Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1

S/S– NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 135 Series

Annex to a Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)¹

top secret
NSC 135/1 Annex

Washington, August 22, 1952.

NSC Staff Study on Reappraisal of United States Objectives and Strategy for National Security

Part I

The Bases of Soviet Action

1. Whatever the estimate (and the field is, of course, highly speculative) of Soviet future actions or long-range and short-range intentions, there are certain fundamental features of the Soviet system which are generally uncontested by all analyses. There may be, as there have been, wide tactical swings in Soviet policy, but these features of the Soviet system are fundamental and unchanging:

a. The USSR is a totalitarian state, heavily armed and continuously seeking to increase its military potential, where the power of decision rests entirely in the hands of a small group of men. Whatever their ultimate ambitions may be, we can say at a minimum that these men seek to develop the power of the Soviet system relative to the non-Soviet world so that the security of their regime cannot be externally challenged or menaced.

b. By the nature of its state structure, reinforced by its ideology, the USSR is fundamentally and unappeasably hostile to any society not susceptible to its control and consequently will exploit any opportunity to weaken its enemies and increase its own power position in so far as the Soviet rulers deem such action to be compatible with the security of the regime.

c. The directing group of the Soviet Government and of international communism is totally uninhibited by any consideration of a humanitarian, moral or ethical character.

These fundamental features of the Soviet system, regardless of the particular tactical phase of Soviet policy, make it clear that an imbalance of power in favor of the Soviet bloc presents a critical threat to the free nations of the world.

2. In assessing the bases of Soviet action, we can draw one general conclusion from an historical analysis of Soviet policy. It is that throughout their history the Bolshevik leaders of Soviet Russia have never been deflected by Communist doctrine from taking whatever immediate steps they believed necessary to consolidate and enhance their position and power in the USSR. The Soviet regime came to power in October 1917 with what the Bolsheviks considered to be a clear, thoroughly thought-out thesis, or doctrine, which described the direction of the future course of world history. In seizing power by a coup d’état rather than by a mass uprising, and in a country which had none of the doctrinaire prerequisites for socialism, Lenin immediately violated the inherited doctrine and Stalin has continued to do so ever since. Indeed, the life of the Soviet regime has been in continual contradiction with pre-existing doctrine and, in essence, Soviet actions have represented an unending series of compromises as, with each concrete situation facing them, the Soviets have attempted to resolve these contradictions. The moment they seized power they discovered that inherited doctrine was inadequate to answer the question as to how to exercise power in that country, under those circumstances, at that time. In the effort to consolidate the power attained and to achieve absolute control over the captured state, Lenin sacrificed pre-existing doctrine to considerations of the winning and holding of power. Stalin has continued to do so, and whenever a conflict has arisen between doctrine (in the sense of the revolutionary ideology) and any question of the security of the regime, the latter has prevailed without exception. Where Lenin, however, acknowledged these sacrifices as such, Stalin has twisted the doctrine to fit the needs of power. His policies therefore have been opportunistic in the sense that he has not hesitated, even at the cost of twisting the doctrine, to take advantage of every opportunity to preserve and strengthen the security of the regime and develop the power of the Soviet Union.

3. Similarly, the necessity of maintaining power at home has always taken precedence over the interest in revolution abroad. Due to the dual nature of the Soviet State, the same men are at once the rulers of the Soviet Union and the board of directors of an international conspiracy. Stalin’s method of reconciling foreign Communists to the subordination of the interests of world revolution to those of the Soviet State has been by claiming that these interests are identical and by forcing obedience to the concept that the first duty of Communists everywhere is to defend the Soviet Union. To date no substantial sacrifice has been made for the benefit of the world revolutionary movement at the expense of the security of the regime. However, great sacrifices have been made to develop the power of the Soviet system, which could be used to expand the area under Soviet control. It is unnecessary, however, to state dogmatically that the Stalin regime is interested in maintaining power in Russia entirely for the sake of power and not at all as a base for eventual world revolution, since for the foreseeable future they amount to the same thing, and since power at the center is in any case a precondition to Soviet expansion. The prime preoccupation of the masters of the Kremlin, whatever their ambitions may be, must remain the security of the home base and the development of its power, for there is no realistic sign that in the foreseeable future the internal or external situation will undergo such radical alteration as to remove this prime preoccupation from their minds.

4. Furthermore, the specific nature of the Stalinist regime makes it probable that any Communist regime not susceptible of control by the Soviet Union would be potentially hostile to it. The relationship of the Soviet Union with other Communist states which it cannot control is a subject of extreme complexity and one on which we have very little evidence to base any firm conclusions, but as Tito illustrates, the mere fact of being Communist does not eliminate the possibility of a hostile relationship with the Soviet Union.

5. To say that the doctrine of communism as expounded by Marx and Lenin does not provide any sure guide to Soviet action, in the sense of cause and effect, does not mean that that doctrine does not have an effect of [on] Soviet action. The effect is indirect but nonetheless real. It has served as the rationalization and justification of Soviet actions which were actually taken for other reasons. By this fact alone it conditions to an important degree the manner in which actions are often taken. Marxist-Leninist doctrine is also the bait that attracts supporters abroad. In one field, furthermore, it has a very important effect, and that is in the field of analysis of situations in non-Soviet countries. Available information indicates that for the Soviet rulers Marxist-Leninist doctrine forms the basis for their analysis of the development of capitalist society, rivalries between capitalist powers, and the relationship between “colonial powers and colonial or semi-colonial peoples”. It is in relation to their view of non-Soviet countries that Marxist-Leninist doctrine plays its greatest role and contains the greatest possibility of serious Soviet miscalculation as to the reaction of other countries. (Finland and Korea provide examples of such miscalculations.) This doctrinaire approach to the outside world has many other indirect effects in connection with Soviet activities. It is the basis on which the idea of an aggressive and hostile world is constantly kept before the eyes of the people under their control. Like other aspects of Soviet theory, the doctrinaire approach to the outside world contains two contradictory theses: On the one hand, it is the rationalization and justification of the consistently maintained propaganda thesis, both at home and abroad, that the capitalist world is constantly planning aggression against the Soviet Union; on the other hand, it is an integral part of doctrine that the internal and external contradictions of capitalist societies prevent their leaders from taking unified and vigorous action.

