.

(2) That the United States make known publicly in an appropriate and unmistakable way that it has established and is determined to carry out this policy.

(3) That the United States reserve freedom of action, in the event of seizure of power by indigenous Communist forces in countries beyond the borders of the Soviet Bloc, to take all measures necessary to re-establish a situation compatible with the security interests of the United States and its allies.

5. Predicted Effects of the Policy

a. A clear indication that further military aggression by the Soviet Bloc would result immediately in general war will reduce the likelihood that such a war will occur.

b. The policy makes most effective use of U.S. power, and exploits Soviet weakness.

(1) It will reduce the effectiveness of Communist power politics and penetration in free countries. It renders subversion of a free country more difficult.

(2) It will make clear that the U.S. does not hire others to fight its war for it, and will provide a firmer basis for U.S. relations with other free world countries.

(3) It will assist the growth of dependably anti-Communist regional groupings of nations.

(4) It will on balance strengthen the United Nations.

(5) It will on balance improve the basis for resistance to Soviet domination in satellite countries.

(6) It provides a safeguard against aggression by Communist China, while also providing a basis for friction between the Chinese Communists and the Kremlin.

(7) Alternative “B”, although it will be most effective in maintaining stable peace over a period of years, offers considerable assistance also in the settlement of the current peripheral wars in Korea and Indochina.

c. The proposed policy clarifies the principal purpose of U.S. forces and enables their most economical development and maintenance.

d. By clarifying the principal purpose of U.S. military forces, and the circumstances in which they would be employed, the U.S. will similarly clarify the size and nature of other necessary military forces around the Soviet periphery.

e. The proposed policy will find the U.S. and the free world best prepared to conduct a general war if it is in the Soviet scheme that there must be one.

6. Costs

Alternative “B” will help stabilize the economy of the free world, by stabilizing the cost of defense and providing a confident political atmosphere for economic development. It is not contended that this alternative enables free world defense expenditures in the long term to be reduced from present levels, but it is contended that it will stabilize defense requirements, furnish a better basis for public understanding of them, and above all, provide a framework for most rewarding expenditure of the money that is in fact made available.

Since Alternative “B” rules out peripheral wars, its military costs will in the long term be less than the cost of any alternative that accepts such wars—by the amount those wars cost. The cost of a general war is not in question; all alternatives aim at preventing it.

Whatever our defense necessities, they must be met. Task Force B is in agreement with A and C that the upper limit on the ability of the U.S. to bear the costs of defense and of a minimum civilian economy, in case of ultimate need, is not the danger of national bankruptcy, but the capacity to produce gross national product. Whatever the evils of inflation, whatever the economic problems involved in efforts to control it, these cannot be weighed in the same scales with the great danger to our national survival.

7. Soviet Reaction to Alternative “B”’s Policy

a. They will most probably adopt a defensive posture.

b. Soviet economy will not adjust quickly to meet the policy, or derive any particular economic advantage from it during the next decade. Economic strength of the USSR will not nearly obtain parity with that of the U.S. in the foreseeable future, nor will the relative economic position of the USSR vis-à-vis. the-U.S. improve to a degree involving an unacceptable risk to the U.S.

c. As further Soviet Bloc expansion is made more risky by a U.S. policy which clearly defines the retaliatory threat of general war, Soviet leadership must reckon with the latent risk of losing control over its own masses in a war which would bring destruction directly upon them.

8. Implementation

The policy must be announced in terms which emphasize that a decisive step has been taken. To have the desired effect on the rulers of the USSR, and on the free world, it is essential to drive home the point that the U.S. stands solidly behind its proclamation. A joint Resolution of Congress will be the most powerful means of making this point. It is important to attract maximum support from U.S. allies, as well as to explain and defend the policy in the UN with the understanding that it is subject neither to the veto of our allies or of the UN.

Task Force C

1. Mission

As directed the policy of the U.S. would be:

a. To increase efforts to disturb and weaken the Soviet Bloc and to accelerate the consolidation and strengthening of the free world to enable it to assume the greater risks involved.

b. To create the maximum disruption and popular resistance throughout the Soviet Bloc.

2. Method of Approach

As a result of their analysis of the Soviet threat, the Task Force has established the necessity of courses of action developed in three distinct phases. The basic problem was to correlate the timing of actions by the United States against the time when the Soviet Union will be capable of dealing a destructive blow to the United States (five years). The short-term period during which specific tasks are recommended is set at five years. The mid-term period is set at seven years beyond the end of the short-term. For this period no specific tasks, but rather general courses of action, are recommended. The long-term is that period beyond the mid-term, with no set terminus. No specific tasks or courses of action are recommended, but U.S. ultimate objectives are summarized, which should be obtained during this period.

