Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1

Truman Library, Truman papers, PSF–Subject file

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the President

top secret

Washington, November 5, 1952.

This “Key Data” book¹ has been prepared by the NSC Reporting Unit to enable you to keep at hand a current ready guide to the national security programs. The information is taken either from National Security Council reports like NSC 135² or from departmental reports maintained by the Reporting Unit in accordance with your basic directive.

The indicators have been selected to present the status of each program in relation to national security objectives approved by you upon the advice of the National Security Council. Additional material will be added from time to time along with revisions of the present contents.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure]

Key Data Book Prepared by the Reporting Unit of the National Security Council for the President

[Extracts]

top secret

[Washington, undated.]

Status of the National Security Programs of the United States of America in Relation to Approved Objectives

Our general objectives with respect to Russia in time of peace as well as in time of war should be:

a. To reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independence and stability of the world family of nations.

b. To bring about a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia, to conform with the purposes and principles set forth in the UN Charter.

In pursuing these objectives due care must be taken to avoid permanently impairing our economy and the fundamental values and institutions inherent in our way of life.

—NSC 20/4³

No. 1 The Military Program

1. The objectives of the military program are:

a. Protection against disaster; and

b. Support of our foreign policy.

In the course of meeting these objectives, the military program is designed to provide, at the least possible cost in manpower and national resources, a maximum deterrent to enemy aggression and, in case war occurs, give the nation a reasonable assurance of victory.

2. In order to attain the above objectives, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended the forces listed herein to carry out on an austere basis the following approved basic military tasks:

a. To provide a reasonable initial defense of the Western Hemisphere and essential allied areas, particularly in Europe.

b. To provide a minimum mobilization base while offensive forces are being developed.

c. To conduct initial air and sea offensive operations to destroy vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity and to check enemy offensive operations until allied offensive strength can be developed.

d. To defend and maintain the lines of communications and base areas necessary to the execution of the above tasks.

e. To provide aid to our allies to assist them in the execution of their responsibilities.

The Military Program—Capability on June 30, 1952 to Fulfil its Objectives

The Army is currently capable of providing, on an austere basis, ground and anti-aircraft defenses for certain of the most critical areas in the Western Hemisphere and the essential overseas bases and lines of communication, except those in the Benelux countries, France and Germany. It does not possess the capability to fulfill the aggregate of the objectives set forth because of the insufficient level of stocks in the mobilization reserve and an inadequate industrial mobilization base and the inadequate strength and readiness of the General Reserve.

The current Navy and Marine Corps capability to fulfill the outlined objectives is good from the standpoint of being able to initiate D–Day tasks. From the standpoint of sustaining and expanding the initial effort in phase with current war plans, the capability is not good. The capability to initiate D–Day tasks will improve as funds already approved are effectively applied to improve the modernization and training of the active forces. The capability to sustain and expand the initial effort will remain unsatisfactory until funds are made available to increase significantly the level of equipment in the mobilization reserve.

The Air Force has currently a limited capability to defend the Western Hemisphere against air attack, owing chiefly to a shortage of all-weather jet interceptors and delay in the completion of the radar network covering Canada,⁴ Alaska and the northeastern United States. Assuming continued involvement in Korea following the onset of general war, it would have difficulty in carrying out those measures for the defense and maintenance of essential lines of communication to Europe which fall within its responsibilities, and could provide only a limited portion of its planned contribution to the defense of NATO and the Far East. It has also a limited capability to carry out the strategic offensive. These capabilities will continue to improve as manpower and resources continue to be made available for the build-up and modernization of the Air Force in accordance with approved goals. The position of the Air Force with respect to post D–Day mobilization and capability to sustain and expand the initial effort is serious. It has been necessary for the Air Force to expend a maximum of available resources for the force in-being at the expense of the mobilization potential. The ability of the Air Force to sustain certain of its D–Day tasks will continue to be less than satisfactory until the mobilization reserve position has been significantly improved.

