Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Review of NSC 68 & 114”

Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

top secret

[Washington,] September 19, 1952.

Outline of Re-Examination Called for by NSC Action 668–b²

The basic purpose of the re-examination is to respond to the President’s Directive (copy attached).³ This work should be divided into three parts:

I. An analysis of the broad allocation of our resources under present programs and of our security posture in 1954 and the immediately following period.

II. An indication of additional high-priority programs which would be desirable to undertake to meet the threats which face us, together with an estimate of the resources which would be required within the next few years to carry out these additional programs.

III. An analysis of the possibilities of undertaking the additional programs by a re-allocation of the planned distribution of our resources under present programs, as against the desirability and possibility of increasing the total resources available for meeting our national security programs.

Part I

An Analysis of the Board Allocation of Our Resources Under Present Programs and of Our Security Posture in 1954 and the Immediately Following Period

a. General

The main purpose of this section of the study should be to give a very broad picture of the allocation of the United States and free world resources in terms of the main threats which face the United States and the rest of the free world. In order to be useful this analysis should be in terms of a period far enough ahead so that if changes are desired there is time to make such changes effective, and, at the same time, not so distant that useful conclusions are impossible. It is suggested that calendar year 1954 and the immediately following period might be the best for this purpose.

The first step will be to indicate broadly the resources which are and will be available for allocation. It will be necessary to give a picture of how the security posture of the United States and the free world will develop based on present programs. It will also be necessary to indicate the probable amounts of military, economic and other resources which the United States will make available to its allies.

With respect to the United States military programs, the primary problems will probably be to present a meaningful picture of the improvement in United States capabilities as a result of the acquisition of the new matériel which is now and will be in process of procurement through fiscal 1954; and of the increased capabilities of the United States with respect to the defense of the Western Hemisphere.

It is suggested that we examine the allocation of our resources to meet the threats to our security in the following five areas:

1. Far East (including Southeast Asia)

2. Middle East, South Asia, and Africa

3. Europe

4. Western Hemisphere

5. Offensive striking power and general military reserve

Effort should be made to indicate for each of these areas what resources are being allocated under present programs. This might be done both on an annual and a cumulative basis. The following resources should be covered and should be given both in terms of United States and free world resources:

a. Deployment of Military Forces

b. Military Aid

c. Economic Aid

d. Other Resources—including political and treaty commitments, information programs, covert programs, etc.

For each of the five areas indicated above, it will be necessary to indicate a general estimate of the security posture which will have been attained during 1954 and the immediately following period as a result of our programs. This will mean an estimate of the threats in the area with respect to general war, local aggression or loss by subversion, together with a broad estimate of the free world’s ability to meet these threats.

Finally, an effort should be made to draw some general conclusions as to the balance or lack of balance in our programs with respect to these five areas and with respect to the relative risks we are accepting. In other words, is the position we expect to be in during 1954 and the immediately following period a satisfactory one in each area?

b. specific

A number of assumptions will have to be made in preparing the above data. Broadly speaking, the assumptions should be on the basis that there is no basic change in the international situation between now and 1954. This would include the assumption that the Korean war continues without major change in scope. Other assumptions will have to be developed as we go along. With regard to the deployment of military forces, some assumption will have to be made as to forces not deployed in a particular area but planned and committed to that area. A distinction will have to be made between such forces and our capability to dispatch elements of a flexible general reserve to areas of our choice.

With respect to the fourth general area, there will be a number of special problems: (1) the allocation of resources to Latin America although small might be segregated; (2) forces allocated for the defense of the Continental United States, including both military and nonmilitary, will have to be segregated.

Part II

An Indication of Additional High-Priority Programs Which Would be Desirable to Undertake to Meet the Threats Which Face Us, Together With an Estimate of the Resources Which Would Be Required Within the Next Few Years to Carry Out These Additional Programs

The general purpose of Part II should be to indicate certain geographic areas or functional areas which the analysis in Part I indicates need special attention. NSC 135/1 indicates that there is a tentative view that both the Middle East and the Far East merit a larger share of our total resources than they are now receiving. Questions have also been raised as to the adequacy of our programs with respect to the Continental United States defense—both military and non-military—in the face of probable Soviet capabilities. Questions have been raised as to the soundness of the present ratio between our programs of military and economic assistance in Europe. An immediate start should be made on these problems in an effort to put forward a tentative high-priority program for the utilization of a larger amount or different types of resources in these areas than is now contemplated. It will be important to have a realistic estimate of the additional resources which could be utilized to good advantage in these areas, as well as a breakdown of the amount of each type of resource needed. Some indication would have to be given of what such a program could be expected to accomplish in terms of United States and free world security.

Part III

An Analysis of the Possibilities of Undertaking the Additional Programs by a Reallocation of the Planned Distribution of Our Resources Under Present Programs, as Against the Desirability and Possibility of Increasing the Total Resources Available for Meeting Our National Security Programs

There is little that can usefully be suggested with respect to this Part until Parts I and II have gotten well under way. It is clear that conclusions under Part III, the questions put in NSC Action 668 b, and appropriate recommendations will call for the highest order of evaluation and judgment.

terms of reference, working group on far east, nsc 135

1. Estimate of probable effectiveness of present programs (a) in the contingency of indefinite cold war with Chinese Communist military operations continuing in present pattern, (b) in the contingency of Chinese Communist aggression against Southeast Asia or major Chinese Communist offensive in Korea, (c) in case of general war.

