Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1

Truman Library, Truman papers, PSF–Subject file

Memorandum for the President of Discussion at the 122d Meeting of the National Security Council on Wednesday, September 3, 1952¹

top secret

September 3, 1952

[Extract]

The following notes contain a summary of the discussion at the 122nd Meeting of the National Security Council, at which you presided. The Vice President was unable to attend the meeting because of his absence from the city.

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2. Status of United States Programs for National Security as of June 30, 1952 (NSC 135)²

The President stated that consideration of the reappraisal of programs for national security was the order of business for the day’s meeting.

After Mr. Lay had noted that there were two reports—one on the status of the programs as of June 30, 1952, and another on reappraisal of United States objectives and strategy—and had explained their background and interrelationship, the President asked if there were any comments on the status report.

Secretary Acheson replied that the first reaction he had to the Council’s consideration of the report was that he was scared to death to have so many copies of so vital a document around. He said that he would send back his own copies.

Mr. Lay then explained that the distribution of the status report had been limited as far as possible in agreement with the NSC agencies, and that in most instances certain pages had been deleted from copies distributed to other than Council agencies.

Secretary Lovett strongly supported the anxieties of the Secretary of State, and explained that his security people were very worried about certain portions of the report. He therefore wanted to turn all copies back to the Executive Secretary after the Council had finished its consideration of the report.

The President stated that he was glad to return his own copy, and directed that all other copies should also be turned in to the Executive Secretary.

The President then asked if there were any further comments on the report. There were none.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted the reference report by the Executive Secretary on the subject.

b. Directed that all outstanding copies of NSC 135 be recalled by the Executive Secretary.

3. Reappraisal of United States Objectives and Strategy for National Security (NSC 135/1 and Annex to NSC 135/1;³ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security”, dated June 30, 1952;⁴ Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Reappraisal of United States Objectives and Strategy for National Security”, dated September 2, 1952⁵)

The President turned to NSC 135/1 and first requested the comments of Secretary Acheson.

Secretary Acheson stated that his comments fell into three categories: First, the substance of what the report recommended; secondly, omissions in the report; and thirdly, the language of the report in general. As for the first category, Secretary Acheson said that he believed that in general NSC 135/1 constituted a reaffirmation of the recommendations previously laid down in the NSC 20, 68 and 114 series. He then proceeded to summarize these various recommendations of NSC 135/1, suggesting that the heart of the paper was in paragraph 9–a, which suggested a re-examination of the various programs which had been set in motion by the three series in question. In general, Secretary Acheson thought that the heart of the present report was sound, but that there were certain difficulties and problems with respect to drafting and wording. The most notable omission, in his view, was on United States economic and trade policy in general, as opposed to policies regarding specific aid to our allies. Secretary Acheson noted that the Department of State and Mr. Harriman’s office were already engaged in studies of this problem, and that it was a matter of the utmost importance.

With respect to the recommendations in paragraph 9–a, Secretary Acheson expressed the opinion that the three departments most closely concerned—namely, State, Defense, and Mutual Security—should, in consultation with other agencies, jointly create working groups to consider the re-examination called for in paragraph 9–a, and to come up subsequently with recommendations on the subjects. In Secretary Acheson’s opinion this task could be accomplished in not more than five or six weeks if the three agencies in question could feel free to call upon the other member agencies for assistance. He was certain, he added, that the results of such reexamination would be of very great use in consideration of the budget for Fiscal 1954.

Secretary Acheson then enlarged on what he regarded as the most serious omission in NSC 135/1, namely, the absence of any treatment of general United States commercial and economic policy. He did not feel, however, that it was possible to rectify this omission in NSC 135/1, and suggested that instead the subject of economic and trade policy, which was now being intensively studied in the State Department and in the Mutual Security Agency and doubtless elsewhere in the Government, should be the subject of a special and separate report which would outline the facts and possibly provide recommendations for the benefit of the new Administration. In any case, he added, the problem was one of general long-range policy, and NSC 135/1 should do no more than call attention to the existence of these separate studies.