6. General war is clearly not something into which the Soviet rulers would enter lightly. One of the chief factors which they would obviously consider would be the relative strength of the enemy. But even if the Soviet military position is favorable relative to the West’s, they must regard a major war as involving risks to the Soviet regime, for such reasons as the added strain on the economy and the control of the satellites, the increased problem of defection, and, most serious of all, a possible altering to the detriment of the party of the relationship between party and army, for control over the army is one of the principal cornerstones of the survival of the regime.

7. An understandable reluctance to enter into general war does not mean that the nature of the Soviet system, reinforced by its ideology, permits genuinely peaceful or normal relations with non-Soviet countries. Struggle and tension are the natural environments of such a system. A hostile environment especially abroad, is a necessity for the maintenance of the Soviet system and is not necessarily related to the achievement of any specific foreign policy objective. The “cold war” relationship with non-Soviet countries is not a postwar phenomenon; it began with the seizure of power by the Bolshevik party in November 1917. Preoccupied with the problems of maintaining iron discipline over the captive peoples, the Soviet rulers are obliged to justify such disciplines by the bogey of “capitalist encirclement” and the stated goal of world revolution. A tranquil relationship with the outside world then becomes impossible and their expansionist tendencies spring from a desire to push the edge of freedom farther and farther away.

8. In the foregoing analysis no attempt has been made to draw all possible conclusions covering Soviet actions in all conceivable circumstances since to do so would involve such widespread speculation as to make the result virtually meaningless. It is rather an attempt, based on the pattern of past and present Soviet conduct and in the light of available information, to indicate the most reasonable probabilities as to the type of situations under which Soviet action initiating or leading to war might occur. Our analysis shows that a power imbalance in favor of the Soviet Union involves real risks of war. There is, of course, no certainty that past and present patterns of Soviet conduct will continue indefinitely into the future, but it is highly unlikely that any radical departure from this pattern will occur unless it is preceded by an event of major importance, such as the death of Stalin, or a radical shift in present world alignment which would in itself require a reexamination of the entire paper. With this thought in mind, the following may be stated:

a. If the Soviet rulers should attain, in their judgment, the capability of defeating the United States or of so reducing its power potential as to render it permanently incapable of effectively challenging Soviet power, and if they should come to believe that such action would not involve serious risk to the maintenance of their regime, they would probably deliberately initiate general war.

b. The Soviets might attack the West if they were convinced as a matter of fact, rather than theory, that an attack by the West was actually imminent.

c. War could come from communist action based on initial Soviet miscalculation of the free world’s interest and reaction to the situation in some particular area (see paragraph 5 above).

d. War could come from a deadlocked situation in which basic interests of both parties are involved with an act of one side setting off an unwinding chain of action and reaction which neither side would be able fully to control.

The statements in subparagraphs a through d above deal with the circumstances under which the Soviet Union would be most likely to initiate general war, or under which general war is most likely to occur. They are not designed to cover all of the infinite range of possible circumstances, actions and counteractions that might lead to the outbreak of general hostilities. It must be assumed that the Soviet Union would be prepared to use military action to defend areas presently under its control deemed vital to Soviet security interests. Nor can it ever be totally excluded that if in the eyes of the Soviet leaders developments in the power balance appeared directly and imminently to threaten the security of the Soviet Union or areas under its control, they might feel compelled to force certain outstanding issues in such a way that the result might well be the outbreak of war without any deliberate intention on the part of the Soviet Union to bring about such an event.

9. Although there remains a serious risk of general war, it is our present view that the most immediate dangers are of such a progressive and cumulative loss of positions of importance (either as a result of deterioration within the free nations or of communist cold war actions or a process involving both) that the United States would eventually be reduced to an isolated and relatively impotent position.

10. In assessing the danger of local expansion, the following represent certain Soviet criteria, all of which should be present before the Soviet Union would be likely to employ Soviet or satellite forces in overt military action against non-Soviet territory. It should be noted both that the Soviets have miscalculated in the past (as in Finland and Korea) and may again misjudge situations and also that these conditions, even if met, do not necessarily impel direct exploitative action. These criteria are:

(1) That the territory’s accession to Soviet power would have a direct and important effect in improving the Soviet strategic position;

(2) That the territory could be brought under total Stalinist control;

(3) That the internal situation would be such in Soviet eyes as to provide the cover of revolutionary or civil war activity for the intervention of Soviet or satellite forces;

(4) That the use of open armed force would not carry with it a major risk of general hostilities involving the Soviet Union.

The foregoing criteria are not necessarily equally applicable to Chinese Communist action. We do not have sufficient evidence concerning the degree of Soviet control over the Chinese Communist regime to justify applying these criteria directly to possible Chinese Communist actions. Furthermore the Chinese Communist regime, only recently installed in power, presumably has more initial revolutionary fervor and less cold-blooded realism and discipline than the present Stalinist regime.

Part II

Relative Political, Economic and Military Capabilities

Section A: Political

11. The USSR engages in continuing political warfare^* against the non-Soviet world. Should the Kremlin in the future launch a major effort to relax international tension, the tempo of Soviet political warfare may be ostensibly reduced and its methods may become more subtle. In one form or another, however, Soviet political warfare against the free world will continue so long as the Soviet system retains its present basic character.

Soviet Political Warfare Capabilities

12. In conducting political warfare the Kremlin has at its disposal the political and economic resources of the Soviet state and the satellites, the network of Communist parties throughout the world, and the Soviet and satellite military potentials. The Kremlin’s political warfare capabilities derive from its ability to employ at will, either separately or in concert, all of these elements:

a. With its rigorous control over the political and economic life of the Soviet state the Kremlin can profess to pursue—and often appear to pursue—domestic policies which have wide popular appeal abroad. With its elaborate world-wide propaganda machinery and its unique ability to conceal the realities of the Soviet orbit from foreign observation the USSR can pose, with considerable effect, as the champion of peace and as the pioneer in many laudable social and economic endeavors. The effectiveness of such appeals among the more uneducated and underprivileged peoples of former “colonial” areas of Asia, the Near East and Africa has been demonstrated.

