Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 153

Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)¹

top secret
NSC 153/1

Washington, June 10, 1953.

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on Restatement of Basic National Security Policy

References:

A.

NSC Action Nos. 776–b and 811²

B.

NSC 20/4, NSC 68/2, NSC 135/3, NSC 149/2³

C.

NSC 79⁴

At the 149th Council meeting on June 9, 1953, the National Security Council and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator adopted NSC 153 subject to the following amendments (NSC Action No. 811):

[Here follows a verbatim repetition of the amendments to NSC 153 adopted at the 149th meeting of the NSC, as printed in the memorandum of discussion, supra.]

The President has this date approved NSC 153, as amended and enclosed herewith as NSC 153/1, and directs its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government.

The enclosed statement of policy summarizes and supersedes the basic national security policies contained in NSC 20/4, NSC 68/2, NSC 135/3 and Part I of 149/2. Continuation in effect of the Objectives in the Annex hereto is also intended to constitute for the time being a response to NSC 79.

The enclosed statement of policy consists of the following parts:

A. General Considerations	Page	1
B. General Objectives	Page	3
C. Courses of Action	Page	5
D. Annex containing “U.S. Objectives vis-à-vis the USSR in the Event of War” as previously stated in NSC 20/4.	Page	10

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure]

Statement of Policy by the National Security Council

top secret

[Washington,] June 10, 1953.

Restatement of Basic National Security Policy

general considerations

1. There are two principal threats to the survival of fundamental values and institutions of the United States:

a. The formidable power and aggressive policy of the communist world led by the USSR.

b. The serious weakening of the economy of the United States that may result from the cost of opposing the Soviet threat over a sustained period.

The basic problem facing the United States is to strike a proper balance between the risks arising from these two threats.

2. In recognition of the Soviet threat, the United States has been engaged in building up its own and free world strength, in order to block Soviet expansion, make possible an affirmative foreign policy, and deter general war, or if war comes, survive the initial shock and go on to victory. This policy is based on the premise that creation by the free world of situations of strength might lead the USSR to modify its behavior, and that eventually the internal conflicts of the Soviet totalitarian system, with positive effort from us, might cause a retraction and decay of Soviet power. This policy rejects both preventive war and isolation.

3. A vital factor in the long-term survival of the free world is the maintenance by the United States of a sound, strong economy. Efforts to build up free world strength rapidly have resulted in a high rate of Federal spending in excess of Federal income, at a time of heavy taxation. Continuation of this course of action over a long period of time would place the United States in danger of seriously weakening its economy and destroying the values and institutions which it is seeking to maintain. Accordingly, in recognition of this danger, greater emphasis than heretofore must now be placed on budgetary, credit, and fiscal policies designed to maintain the strength and soundness of the U.S. economy. However, if a basic change in the world situation should occur, these policies would be subject to review.

4. This new emphasis does not imply a belief that the Soviet threat to the free world is diminishing. On the contrary:

a. The Soviet orbit has formidable and growing military, economic, and political capabilities, including in particular an atomic capability and a possible thermonuclear capability which will probably become sufficient in the next few years to damage critically the United States and its allies.

b. Although there is continuing danger of general war, the most immediate danger facing the United States is that a progressive and cumulative loss of positions of importance to the United States (either as a result of deterioration within the free nations, or of communist cold war actions, or of a process involving both) could eventually reduce the United States, short of general war, to an isolated and critically vulnerable position.

c. The increasingly destructive power available to the Soviet Union, the development of over-all Soviet production potential, and the allocation by the USSR of a much greater proportion of its resources to war purposes, make it impossible for the free world to assign the same weight as in the past to its economic potential as the determining factor in final victory.

d. In deciding whether or in what manner to exercise its capabilities, the USSR is not restrained by moral considerations, by constitutional procedures or by the necessity of consulting with allies.

e. Although the USSR has recently assumed a more conciliatory posture in its dealings with the West, there is no basis for concluding that the fundamental hostility of the Kremlin toward the West has abated, that the ultimate objectives of the Soviet rulers have changed, or that the menace of communism to the free world has diminished.