3. Analysis of the Soviet Threat

The Task Force concludes from a study of the Soviet threat that time has been working against us. This trend will continue unless it is arrested, and reversed by positive action.…

4. Basic U.S. Objectives

Under this policy the general peacetime objectives of NSC 153/1 are accepted, but the wartime objectives are added. The basic purpose of national security policies remains unchanged: to maintain the fundamental American values and institutions which rest on the essential dignity and worth of the individual in a free society. Similarly, the objectives which call for building of U.S. military and nonmilitary strength, protecting a strong U.S. economy, and calling for free political institutions and informed public opinion, are maintained.

Instead of preventing “significant expansion” of Soviet Bloc power (NSC 153/1), the alternative is categorical as to preventing any further expansion. In reducing Soviet power this alternative calls for this action “without, however, initiating general war” instead of the stipulation of “without unduly risking a general war” of NSC 153/1. In adding U.S. war objectives to our peace objectives, the following aims result:

a. Ending Soviet domination outside traditional borders.

b. Destroying the Communist apparatus in the free world.

c. Curtailing Soviet power for aggressive war.

d. Ending the Iron Curtain.

e. Cutting down the strength of any Bolshevik elements left in Soviet Russia.

These latter objectives are considered the true objectives of the United States. NSC 153/1 does not provide for their attainment other than by recourse to general war. The policy of Alternative Claims [C claims] to achieve them through cold war, although admittedly running greater risk of general war.

5. Major Policies and Guidelines to Govern Courses of Action

a. Prosecute relentlessly a forward and aggressive political strategy in all fields and by all means: military, economic, diplomatic, covert and propaganda.

b. Evolve and maintain a military policy that will support the strong political line until a real and permanent decision has been secured.

c. Establish, perfect and employ an executive cold war machinery that can plan and execute a dynamic program of action.

d. Continue integration and build-up of all elements of anti-Soviet strength.

e. Exploit to the fullest, use of military forces as instruments of national policy to achieve political, propaganda and prestige objectives by both military and diplomatic means.

f. Utilize the technical and productive genius of the United States combined with the power of our matchless industrial plant, our skilled manpower and a largely self-sufficient economy.

g. Educate the public of the U.S. in the nature of our enemy, the threat to our freedoms and existence and the necessity for intense and sustained attack against our real political enemy, the Kremlin group.

h. Employ negotiations as a means for exploiting favorable developments and improving our political position but bar those in which the United States would be on the defensive or which could risk loss of certain vital elements of strength and position.

i. Prosecute initially a large part of our intensified cold war covertly using a national program of deception and concealment from public disclosure and Soviet discernment as to the depth and extent of our challenge.

j. Miss no opportunities to confuse and unbalance our enemy nor any to discredit him: within his own borders, in the eyes of our public and in satellite and international circles.

k. Attain limited but definite time-phased objectives of an operational nature leading progressively to more comprehensive distant objectives.

l. Limit political commitments so that the United States can retain its initiative and freedom of action and exercise free world leadership.

6. Summary of Political, Economic and Military Considerations

a. The policy is one of dynamic political warfare designed to create a climate of victory which will encourage the free world and attract doubting nations to our side. It exploits the principle that nothing succeeds like success.

b. The free nations need early tactical victories in order to reverse the trend of Communist successes.

c. The policy is a departure from our traditional concepts of war and peace. It requires Congressional and popular support of the costs of building a stronger military establishment than presently contemplated. It requires an increased tempo of diplomatic and political activity towards the Soviet Bloc.

d. The allies would be a source of strength and weakness. They would undoubtedly oppose such an aggressive policy. Therefore, the full scope of the plan would be revealed to them only gradually as successes were won.

e. The United States and its allies must as a first step meet commitments under the recently amended force goals in NATO. These goals must not be revised downward further.

f. The United States would overtly and covertly attack the Communist apparatus on a world-wide basis. The Communist Party in the United States would be outlawed.

g. Nationalism would be exploited as an effective weapon against Communism.

h. In dealing with Communist forces engaged in actual hostilities, the United States would not suspend the tempo of those hostilities or reduce military pressure on the enemy before a settlement is actually reached.

i. The policy must never be made to appear as a policy of aggression.

