Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 229th Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, December 21, 1954¹

[Extracts]

top secret
eyes only

December 21, 1954

Present at the 229th Meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 2); the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 4); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 2); Mr. Spear for the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (for Item 2); the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers (for Item 2); the Director, U.S. Information Agency; General Twining for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Joseph M. Dodge and Nelson A. Rockefeller, Special Assistants to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

. . . . . . .

2. Review of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5440; NSC 162/2; NSC 5422/2; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Summary Statement of Existing Basic National Security Policy”, dated October 11, 1954;² Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Basic National Security Policy”, dated December 20, 1954;³ NSC Actions Nos. 1251, 1272, 1279, and 1286;⁴ NIE 11–4–54; NIE 11–6–54⁵)

In the course of his briefing (copy of notes filed in the minutes of the meeting⁶), Mr. Cutler referred to and summarized the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which had been circulated the previous evening. While the views of the Joint Chiefs were still tentative, they took exception to many portions of the proposed new policy statement. In effect they were reaffirming the position that they had taken at the meeting on November 24. Mr. Cutler then called for a general discussion of the report (NSC 5440), and suggested that the Secretary of State speak first.

Secretary Dulles said that inasmuch as this meeting was preliminary in character, it would be best for him to speak in general terms rather than to direct his remarks to specific points in the policy report. He then indicated that he could not help but have some sympathy for the general view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in favor of greater dynamism in the American attitude toward the Soviet Union and Communist China. After all, during the course of the 1952 campaign he had himself called for a more dynamic U.S. policy vis-à-vis Communism. However, experience indicated that it was not easy to go very much beyond the point that this Administration had reached in translating a dynamic policy into courses of action, and in any case we had been more dynamic than our predecessors.

Secretary Dulles then stated that of course we have ruled out preventive war. In certain quarters it is suggested, however, that while we continue to have atomic superiority over the enemy, we should apply strong and forceful measures to change the basic character of the Soviet system. Secretary Dulles said he assumed that this would call, in effect, for an effort to overthrow the Communist regimes in China and in the European satellites and to detach these countries from the USSR. In his opinion, continued Secretary Dulles, the effort to implement such a course of action would involve the United States in general war. If it did not, however, and we did succeed in detaching Communist China and the satellites from their alliance with the Soviet Union, this in itself would not actually touch the heart of the problem: Soviet atomic plenty. Even if we split the Soviet bloc, in other words, we would still have to face the terrible problem and threat of an unimpaired nuclear capability in the USSR itself. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles did not think that this more dynamic and aggressive policy would in fact achieve the desired goal unless it eventuated in a general war which we could win. Moreover, while these more aggressive policies, if successful, might result in the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, they would almost certainly cause the disintegration of the free world bloc, of which we were the leaders, for our allies in the free world would never go along with such courses of action as these. In sum, Secretary Dulles said that he must conclude that this kind of aggressive policy was not in the best interests of the United States.

Another step which it had been suggested that the U.S. might take, would be to present the USSR with an ultimatum to the effect that if the USSR proceeded to try to take over any other free nation—such as Vietnam or Finland—the United States would regard such an attempt as a casus belli. This was another case, said Secretary Dulles, of a step which might possibly succeed. But even if it did succeed, it would not touch the heart of the problem of Soviet atomic capabilities, and would likewise prove disastrous to the unity of the free world coalition. The remaining areas into which the Soviets could expand their powers were not areas— except perhaps in the case of the Middle East—whose acquisition would notably increase the actual power of the Soviet bloc, although the prestige of the latter might gain.

Basically, therefore, said Secretary Dulles, he felt our present national security policies were pretty generally adequate, save, perhaps, in Asia and in the Middle East. Our alliance system has staked out the vital areas of the world which we propose to hold even at the risk of general war. These vital areas include currently all the areas of immediate strategic value to us or which possess significant war potential. The NATO area is by all odds the greatest single U.S. asset. Its defense is covered by our NATO treaty and by our interpretation of that treaty in such fashion as to ensure a strong reaction to any Soviet attempt at a take-over. We are thus committed to the denial of the NATO area to the USSR.…

Outside the NATO area, in Latin America we have the Declaration of Caracas,⁷ which has the same effect in the Western Hemisphere that our NATO commitment has for Western Europe.

In the Pacific the vital areas are staked out by the Manila Pact or by other treaties which commit the U.S. to defend the offshore island chain. One critical gap in this area, which deserves our most careful consideration, is Indonesia. In a way, Indonesia is a part of our great defensive arc in the Pacific. It is of very great importance to us and to certain of our allies, especially Japan. By and large, in sum, the situation in the Pacific is pretty well in hand and buttressed by adequate policies, save in the case of have concern, Southeast Asia, South Asia, India and Pakistan, etc., and the Middle East. Secretary Dulles pointed out that all these areas lie so close to the orbit of the USSR and China, and all of the countries in question are so weak themselves, that they cannot but pose very serious problems to us. Secretary Dulles said that he was not at all optimistic about the future of Free Vietnam. Laos and Cambodia are also very vulnerable. Yet if one looked at the other side of the picture, these countries are not really of great significance to us, other than from the point of view of prestige, except that they must be regarded as staging grounds for further forward thrusts by the Communist powers. An example would be Indonesia. Happily, the countries which are likely victims of such a Communist forward thrust are covered by adequate defense arrangements.