b. The USSR enjoys greater flexibility than the West in the conduct of foreign policy because of its greater control over public opinion and its control over the European satellites. It can opportunistically exploit the differences among the Western Powers. It can stimulate tendencies toward “neutralism” by playing upon the desires of many peoples and governments to avoid involvement in a major struggle between the great powers. It has considerable tactical flexibility in attempting to force its adversaries to choose between difficult alternatives.

c. With its virtually absolute control over the economic resources of the USSR and the European satellites, the Kremlin can offer economic inducements, extend economic favors and apply economic pressures in support of its political warfare efforts.

d. The unique facilities of the international communist movement and communist front organizations provide the Kremlin with a world-wide system of strategically placed sounding boards, capable of picking up and amplifying Soviet propaganda themes. These Party and front elements can stimulate “peace” campaigns, and agitate for disarmament and prohibitions against the use of mass destruction weapons. By mobilizing mass pressure groups or penetrating key organizations and government agencies, they can influence official policy. This potential is at present especially serious in France and Italy, and may become so in Japan. By provoking labor disturbances they can impair economic health. By inciting local antagonisms they can weaken political stability. And they have the capability of undertaking missions of espionage, sabotage and open violence.

e. The Kremlin’s political warfare capabilities are supported by world-wide fears of the Soviet military potential, which is used to intimidate the USSR’s neighbors and inhibit the Western Powers from boldly countering the Kremlin’s political warfare operations.

f. The capability of the USSR to threaten local regimes by instigating guerrilla activity and other subversive measures may force the Western Powers to choose between suffering the loss of key peripheral areas by default or committing military forces in an effort to maintain the status quo.

13. Under conditions of general war all of the Kremlin’s political warfare resources would be mobilized to hamper the Western effort. The Kremlin probably would seek to manipulate the circumstances surrounding the outbreak of hostilities to make it appear that the war was unnecessary, and that it had been brought about by the design of Western leaders against the interests of their peoples, thereby detracting from the unity and will of the free world effort. At the same time, “hard core” Communist cells in the West would attempt to carry out industrial and military sabotage and espionage, provoke labor disturbances, to stir up racial strife, and to undermine the morale of Western armed forces.

Soviet Political Warfare Vulnerabilities

14. The Soviet Orbit’s political warfare vulnerabilities stem in part from some of the same factors which contribute to its capabilities. The Soviet system is highly dependent on its rigid, centralized control machinery. It relies heavily on the elaborate false facade of political progress at home, of enlightened and high-minded policies abroad, of invincible economic and military power, and of the infallibility of Communist doctrine and Soviet leadership. To the extent that this control machinery can be disrupted and the myths out of which this facade is built can be discredited, Soviet political capabilities abroad will be damaged and the Soviet system at home weakened.

15. Potential vulnerabilities in the USSR and the European satellites which might be exploited by political warfare include the following:

a. Disillusionment and resentment in both the USSR and the European satellites over exactions, repressions and personal helplessness and insecurity.

b. Resentment of the rural populations over official agricultural policy.

c. Hostility of minority Soviet nationalities to Kremlin rule.

d. Stifled initiative and mutual distrust among virtually all elements of the population, including the Politburo itself, resulting from the fear and suspicion aroused by Party and police surveillance.

e. Resentment of the satellite peoples over domination and exploitation by the USSR, and especially over the heavy economic burdens which Soviet-dictated policies have imposed on the satellite populations.

f. The highly centralized nature of official control machinery, the thorough disruption of which could result in the serious weakening of the Soviet state structure.

g. Exposure of Soviet methods of seizing and maintaining control over the satellites, which can serve as a powerful incentive for other small nations to resist Soviet overtures or communist penetration.

Some of these vulnerabilities already exist with respect to Communist China and others may develop.

Political Warfare Assets and Capabilities of the Free World

16. The growing realization that the military power and political ideology of the Soviet bloc threaten the national interests of free peoples provides an increasingly realistic foundation for the development of free world strength. Each effective increment to this strength adds to the morale and resolution of free peoples. In particular, the development of closer cooperation and rearmament in Western Europe and the association of Western Germany and Japan with the free nations will progressively add to the free world’s strength and confidence.

17. The principles of free democratic government, the rights of individuals and the opportunities for peoples to develop their own national and cultural interests free of outside interference still have broad appeal. Insofar as the governments of the free world are able to demonstrate that these principles are being pursued and advanced, progress can continue to be made toward enlisting popular support both within and without the Soviet bloc.

18. More particularly, the free world’s political warfare capabilities include the following:

a. The free world still controls the vast bulk of the world’s economic resources and productive capacity. By appropriate economic measures, the U.S. and its allies can help to deprive the Soviet orbit of needed resources and retard the development of Soviet orbit military potential. By skillful execution of other measures against the Soviet orbit, the United States and its allies may sap the morale of satellite leaders and encourage rifts between the USSR and the satellite countries. It should be recognized, however, that measures of these types alone, however vigorously pursued against the Soviet orbit, cannot be counted on drastically to reduce the threat which the Soviet system poses to the free world.

b. In the countries outside the Soviet orbit the free world can weaken Communist organizations and reduce the Communist potential for revolution and sabotage.

Political Warfare Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities of the Free World

19. Nevertheless, the free world is beset by grave problems, some of which—quite independent of any Soviet action—reduce its strength and resolution:

a. It consists of independent nations and dependent areas with varying interests and objectives. It consists of the NATO allies, among whom there are important divergent interests; various pro-Western countries such as the Latin American nations and the British Commonwealth countries which are associated in varying degrees with the NATO powers; and a large group of countries such as Burma, Indonesia, and the Arab States which do not actively participate in the East-West conflict. While basically elements of strength, these varying interests and objectives make the free nations susceptible to communist divisive pressures.

b. The economic and social conditions of large masses of people have not improved enough to combat the appeal of communism.

c. The principal nations of the free world have been obliged, for one reason or another, to work with unpopular and undemocratic governments. This has caused dissention, resentment, and disillusionment in various quarters, and has thus created opportunities for communist exploitation.

d. The lack of strong and dynamic governments weakens the ability of numerous free countries to cope with social, economic and rearmament problems and to act vigorously in the cold war. In continental Western Europe, for example, the narrow parliamentary majorities and fragmentation of political parties in such key countries as France, Italy, and West Germany impairs the development of NATO strength. In the Near and Far East, the inexperience of the present leadership, widespread corruption and lack of a firm popular base hampers the ability of various countries to strengthen themselves internally and to cope with Communist and extremist pressures.

e. The rise of nationalism in important areas of Asia and Africa has created many divisive conflicts. This nationalism is still largely anti-Western. It represents a reaction against the former or remaining colonial controls, and is aggravated by the reluctance of certain colonial powers to face the problems created by the recent growth of nationalist feeling.

f. Continuing economic weaknesses within even the principal non-Soviet powers hamper the development of free world strength and provide opportunities for Communist exploitation. Despite continued economic expansion, largely with U.S. assistance, the Western countries are still susceptible to economic crises resulting from unfavorable trade patterns, the burdens of rearmament, and inadequate governmental fiscal systems and anti-inflationary controls. In Asia and Africa economic weakness results largely from the lack of development of national resources, which has prevented local governments from satisfying rising popular demands and achieving political stability and economic viability.