j. Germany. A united and rearmed Germany integrated in the European community is sought. A lesser objective would be a neutralized East Germany and a rearmed West Germany. In seeking these objectives, the possibility is recognized that an agreement with the Soviet Government for unification of Germany could only be obtained on condition that it would be neutralized though permitted a small national defense establishment. Under Alternative C the United States would be prepared to accept such a risk as an interim step toward attainment of our main objective. Our minimum objective, however, is a rearmed West Germany associated with the West. It is recommended that we press forward toward all of these objectives until a point is reached which requires that we make a final choice in the light of realities of the then existing situation. The EDC nations should be informed that if they do not constitute their defense community by the end of this year, the United States will rearm West Germany on a bilateral basis. Concurrently, the NATO nations will be reassured that we will come to their aid if attacked by Germany.

k. France. Tactfully but firmly inform France that the United States is now embarked on a new course of action which requires an end to delays in getting our mutual security interests in order.

l. East-West trade should be undertaken on a selective basis with maximum advantage to ourselves and minimum gain to the enemy. Exploitation of those areas in which the Soviet Bloc is not economically sufficient, frequently by preclusive buying. Establish stringent controls and harassing policies on Soviet shipping.

m. Foreign Aid Programs. Continuation of aid to our allies, at least on a maintenance basis, for as long as the cold war continues. Liberalized U.S. trade and tariff policies.

n. Immediately strengthen our military posture, both offensively and defensively, in order to carry out the military operations contemplated, and to be prepared to meet any risks of general war resulting therefrom. To include the following:

(1) Organize, train and equip the additional ready forces required.

(2) Prepare for early mobilization of the reinforcing units required.

(3) Deploy additional forces to sensitive areas.

(4) Accelerate improvements in our continental air defenses:

(a) Development of a much improved early warning capability.

(b) Early completion of an integrated Army-Navy–Air Force air defense plan closely coordinated with the Canadians.

(c) Expedite research, development and early production of new air defense weapons.

(d) Establish a workable civil defense program.

(5) In the field of atomic weapons:

(a) Ensure that counter-air strikes could be launched without delay by placing the complete weapons in the hands of tactical units designated to employ them. This requires many important governmental policy decisions regarding the use of atomic weapons and particularly inter-governmental agreements before a general war is forced upon us.

(b) Expedite development of a logistic capability and of operational procedures for handling and employing atomic weapons on tactical targets.

(6) Build-up of equipment reserves, including some overseas stockpiling.

(7) Stepped up delivery of equipment to our allies.

(8) Continue a vigorous research and development program to maintain and widen our technical lead over the enemy.

(9) Avoid losing freedom of action through participation in additional regional pacts.

(10) Minimize participation in disarmament discussions.

(11) Adopt a basic system of universal military training and service.

7. Additional Courses of Action in Various Parts of the World

a. Western Hemisphere. Eliminate Communist footholds in the Western Hemisphere.

b. Europe.

. . . . . . .

(2) Support closer Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav political and military cooperation.

(3) Expedite the development of the Volunteer Freedom Corps.⁵

c. Middle East.

. . . . . . .

d. Far East

(1) Indochina.

Press for a high-level conference in Paris to arrive at a complete understanding with the French concerning political, economic, and military policies to be taken with respect to Indochina including the following specific actions:

(a) Press the French to grant full dominion status to the Associated States by early 1954 and, at war’s end, to permit them to vote on continued membership in the French Union.

(b) Urge the election of a Vietnam National Assembly at an early date.

(c) Press the French Government to clearly define the status of their nationals in Indochina.

(d) Expand the indigenous forces and adopt U.S. training methods.

(e) Press for more vigorous prosecution of the war in Indochina including: closer US–French military collaboration; expansion of forces; organization of divisional size units; more vigorous and aggressive conduct of war; cut enemy lines of supply from Communist China.

(2) Communist China.

(a) Take actions to isolate Communist China politically and prevent her being seated in the UN or any other international body.

(b) Maintain an embargo on trade with Communist China and induce our allies to do the same.

(c) In the event of continued war in Korea, blockade the Chinese coast with the assistance of the Nationalists.

(d) In the event of a cease-fire agreement, utilize the war between Communist and Nationalist China as a basis for a blockade. Provide the Nationalists with the means to effect the blockade.

(3) Nationalist China.

(a) Employ Nationalist forces for conducting active military operations against the Chinese Communists.

(b) Before mounting operations against the mainland, employ these forces to recapture the island of Hainan.

(4) Japan.

Essentially the same policy as that of Task Force A, but greater pressure on Japanese to meet scheduled organization of Japanese Safety Force.

(5) Korea.