The Military Program—Air Defense

At present, the 3–6 hour warning of an impending air attack on the continental U.S. essential for both military and civil defense is not assured. Intelligence may fail, and the present warning systems in Alaska, Canada, and Newfoundland can be avoided—through gaps in coverage, by low-level attacks or by submarine-launched missiles. A raid might not be detected until well within the continental U.S. defense system.

The capabilities of air defense forces are extremely meager, especially against low altitude and night attacks. The following need improvement: early warning, land radar cover at low altitude, seaward radar coverage at all altitudes, capacity of present systems to handle large raids, identification of surprise attacks, quality and quantity of all-weather interceptors, and AA against very high and very low attacks.

Present forces for the air defense of the U.S. and Canada include 46 interceptor squadrons, 45 AA battalions, 80 large radars and 11 air defense control centers. Additional radar sites are under construction.

Programmed and funded improvements include 60 early warning and control aircraft to man 8 off-shore stations; 57 all-weather fighter squadrons totaling 1425 aircraft; 9 RCAF all-weather fighter squadrons totaling 172 aircraft; and 66 AA battalions, 28 of which are to be equipped with Nike missiles.

Additional improvements planned, but not yet funded include 35 more large radars to fill gaps in the perimeter; some small radars for low altitude protection; sea-based radar coverage in critical coastal sea areas; better data-handling systems, identification, fighter interceptors, and local defense; and development generally for additional early warning and defense in depth.

Two recent technological break-throughs make the extension of the early warning system northward beyond the boundaries of the United States technically and economically feasible. First, the development of audible means for presenting radar information eliminates the problem of manning and watching radar scopes under Arctic conditions. Secondly, the discovery that long-range radio communications are possible at frequencies much higher than usually assumed greatly increases the reliability of Arctic communications, previously hampered by ionospheric storms.

Pursuant to Presidential directive on October 14, 1952,⁵ the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, NSRB, are preparing coordinated recommendations on the possibility of an improved continental early warning system.

The Military Program—Research and Development

Research and development for national defense, measured in dollars, has more than doubled since Korea. Programs presently directed toward defense objectives include those of the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. Together these programs absorb more than half the 135,000 engineers and scientists engaged in research and development in the nation and will absorb more in the next year or two.

Funds obligated by the Department of Defense for research and development are running as follows:

Obligations
(millions of dollars)

FY 1950 Actual	FY 1951 Actual	FY 1952 Estimated	FY 1953 Estimated
520	994	1325	1472

1. Air Defense. The three major components of air defense are warning systems, surface weapons, and air weapons. Present warning and control systems have three major weaknesses: (1) the ranges of surveillance radars do not provide sufficient warning for interceptor aircraft; (2) present radars have difficulty detecting aircraft at very low altitudes or at very high altitudes; (3) the radar systems are easily saturated; that is, the number of aircraft that can be detected, tracked and taken under attack simultaneously by present warning and control networks is altogether too small. Major improvement cannot be expected for four or five years.

Present anti-aircraft gun systems are ineffective above 20,000 feet and at very low altitudes. Extremely rapid firing rocket systems, to be available in next three to five years, should improve capabilities for countering very low level attacks. Major improvement of anti-aircraft defense will begin to be realized in approximately 2 years with the advent of surface launched guided missiles in significant numbers. These promise anti-aircraft ranges of 10 to 25 miles at altitudes up to 60,000 feet, with high probability of kills in one or two shots.

Regarding air weapons, our jet fighters should be effective against present Russian heavy bombers if alerted and directed to the target in time. Between 1957 and 1960 our interceptors should become armed with guided missiles and should be susceptible of control, in any kind of weather, from the ground or from aircraft carriers. During this same period, ground-to-air guided missiles, completely controlled from ground stations at ranges of 100 to 250 miles, should begin to be available.

2. Anti-Submarine and Anti-Mine Warfare. The problems of detecting distant objects under water and properly classifying them are both extremely difficult and especially critical to our success. Our ability to deal with modern submarines, once detected, also leaves much to be desired, but weapons now under development are expected to provide substantial improvement in the next 2 to 3 years. The use of atomic weapons to destroy submarines at sea may become economically feasible.

