The time has now arrived when the drafting group will be forced to attempt to
produce some “Conclusions” and in fact I understand that the Defense and
JCS members have already written
something which they will table in the next two or three days. Although we
have been pressed to contribute something, I have not wanted to send
anything in writing over there on this most ticklish subject until I have
had a chance to discuss it with you. I am attaching a copy of a memorandum
which was designed as a “discussion piece” and I would like to get your
general and tentative views on the approach contained therein to this
problem.
Can we get together in the next day or two to go over this.
[Annex]
Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Policy
Planning Staff (Schwartz) to the
Counselor (Bohlen)
top secret
[Washington,] May 12, 1952.
- Subject:
- A Response to NSC Action No. 575c
(Oct. 17, 1951) calling for a “Reappraisal of the Policies and
Programs set forth in the NSC 68 and
114 Series, including a Revision of Part I of NSC 114/2 and in the light of: (1)
further analysis of Soviet atomic capability as indicated by the
recent explosion of another atomic bomb in the U.S.S.R., and (2) the
current evaluation of the net capability of the U.S.S.R. to injure
the continental United States”.4
We now have the latest estimate of Soviet stockpiles of atomic bombs. We
are not likely to have any time soon a useful “net capability” study. In
fact, from what I have heard about this study it might be better that it
not be circulated formally because, unless radical changes are made in
the method of developing it, it will probably be worse than useless.
Leaving “programs” aside for the moment we are faced, then, with the
task of reappraising the policies of the 68 and 114 Series—or, as it has
become the custom to express it, our national strategy.
That being the case, the first necessity is to identify as clearly as
possible those ideas which represent the core of our national strategy.
The next task would seem to be to “reappraise” it in such a manner that
when we are through we have a better idea than we have now of the nature
of the most serious problems facing us and the manner in which we should
attempt to meet them. I would suggest an approach somewhat as follows
and I would think that, whether we consider this effort as the
“conclusions” of the paper which the Steering Group is struggling to
write, or as the paper itself, most of the following thoughts should be
reflected therein:
A. During the two or three years immediately following World War II it
became increasingly clear to the U.S. that its national security was
again faced with a threat of major proportions and that this threat
stemmed primarily from the strength and attitude of the Soviet Union,
coupled with the unusual means available to the
[Page 13]
Soviet Union for making its strength, and our
weaknesses, felt abroad, particularly the apparatus of international
communism.
B. In 1948, several documents (the NSC 20
Series)5 were prepared by the National
Security Council setting forth the nature of the threat and some ideas
as to what we should do about it. The summary conclusions of NSC 20/4 were approved by the Council and
by the President. The essence of these ideas was that by methods short
of war we would have to encourage and promote a gradual retraction of
undue Russian power and change the attitude of the Soviet Union.
Implicit in the development of these ideas, and all others that flowed
from them, was the belief that we did not have to and should not try to
attain these objectives in any specific time period. (To quote from
20/1: “In the first place, there is no time limit for the achievement of
our objectives under conditions of peace. We are faced here with no
rigid periodicity of war and peace which would enable us to conclude
that we must achieve our peacetime objectives by a given date ‘or
else’”). Among the most important requirements set forth by 20/4 as
essential to the attainment of these objectives were:
- a.
- “A level of military readiness which can be maintained as long
as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression, as
indispensable support to our political attitude toward the
U.S.S.R., as a source of encouragement to nations resisting
Soviet political aggression, and as an adequate basis for
immediate military commitments and for rapid mobilization should
war prove unavoidable”, and
- b.
- To get as much help from others as possible.
For the purpose of this study, then, these thoughts can
be considered the essence of U.S. national strategy as of the date of
approval of 20/4.