(a) If a cease-fire agreement is reached:

i. At the peace conference, insist upon a unified, independent Korea, not under Communist control or domination.

ii. No withdrawal of UN forces from Korea until a peace is signed and indigeneous defense forces developed.

iii. Establish 10 mile demilitarized zone astride the present Korean-Manchurian border.

(b) If no cease-fire agreement is reached, or if a political conference fails and fighting is resumed in Korea, intensify military operations in order to:

i. Seize a position across the waist of Korea.

ii. Capture or destroy maximum enemy forces and equipment.

iii. Create conditions that would force the enemy to accept a settlement favorable to the UN.

iv. Atomic weapons would be employed in these operations.

v. Extend the air and sea war to Communist China with priority to lines of communication and industrial facilities.

(c) An effective UN economic and rehabilitation program in Korea is viewed as essential.

8. Special Actions Required in the Field of Propaganda and Covert Operations

a. United States propaganda and covert apparatus have failed to a certain extent, largely due to two deficiencies: (1) lack of a national strategy to end the cold war by winning it, and (2) lack of a national command post to concentrate our political, military and economic resources on winning. Adoption of the policy of Alternative C as a national strategy would solve the first deficiency. The establishment of a governmental organization (such as that recommended by the Jackson Committee) for implementing the strategy is recommended.

b. A large-scale expansion and development of our covert apparatus is urged.

9. Implementation

The United States Government must take the necessary steps, in terms of organization and procedures, to attain the ability to effectively prosecute the policy. Speed of action, continuity of policy and programs and security of operations are required.

10. Costs

a. It is estimated that expenditures to carry out Alternative C would be of the order of $60 billion in FY 1954 and 1955. Expenditures decline to below $45 billion by FY 1958. If fighting was resumed in Korea, the figures for FY 1954–1955 would be between $60 billion and $65 billion. These figures do not include preclusive buying, which would be limited and selective. Peacetime costs would be higher in the short term than under Alternatives A or B, and higher than presently proposed programs. In the long term, costs should be substantially lower when we have won the cold war, and lower than the current policy or Alternative A or B, which do not end the cold war.

b. The Task Force is generally in accord with the views of Task Force A relating to the capacity of the United States to provide and finance these resources requirements.

11. Legislative Requirements

a. Appropriations covering the increased program costs.

b. Tax legislation consistent with these appropriations.

c. Reduction of tariffs and simplification of customs procedures.

d. Stand-by legislation for wartime economic controls.

e. A basic system of universal military training and service.

f. Increased latitude with respect to immigration.

12. Additional Requirements

a. Greater continuity of security policies and programs.

b. Special arrangements to reconcile the necessity for security of sensitive operations with the need for Congressional understanding and support.

13. Public Opinion

The alternative puts major demands on public support. The necessity and Tightness of the policy must be fully and expressly conveyed to them.

14. Allies

Alternative C’s policy would strain our system of alliances which remain essential to consolidation of the strength of the free world. It is believed that a situation exists where the United States can and should be less solicitous of specific internal problems of the Western European countries, and can and should feel less constrained to subject its actions outside the scope of the NATO commitment to the veto of NATO partners, specifically France and the United Kingdom.

15. The Timetable: Short Term

a. U.S.S.R.

(1) Political.

(a) Withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany and Austria.

(b) Release German and Japanese prisoners of war.

(c) Austrian State Treaty.

(d) United Germany, pro-western and rearmed.

(e) Condemn repressive measures in occupied territories.

(f) Unrelenting pressure on Soviet leaders on each political issue that arises.

(2) Military.

(a) Show U.S.S.R. strong defense, demonstrating folly of attack on free world and especially on the United States with any hope of success.

(3) Economic.

(a) Apply principle of selective sanctions.

(b) Deny vital strategic materials including natural rubber, electronic tubes, machine tools, and tungsten wire.

(c) Impede shipping—throw burden of overhaul on Soviet shipyards—push for goods movement in only Orbit bottoms.

(d) Adopt as principle that of limited, selective preclusive buying.

(4) Propaganda.

(a) Support lines set forth under political lines.

(b) Advocate student and cultural exchange.

(c) Abandon pushing merits of United States.

(d) Concentrate on evils of Soviet system:

(i) Slave labor camps.

(ii) Restriction of movement within Russia.

(iii) Inequalities of living.

(iv) Stratification of Soviet society.

(v) Promotion of a phony peace.

. . . . . . .

b. Communist China.

(1) Political.

(a) Withhold recognition or any diplomatic relationship as long as they support hostilities in Korea and Indochina.

(b) Press for a unified, independent Korea, not under Communist control.

(c) Block Membership in the United Nations.