20. There are, moreover, varying degrees of resentment, fear and distrust of the United States in many parts of the free world. In some quarters of Western Europe there is still some fear that the United States will recklessly precipitate a general war with the USSR or leave Western Europe unprotected after provoking the USSR to take military action. There is also popular resentment over certain U.S. trade policies and over U.S. pressure for increased rearmament efforts. In many quarters through the Middle and Far East there is a feeling that the United States has supported the colonial powers, and in the Arab states there is resentment over U.S. support of Israeli independence.

Section B: Economic

Economic Assets and Vulnerabilities of the Soviet Orbit

21. The economy of the Soviet orbit is being steadily expanded, including long-term development of the orbit’s strategic potential. Particular attention is apparently being given to capital construction, chiefly in the heavy industries and in the electrical, transportation, and communications fields. Under this program an estimated 25% of the USSR’s gross national product is going into capital investment. The USSR is thus increasing not only its actual production but—more important—its basic industrial potential.

22. A high level of immediate war readiness is being maintained. In 1951 about 16% of the Soviet gross national product went to direct military expenditures, and additional substantial sums, amounting to an estimated 7% of the gross national product, were spent on research and development in fields of military importance and on strategic stockpiling, post-enlistment and pre-enlistment training, the maintenance of internal security troops, and other activities directly contributing to the present Soviet war potential.

23. The industrial economies of the European satellites are being expanded and integrated with that of the USSR. They already contribute to the USSR large, and in some cases critical, quantities of raw materials and industrial goods, including uranium ore and concentrates, petroleum products, industrial chemicals, and engineering equipment. The importance of the contributions will increase as production programs develop and Soviet-satellite integration progresses.

24. Many major Soviet plants are designed and equipped for rapid conversion to war production, and strategic considerations appear to have an important bearing on the location of new industrial installations. Because of this emphasis on strategic considerations, in many cases accomplished at the expense of consumer needs, and because of the rigorous control which the Kremlin exercises over all important aspects of Soviet economic activity, a comparison of Soviet and Western production figures is of only limited value as a gauge of relative war potential.

25. In the event of early general war the Soviet economy could, in the absence of destruction from Allied attack, support a substantial increase in military production. The Soviet munitions industry has a sizable reserve capacity, and many other industries could be quickly converted to serve military needs. During the early phase of operations stringent controls over the allocation of materials, transportation and labor could prevent the development of critical deficiencies. In a prolonged war, however, certain shortages probably would weaken or limit some phases of the Soviet military effort. Successful allied air attack would, of course, greatly aggravate these difficulties.

26. The Soviet orbit is largely self-sufficient in raw materials, and dependence on outside sources in relation to total consumption of most commodities is relatively small in peace-time. The chief commodities for which the USSR is dependent on sources outside the Soviet orbit are rubber, tin, wool, jute, and industrial diamonds. Economic deficiencies which are expected to persist during the next few years include such items as certain types of aviation fuels, some chemical items, electronics, merchant shipping, some types of machinery equipment and precision instruments, certain nonferrous metals and ferroalloys, and a wide variety of replacement parts and equipment components. Agricultural production in the USSR and the European satellites meets requirements for the comparatively low levels of consumption.

27. The Soviet bloc transportation system, in which railroads occupy by far the most important position, represents a stringency in the peacetime economy but in wartime it has the capacity, after cutbacks in non-essential traffic, to meet military and major economic requirements in a major war. This estimate assumes no damage from hostile attack. The difference in gauges between the Soviet and satellite rail systems necessitates the transloading of all freight to standard gauge at or near the borders of the Soviet Union. Some 16 transfer zones, several of which are extensive in nature, retard through freight movements, but their capacity is adequate to handle Soviet logistic requirements. Despite the foregoing limitations, the Soviet rail system is probably better equipped to support a major war effort than it was in 1940.

28. The close balance between availability and requirements in many items of importance to the Soviet Bloc economy, together with the vulnerability of some important segments of the economy to air attack, would represent the principal weakness in any effort to maintain or strengthen the economy of the Soviet bloc under wartime conditions. The concentration of certain industries in areas accessible to Allied bombers and the extreme difficulty of replacing or reconstructing plants makes these industries highly vulnerable. Attacks on these industries could produce a serious reduction in the supply of vital services and commodities; however, substantial stocks of these commodities and of military end items, which are widely dispersed, would prevent the full effects of such losses from being felt at the front during the early phases of the conflict.

Assets and Vulnerabilities of the Free World Economy

29. The great strength and flexibility of the United States economy is a principal asset of the free world. This is shown by a few data on U.S. gross national product (in billions of dollars at 1951 prices):

		1950	1951	1952	1953
GNP		302	328	345	363
Total Govt. purchases of goods and services		46	63	83	95
	Of which:
	For natl. security	20	37	56	67
	For all other purposes	26	26	27	28
Personal consumption expenditures		208	206	210	218
Gross private domestic investment and net foreign investment		48	59	52	50

30. This great strength and flexibility of the United States economy would, however, be subjected to severe stresses under wartime conditions. The United States would be the primary arsenal of the entire free world to an even greater degree than was the case in World War II. The degree of shift of resources from normal economic purposes to war-waging activities would be much greater than the corresponding shift in Soviet orbit countries. The U.S. economy is dependent upon outside sources for more vitally needed raw materials than the Soviet and this condition would be accentuated during war. The maintenance of control over producing areas, and the maintenance of supply lines to these areas would place an added strain upon war-oriented economy.