The best technique today for detecting fully submerged submarines is “sonar,” a system based upon sound signals transmitted through the water. The present average range of sonar detection can be approximately doubled by towing the sonar gear some distance below the ship or by suspending it from a helicopter or blimp. Such techniques will be operational in 1955. Ranges up to 5 miles may be achieved by 1956. An important program is now underway to exploit the discovery that the very low frequency sounds given off by snorkelling or surfaced submarines can be heard at great distances in the water. Large listening arrays can provide submarine surveillance by this technique known as “lofar”, at distances considerably in excess of 100 miles.

Our present capability against mines is dangerously low, especially in the case of pressure, magnetic and acoustic mines laid on harbor and channel bottoms. No completely adequate means to detect and classify bottom-laid mines are in prospect. For this reason we are developing sweeping equipment that will itself explode the mines, thereby removing the need for detecting and classifying them. Despite our best ingenuity, however, anti-mine warfare is expected to remain a slow, costly, and extremely dangerous operation.

3. General Air Warfare. The most significant weapons advance in this field is the development of small atomic bombs that can be carried by fighters, fighter bombers, light bombers and general purpose aircraft operating from forward airfields and aircraft carriers. These smaller bombs are beginning to be stockpiled this year. To carry the small atomic bomb several currently operational fighters and light attack aircraft are being modified.

Dive-bombing is an accurate delivery technique, but if an atomic weapon is used, ceilings as high as 18,000 feet are normally required so that release can be made at an altitude which permits the aircraft to escape damage. However, one experimental method, expected to be operational by 1953, would allow a fighter to approach the target at treetop height and release its bomb in a sharp climbing maneuver, lobbing the bomb several miles to the target.

In the field of guided missiles, two subsonic turbo-jet guided missiles may assist in penetrating enemy defenses. Each is designed to carry the atomic bomb to maximum ranges of 500 miles, Matador from land bases and Regulus from submarines, surface ships or land bases. Both are now in limited production for test purposes, but may be operational in 2 to 5 years.

Air bases and aircraft carriers must be considered prime targets in an enemy’s efforts to reduce our air capabilities. To decrease the vulnerability of land bases to air attack, reduction in their size would be highly desirable. To this end, work is being done on the “zero length launcher”: a technique of rocket-assisted launching that eliminates the normal take-off run. The British have developed a corrolary technique of landing fighters without wheels on a pneumatic mat. This is being further investigated for application to larger aircraft and may lead to an increasing capability to operate from very small areas.

4. Ground Combat. The development of tactical atomic weapons will undoubtedly have the most profound implications for land warfare, although the ultimate impact cannot yet be accurately foreseen. A ground-fired atomic weapon will be available for service in 1953. A large unguided rocket with an atomic warhead will be operationally available in significant numbers in 1954. Also in 1954, a shortrange, surface launched rocket-type guided missile with a range of about 75 miles, carrying an atomic warhead will become operational. Similar missiles with ranges up to 150 miles will follow.

By 1954, full scale offensive capability for the nerve gas GB is expected. A new light and mobile anti-tank vehicle with sufficient armor to protect its crew against the weapons of an enemy infantry screen and armed with recoilless rifles capable of destroying any known enemy tank will become available in 1954.

A problem of great urgency concerns our night-time capabilities for surveillance, detection, ranging, and fire control. Full solution is several years away. Another serious problem, for which solution is very remote, concerns our ability to detect non-metallic land mines.

Improvement in supply and transport techniques is steady. The availability of large powerful helicopters has already enhanced our capability for rapidly delivering groups of fully equipped men ready for immediate combat into areas where other aircraft cannot land. About 1957, a helicopter able to carry 18 men will be available.

5. Strategic Air Operations. Strategic air operations involve three primary problems: (1) penetration of enemy defenses; (2) location of the target and accurate delivery of the bomb; and (3) the ability to accomplish the foregoing in all kinds of weather.