(d) Seek to drive a wedge in the Moscow–Peiping axis.

(2) Military.

(a) If no truce—defeat Chinese Communist armies in Korea.

(b) Seize Hainan and, if successful, attack one point on the mainland with the Chinese Nationalist forces, successively by 1955.

(c) Tighten blockade of the mainland, using Chinese Nationalist forces.

(3) Economic.

(a) Maintain tight economic blockade during period of hostility.

(b) Tighten restrictions on overseas contributions to Communist China.

(c) Selective and limited preclusive buying.

(d) Prevent acquisition of external assets that improve international trade position.

(e) Deny all strategic materials during belligerency period—tighten all other materials.

(4) Propaganda.

(a) Attack subservience to U.S.S.R. through ridicule—theme “Mao is puppet.”

(b) Restore family and community loyalty.

(c) Point up aggression—Tibet, Korea, and Indochina.

(d) Point up isolation from free world because of their own aggression.

(e) Ridicule inability to reduce Chiang Kai-shek and Chinese Nationalists.

. . . . . . .

c. European Satellites, East Germany, and Austria.

(1) Political.

(a) Hamper consolidation of Soviet control over satellites and keep alive satellite morale and aspirations for national independence without inciting them to premature or suicidal insurrection.

(b) Maintain diplomatic relations as long as advantages outweigh disadvantages.

. . . . . . .

(2) Military.

(a) Build strength on adjacent borders—Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary. Pose no threat.

(b) “Recapture” the Baltic by Allied fleet visits.

(c) Maintain naval strength in Mediterranean.

(d) Decry large forces in being in the satellites.

(3) Economic.

(a) Apply principle of selective sanctions.

(b) Permit large flow of luxury items to drain foreign exchange.

(c) Deny vital strategic materials.

(d) Open trade in items that will reduce reliance of satellites on Soviets.

(e) Limited and selective preclusive buying.

(4) Propaganda.

(a) Stress puppet status of satellites.

(b) Advocate student and cultural exchange.

(c) Point up restrictive measures, inequality of treatment, destruction of national aspirations.

(d) Abandon attempting to “sell” the United States.

(e) Point information to receptivity of the country receiving it.

(f) Repeat free world readiness to cooperate, as with Yugoslavia.

(g) Indicate Soviet oppression on peoples with progressive free world ideas.

. . . . . . .

d. Free Europe—Northwest Africa.

(1) Political.

(a) Evacuation of Eastern Germany and Austria by Soviet occupation forces.

(b) Unified Germany, pro-Western and rearmed.

(c) Austrian State Treaty.

(d) Reduction of Communist Party strength, particularly in France and Italy.

(e) Adoption of progressive policy by colonial powers with respect to their colonial possessions leading to self-government.

(f) Support European regional institutions, including EDC, unless and until a choice must be made between EDC and a unified Germany.

(2) Military.

(a) Set goals for European countries consistent with their capabilities and assessment of the threat. Continue the build-up.

(b) Pursue principle of regional balanced forces as opposed to national balanced forces.

(c) Increase depth of defense to include Spain in regional agreements.

(d) Improve flexibility and adequacy of logistic support.

(3) Economic.

(a) Continue marginal support of economies with emphasis on defense support.

(b) Continue effort to expand European trading system started in Schuman Plan.

(c) Seek substitute sources of materials presently coming from satellites.

(4) Propaganda.

(a) Stress repressions in satellites as salutary warning.

(b) Point to continued presence of Soviet Armies in Central Europe as bar to peace.

(c) Support vigorous diplomatic front with tailored propaganda for respective areas.

(d) Promote greatest possible number of exchanges with United States.

(e) Ridicule as dupes those “voting Communist”.

(f) Keep sense of humor as only convincing approach.

. . . . . . .

e. Middle East—Northeast Africa.

(1) Political.

(a) Expand United States activities demonstrating long-term friendship and interest in the area.

(b) Establish a regional planning group looking to the defense of the Middle East, including initially the United States, United Kingdom, and Turkey with an invitation to other area countries to participate and notification to Pakistan.

(c) More formal relations with Israel with emphasis on less open professions of total support.

(d) More direct and indirect pressure for Israeli-Arab settlement of differences.

(2) Military.

(a) Immediate steps to establish a MEDO Planning Group; invite Arab State(s) association.

(b) Plan defense of the area.

(c) Consummate bilateral agreements with those nations willing and able to participate in the area and with which we do not already have an agreement.

(d) Maintain high priority of support to Turkey.

(e) Establish safeguards to prevent improper use of military aid furnished them.

(3) Economic.