31. However, the United States and some other countries in the free world are currently engaged in a mobilization program which is designed to facilitate any future shift to a war economy and to maintain a substantial level of strength over an extended period. Industrial capacity is being created, susceptible of shifting to direct war support, which otherwise would have to be built in the early stages of actual conflict. In most cases, under present programs and schedules, this capacity will serve concurrently to support a rising consumption level and a structure of weapons facilities and a flow of actual weapons output, both in conventional armament and in weapons of mass destruction. Sources of materials supply, both within the continental United States and elsewhere in the free world, are being steadily expanded, with exceptions in the case of certain important materials. Actual stocks in the government-owned stockpile, though still deficient in some materials, have increased steadily since mid-1950.

32. Elsewhere in the free world, efforts aimed at broadening and strengthening the industrial base are proceeding much more slowly. The United States has assisted this development in such fields as electric power, transport of all kinds, steel capacity, non-ferrous metal production, and agriculture. There has been a welcome inheritance in Western Europe from four years of Marshall Plan cooperation. The net outflow of resources from the U.S. economy is and will be greater than that from the Soviet economy to its satellite areas; indeed, the flow of assistance is to a considerable degree inward to the Russian economy rather than outward.

33. The task of strengthening the U.S. economy against the contingency of war is one which has been accepted and will be carried out by U.S. industry. To accomplish the established goals of the armament program, a relatively smaller diversion of resources away from consumption goods will be required here than is necessary to achieve comparable goals in the Soviet orbit.

34. There is now evidence to support the view that projected U.S. armament programs, including the program for industrial expansion, can be maintained with less restriction on the civilian economy than was believed possible a few months ago. One reason for this has been the steadily increasing capacity of the American economy to produce civilian and military goods; each year that passes will, by past experience, see further improvement in that capacity. In addition, the pressure upon the civilian segment of the economy has been less than was expected at the end of 1950 because military requirements then stated have been subsequently modified by a stretch-out. This situation could permit an acceleration in the production of certain military end items over the schedules now contemplated; it holds out the further possibility that the United States is capable of sustaining a generally higher level of arms production than is contemplated by currently projected programs.

35. But the maintenance for several years ahead of a complex program of (a) increasing our present lead in weapons of mass destruction, (b) expanding current output of conventional armament, (c) expanding and balancing the war-supporting industrial base, and (d) assisting free world allies to increase their own military and economic strength—all rest on the willingness of the American public to sustain and support the resulting burden. This burden may involve a willingness in the United States and allied countries to accept an increased diversion of scarce materials and other resources to armament production through more severe direct physical controls. In addition more vigorous price and credit controls and a heavier tax burden would be required in order to protect the economies of these nations. The combined efforts of labor, capital and management must contribute to the accomplishment of the task at hand, with each accepting a comparable degree of sacrifice. The effort must stem from conviction of its value.

36. Allocation of budgetary money costs to military purposes within the free world presents a further difficulty. A relatively free price system is sensitive to the threat and actuality of government deficits. In 1950–51, the free world endured a punishing object lesson in the added money cost of military programs; the threat of inflationary effects, even without budgetary deficits in any of the leading free nations (e.g. U.S., U.K., Canada) set off a wave of advancing prices. Planning the level of military build-up must therefore include as a factor, and recognize as a limit, the effect of varying levels of military expenditure upon tax burdens and inflationary pressures.

37. A comparison of relative production figures gives only an imperfect picture of the war potential of the Soviet economy. Subject to this qualification, however, the figures in the attached table represent the situation with respect to several key items.

	USSR 1940	USSR 1951	US 1951	USSR Plus European Satellites† 1951	US Plus NATO countries 1951
Steel (thousands of metric tons)	18,000	30,000	95,370	37,300	135,260
Coal‡ (thousands of metric tons)	166,000	227,000	523,000	400,000	934,000
Crude Oil (thousands of metric tons)	32,000	§43,000	334,000	53,000	342,000
Electric power (millions of kwh)	50,000	104,000	432,000	150,200	653,800
Bread grains (wheat & rye) (millions of metric tons)	║56.2	58.1	27.4	81.2	75.6
Aluminum (thousands of metric tons)	59.9	200.0	759	222	1380
Synthetic rubber (thousands of metric tons)	82.0	172	975	223	1039
Sulphuric acid¶ (thousands of metric tons)	1,540	3,250	13,500	4,268	21,935
Rail Transportation (billions of ton kilometers)	415	673.0	1012	764	1202

38. In terms of both available resources and productive capacity, the Soviet bloc is in a position of marked inferiority vis-à-vis the free world; moreover, although the Soviet position is still improving, in the foreseeable future the orbit’s basic economic strength will not approach equality with the free world. Moreover, the Soviet bloc would encounter greater economic difficulty than the free world in expanding military production from present levels, with or without war, partly because of the low level of civilian consumption now existing in the USSR. Nevertheless, the Soviet orbit, through its total control over the Soviet economy and population, can utilize a high proportion of the Soviet orbit resources and potential to achieve and maintain the present level of military preparedness. In the absence of general war, it is far more difficult for the free world to achieve an adequate utilization of its resources and potential to counter the Soviet threat. The present Soviet advantage in available military equipment (stockpiles), in current military production of certain items and in preparedness for expansion of military production derives from the fact that such production has continued at a high rate since 1945, and from the Kremlin’s centralized control over the economy.

39. The increasingly destructive power that will be available to both sides could make it more difficult to ensure the effective conversion of the economies to full war production. In planning the utilization of its resources in the absence of general war, therefore, the free world cannot give the same weight as in previous wars to its heavy preponderance of productive capacity and economic potential as the determining factor in preventing or winning a general war.