Consequently the United States must continue to give primary consideration to the threat of Soviet power. But the threat to the U.S. economy cannot be neglected. At the same time, we must recognize that increased emphasis on sound fiscal policy may involve assuming increased risks in relation to the Soviet threat, and will therefore increase the importance of more careful balance and improved efficiency in the various national security programs.

5. The Soviet orbit also has marked disadvantages and vulnerabilities vis-à-vis the free world. Because the Soviet system relies heavily on falsehood, compulsion and rigid centralized control machinery, it has built up disillusionment and resentment in the USSR, and even more in the satellites. For some period of time, the difficulties and uncertainties involved in the transition from the old to the new regime will increase these and other vulnerabilities inherent in the Soviet system. The USSR is, and for the foreseeable future will remain, inferior to the free world in available resources and productive capacity. The Soviet orbit is also vulnerable to developing U.S. atomic and thermonuclear capabilities.

6. In the light of all these factors, the greatest safeguard to the security of the United States and the free world continues to be the achievement and maintenance of integrated political, military, and economic power providing the United States with an over-all strength sufficient, together with our spiritual determination, to deter or win general war, prevent or counter communist aggression, and permit the exploitation of Soviet bloc vulnerabilities.

general objectives

7. One purpose underlies every national security policy: to maintain the fundamental values and institutions of the United States, which rest on the essential dignity and worth of the individual in a free society.

8. To achieve this fundamental purpose, in view of the dual threat facing us, we set the following objectives:

a. To create and maintain sufficient strength, both military and nonmilitary, to provide for the security of the United States, assist in the defense of vital areas of the free world, prevent or counter aggression, deter general war, protect the continental United States, and provide the basis for winning a general war if one should be forced on us.

b. To maintain a sound and strong U.S. economy based on free enterprise.

c. To maintain free U.S. political institutions supported by an informed public opinion.

d. To strengthen the will and ability of other nations of the free world, individually and collectively, to deter or oppose communist aggression and achieve internal stability.

e. To prevent significant expansion of Soviet bloc power, even though in certain cases measures to this end may be used by the Soviet bloc as a pretext for war.

f. To delay and disrupt the consolidation of Soviet bloc power and influence, and eventually to reduce such power and influence to a point which no longer constitutes a threat to our security, without unduly risking a general war.

g. To establish an international system based on freedom and justice as contemplated in the Charter of the United Nations.

h. To continue in effect U.S. objectives vis-à-vis the USSR in the event of war, as set forth in the Annex to this report.

courses of action

Maintenance of U.S. Strength

9. Achieve and maintain in readiness for as long as necessary to meet the Soviet threat, the military forces which will permit timely and effective military operations, in collaboration with our allies or alone, as an essential element in our efforts to:

a. Deter war;

b. Deter or counter peripheral aggression wherever and whenever necessary for U.S. security;

c. Provide a reasonable initial defense and an adequate basis for victory, in the event general war is forced upon us.

10. Develop and maintain an offensive capability, particularly the capability to inflict massive damage on Soviet war-making capacity, at a level that the Soviets must regard as an unacceptable risk in war.

11. Emphasize the development of a continental defense system, including early warning, adequate to prevent disaster and to make secure the mobilization base necessary to achieve U.S. victory in the event of general war.

12. Strengthen the defense position of the United States by non-military measures, including development of a stronger civil defense, feasible reduction of urban vulnerability, and preparations to assure the continuity of government and essential production.

13. Maintain the security of defense positions outside the continental U.S. which are determined from time to time to be necessary to U.S. security.

14. Maintain superiority in quantity and quality of special weapons and sustain emphasis on scientific research and development.