(a) Expand technical aid at the village level.

(b) Initiate project to restore productivity of Tigris-Euphrates Valley.

(c) Work to diversion of oil profits to research projects beneficial to area:

(i) Desalinize sea water.

(ii) Solar power.

(iii) Irrigation.

(d) Improve sanitation.

(e) Expand educational facilities.

(4) Propaganda.

(a) Respect and stress the basic tenets of Muslimism.

(b) Stress repressions under Soviets.

(c) Keep theme simple, stressing provisions of wells, schools, health benefits, with emphasis on benefits that can be seen.

(d) Avoid over-commitment to attacks on Communist ideology.

(e) Present basic solidarity of free world.

. . . . . . .

f. Northeast Asia—Korea.

(1) Political.

(a) Establish as objective unified independent, non-Communist Korea.

(b) Continue suppression of Communist Party in free Korea.

(c) Press for wider internal political latitude—deplore one-party system.

(d) Establish 10-mile neutral zone at Yalu subject to international inspection with respective governments retaining jurisdiction over national territory.

(e) Include Korea in regional defense pact.

(2) Military (No Truce).

(a) Build force to inflict sound military defeat on Chinese Communists.

(b) Maintain U.S. forces in Korea as stabilizing influence.

(c) Continue build-up and support of ROK armies.

(d) Press for greater UN contributions as evidence of good faith. By-product is wider world support for outright defense against overt aggression.

(Truce)

(a) Maintain full UN force in Korea until acceptable peace is signed. (Objectives in political are obtained)

(b) Limit peace talks to definite period—six months maximum.

(c) Renew and extend war under failure of peace talks and so state.

(d) Issue “greater sanctions” statement.

(3) Economic.

(a) Restore Korea to economic self-sufficiency except for heavy military hardware.

(b) Press for establishment of trade relations with Japan.

(c) Extend technical aid in improving agricultural methods-stress village level.

(4) Propaganda.

(a) Play up Korean effort in repelling aggression.

(b) Broaden student, leader, and technical exchange program.

(c) Play Korea as the show piece of the free world against the ramparts of Communist Asia.

(d) Present basic solidarity of the free world.

. . . . . . .

g. Northeast Asia—Japan.

(1) Political.

(a) Press for constitutional changes that will permit rearming.

(b) Press for outlawing Communist Party.

(c) Continue close ties with Japanese Government.

(d) Press for Japanese inclusion in UN.

(e) Demand of Russia a peace settlement with Japan.

(2) Military.

(a) Push development of minimum ten-division National Safety force with sea and air forces of appropriate size in point of defense mission involved. Expand Japanese forces when United States forces are withdrawn.

(3) Economic.

(a) Seek trade outlets for Japanese industrial output.

(b) Seek raw material sources for Japanese industry.

(c) Expand technical aid seeking self-sufficiency in foodstuffs.

(4) Propaganda.

(a) Stress repressions of Soviets.

(b) Keep prisoners held by Soviets before Japanese people.

(c) Expand student exchange—make this a two-way street.

(d) Present basic solidarity of free world.

. . . . . . .

h. Northeast Asia—Formosa.

(1) Political.

(a) Maintain support of Chiang regime.

(b) Seek support of overseas Chinese for Chiang—more for effect of denial on Mao.

(2) Military.

(a) Require positive military act by Chiang—against Hainan or mainland.

(b) Build up naval capability of blockade of mainland.

(c) Build air defense capability.

(3) Economic.

(a) Continue effort to make Formosa self-sufficient except for heavy military hardware.

(4) Propaganda.

(a) Play up Chiang’s fight for freedom.

. . . . . . .

i. Southeast Asia—Indochina.

(1) Political.

(a) Insist on full independence for Indochinese States by February 1954.

(b) Support Indochinese affiliation with French Union, as the best safeguard against Communist encroachment after independence.

(c) Seek admission of Indochinese States into the United States [Nations].

(d) Inclusion of the Indochinese States in a regional pact involving other states of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.

(2) Military.

(a) Develop increased military force to win outright victory in Indochina.

(b) Inclusion in mutual defense pact for Pacific area after freedom is attained.

(3) Economic.

(a) Continued economic aid.

(b) Economic reforms within the Indochinese States.

(c) Expanded trade relationships with Asiatic countries—emphasis on Japan.

(4) Propaganda.

(a) Ridicule useless sacrifices of duped Viet Minh.

(b) Conduct subtle campaign against reactionary colonialists in Indochina.

(c) Emphasize indoctrination of armed forces to assure future loyalty.