Section C: Military

Soviet Capabilities

40. The Soviet orbit now has formidable military capabilities. The principal elements of communist armed strength in being are the Soviet Army of about 2½ million men organized into about 175 divisions; the several Soviet Air Forces of about 600,000 men and 20,000 aircraft; the Soviet Fleet of about 680,000 men and 810,000 tons of naval vessels, including 370 submarines of which about 100 are long-range vessels. Available to complement these forces in the cold war and to supplement them in the event of general war are the Chinese and satellite armed forces, although their effectiveness is conditioned by their combat-readiness and political reliability. While the size of the Soviet forces is relatively stable, it appears that the Chinese and satellite forces are in the process of being both expanded and modernized as to equipment. The satellite armed forces now total over 1,000,000 men in about 70 divisions, with an estimated expansion to over 1½ million men in 120 divisions to be reached by late 1953. Satellite air forces are being organized and equipped with modern Soviet planes. The Chinese Communist army of over 3½ million men is the most powerful ground force in the Far East. Its capabilities will probably increase with the provision of Soviet equipment and higher standards of organization and training under Soviet direction. The Chinese air force appears to be expanding in size and is using modern Soviet aircraft.

41. It is estimated that at the end of 1951 the USSR possessed a stockpile of about 30 atomic weapons with an energy yield between 30 and 70 kilotons. Current estimates indicate that the Soviet stockpile of atomic weapons will increase approximately as follows: mid-1952, 50; mid-1953, 100; mid-1954, 190; mid-1955, 300. In view of the many uncertainties and variable factors involved, the Soviet weapon stockpile at any given time may be half as large or twice as large as the figures stated above. Despite its over-all economic inferiority in comparison with the free world, the Soviet system has also succeeded in developing significant electronic, and possibly BW and CW capabilities.

42. Because of the advanced state of mobilization of the Soviet economy, and because of raw material and equipment reserves which the Soviets probably have accumulated, the Soviets would be able to support extensive military operations of an offensive nature during the early phases of a general war. However, the relatively smaller size of the Soviet industrial base, its relative inflexibility and relative shortage of developed resources, would render it less capable than the U.S. economy of sustaining a protracted general war.

43. The air defenses of the USSR have improved substantially since 1945, and an air offensive against the principal Soviet centers of population and industry would encounter vigorous and determined opposition. Although deficiencies in Soviet air defenses now exist, the Soviet air defense system can be expected to make the cost of air attack increasingly high within the next few years. While it is not possible accurately to estimate the immediate effects of our air offensive against the USSR, it appears that we will retain the capability of inflicting damage of such magnitude as to reduce substantially the over-all Soviet potential through destruction of military and economic targets.

44. The Soviet advantages in war derive from an abundance of manpower which it can use with little regard to losses, large inventories of military equipment with production lines in being, a highly effective world-wide intelligence and subversive system, and sufficient area to permit absorption of heavy military losses without decisive results. Soviet disadvantages result from shortages of raw materials and industrial capacity—which would be accentuated by hostile attack—and the problems involved in the retention of Kremlin control over the armed forces and dissident elements. The advantages which normally would accrue from interior lines of communication would be offset to some extent by limited transportation networks over vast areas.

Free World Capabilities

45. While the armed forces of the free world are significant in size, it would be misleading in terms of capabilities to tabulate their totals. Their far-flung geographic deployments, conflicting national interests, their differences in training, organization, equipment, and will to fight, all detract from the value of tabulating totals.

46. Bearing in mind the above reservations, it is nevertheless useful to indicate briefly the extent to which the military forces of the United States and its allies have been strengthened since mid-1950:

a. There are more than twice as many men and women in the U.S. armed services as there were in June 1950 (the increase is from about 1.7 million to about 3.6 million). There will be about 20 Army and three Marine divisions in being in FY 1953. The state of combat readiness is being steadily improved as a result of training, experience, and the flow of modern equipment.

b. U.S. monthly production of military end items is five or six times as large as it was in June 1950. Between July 1951 and May 1952 the monthly deliveries of military end items have risen from an annual rate of $6.4 billion to $17.8 billion, and the trend is sharply upward. In the aircraft field, deliveries have increased as follows:

	Average Monthly Rates
	FY 1951	FY 1952
All military aircraft	310	628
Medium bombers	10	23
Fighters	136	235

There has been a substantial increase in the number of NATO forces on active duty in Europe. Also, the normal service period for conscripts has been increased in most countries. Excluding U.S. forces in Europe, and excluding Greece and Turkey, the data for army, navy, and air forces combined are as follows:

1/1/1950	1,407,200
1/1/1951	1,648,000
1/1/1952	1,880,000

In the case of Greece and Turkey, the mid-1952 data for army-navy-air forces on active duty in Europe are: Greece 161,000; Turkey, 384,000.

47. In the NATO area the free world will increase its military strength during the years immediately ahead, if progress continues to be made toward solving the political, economic, and morale difficulties which hamper the growth of a strong defensive posture. Greece and Turkey, with their significant forces, are being successfully integrated in NATO; Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav military cooperation is beginning to develop; the juridical basis for Western German rearmament is being established; and Spain’s participation in Western defense plans is a developing prospect. However, our major European allies, particularly the UK and France, are encountering major obstacles in making a fully adequate contribution to the forces of NATO and in supporting their existing responsibilities outside Europe. The volume and rate of delivery of U.S. assistance, which in turn depends upon production and availability of material, is a major factor in determining the size and timing of the genuinely effective forces which can be created. On balance, the NATO commitments, and such additional declarations as those of the United States and its allies concerning Berlin, together with European efforts and U.S. assistance, have made it clear that military action in Europe by the USSR or its satellites would almost certainly lead to general war. It is therefore unlikely that the Soviet orbit will take military action there unless it is prepared to engage in general war. If general war should occur, however, even with the improvements which would result from achievement of the foregoing, it is not expected that the free world will have the capability by mid-1953 of holding more than lodgement areas in Europe against a determined Soviet assault, or that Western Europe as a whole can be assured against Soviet occupation prior to 1956.

48. Developments affecting the military position of the free world in the Far and Middle East are more difficult to predict. In the Far East, this is due in part to the uncertain situations in Korea and Southeast Asia. Additionally, there are a number of political and economic problems surrounding the question of Japanese rearmament, but the contribution which Japan can make to the free world renders it imperative that the restoration of Japan continue to be a major objective. For a strong and friendly Japan would provide a natural anchor for Western defenses in the Pacific and would make an immense contribution to the maintenance of the free world position throughout Asia. In the Middle East, the primary threat appears to be communist exploitation of political and economic instability, rather than direct military intervention. Continued deterioration of conditions there could result in the loss to the West of strategic positions and resources. Under a continuation of present programs, priorities and force dispositions, it does not appear that free world military capabilities in the Far East and Middle East will significantly improve.