The application of supplementary jet engines to the B–36 gives it higher speeds for short periods and thus improves its prospects of successful penetration. The all-jet B–47, to be fully operational in 1953, represents the next step in aircraft development and will have a combat speed of 540 miles per hour. However, because of its lesser range, it must operate from advance bases or be refueled in the air in order to reach many of the probable target areas. The B–52 and B–60, which will come into operational use about 1956, promise very long ranges without refueling and at a speed of 600 miles per hour.

Two new bombers will soon enter development. Test flights are scheduled for 1956 and production may be possible in 1958. One is designed to fly at a speed just below that of sound and at altitudes below 1000 feet. The other is designed for operation at high altitudes at combat speeds approaching 1250 miles per hour, far above the speed of sound. Refueling of both in the air will be necessary for long-range missions.

Also under consideration as a penetration technique is the “parasite” system in which a small aircraft proceeds to the target after being carried to the combat zone by a larger, slower, long-range aircraft.

Guided missiles may be the ultimate answer to the penetration problem. A subsonic surface-launched guided missile capable of carrying an atomic warhead to intercontinental ranges will be tested in 2 or 3 years and may be operational within six years. Proceeding on about the same time scale is a supersonic missile, also with an atomic warhead, to be launched from a large bomber that will carry it to within about 100 miles of the target. Missiles with several times the speed of sound and with intercontinental ranges may become operational several years later.

Source: NSC 135, No. 1, “The Military Program”

Prepared by NSC Reporting Unit

November 19, 1952

No. 2 The Mobilization Program

The objectives of the mobilization program are:

1. Provision of general production assistance for the military programs.

2. Expansion of materials supply and of the general industrial and agricultural base.

3. Allocation of limited current supplies to meet the needs of defense build-up while at the same time maintaining a healthy civilian economy.

4. Initiation of planning for the completion and maintenance of the mobilization base to meet the requirements of all-out war.

5. Prevention of undue inflationary pressures upon the economy while the foregoing objectives are being accomplished.

—NSC 135

the mobilization program—status on september 30, 1952

In military procurement, a slow but steady increase in deliveries has taken place (see the following chart).⁶ By September 30, 1952, total deliveries since Korea reached $41 billion, about one-third of the $129 billion financed through FY 1953. Current deliveries are running about $8 billion per quarter. The recent stoppage in the steel industry has caused some losses of military production—part of which will be made up—and may cause additional losses in the coming months despite preventive action. Current aircraft production is running about 900 planes per month, a post-Korea high, but somewhat under the latest approved schedule. Medium tank production reached 535 units in September, many times the rate of a year ago. It is expected to rise to a monthly average of over 800 in the April–June quarter of 1953, a quantity sufficient to provide for immediate demand. Since succeeding production will provide for accumulation of mobilization reserves, a stretch-out of the medium tank schedule will follow.

On September 30, expansion goals had been set for 176 products and materials. The primary tool to achieve these goals has been accelerated tax amortization, with most projects so aided due to be completed by December, 1953. The programs for aluminum, electric power, steel, and petroleum refining are shown graphically in a separate chart.⁶ Expansion programs were also under way to increase supplies by 1955 of such stockpiled items as copper, lead, zinc, nickel, tungsten, and cobalt.

Allocation operations met defense needs for all major materials during FY 1952. There was scarcity, therefore, only in the sense that civilian and export needs were trimmed and industrial usage reduced, or that stockpile accumulations fell behind. By the summer of 1953, except for several special shapes and alloys, enough steel should be available to satisfy unrestricted demand. However, since the supply of copper and, to a lesser extent, aluminum will not reach comfortable proportions until the latter half of 1953, the framework of the Controlled Materials Plan will be required at least until mid-1953. The advisability of removing most controls by that time is under study.

Because of uncertainty as to the dimensions of the mobilization base, fresh appraisals of the nation’s present and proposed production distributive capacity were initiated in FY 1952. Action in this area must wait completion of these and other studies and agreement on proposals to remedy deficiencies. The Department of Defense has, however, already taken the step of including in its 1954 budget request a separate fund for the procurement of production equipment for reserve production capacity.

FY 1952 was a year of remarkable general stability in the economy, the distortions of FY 1951 having been largely eliminated. At the end of September, wholesale prices were 11% above and consumers’ prices 12% above their respective June 1950 levels.