(d) Create regional consciousness in Southeast Asia.

(e) Present basic solidarity of the free world.

(f) Promote exchanges with neighboring countries, especially the Philippines.

. . . . . . .

16. Mid-Term Guidelines for Courses of Action (1958–1965)

. . . . . . .

f. It was not deemed feasible to specify courses of action for a period five years away. At the end of the short-term period in 1958, it is believed that under Alternative C, U.S. and free world strength would have greatly increased. There would be no lasting peace in Korea. A severe blow to Chinese prestige though the administration of a sound military defeat and the destruction of some of her industrial centers would have been dealt. Relations between the Soviet Union and China would have been strained, and China would be beset by internal difficulties. In Europe, Germany would be united and committed to neither side, though oriented toward the free world; or, alternatively, she would be divided with West Germany an armed and active partisan of the West. Soviet armed forces would conceivably be withdrawn within the borders of the Soviet Union. The satellites would experience internal deterioration.

g. In the Middle East an acceptable degree of internal stability would have been attained.

h. In Africa and in Latin America improved stability and the destruction of a substantial part of the Communist conspiracy would have been attained.

17. Mid-Term Specific Guidelines

a. Political.

(1) Continued “hard” policy toward our enemies, but tempered by an increased willingness to bargain, since we will be negotiating from a position of strength.

(2) Continued friendship toward those areas, primarily Latin America, neutralist Asia and Sub-equatorial Africa, in which the Communist threat has been materially reduced.

(3) Continued effort to maintain the support of Allies, though resorting to a “hard” policy when required. Our task is to command respect, not necessarily love and devotion.

(4) All-out political offensive to overthrow satellite governments and bring them into the family of free nations.

b. Military.

(1) Continued maintenance of a strong base at home, with forces deployed world-wide….

(2) Continued stress and support of preparedness on the part of our Allies, with emphasis on those countries adjacent to satellite territories.

c. Economic.

(1) Continued limited aid in those areas where Point IV aspects of current aid have been stressed.

(2) Reduced economic aid where applicable but continued support of military forces in being on a sustaining basis. This envisages a marked reduction in economic aid in Western Europe and in Japan.

. . . . . . .

18. Long-Term Guidelines

a. At the end of the mid-term or in 1965, it is envisaged that the satellites will be freed, or in such a state of disaffection with the U.S.S.R. as to constitute a serious weakness rather than strength in the Soviet bloc. The strains between Communist China and the U.S.S.R. will have reached a point where prospects are favorable for driving a final wedge between them.

b. There will be two ultimate objectives in the long term:

(1) The reduction of Soviet power and militancy and the elimination of the Communist conspiracy; and

(2) Overthrow of the Communist regime in China.

Since this phase of the conflict is in the distant future, no specific courses of action are recommended. It is important to keep these objectives in mind throughout all periods. No action should be undertaken that does not lead ultimately to the goal of liquidation of the Communist menace.

Summary of Points Made in Discussion Following Presentation by Task Forces July 16, 1953

1. Task Force B. While armed, easily identifiable aggression by Communist forces across the “line” drawn by the United States would be grounds for general war, the United States would, in the case of indigenous Communist seizure of power in a country on our side of the line, retain freedom of action to restore the pre-existing situation as we saw fit by using any means at our disposal.

2. Task Force B. The basic policy of Task Force B should strongly deter the aggressive movement by Communist forces across the “line” drawn by the U.S., and thereby create a stronger political and psychological climate in the countries on our side of the “line”. Thus, it will become easier for these countries to deal with and minimize the possibility of indigenous subversion.

3. Task Force A. Our initial position with respect to the arming of Germany should leave this issue to be decided by the Germans themselves, following an ultimate peace settlement. The difficulty of restricting German rearmament would lie in its international regulation by a body such as the UN, a body of which the Soviets are members. A very careful examination should be made before being willing to accept a neutralized Germany.

4. Task Force A. The primary objection to implementing EDC at this time is the loss of negotiating position vis-à-vis the Soviets in connection with an ultimate settlement of the German question. An implemented EDC would mean that the free world would be asking the Soviets to withdraw their forces from East Germany, while we would be free to include East Germany with West Germany in an alliance directed against the Soviets. NATO provides a good framework for negotiation, apart from EDC. If we do not entwine the Germans more than necessary in EDC and NATO, they and we will have more flexibility in developing successful negotiating positions with the Soviets.