15. Develop and maintain United States military forces and matériel stocks at levels adequate to meet the needs of United States security and capable of continued maintenance, but not designed to meet any assumed date of greatest danger.

16. Continue, for as long as necessary, a state of limited mobilization to develop military readiness, placing increased emphasis on development and maintenance of production plant capacity capable of rapid expansion or conversion to essential wartime output.

17. While lessening dependence on large reserve stocks of end items, create and maintain certain minimum essential reserve stocks of end items to support effectively the war effort until war production reaches the required levels.

18. Maintain the stockpiling programs and provide additional producing facilities for those materials the shortage of which would critically affect essential defense programs, and reduce the goal or rates of acquisition of other stockpile materials in line with the policy of decreased emphasis on fixed target dates.

19. Assure internal security against covert attack, sabotage, and espionage, through methods consistent with the maintenance of a vital and democratic society.

Maintenance of the Economy

20. As rapidly as is consistent with continuing our leadership in the free world, and barring a basic change in the world situation, balance Federal expenditures with Federal income and maintain over-all credit and fiscal policies to assist in stabilizing the economy.

21. So long as there is war in Korea, do not substantially reduce the level of Federal taxation, although a change in form may be made.

22. Eliminate waste, duplication, and unnecessary overhead in the Federal Government.

23. Minimize Federal expenditures for programs that are not essential to the national security.

24. Maximize the economic potential of private enterprise by minimizing governmental controls and regulations, and by encouraging private enterprise to develop natural and technological resources (e.g., nuclear power).

25. Maintain a high level of economic activity at relatively stable price levels.

Maintenance of Free Political Institutions

26. Assure the vitality and soundness of our free, democratic institutions.

27. Undertake the clarification to the American people of the nature of the communist threat, and the spiritual and material resources which the free world possesses to meet that threat.

28. Build up a vigorous and informed public opinion, united in support of the measures necessary to meet the Soviet threat.

29. Provide appropriate safeguards against subversion, through methods consistent with the maintenance of a vital and democratic society.

Strengthening of the Free World (In addition to relevant courses of action in other sections)

30. Develop the political unity, strength, and determination of the free world by political and psychological measures designed to promote internal stability in critical areas, reduce communist and neutralist influence, combat anti-American propaganda, and encourage the adoption and support of policies consistent with our national policy.

31. Extend good offices where appropriate in resolving controversies between nations of the free world, in helping to adjust colonial and quasi-colonial relationships, and in moderating extreme nationalism, with a view to aiding the orderly self-development of the peoples of the free world rather than to preserving the status quo.

32. Encourage and assist the development of indigenous free world armed forces, and regional defense and collective security arrangements among free nations, capable of an increased share of responsibility in resisting local communist aggression.

33. Increase emphasis on aid to countries of the Far East and Middle East in the light of present threats to these countries.

34. Support and strengthen the NATO countries as a principal element in the world defense against communism; promote the establishment of NATO forces at levels maintainable over a period of time; and decrease emphasis on early fixed target dates for the attainment of such force levels.

35. Extend economic and military aid to free nations with due regard to their contributions to free world defense, their ability to use such aid effectively, and the effect of such aid on their political and economic stability.

36. Concentrate aid on vital free countries, helping the weakest to attain economic strength, and encouraging and enlisting the strong to maximize their carrying of their share of the over-all defense requirements.

37. Emphasize, in connection with the mutual security program, longer-term programs for improved planning, procurement and production base.

38. Increase emphasis on off-shore procurement of military material, designed to increase the capability of our allies to support their own defense.

39. Emphasize (a) sound and stable economies in the free nations, as well as increasing productivity; and (b) substantial, equitable defense contributions by each of the free nations.

40. Pursue international economic policies which stress trade, raw material development, increased capital investment by private enterprise, and sound financial relations.

41. Lower trade barriers and encourage reciprocal trade on a mutually favorable basis consistent with the over-all national interest.