Sources:

• NSC 135, No. 2, “The Mobilization Program”
• ODM, Seventh Quarterly Report to the President by the Director of Defense Mobilization, October 1, 1952
• ODM Report to the President by the Director of Defense Mobilization, November 1, 1952

Prepared by NSC Reporting Unit

November 19, 1952

No. 3 The Mutual Security Program⁷

The objectives of the mutual security program are:

(1) to maintain the security and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by military, economic, and technical assistance to friendly countries to strengthen the mutual security and individual and collective defenses of the free world;

(2) to develop their resources in the interest of their security and independence and the national interest of the United States;

(3) to facilitate the effective participation of those countries in the United Nations system for collective security.

—Mutual Security Act of 1951

the mutual security program—status on june 30, 1952

With respect to the Lisbon goals for December 31, 1952,⁸ shortfalls were in prospect as a result of European delay in raising and training men, and U.S. delay in MDAP shipments (see attached chart).⁹ 13 ⅓ divisions will not meet prescribed readiness even though all 43 ⅔ will be in being. There will be shortfalls in aircraft (916), plus deficiencies in combat reserve planes, training, and organization. Navy goals will be short in minesweepers.

The Austrian $70 million military aid program had not yet been implemented, but $1.5 billion in economic aid had enabled Austria to achieve economic viability. Yugoslav ground and naval forces were up to JCS goals, but their combat effectiveness was rated low because of equipment deficiencies. Considerable expansion of air forces was planned. Tripartite economic aid to Yugoslavia allowed minimum living standards and modest development while military forces were being enlarged. The $62.5 million Spanish loan had been almost entirely committed, but the recent $100 million appropriation had not been obligated pending outcome of the base negotiations.

Greek and Turkish forces were capable of carrying out their wartime missions of home defense, except that in the case of Greece there were some equipment deficiencies. Iranian forces, designed chiefly for internal security, met 95% of JCS goals. With political unrest and critical economic conditions in the rest of the Near East and Africa, economic aid was directed at Arab refugees, neutralism, and Israeli economic weaknesses. Point Four programs were just getting underway in the area with the signature of general agreements.

In spite of political instability and threats to internal security in the Far East, progress was made during the year in strengthening existing governments, with the exception of Thailand’s. JCS personnel goals for Indo-China and Formosa were nearly met, but equipment was scanty. About 15–20% of programmed military aid for the Philippines and Thailand had been shipped.

No military aid shipments for Latin America were made before June 30. The effective technical assistance program was furthered by $19 million, which was more than matched by local contributions.

The U.S. also participates with substantial contributions in several UN assistance programs.

No. 4 The Civil Defense Program

The objectives of the national civil defense program are to minimize the effects of enemy attacks and to ensure the retention of our productive capacity and will to fight—through the education of the public in basic knowledge of and skill in self-protection, and through the development of civil defense organizations which are organized, staffed, trained and equipped for emergency operations.

The Federal Civil Defense Administration has the responsibility, under Public Law No. 290, 81st Congress, for preparing and directing national plans and programs for civil defense and, under emergency conditions, must be prepared to coordinate and furnish support to the operating civil defense forces of the country.

—NSC 135

the civil defense program—status on june 30, 1952

Current civil defense planning assumes grave danger of war, that the USSR can attack any or all of 67 critical target areas with an A-bomb (see separate chart),¹⁰ and that total casualties would be about 7,500,000, depending upon the degree of warning and preparation.

If an attack had occurred on June 30, the Federal Civil Defense Administration would have had a measure of functional capability, but the nation-wide civil defense organization would have been grossly inadequate. The public would not have been mentally or emotionally prepared. The warning system was 20% operational. Shelter would have been less than 10% adequate. Radio and television stations would have left the air, thus depriving the people of the means of guidance. Medical supplies, mass feeding facilities and emergency lodging, traffic control, rescue service, water supplies for fire-fighting, and organized transportation would all have been ineffective.

