Also enclosed for the information of the Council as the basis for the draft
statement of policy is an appendix containing a “Summary and General
Conclusions”5 resulting from
the NSC Staffs reappraisal of U.S.
objectives and strategy for national security.
A staff study to accompany the enclosure will be transmitted shortly as an
annex to NSC 135/1 for the information of
the Council in this connection.
It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosure, it be submitted
to the President for consideration with the recommendation that he approve
it as a reappraisal of United States objectives and strategy for national
security, and direct its use as a guide by all appropriate executive
departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, and by the National
Security Council in completing by October 1 its report pursuant to the third
paragraph in the President’s memorandum of June 28 (reference B).6
[Enclosure]
Draft Statement of Policy Proposed by the National
Security Council
top secret
[Washington, undated.]
Reappraisal of United States
Objectives and Strategy for National Security
General
1. Reappraisal of United States objectives and strategy for national
security reaffirms the basic purposes and policies of the NSC 20, 68 and 114 Series. The fundamental
purpose of the United States remains as stated in NSC 68: to assure the integrity and
vitality of our free society founded upon the dignity and worth of the
individual. Pursuit of this fundamental purpose should continue to be
through that general policy which seeks:
- a.
- To develop throughout the world positive appeals superior to
those of communism.
- b.
- Even at grave risk of general war, to block further expansion
of Soviet power.
- c.
- By all means short of general war to induce a retraction of
the Kremlin’s control and influence, and so
to foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system that
the Kremlin is brought at least to the
point of modifying its behavior to conform to generally accepted
international standards.
2. We continue to believe that the free world with its superior resources
should be able to build and maintain, for whatever length of time proves
to be necessary, such strength that the Soviet orbit will be unable to
make significant advances in expanding its power, either geographically
or politically. Moreover if the free world develops such strength, the
internal conflicts of the Soviet totalitarian system should, with
positive effort from us, subsequently cause a retraction of Soviet power
and influence and eventually cause that system gradually to weaken and
decay, although no time limit can be established by which these
objectives will be achieved.
3. Although no fundamental departures from the conclusions of the NSC 20 and 68 Series are required, it is
essential that we take into account certain factors that have developed
or acquired new significance since the adoption of these reports:
- a.
- The United States and its major allies have responded to the
perilous situation of 1950; they have responded collectively to
the attack upon South Korea; they are improving the security
position in Western Europe and in the Pacific; they, and
particularly the United States, have significantly improved
their readiness for war. These efforts, though not yet complete,
have already reenforced the deterrents to general war and
reaffirmed the reasoning of NSC
68 by which both preventive war and isolation were rejected as
courses of action.
- b.
- There has also been a substantial further development of
Soviet orbit strength since 1950. Modernization and expansion
programs in the Soviet, satellite, and Chinese Communist armed
forces are proceeding, supported by a rapidly growing economic
and industrial capacity and by a high level of scientific and
technical capability in selected fields of vital military
importance. As a result of the developing atomic and possible
thermonuclear capability of the USSR, the vulnerability of the
United States to direct attack, which is now serious, will in a
few years probably assume critical proportions. The same
reasoning would apply in general to the defensive position of
the Soviet orbit.
4. In the light of these concurrent developments, it must remain the
immediate and, we believe, attainable objective of the free world to
maintain such over-all strength as will (a) confront the
Kremlin with the prospect that a Soviet attack
would result in serious risk to the Soviet regime, (b) reduce the
opportunities for local Soviet or satellite aggression and political
warfare, and (c) permit the exploitation of rifts between the USSR and
other communist
[Page 83]
states and
between the satellite regimes and the peoples they are oppressing. The
United States should accordingly pursue with determination and constancy
the courses of action set forth in the following paragraphs.
Deterrent to General War
5. The United States should develop and maintain, in cooperation with its
allies, a position of strength, flexibility and depth adequate to deter
the Soviets from deliberately initiating general war and to discourage
them from pursuing courses of action involving grave risk of general
war.