5. Task Force A. Concurrently with attempting to re-unify Germany and secure Russian withdrawal, we should proceed with the unilateral rearmament of West Germany. While such unilateral rearmament would weaken and strain NATO, it would not destroy it. There is great possibility that Germany can be brought into EDC only after German unification, and not before or as a condition of German unification. While the U.S. was checked two and a half years ago on unilaterally rearming Germany, there exists a considerably different situation today. Our allies then feared we would take away equipment and supplies intended for them, and give them to the Germans. We should not be restrained in our liberty of action by basically unsound French fears of Germany. We recognize however that French fears and reactions must be seriously considered and if possible modified, because France is an indispensible part of our military geography.

6. Task Force A. Some preference exists for a unilaterally rearmed Germany as opposed to Germany as a part of EDC, but the decision turns upon and is related to other matters. There is hope that following achievement of German unification and withdrawal of Soviet forces from Germany, the Soviets might withdraw their military forces from the satellites. Such a situation in turn would lead to the necessity of the Soviets creating new arrangements for the protection of their position and interests in the area.

7. Task Force A. Germany is the key to developing the strength of Western Europe. We cannot accept as the price for obtaining French and British support against the Soviet Union suppression of Germany’s natural vigor and power. We do not wish Germany again to be a menace to Europe. Yet the restriction of her rearmament to certain types of conventional weapons presents difficulties and is questionable. We should take advantage of our very favorable position as it exists today in Germany, rather than lose this opportunity because of a risk that the German menace may reappear.

8. Even if the U.S. could get along economically and on the basis of sufficient raw materials by concentrating its efforts on the West and letting the Far and Middle East fall where it might, our allies could not get along without the essential resources and dollar earnings of those areas. There would result a deterioration of the allies’ political and economic position and their will to resist, which in turn would affect the U.S. From the military point of view, such a course of action would lead to a danger so great to the U.S. as to necessitate spending much more than we are today for defense. For example, if the power complex of Japan were added to the Soviet Union’s capability, the resultant increase in Soviet strength would be a great danger to the U.S. The union of Japan, China, and Manchuria in a communist system would be incalculably dangerous. Furthermore, it would create a climate of defeat through the free world.

9. Task Force C. Rather than taking fewer actions stretching out over a longer period of time in order to involve less dollar costs, Task Force C believes its program might be strung out over too long a period.

10. Task Force C. Task Force C feels that the guarantee to France against German aggression should be restated and reaffirmed.

11. Task Force C. The matter of the ratification of EDC has been left too much in the hands of the French Government. The U.S. should pick up the ball and pressure for a decision by France. Of course it is not possible to foretell whether the French will react logically to such pressure in terms of what we would consider logical.

12. The essential differences of approach between Task Forces A and C cannot be reconciled. There are also differences between Task Forces A and B. The latter Task Force believes the Soviet will be a tougher aggressive menace than A envisages. Task Force A thinks mainly in terms of aggression by Russian forces, while Task Force B treats the Soviet bloc as a whole.

13. Task Force B. Peripheral wars are uneconomical and weakening. UN and regional agreements do not sufficiently guarantee against peripheral wars. The strength of the position of Task Force B lies in its reliance on the threat of general war as a final sanction. However, if it were clear that the UN and regional agreements went beyond local and peripheral defense arrangements and envisaged direct retaliation against the Soviet Union, they might provide as effective mechanisms as unilateral action.

14. Task Force C. The U.S. cannot continue to live with the Soviet threat. So long as the Soviet Union exists, it will not fall apart, but must and can be shaken apart.

15. Task Force A. We must try to weaken Soviet power and bring about its withdrawal within traditional Russian boundaries, then, rather than press for the destruction of the Soviet state, we should wait for an evolution in Soviet life and patterns of behavior which might follow from such a withdrawal. There is possibility that the Soviet Union will change. There are signs of evolution, particularly in recent events. Accordingly, one fears the aggressive thesis of Task Force C, and must ask: if we won a war, what would we put in the place of the Soviet Government? There do not exist among Russian people at this time elements from which could be formed a democratic government. While Task Force B feels that it is necessary to create a further deterrent to general war and Soviet aggression in order to bring about an evolution in Soviet behavior, Task Force A feels that sufficient deterrents already exist and are capable of being shaped into a better form.

1. Copies to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Directors of the Bureau of the Budget and Central Intelligence, and the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Atomic Energy Commission.
2. For NSC Action No. 853–c, see footnote 2, supra.
3. Dated June 10, p. 378.
4. Dated May 25; see vol. i, Part 2, p. 968.
5. For documentation on the various longstanding and short-term proposals for the incorporation of Eastern European refugees into a volunteer military force which culminated in the NSC 143 Series, February–May 1953, see volume viii .