In terms of personnel, civil defense had 3.3 million persons organized, about 18% of the 17.5 million required. Even this is an overstatement of personnel readiness, since those enrolled were not properly distributed. The number enrolled was relatively high for regular community services like fire-fighting and police, but low for activities peculiar to civil defense like warden and rescue services.

In terms of money, the total non-recurring cost to the Federal Government of the estimated requirements is $1.9 billion. Half of this would be for shelters, about 40% for a federal stockpile of medical and other supplies, and about 10% for federal contributions to the purchase of other equipment. Through FY 1953 about $119 million had been appropriated, 6% of the total. State and local governments have appropriated to date $183 million of $1.1 billion required. (See separate fiscal table.)¹¹

Organizationally, a start has been made. All states, territories and possessions have designated a civil defense director. There are 23 interstate compacts in effect for mutual assistance, and a framework for organization now exists at all governmental levels.

No. 5 The Stockpiling Program

The objective of the stockpiling program is to acquire, prior to M–Day, sufficient stocks of strategic and critical materials to offset the anticipated deficit between estimated wartime supplies on the one hand and wartime requirements for military, industrial and minimum essential civilian needs on the other.

The assumed duration of this war (five years) is the minimum given in current JCS guidance.

—NSC 114/2¹²

the stockpiling program—status on august 31, 1952

Estimated wartime requirements for many materials could be met by domestic production and available imports, but 75 are now stockpiled to cover calculated deficits,

Recently the Interdepartmental Stockpiling Committee put all stockpile materials in 5 bands on the basis of urgency. They found metals to be the most critical, and put 6—beryl, cobalt, columbite, nickel, tantalite and tungsten—in Band I (most urgent).

The percent-of-wartime-requirements approach used for the individual stockpile items is the best one for measuring the status of the program. This is shown in the following chart. But other measures may be used for operational purposes. The second chart,¹³ marked “Rate of Acquisition”, plots the growth of the stockpile as a whole. On June 30, 1951, 36% of the total stockpile goal, figures in then current prices, was on hand. Since then some individual objectives have been changed and prices have fluctuated; but on August 31, 1952, 51% of the total stockpile goal, figured in current prices, was on hand. At this rate of growth, it would be at least 3 years, and possibly 6 or more, before the stockpile is completed. Schedules, however, now call for an increase in this rate. Most individual stockpiles grew more slowly during the past year or so than was planned. Inventories of 2 declined: chemical grade chromite and corundum.

This slow progress resulted from priority given to current military production, and to certain civilian production necessary to maintain employment and a healthy civilian economy. These prior claims have meant the diversion of goods scheduled for stockpile acquisition and, in some cases, even withdrawals from the stockpile.

On August 31 the stockpile was valued at $3.7 billion in current prices, but the Government had paid for it (at various earlier dates) only $2.3 billion.

The stockpile program is based on the wartime needs of the United States alone. There has been no effort to dovetail our stockpiling program and those of our allies into a single program. However, the U.S. does attempt to work out current demand and supply of scarce materials with other free nations through the International Materials Conference.

No. 6 The National Psychological Program

The mission of the Psychological Strategy Board is to provide for the more effective planning, coordination and conduct, within the framework of approved national policies, of psychological operations.

The PSB is responsible for the formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations, of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort.

—Presidential Directive of April 4, 1951 Establishing the Psychological Strategy Board¹⁴

the national psychological program—status on june 30, 1952

While an agreed over-all strategic concept for the program had not been formulated, certain broad criteria for establishing relative priorities were agreed. Some progress was made in NATO areas, but deterioration took place elsewhere, particularly in the Near East. The made-in-America character of part of our psychological output was a major handicap. Even worse was the increasing reaction, expressed in neutralism and charges of U.S. aggressiveness, to the military character of some of our political and economic activities. In underdeveloped countries, past or present white domination is a far greater psychological reality than the Soviet menace. In other areas, particularly Western Europe, the over-riding abhorrence of another possible war constitutes an important liability.