2. Estimate of programs which might be calculated (a) to give maximum prospects of success in achieving our objectives in that area in cold war, (b) to give prospects of adequate defense or effective counter action against further Chinese Communist aggressions, (c) to give prospects of successful defense of key areas in general war.

a. Political programs.

i. Re securing Japanese contribution to general security.

ii. Re Nationalist China.

iii. Relations with France and Associated States.

iv. Intergovernmental security arrangements.

b. Military and military assistance programs.

i. Forces required (under each of three contingencies described in 1 above) and divisions between indigenous, non-US Western, and US.

ii. Nature, magnitude and cost of equipment and maintenance requirements.

iii. Timing.

c. Scope, cost and timing of economic programs.

i. Developmental and technical assistance for long range purposes.

ii. Financial and technical assistance for immediate political purposes.

iii. Economic support for military programs.

d. Information activities.

e. Covert activities.

3. Estimate of relative effectiveness of programs described in 2 above as against present programs.

terms of reference, working group on middle east, south asia and africa, nsc 135

1. Estimate of probable effectiveness of present programs (a) in contingency of indefinite cold war, (b) in case of general war.

2. Estimate of programs which might be calculated (a) to give maximum prospect of achieving our objectives in that area in cold war, (b) to give prospect of successful defense of key areas in general war.

a. Political programs

(1) Relations with U.K. and France

(2) Re Israel-Arab relations, etc.

(3) Relations with existing governments vs. new leadership groups

(4) Intergovernmental security arrangements

b. Military and military assistance programs

(1) Forces required and division between indigenous and outside (non-U.S., U.S.)

(2) Nature, magnitude, cost and timing of equipment and maintenance requirements

c. Scope, cost and timing of Economic Programs, Non-U.S. and U.S.

(1) Development and technical assistance for long range purposes

(2) Financial and technical assistance for immediate political purposes

(3) Economic support for military programs

(4) Regional programs

d. Information activities

e. Covert activities

3. Estimate of relative effectiveness of programs described in 2, above, as against present programs.

terms of reference, working group on europe, nsc 135

1. Estimate of probable effectiveness of present programs (a) in contingency of indefinite cold war, (b) in case of general war. This estimate should reflect:

a. The problem of ratification of EDC and contractual, the resulting situation if France or Germany fail to ratify;

b. The impact of present programs on politico-economic situation particularly of U.K. and France; and

c. The impact of present programs on U.K. and French capabilities and willingness to continue to carry commitments in other parts of the world.

2. Estimate of possible shifts in amount, allocation or timing of programs (U.S., non-U.S.) which would:

a. Increase prospects of achieving our objectives in the area in cold war

b. Increase capacity and willingness of French and U.K. to carry commitments in other parts of the world

c. Improve prospect of success in contingency of general war

3. Estimate of relative effectiveness of programs described in 2, above, as against present programs.

terms of reference, working group on defense of western hemisphere, nsc 135

A. Defense of the U.S. against atomic attack.

1. Estimate of the cost and effectiveness of the U.S. air defense system, in terms of aircraft, radar warning net, anti-aircraft artillery or missiles, and other components, that will become available and operative at various dates under present and projected programs.^*

2. Estimate of the cost and effectiveness of U.S. civil defense and other passive defense measures, such as dispersal of industry and provision for the continuity of governmental functions, etc., at various dates under present and projected programs.

B. Defense of the U.S. against sabotage.

1. Estimate of U.S. capabilities to provide security against threats arising from within the United States, at various dates under present and projected programs.

C. Defense of South and Central America.

1. Estimate of the effectiveness of present programs in Latin America (both U.S. and non-U.S.) to maintain stability and prevent the development of serious threats to U.S. (a) in the contingency of indefinite cold war, (b) in the event of general war.

D. Estimates of what might be done to increase the capabilities determined pursuant to A, B, and C above, taking into account cost, feasibility, timing and effectiveness.

terms of reference, working group on offensive striking power and general military reserve, nsc 135

A. Offensive Striking Power.

1. Estimate of the cost of U.S. resources including weapons, bases, aircraft, ships and other appropriate elements, which are assigned, or will under present and projected programs be assigned, the primary mission of delivering an atomic offensive against the Soviet Union in the event of war.

2. Estimate of the capability of the forces described above to deliver the atomic offensive against the Soviet Union, at various dates under present and projected programs.

3. Estimate of U.S. forces assigned other missions, which could be rapidly diverted to the mission of delivering the atomic offensive in the event of need and their capability to assist in carrying out the atomic offensive.

B. General Reserve.

1. Estimate of the size and composition of U.S. military forces located in the United States which are not assigned the mission of defending the continental United States and which therefore constitute a general reserve capable of deployment to areas of our choosing (a) in the cold war and (b) in the event of general war. Indicate the size and composition of these forces at various times under present and projected programs.

2. Estimate of the effectiveness of this general reserve, at various dates under present and projected programs, (a) as a deterrent to general war, (b) as a deterrent to local aggression, (c) as a counter to local aggression or subversion (viz. Iran), (d) as an immediate reinforcement for forces initially committed against the enemy, in the event of general war.

C. Estimate of what might be done to increase the capabilities determined pursuant to A and B above, taking into account cost, feasibility, timing and effectiveness.

1. Undated slips attached to the source text indicate that this paper was sent from Nitze to Acheson for approval. It was subsequently transmitted to Charles P. Noyes and Lovett at the Department of Defense. A covering memorandum by Philip Watts of the Policy Planning Staff to Perkins of EUR and eight other addressees on Sept. 22 reads: “Attached for your information is a revised Outline of Re-examination called for by NSC Action 668b which takes into account changes suggested by officers of the Department as well as Defense and DMS.” An earlier draft of this outline, dated Sept. 16 and circulated within the Department of State is in the PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Review of NSC 68 & 114”, along with related papers, comments, and criticisms.
2. See footnote 7, p. 123.
3. See the memorandum by Lay, Sept. 4, supra.
4. The effectiveness and timing of the Canadian contribution must also be taken into account. [Footnote in the source text.]