C. By direction of the President, NSC 68
was designed to examine this national strategy in the light of recent
evidence that the Soviets had developed an atomic bomb, and to determine
whether or not it was still valid and to what extent. NSC 68 reaffirmed the validity of the
national strategy set forth in the NSC
20 Series, but found that our level of military readiness was
inadequate—in fact, dangerously so—particularly in the light of what we
could expect in the way of a developing Soviet atomic capability. The
President approved the conclusions of NSC 68.
D. The rest of the 68 Series was concerned primarily with the buildup of
our military strength in the light of this conclusion and of the Korean
war. NSC 114/16 and 114/2 were generally inconclusive
[Page 14]
and in the process of preparing
them sufficient doubts were raised about the validity of U.S. national
strategy to make necessary the current “reappraisal”. A basic question
is again raised: Does currently approved U.S. national strategy remain
valid in the light of the apparently rapidly growing atomic, and
possibly thermonuclear, capacity of the U.S.S.R.? In other words, is
time of the essence? Can we really hope to “contain” the Soviet Union
even if we maintain a high-level military strength indefinitely? Or must
we adopt a more “aggressive” policy? To what extent can we rely on the
threat, explicit or implicit, of global war to protect the periphery?
Can we seriously hope to change the nature of the Soviet Union if we
place greater emphasis on the avoidance of war?
E. That analysis of the balance of military power between the U.S.S.R.
and the U.S., as it is now and as it is expected to develop, which most
sharply challenges the validity of our current strategy goes as follows:
- 1.
- If a certain number of targets in the U.S. were destroyed, the
U.S. would face unavoidable defeat.
- 2.
- The Soviet Union is capable of producing the requisite number
of atomic, or thermonuclear, bombs to destroy those targets and
is capable of producing the means of delivering the
bombs.
- 3.
- Because primarily of the nature of the weapons, the U.S. will
not be capable of preventing the Soviet Union at some time in
the not too distant future of delivering the requisite number of
bombs on targets in the U.S.
- 4.
- We must assume—because we cannot afford not to assume—that
when the Soviet Union attains such a capability, it will be used
against us.
- 5.
- Therefore, we must overthrow the Soviet Union prior to the
time when we think the Soviet Union can attain and employ
against us such a capability. Time is, then, of the essence. We
do have to attain our national objectives with respect to the
Soviet Union by a certain date, “or else”. That date can be put
off somewhat by the nature and extent of our armament effort;
but, by the very nature of the mathematical inevitability of the
Soviet attainment of the capability under reference, it cannot
be put off indefinitely. And our currently approved national
strategy as set forth herein is invalid.
F. If, however, we examine this atomic analysis, we find that it is
unsound for a number of reasons, of which the following are the most
important:
- 1.
- A key part of the analysis (subparagraph E, 3) is based not
only on the fact that we do not have today defenses adequate to
keep out a large percentage of our attacking force but also on
the assumption that we are incapable of developing such defenses
for the future. (50% on target of bombs sortied seems to have
been accepted as a constant.) This assumption gives no consideration to the fact that new
weapons are constantly being developed, and that, in
[Page 15]
the past, new defensive
weapons which could successfully challenge new offensive weapons
have invariably been produced. The point is that while we cannot
rely on the development of adequate new weapons neither is it
wise or advisable to ignore completely the possibilities in this
field. That the possibilities are great is evidenced, in one
important instance at least, by the fact that the atomic bomb
itself was designed, developed and used within a four-year
period.
- 2.
- The analysis must assume one, or some combination, of the
following:
- a.
- That, regardless of the defensive measures which we
may take, the Soviets will be able to destroy our
retaliatory capacity;
- b.
- That, although the Soviets might not be able
completely to destroy our retaliatory capacity, they
could inflict on it such damage that we in turn would be
unable to do major damage to the Soviet Union,
particularly as the Soviets would measure “major damage”
against the advantage of eliminating the U.S. as a world
power;
- c.
- That the Soviets would be willing to accept any damage
that we could inflict upon them with our retaliatory
capacity in the belief that they could rebuild much
faster than we could and be more successful than we in
maintaining internal control.