49. Free world advantages derive from its ability to project its strength outward to the enemy; its atomic capability; a three or four to one superiority in industrial capacity; and a vast area many principal parts of which would not be vulnerable to attack by massed manpower. Offsetting these advantages are the normal conflicts of interest among sovereign nations; unwillingness or inability to assume commitments which would produce additional strains on limited resources; and the tendency of free peoples to avoid sacrifice until they realize that the danger facing them is of such magnitude that it can no longer be ignored.

Comparative Prospects in the Cold War

50. Through ruthless exploitation and domination, the USSR since 1945 has created a system of satellite states with military forces with which we must reckon. We now credit the satellites, aided logistically by the USSR, with the capability of defeating Yugoslavia if not assisted by the West, although Yugoslavia prior to leaving the Soviet orbit was the strongest military force in the Balkans. The Chinese People’s Republic, in control of the Chinese land mass and apparently responsive to Soviet influence, has stalemated the situation in Korea and appears to have the capability of overrunning mainland Southeast Asia against the pro-Western forces presently in the area. Thus there are available for communist aggression, under the direction of the Soviet Union but without direct Soviet involvement, military forces adequate to achieve local superiority in important areas unless the free world intervenes.

51. The free world’s response to local aggression is handicapped by a number of factors. First among these is preoccupation with the threat of global war. The fear of our allies is that the over-all strength of the United States is not sufficient to insure that action can be taken to counter local aggression without serious risk of general war. From this stems the fear of attrition and dispersion of resources (while the Soviet Union is able to retain the concentration of its military forces) and the doubtful willingness and ability of the European democracies to devote sufficient of their national resources to distant areas while their homelands remain vulnerable to direct Soviet attack. There is also the apathy of the threatened areas toward communism, which, when coupled with xenophobia and nationalist aspirations, hampers the ability of the Western powers to defend these areas.

52. Notwithstanding these inherent difficulties, the free world is not incapable of responding effectively to local military challenges. Moreover, its over-all rearmament effort is re-enforcing existing deterrents to those aggressive acts which would be likely to lead, in the opinion of the Soviet, to general war. Europe is being made safer from direct ground assault and the United States is significantly increasing its armed forces and its readiness for war. One result of the United Nations action in Korea has been to create uncertainty in the minds of the Soviet leaders regarding future Western reaction. The sum of these developments has the result of significantly narrowing the opportunities open to the Soviets for aggression by proxy without serious risk of general war. However, there is still a serious threat of communist expansion into Southeast Asia and a more indirect communist threat to the Middle East. Despite the vital interest of the free world in assuring that these areas do not fall behind the Iron Curtain, measures to deal with a sudden worsening of situations in the Far and Middle East are not now provided for under present programs, priorities and force levels. In the circumstances, the questions arise (a) whether these serious threats can be met by a re-distribution of the free world’s effort presently programmed, or (b) whether consideration must be given to increasing the total effort, or (c) both. It is evident that a revision of existing priorities would be accomplished at the expense of the NATO area. It is to be noted in this regard that the analysis in Part I of this paper views a deliberate Soviet attack on Europe (made in the full knowledge that such an act would bring the North Atlantic Treaty into operation) as very unlikely, unless the Soviets believed themselves capable of dealing the United States a “decisive” blow or of so reducing the power potential of the United States as to render it permanently incapable of effectively challenging Soviet power. It is the conclusion of a subsequent section of this analysis that the Soviets do not now possess such a capability. From the foregoing it may be argued that the relative improvement of NATO defenses, including the organization of SHAPE and the promise of greater forces over the next two years, would increasingly permit a shift of emphasis to other areas. On the other hand, notwithstanding the heavy concentration of the military effort in Europe and the fact that considerable progress has been made, achievement of the tentatively planned NATO armament goals is by no means assured. NATO is now aiming to achieve a balanced 25–50 division force (exclusive of Greek and Turkish forces) by the end of calendar 1952, with all force levels beyond that date provisional and subject to annual review. The prospect is, therefore, that continued progress even toward NATO force levels below those regarded as militarily desirable will require continued application of effort on that area.

General War

53. At present the Soviet system has the military capability of overrunning large portions of continental Europe, the Near East, and Southeast Asia before the free world could mobilize and bring to bear forces adequate to halt the Soviet drive. Powerful blows could be struck by Soviet air and submarine forces against the U.K. and Japan, perhaps sufficient together with BW, CW, and sabotage operations, seriously to reduce the usefulness of these positions as bases. The Soviet system does not now have adequate naval forces and sufficient shipping to enable it to make large overseas amphibious type attacks. The USSR does not now appear capable of occupying the U.K. The air forces of the Soviet system are now capable of providing adequate tactical support to the ground forces. U.S. bases overseas could be brought under attack with atomic and other weapons. The Soviet long-range air force is capable of atomic attack on the United States and might achieve surprise in the initial strike. Sabotage and overt and clandestine BW and CW attacks could be employed against a variety of targets, including important military, industrial, and governmental targets in the United States.

54. The most promising development in the defense of Western Europe is the prospect of integrating the resources of Western Germany into the European Defense Community. If the political and economic obstacles can be surmounted, and if the output of equipment can be sufficiently expanded to provide arms for the forces that will be available, a significant change in over-all capabilities may take place in a few years. Further, the availability of tactical atomic weapons in the near future will add greatly to the Western defensive potential. The equipping and training of the Japanese Police Reserve will provide an additional ten divisions by 1954 for the defense of Japan, which will improve the prospect of successfully implementing Western strategy in the Far East. Under presently projected programs, it is unlikely that the Free World will be able during the next several years to do more in the Middle East than provide the forces required to hold certain vital areas in the face of Soviet assault.

Atomic and Possible Thermonuclear Developments

55. The capabilities of the United States and USSR in the field of weapons of mass destruction are considered primarily in the context of general war. However, it is recognized that the possession of stockpiles of these weapons by both sides will have an increasing impact on the tactics employed in the cold war and that appropriate atomic weapons may be employed by either side for limited purposes. It should also be borne in mind that atomic and possible thermonuclear capabilities must be considered in their relationship to conventional military capabilities, since the two are inter-dependent and mutually re-enforcing. Superiority in one sphere does not completely offset deficiency in the other.