6. To achieve such a deterrent, the United States should take the
necessary measures to:
- a.
- Develop the political unity of and encourage the growth of
strength and determination in the free world so as to minimize
the likelihood that the Soviets would believe they could
undertake local aggression without serious risk of war.
- b.
- Develop and retain, under all foreseeable conditions, the
capability to deliver an offensive of sufficient power to
inflict massive damage on the Soviet war-making capacity.
- c.
- Assure ready defensive strength adequate to provide in the
event of general war a reasonable initial defense and to ensure
reasonable protection to the nation during the period of
mobilization for ultimate victory.
- d.
- Round out and maintain the mobilization base, both military
and industrial, in the United States at a level which in the
event of need will enable us to expand rapidly to full
mobilization; and, consistent with the maintenance of a vital
and democratic society, provide the means for protecting the
mobilization base against covert attack and sabotage.
7. The United States should develop a substantially improved civil
defense in the light of the capacity of the USSR to deliver an atomic
and possible thermonuclear attack against the United States, in order to
(a) provide reasonable protection for the American people and maintain
their morale, thereby enhancing the freedom of action of the U.S.
Government, and (b) increase the capability of the country’s economy to
recover from such an attack. At the same time the American people must
be brought to a recognition of the need to accept and live with a
substantial degree of vulnerability.
Areas Outside the Soviet
Orbit
8. A preliminary study of problems in the areas outside the Soviet orbit
brings out some major causes of concern which indicate the need for a
restudy and possible change of emphasis and redirection of certain of
our efforts with respect to those areas. These causes of concern are:
[Page 84]
- a.
- Whether our major European allies, particularly the United
Kingdom and France, have the political and economic capacity (a)
to make a fully adequate contribution to the forces of NATO and (b) to support their
existing responsibilities outside of Europe.
- b.
- The readily deployable reserve strength of the United States
and its allies, together with present indigenous political and
military strength in areas on the periphery of the Soviet orbit,
is insufficient to permit us to escape from the possibility of
having to choose, in the face of local aggression, either the
eventual further expansion of Soviet power, inconclusive local
counteraction, or general war.
- c.
- Serious internal instability in many areas, caused in varying
degrees by the activities of indigenous communist parties, rabid
nationalism, economic and political backwardness, and defeatist
neutralism, and stimulated by aggressive Soviet and satellite
propaganda directed chiefly against the United States, threatens
to create conditions where communist influence and control may
be extended without Soviet aggression unless effective counter
measures are taken.
9. In the light of the above, the United States should:
- a.
- Reexamine the amounts and allocations of resources to various
areas in terms of kind, quantity, timing and priority, to
determine (1) whether a general increase in the level of free
world programs and military forces is required to deal with the
several threats; (2) whether the present allocation of resources
as between U.S. military forces and other free world forces is
appropriate; (3) whether the present balance between military
assistance and the various types of economic assistance is
appropriate; and (4) whether these allocations are in proper
relationship to the threats facing the United States in Europe,
the Far East and the Middle East, to the importance of these
areas for U.S. security, and to United States commitments. The
results of this reexamination should be reflected in the NSC report called for by the
President by October 1, 1952.
- b.
- Be increasingly willing to commit military forces or material,
as appropriate and in cooperation with its allies, in support of
its objectives in specific geographic areas, and to this end
include in the reexamination under paragraph 9–a above the
necessary study of requirements and capabilities. At the same
time the United States should encourage and as appropriate
assist in the development of indigenous forces and regional
defense arrangements capable of bearing an increasing share of
responsibility for resisting local communist aggression. When
U.S. forces are committed to combat a local aggression, the
action should whenever possible be of sufficient strength and
scope to effect a decision favorable to the United
States.
- c.
- Increase its efforts to promote internal stability in critical
areas outside the Soviet orbit. Here the United States should
conduct, with greater vigor, political warfare operations as an
integral part of its over-all strategy, in order to reduce
communist and neutralist influence, combat anti-American
propaganda, and create stronger support for the purposes of
United States foreign policy.