The President then called upon Secretary Lovett for his comments on NSC 135/1.

Secretary Lovett expressed agreement with Secretary Acheson that the general conclusions of the paper were probably useful. It had nevertheless caused considerable concern in the Department of Defense, especially among the three Secretaries, because of the choice of certain kinds of language. As an example he cited paragraph 1, which he felt was too belligerent in tone and made no reference to our national aim to secure a lasting peace. Secretary Lovett even thought that it would be possible to see in this paragraph the connotation of preventive war.

As a second instance of defects in drafting, Secretary Lovett pointed to the wording of paragraph 9–b, on pages 7 and 8, particularly the last sentence. He said it seemed to him to be a very awkward way of stating a truism, and that naturally United States forces should not be committed to combat local aggression if they did not expect a favorable decision. This sentence, said Secretary Lovett, as presently written was “absurd”.

Secretary Lovett also took exception to the manner in which paragraph 15, on page 11, had been phrased. The net of the Department of Defense’s feeling, said Secretary Lovett, was that the purpose of the report was good but that there was considerable room for improvement in the drafting, and he felt that this latter problem should be referred to the NSC Staff.

Secretary Lovett then turned his attention to the suggestions which had been set forth by the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board in his memorandum to the Council.⁶ While Secretary Lovett expressed sympathy for the lack of guidance which NSRB and the other civilian agencies so keenly felt, he said that the type of information and guidance which were requested in Mr. Gorrie’s memorandum were for the most part not susceptible to any satisfactory answer. There was no way at present of being sure that it would be possible to give even an hour’s warning before an actual attack, nor was it yet possible to estimate exactly what proportion of the attacking aircraft would get through to the target. Thus far we were pretty well compelled to calculate this latter problem on the basis of World War II experience, which indicated that 75% of an armed enemy attack would get through. All this, continued Secretary Lovett, led up to the crucial question of how much money was needed to create something like an absolute defense of the nation’s critical target areas. There was no answer to that question either, argued Secretary Lovett, although one could at least say that it would be of a crushing size.

The President stated that he had been startled by the briefing on this very problem which he had been given that morning in the Cabinet Room. As far as he could see, said the President, there wasn’t very much of a defense in prospect except a vigorous offense.

On this point Secretary Lovett said that he felt that the rate of development of the nation’s offensive capacity should be accelerated, but nevertheless he was forced to the conclusion that notwithstanding the best efforts of all the agencies concerned, military and civilian, it was impossible to achieve an accurate foundation and basis on which Civil Defense and other agencies concerned with passive defense could operate with maximum efficiency. It was, in short, impossible to respond to the problem raised by NSRB. The defensive weapon of today was almost always an offensive weapon also.

Mr. Gorrie then inquired whether Secretary Lovett felt that the Government had really exhausted all its capacities to meet the problem of defense which he had raised and described in his memorandum.

Secretary Lovett replied in the negative, but insisted that progress was nevertheless slow and difficult.

Mr. Gorrie then said that it was his conviction that consideration ought to be given now to an extensive new national effort to solve this problem, for which purpose the very best brains available should be requisitioned for a period of anywhere from two to ten years. At the present time, he added, there seemed to him relatively little purpose and point in the formulation of programs of passive defense which were foredoomed to failure in the event that the Soviets attack. In such a case at present there would be no cities left to defend.

In response, Secretary Lovett said that the Defense Department had for the past two years been making use of the nation’s best scientists in an effort to deal with the defense problem. In connection with his point, Secretary Lovett invited the Council’s attention to the Alsop column in the Washington Post calling for two large “Manhattan District” projects. The conclusions which the column reached were, in Secretary Lovett’s view, “utter nonsense”, and in any case Secretary Lovett expressed the opinion that any such large project as that which Mr. Gorrie advocated should not be permitted to complicate the revision of NSC 135/1.