56. The unknown factor in all calculations of relative capabilities is the effect atomic warfare may have on both sides. The possibility that either or both sides may, during the next two to five years, develop and have available for use thermonuclear weapons many times more powerful than atomic bombs accentuates the difficulties of attempting to assess future situations.

57. It is the developing atomic capability of the USSR and the probable advent of the thermonuclear weapons, together with the bipolarization of power and the imbalance of conventional armaments, which significantly change the security position of the United States and require a searching re-examination of current policies and programs. These developments render the United States vulnerable to direct attack of serious proportions.

58. The new security problem lies in the great power of atomic and thermonuclear weapons and the possibility that the USSR and the United States may each achieve a capability sufficient to:

a. Seriously cripple for many months the ability of the other to mobilize and carry on an organized war effort.

b. Place the ultimate victory of the other in grave doubt.

c. Render both sides through exchange of atomic and possible thermonuclear blows incapable of achieving a clear-cut decision.

By steady production and accumulation, both sides must be presumed to be advancing toward the day when they will possess the capability to achieve one of the above results; and the prospect is that neither side will be able, short of war, to arrest the progress of the other toward such atomic and possible thermonuclear strength.

59. The United States is increasing its atomic strength and may soon develop a thermonuclear weapon. There is, in fact, every indication that its present advantage in atomic weapons stockpile and in the production of fissionable materials will be further increased; and means for their delivery exist. The free world will thus continue to have a significant advantage in the event of war, but it does not appear to be conclusive that the possession of a superior atomic and possible thermonuclear capability can of itself provide assurance against deliberate initiation of general war. This is so because the controlling relationship in the atomic equation appears not to be that of stockpiles to each other, but rather the relationship of one stockpile, plus its deliverability, to the number of key enemy targets, including retaliatory facilities, which must be destroyed in order to warrant an attack. If this latter relationship is controlling, then it follows that the Soviets may achieve what is, in their judgment, a level of atomic strength sufficient to warrant the risk of an all-out surprise attack, even though this level be inferior—in absolute terms—to the then-existing atomic strength of the United States.

60. There are several means open to the free world for increasing the difficulties and dangers of an attack which the Soviets might contemplate, and thus for extending for the foreseeable future those conditions which will not be favorable to a general Soviet attack. For the present, it apears that the USSR does not have the means to deliver a decisive attack upon the free world. However, Soviet atomic capabilities will presumably continue to grow. While increased defensive countermeasures can serve to postpone the attainment of a Soviet capability which the Soviet leaders might regard as sufficiently devastating to warrant an attack, it does not appear that measures which are feasible for the free world to take can prevent the probable attainment of a Soviet capability to damage critically the United States. Two factors underline this conclusion: (a) the increasing cost of effective defense and (b) the limitations on the development and maintenance of defensive measures which free society can impose upon itself without losing a substantial degree of the freedoms now enjoyed. The free world for its own protection must take measures to improve active and passive defense, including the exploration of new technological possibilities, but nevertheless must probably accept a substantial degree of vulnerability and avoid disproportionate concentration of resources on defense at the expense of measures necessary to project its strength outward to the enemy.

61. On the other hand, the free world’s continued possession of a superior atomic capability should constitute a powerful deterrent. For in the event of war, the Soviets would understand that, unless they could derive decisive results from the initial attack, in the ensuing series of atomic strikes and counter-strikes the advantage would lie with the side having the larger stockpile and the greater and more flexible means of delivery. In the event of war under such conditions, the Soviets would face the probability that the free world would retain the capacity to carry out atomic attacks after the Soviet stockpile was exhausted. Such considerations would probably re-enforce Soviet reluctance to initiate general war.

62. In light of the reluctance of the Soviets to expose their power center to direct attack, it is basic that we maintain the capacity to deliver an atomic offensive of adequate power under all foreseeable conditions, i.e., despite sabotage, enemy attack, or adverse political developments in overseas areas where U.S. forces are based. Provided that the necessary effort is made to assure their continuing validity, three factors may be cited in support of the view that we can maintain such a capacity: (1) the free world’s substantial atomic superiority and the high probability that the margin of this superiority will increase; (2) the development of well-dispersed overseas bases close to the sources of Soviet political and industrial power; and (3) the increasing variety of mass destruction weapons and of the methods of their delivery. In combination these factors support the view that the United States and its allies hold it within their power to develop and maintain a position of strength, flexibility and depth adequate to deter the Soviets from deliberately initiating general war and to discourage them from pursuing courses of action involving grave risk of general war.

63. The concurrent development of two atomic and possible thermonuclear capabilities will steadily increase, for both sides, the adverse consequences of general war. It must however be expected that the value of the free world’s atomic and possible thermonuclear strength, while it will remain high as a deterrent to general war, may diminish as a deterrent to local Soviet-inspired aggression. For in the face of the increasingly grave implications of general war, democratic governments may experience difficulty in facing up squarely to a Soviet challenge to an area distant from the homeland; whereas the Kremlin can probably take greater risks. The prospect must accordingly be faced that, with the accumulation on both sides of atomic and other mass destruction weapons, the developing situation may present a continuing and possibly improved opportunity for Soviet expansion by the techniques of political warfare and local aggression, if the free world permits the fear and threat of general war to paralyze its reaction to such threats.

64. Nevertheless it is also possible that U.S. possession of atomic weapons, particularly tactical types, will operate as a deterrent to local aggression by providing an effective means of defeating it without resort to general war.

1. The source text is accompanied by a covering sheet indicating that this is the Annex to NSC 135/1 in the form of a Report to the National Security Council by its Executive Secretary, James S. Lay, Jr., datelined Washington, Aug. 22, 1952. Regarding the origins and development of this Study, see the editorial note, p. 56.
2. Political warfare will be here used in its broadest sense, including psychological warfare, subversion, political and economic pressure, diplomatic action, world-wide Communist activity, etc. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. lncluding Soviet Zone of Germany. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. In hard coal equivalent. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. Includes synthetic liquid fuels. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. 1935–1939 average. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. Annual production rate at end of 1951. [Footnote in the source text.]