Certain U.S. policies are psychologically damaging. In the Moslem world, it is U.S. policy toward Israel. In areas under European domination, it is U.S. identification with its NATO allies. In Britain and elsewhere, it is U.S. policy toward China. The same is true of certain primarily domestic matters: race relations; the restrictive immigration policy, most recently embodied in the McCarran Act; and tariff laws.

… In the … information field, the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe were the only significant remaining programs reaching the USSR and the Satellites….

. . . . . . .

No. 7 The Foreign Intelligence Program

For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of CIA, under the direction of the National Security Council—

(1) to advise the NSC in matters concerning such intelligence activities of departments and agencies as relate to the national security;

(2) to make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies as relate to the national security;

(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: provided, that CIA shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions: provided further, that the departments and other agencies shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: and provided further, that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the NSC determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC may from time to time direct.

—National Security Act of 1947, as Amended

. . . . . . .

No. 8 The Internal Security Program¹⁵

The objective of the internal security program is to protect this country from the threats of espionage, sabotage, and other disruptive tactics which are directed against the United States by Soviet Russia and her satellites through world communism and other avenues, with the recognition that, in approaching a goal of absolute security, there is a danger of encroachment upon the constitutional liberties guaranteed by our democratic form of government.

—NSC 135

the internal security program—status on october 31, 1952

The Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security and the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference believe they are achieving adequate coordination, both for present limited mobilization and for possible general war.

Control of subversives was increased in FY 1952 through the prosecution of members of the Communist Party, USA, by expansion of the informant program, and by the executive orders on loyalty and security, Action by the Civil Service Commission on the loyalty program will contribute to the improvement of security through the development of a common procedure in all sensitive governmental units. Control of persons is weak in the entry-exit area, despite limited measures taken regarding the entry of potentially dangerous aliens and new authority under the recent Omnibus Immigration Act. There are no adequate controls over alien crewmen, or foreign official and diplomatic personnel.

There is a high degree of installation security for certain government buildings and areas of some sensitive agencies. Uniform standards for industrial facilities are being prepared by the Facilities Protection Board for publication in December, 1952. A substantial number of key facilities have been assigned by the Industries Evaluation Board to government agencies for security supervision, and a great many others are under review. There is virtually no control over the subcontracting plants of classified contractors. Furthermore, legal authority is lacking to remove security risks in industry, there is difficulty in preventing strikes by communist-infiltrated unions, and plant visitors are not adequately checked. Accordingly, the U.S. industrial establishment is not secure, and acts of sabotage should come as no surprise.

Difficulties in implementing the limited port security program reduce its effectiveness, even in major ports. No effective security program was in force for the communications industry. Export licensing and monetary controls are limited primarily by problems of transshipment abroad and diplomatic immunity; import control has been identified as a counter-smuggling problem, and is being treated accordingly.

Present safeguards against clandestine unconventional attack provide little security—whether in the area of port security, atomic material, use of the mails, air traffic, or diplomatic shipments.

The “minimum standards” executive order provides the basis for safeguarding classified information, but the program for personnel clearance for access thereto awaits another executive order, as well as decision with respect to standards for making classified information available to Americans outside the government and to foreigners.

1. Below.
2. Regarding NSC 135, see the editorial note, p. 56.
3. For text of NSC 20/4, “United States Objectives with Respect to the USSR To Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security,” Nov. 23, 1948, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. i, Part 2, p. 662.
4. Documentation on negotiations and discussions leading to joint US–Canadian construction of an early warning system across Alaska and northern Canada is scheduled for publication in volume vi.
5. See the memorandum by Bruce, Oct. 14, p. 164.
6. Not printed.
6. Not printed.
7. For further documentation on the Mutual Security Program, see vol. i, Part 1, pp. 460 ff.
8. Reference is to the force and production goals agreed upon at the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon, Feb. 20–25; for documentation, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 107 ff.
9. Not printed.
10. Not printed.
11. Not printed.
12. For text of NSC 114/2, “United States Programs for National Security,” Oct. 12, 1951, and its annexes, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. i, p. 182.
13. Neither chart printed.
14. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. i, p. 58.
15. For further documentation on internal security and the federal loyalty program, see vol. i, Part 2, pp. 1379 ff.