[Page 85]
Particular emphasis should be placed on
measures directed against the effectiveness of local communist
parties.
Areas Within the Soviet Orbit
10. Where operations can be conducted on terms which may result in a
relative decrease in Soviet power without involving unacceptable risks,
the United States should pursue and as practicable intensify positive
political, economic, propaganda, and paramilitary operations against the
Soviet orbit, particularly those operations designed to weaken
Kremlin control over the satellites and the
military potential of the Soviet system. However, we should not
over-estimate the effectiveness of the activities we can pursue within
the Soviet orbit, and should proceed with a careful weighing of the
risks against the possible gains in pressing upon what the
Kremlin probably regards as its vital
interests.
Economic Measures
11. The United States should:
- a.
- Utilize its economic power wherever feasible to facilitate the
growth of strength, stability and unity in the free world. The
provision of economic assistance designed to achieve these
objectives should be closely coordinated with military and
political measures and aid should be allocated in the light of
the reexamination called for in paragraph 9, above.
- b.
- Be prepared to utilize its economic resources to forestall or,
if necessary, to resolve favorably political crises which pose a
threat to U.S. security interests, particularly those arising in
a context which precludes the effective use of allied or U.S.
military forces.
Public Support
12. The United States should undertake systematically and consistently a
program of clarifying to the American public and to other peoples of the
free world the complex problems of the free world in meeting the Soviet
threat, the nature of that threat, the strength and resources the free
world possesses to meet that threat, and to the extent possible the
reasoning behind the general lines of policy and action described
herein, in order to secure that public understanding and support which
is essential to the success of our policies and actions.
Negotiation
13. The United States, in cooperation with its allies, should develop a
sound negotiating position in any question or dispute involving the USSR
and should be prepared to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union
if they offer promise of achieving acceptable modus
vivendi, or if, for other reasons, they appear to be desirable.
On the other hand we should recognize that only enforceable agreements
are meaningful and that the major contributions
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of negotiation in the foreseeable future may be to
convince the world of the validity and sincerity of our position and to
serve as a political warfare weapon.
Mobilization Policy
14. The United States should continue to pursue a policy of limited
mobilization designed to develop and maintain a favorable power position
without resort to an armament effort so large as to disrupt the
economies of the free nations. Such a power position should be
sufficient to (1) maximize the chance that general war will be
indefinitely postponed, (2) provide an effective counter to local
aggression in key peripheral areas, and (3) provide the basis for
winning a general war should it occur.
15. It continues to be impracticable to fix a tentative D-day by which
our preparations for war should be at their peak, although there are
estimated time periods within which measures must be taken to reduce or
eliminate vulnerabilities of a critical nature.
16. The adequacy of currently projected mobilization goals is a question
separate from that of the soundness of the concept of limited
mobilization. Appraisal of the present goals must be accomplished on a
continuing basis as the various programs are fulfilled and in light of
changes in the world situation. The rapid growth of the Soviet atomic
capability, the prospect for our continued heavy commitment in Korea,
the serious threat to Southeast Asia, the danger of further
deterioration of the situations in Iran and Egypt, the grave
implications of further Soviet efforts to force the Western powers out
of Berlin—all of these portents underline the risks involved in the
projected rates of delivery and in adhering to presently programmed
force levels.
17. Recognizing the above risks and objectives in the light of the
situation facing us, and recognizing that acceleration and upward
adjustment of our national security programs as a whole, if necessary,
are well within our capacity and can be accomplished without serious
adverse effects on the U.S. economy, the United States should:
- a.
- Assure the acceleration of the production of selected military
end items under present programs.
- b.
- Place continued high emphasis upon selected scientific and
technical programs in fields of military application.
- c.
- Make such adjustments in our national security programs as may
be found necessary and feasible in the light of the
reexamination called for in paragraph 9 above.
