PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Natl Sec (civil defense)”
Paper Drafted by Paul H. Nitze and Carlton Savage of the Policy Planning Staff1
Problem
To establish an Early Warning System for detecting the approach of hostile aircraft to the United States.
Discussion
It has been estimated that if the Soviet Union should drop 500 or more2 atomic bombs3 on targets in the United States, our ability to recover from the attack would be destroyed. In a few years the Soviet Union will have enough atomic bombs and the means to deliver them to launch such an attack.
To prevent a national tragedy of this sort, it is clear that the United States must develop a combined system of air defense and civil defense. One of the prime factors in this defense is early warning of the coming of enemy planes. Without an early warning the loss of civilian life from a saturation atomic raid would be staggering, with consequent loss to national morale and capacity for carrying on a war. Early warning is essential also for military purposes to preserve our retaliatory capacity and put our defensive forces into action. Furthermore, early warning is essential for the success of joint civilian-military actions such as a civil defense program, industrial security program, stockpiling, and navigational counter measures designed to prevent the enemy from homing on prime targets.
Our current warning capabilities are inadequate.4 However, new developments now make it possible to establish an adequate early [Page 183] warning system at a cost so small that it need not interfere seriously with existing military programs. Project East River5 states in its report of June 26, 1952 that “There are no serious technical obstacles to prevent us from detecting a Soviet airborne attack soon after the airplanes leave their own bases.” It recommended that the Department of Defense undertake to provide for detection of an enemy airborne attack at a distance not less than 2,000 miles from the continental limits of the United States with resulting early warnings.
As a consequence of new technical developments, it is estimated that $250,000,000 per year would be sufficient to support an early warning system, that is, to provide for initial procurement and installation; to maintain and operate stations after they are installed; to extend the system progressively; and to permit a continual improvement program based on general technological advances in electronics and related fields. It is estimated that such an early warning system could possibly be in operation within two years if the initial funds for this purpose were made available immediately, and the necessary priorities and continuing support were given to the project.
An early warning system obviously is not the only element in a program necessary for the protection of the United States against atomic attack. Many other elements such as interceptors and guided missile defenses are also essential, as well as the military measures precedent to a manageable civil defense recommended by the East River Project. But while these other elements are being developed we should proceed rapidly with the establishment of an early warning system, which is the sine qua non of any program for the protection of the United States and which has significant effectiveness in itself.
The inadequacy of military measures precedent to a manageable civil defense and of our civil defense system, including early warning, constitute a startling weakness in our national defense at the present time. The Civil Defense Administration and the National Security Resources Board are unable adequately to plan their activities. Our civilians and our industrial establishment would suffer terrible losses as a consequence of enemy atomic attack.
On the other hand, an effective system of national defense would be a powerful deterrent to war; the enemy would be reluctant to strike if its blows would not be effective against us. Furthermore, an adequate defense would increase tremendously our security, add to our power position with respect to the Soviet Union, and give us a sounder base for speaking with assurance in international affairs.
[Page 184]Recommendations
- 1. That the Department of Defense be assigned responsibility to install and have operational an early warning system capable of giving three to six hours warning of hostile aircraft approaching the United States; that a target date of December 31, 1954 be set for the accomplishment of this mission; that all agencies and departments be directed to give full support to the Department of Defense as requested by it in accomplishing this mission; that $20,000,000 be made available immediately out of 1953 obligational authority; that additional amounts up to an aggregate of $100,000,000 out of 1953 funds be made available as additional elements of the program are worked out.
- [2. That planning for and research and development work in connection with an air defense program proceed on the assumption that an early warning system will be operational in two years; and that progressively increasing effectiveness of the U.S. air defense capability is required.
- 3. That the Civil Defense Administration and the National Security Resources Board proceed in their planning on the assumptions that (a) the early warning system will be operational in two years, and (b) the air defense system will increase progressively in effectiveness from 25 percent in 1955 to 75 percent by the end of 1957.]6
- A covering memorandum from Savage to Nitze reads: “Here is the redraft of the Early Warning paper. I should think that before this case is presented to the President, some appropriate agency should prepare as an annex an estimate of proposed expenditures over the next four years with more definite information of what performance might be expected with the inauguration of the early warning system. So far as I am aware, this has not yet been done. I do not believe it is customary to have budgetary commitments without some more precise information of this nature.” Although this memorandum would seem to indicate that Savage had alone been responsible for drafting it, Nitze’s name does appear upon it as a codrafting officer. The “Early Warning paper” under reference would seem to indicate that this paper was a redraft of an earlier Department of Defense paper on the subject. See footnote 3, p. 142.↩
- The handwritten word “nominalized” [?] is on the source text at this point.↩
- The handwritten phrase “or a smaller number of modern atomic bombs” is on the source text at this point.↩
- The typewritten words “and obsolete” have been stricken from the source text at this point.↩
- Regarding Project East River, see footnote 2, p. 20.↩
- Brackets in the source text.↩