Mr. Gorrie observed that nevertheless some method should be worked out to enable the civilian and military agencies to work together to better purpose on this problem and to provide the military guidance necessary to the civilian agencies if they were to do an effective job.

Secretary Lovett still doubted whether this belonged in any revision of NSC 135/1, and went on to say that he felt that the nation was in much greater danger from covert attack than it was from overt Soviet attack. What troubled him particularly was “bombs in suitcases”.

The President then asked Mr. Harriman for his opinion of NSC 135/1, and Mr. Harriman replied that he found himself in general agreement with the views of the Secretary of State and more particularly with Secretary Acheson’s proposal for carrying out the reexamination of the programs recommended in paragraph 9–a.

The President then stated that the Departments of State and Defense and Mr. Harriman’s office should get together and work out something on this problem in the near future.

In response to a request for his views, Secretary Foley said that he was extremely pleased with the prospect of a study of economic and fiscal policy going along concurrently with other studies by State, Defense and MSA.

Mr. Wadsworth then asked for permission to give his views, which he stated were in large measure identical with those set forth in Mr. Gorrie’s memorandum. Mr. Wadsworth was, he said, especially struck by the imbalance between our national security programs, particularly the heavy weighting on the military as opposed to the civilian side. It was his opinion that the revised report should call attention to this imbalance and advise its correction. This could be rectified in the rewriting of the paper without actually involving any major change in policy. Civil defense, he thought, was rather neglected in the paper as compared to the heavy military emphasis.

Mr. Staats inquired whether the re-examination called for in paragraph 9–a would have the effect of holding up the processing of the Fiscal Year 1954 budget, and was assured that it would not.

Mr. Lay then observed that the Senior NSC Staff had recommended deletion of the last sentence of paragraph 9–a. As he understood it, he said, the re-examination called for in this paragraph would now be accomplished by State, Defense and Mutual Security.

Mr. Harriman suggested, however, that the revised paper include in it a statement to the effect that a re-examination of this country’s general financial and economic policy was being undertaken by the appropriate Government agencies as a separate study.

The National Security Council:⁷

a. Discussed NSC 135/1 and referred it to the Senior NSC Staff for revision.

b. Noted that the President directs the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director for Mutual Security jointly to undertake, in consultation as appropriate with other departments and agencies, the preparation of materials necessary for a re-examination of the amounts and allocations of resources to various areas in terms of kind, quantity, timing and priority, to determine:

(1) Whether a general increase in the level of free world programs and military forces is required to deal with the several threats;

(2) Whether the present allocation of resources as between U.S. military forces and other free world forces is appropriate;

(3) Whether the present balance between military assistance and the various types of economic assistance is appropriate; and

(4) Whether these allocations are in proper relationship to the threats facing the United States in Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East, to the importance of these areas for U.S. security, and to United States commitments.

The materials so prepared, together with any recommendations, are to be submitted to the President, through the National Security Council, prior to January 1, 1953, with a progress report to be submitted by November 15, 1952, if the work has proceeded sufficiently.

. . . . . . .

1. Prepared on Sept. 4, presumably by the Secretariat of the NSC. According to the minutes of the meeting, which consist of a list of participants and a brief list of decisions taken, the following members of the Council attended: President Truman (presiding), Acheson, Lovett, Harriman, and Gorrie. Others present at the meeting included Foley, Livermore, Murray, Staats, Keyserling, Wadsworth, General Bradley, Allen Dulles, Commander Clausner, Major Rule, Lay, and Gleason. (Minutes of the 122d Meeting of the NSC, Sept. 3, 1952, Truman Library, Truman papers, PSF–Subject file)
2. See the editorial note, p. 56.
3. NSC 135/1 is printed on p. 80; the Annex to NSC 135/1 is printed on p. 89.
4. Ante, p. 54.
5. See footnote 1, p. 113, and footnote 1, supra.
6. Supra.
7. Paragraphs a and b below constitute NSC Action No. 668. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Records of Action, 1952”)