Prevention of Soviet Expansion (In addition to relevant courses of action in other sections)

42. Develop and maintain our capability and willingness to commit appropriate forces and matériel in collective, and if necessary, unilateral action against local communist aggression in key areas.

43. Increase emphasis on: (a) bringing the Korean war to a final settlement acceptable to us; and (b) aiding in the prosecution of the war in Indo-China to a favorable conclusion, without direct intervention except possibly in the event of Chinese Communist aggression or of other basic change.

Reduction of Soviet Power (In addition to relevant courses of action in other sections)

44. Without taking undue risks, place the maximum strain on Soviet-satellite relations and try to weaken Soviet control over the satellite countries.

45. Utilize political, economic, propaganda, and paramilitary operations, including controls on East-West trade, against the USSR and the Soviet orbit, in order to delay the consolidation of Soviet bloc power, stimulate internal conflicts and reduce the Soviet bloc military and economic potential.

Establishment of International Order

46. Continue active participation and leadership in the United Nations for realization of the principles and purposes of the Charter.

47. Develop sound negotiating positions and be prepared to enter into negotiations with the USSR if they offer promise of achieving acceptable modus vivendi, or if, for other reasons, they appear to be desirable; but recognize that only enforceable agreements are meaningful and that the value of negotiation in the foreseeable future may be primarily to influence world opinion.

Annex

U.S. Objectives Vis–à–Vis the USSR in the Event of War

(The following paragraphs are taken verbatim from NSC 20/4, approved in November, 1948. These paragraphs are currently under review by the NSC Planning Board.)

1. In the event of war with the USSR we should endeavor by successful military and other operations to create conditions which would permit satisfactory accomplishment of U.S. objectives without a predetermined requirement for unconditional surrender. War aims supplemental to our peace-time aims should include:

a. Eliminating Soviet Russian domination in areas outside the borders of any Russian state allowed to exist after the war.

b. Destroying the structure of relationships by which leaders of the Ail-Union Communist Party have been able to exert moral and disciplinary authority over individual citizens, or groups of citizens, in countries not under communist control.

c. Assuring that any regime or regimes which may exist on traditional Russian territory in the aftermath of a war:

(1) Do not have sufficient military power to wage aggressive war.

(2) Impose nothing resembling the present iron curtain over contacts with the outside world.

d. In addition, if any Bolshevik regime is left in any part of the Soviet Union, insuring that it does not control enough of the military-industrial potential of the Soviet Union to enable it to wage war on comparable terms with any other regime or regimes which may exist on traditional Russian territory.

e. Seeking to create post-war conditions which will:

(1) Prevent the development of power relationships dangerous to the security of the United States and international peace.

(2) Be conducive to the successful development of an effective world organization based upon the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

(3) Permit the earliest practicable discontinuance within the United States of wartime controls.

2. In pursuing the above war aims, we should avoid making irrevocable or premature decisions or commitments respecting border rearrangements, administration of government within enemy territory, independence for national minorities, or post-war responsibility for the readjustment of the inevitable political, economic, and social dislocations resulting from the war.

1. Copies to the Secretary of the Treasury; the Directors of Defense Mobilization, the Bureau of the Budget, and Central Intelligence; to the Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and to the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.
2. For NSC Action No. 776–b, see footnote 6, p. 304; for NSC Action No. 811, see footnote 5, supra.
3. For texts of NSC 20/4, “U.S. Objectives With Respect to the USSR To Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security,” Nov. 24, 1948, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. i, Part 2, p. 662;NSC 68/2, “U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security,” Sept. 30, 1950, see ibid., 1950 vol. i, p. 400; NSC 135/3, Sept. 25, 1952, see p. 142; NSC 149/2, Apr. 29, 1953, see p. 305.
4. For text of NSC 79, “U.S. and Allied War Objectives in the Event of Global War,” Aug. 25, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. i, p. 390.