Taking these up in reverse order we find that, although differing in
degree, neither Assumption b. nor Assumption c. reflects what we know
about the Soviets and the bases of their actions. In Part I of the
“reappraisal” it is stated that “should the Soviets attain the
capability of delivering a ‘decisive’ initial blow on the U.S. without serious risk to their own regime, they
would do so”—or, at any rate, that we would have to assume that they
would do so. It is also pointed out in Part I that the major
preoccupation of the Soviets is with internal security and that they
must consider any major war as “highly dangerous” to their regime. That
they would deliberately choose a course of action sure to result in
heavy atomic blows on their major centers with effects which neither
they nor we can accurately predict seems highly inconsistent with the
analysis.
Assumption a. and, to a certain extent, Assumption b., seems to ignore
the nature of our retaliatory power, the tremendous difficulty of
destroying it, the possibilities open to us of increasing that
difficulty and, finally, the decisions which the Soviets would be forced
to make before they could attempt to destroy it.
In the first place we must assume, at least until the contrary is
demonstrated, that we are now and will remain capable of doing greater
damage to the Soviet Union with atomic bombs than the Soviet Union can
do to the United States unless the Soviets, by
taking the initiative, critically damage our retaliatory striking
[Page 16]
force before it can be put into action. But looking at our
retaliatory striking force as a single target system, what the Soviets
must consider, if they plan to destroy it, is the following:
- (1)
- Air bases scattered over half the globe, some—although not a
large number at present—specifically designed for the purpose of
launching strategic bombers on combat missions, but many others
which could, under dire circumstances, be used for that
purpose.
- (2)
- Planes and crews which, if in the air, cannot be destroyed and
which, given a relatively short warning, can somehow or other
get into the air.
- (3)
- A warning system which, in addition to a radar screen that can
be completed prior to the time that the Soviets obtain the
minimum capability necessary for the attempt at a decisive blow,
includes the fact that if all elements of this complicated
target system are not hit concurrently, the other elements will,
ipso facto, be warned.
- (4)
- Bombs which can be protected from destruction.
- (5)
- Fuel which can either be protected from destruction or which
can in circumstances of dire emergency be obtained elsewhere
than those places designated by current plans.
- (6)
- Potentialities for flexibility of employment of SAC which must always leave the
Soviets in doubt as to how much of our striking force we could
send against them if they failed to knock out all of our bases
and keep them knocked out.
It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that we can maintain a position
which will indefinitely face the Soviets with the following as a
comparable dilemma: either that they throw all of their atomic power
against ours with the strong possibility of succeeding only in
eliminating both atomic capabilities, while starting a long war with
U.S. industrial potential largely undamaged; or face the probability of
incalculable damage to the Soviet home base as the price for rendering
the U.S. incapable of a full scale effort in a long war.
G. From the foregoing it can be concluded that it lies within our power
for the foreseeable future to prevent the Soviet Union from attaining
the capability of waging general war against the United States without
serious risk to the Soviet regime.
From what we know of the Soviets we can also conclude that it is
unlikely, in these circumstances, that they will deliberately initiate a
general war against the United States.
The essence of our national strategy, then, remains valid; and we can
continue to work toward our objectives with respect to the U.S.S.R.
without feeling the compulsion of achieving them by a certain date, “or
else”.
Such is the nature of relations between the Communist and non-Communist
world, however, that general war is now, and will continue to be for the
foreseeable future, an ever-present possibility.
[Page 17]
Furthermore, we must assume that any general war will be sooner or later
an atomic war and that, as time goes on, damage to both sides in such a
war will be progressively more serious, and both general war and the
threat thereof less and less rewarding.
We cannot assume from this, however, that the Soviets will cease their
probing; nor that we must give up marking [marching?] toward our objectives. What does follow is that we
must develop both a greater willingness and a greater capacity for
dealing with local peripheral “cold war” situations than we have, as a
nation, demonstrated to date.