Furthermore, continued Secretary Dulles, the South Asian countries were no real assets to the United States in the military sense. It was different in the Middle East, where the problem is greater, thanks to their oil resources. The Middle East must be denied to the Soviet bloc, for the loss of this area to the free world would be a matter of great gravity. So, said Secretary Dulles, he coupled the area of the Middle East with Indonesia as representing a serious unsolved problem for our national security.

Secretary Dulles added that he had talked about the problem of the Middle East with Foreign Secretary Eden in the course of his stay in Paris. The British were thoroughly alarmed over evidences of Communist infiltration into some of the Arab countries, and were jointly considering with the United States how best to combat this infiltration. Equal difficulty was presented by Indonesia, and Secretary Dulles thought our policies vis-à-vis that country “inadequate”.

There was, of course, continued Secretary Dulles, great concern at the prospect of future developments in the strength of the Soviet bloc. We need not, however, be too pessimistic. Time might well bring about many changes in the Communist bloc. For example, Secretary Dulles believed that one could properly anticipate that there will be in the future some disintegration of the present monolithic power structure of the Soviet orbit. If conditions were so changed in the orbit that no single nation (the Soviet Union) can decide upon and take sudden action without considering the views of its allies and associates, the risk and threat posed by this single nation would be greatly diminished. Nationalism, in short, may quite conceivably grow apace among the satellites, and it was also logical, from the historical point of view, to expect Communist China to reveal an increasing attitude of independence vis-à-vis the USSR. Accordingly, it was possible to foresee the growth within the Soviet bloc of so wide a distribution of power that no single individual could decide on a course of action which would bind all the rest. There was already some slight evidence of such a development, and the United States may itself be able to promote its further growth.

In conclusion, therefore, Secretary Dulles said that he felt that our policies were in the main adequate to protect our national security. In any case, he could see no clear substitutes for existing policies except in Indonesia, the Middle East, and Vietnam. Secretary Dulles also indicated again the desirability of strengthening ourselves, from an organizational as opposed to a policy point of view, in the field of action to cope with the subversion tactics of our Communist enemies.

The President commented that if and when you should decide on a policy of drawing a defensive line beyond which you tell the enemy he cannot step without risking a clash, you automatically give the initiative to the enemy to seize whatever falls short of the defensive line. For this reason he had always rejected the concept of linedrawing.

Mr. Cutler then called on Secretary Humphrey to make any general comments he might wish.

Secretary Humphrey at first said that Secretary Dulles had stated his own thoughts better than he could. However, he said he did desire to emphasize one or two points made by the Secretary of State, particularly with respect to the timing of our courses of action and with respect to the areas which we select for concentrating our activities. Preventive war, said Secretary Humphrey, was obviously out. Moreover, an aggressive course of action to roll back Communism was also out. We would lose our allies, and such a course of action was not worth the risks it entailed. These two decisions plainly settle our course of action in a number of areas in the world, such as Quemoy and Indochina. If there was to be no aggressive roll-back of the enemy, the United States must be very careful never again to let itself get into situations where we do not really plan to defend our interests. In short, if we know we are not going to embrace a policy of rolling back the enemy, we should withdraw from those positions in the world which we do not propose to defend by military action.

If we adopt such a policy as he was suggesting, Secretary Humphrey said we would be in effect practicing a policy of co-existence. The United States must, in other words, now learn to live the way many of the other nations of the world have lived for many centuries—that is, by co-existence based on the maintenance of the balance of power. The United States must participate in a world division of power so carefully balanced that neither side dares to “jump” the other. For these reasons we should avoid provocative actions vis-à-vis the USSR and not get ourselves into positions which are untenable from the point of view of their defense.

Secretary Dulles, continued Secretary Humphrey, had indicated in his statement the three major areas of the world in which the United States should be prepared to spend its resources and to fight if necessary, and Secretary Humphrey added that he did not believe that there were any other such areas. Quemoy and Indochina were certainly not among the areas for which we would fight, and, indeed, he doubted if we should really fight anywhere on the Asian continent. Instead, we should devote our resources to those areas where we decide in advance that it is essential for us to be strong. We can’t do everything for everybody at the same time. Accordingly, we should pick out the key areas and intensify our action there, and not spend our time and resources anywhere else. If we adopted some such basic principle as this, the details with which we are constantly confronted, in trying to determine our military and economic setup, would settle themselves.

South America, said Secretary Humphrey, the Middle East, and Japan should be strengthened, along with Western Europe, including North Africa. He would much prefer to strengthen our position in the Middle East than to bolster up India. The same rule applied to Japan and Indonesia. If we are to adopt a policy of building up these areas, instead of constantly trying to kick Russia in the shins, then Secretary Humphrey thought we must begin realistically to look at our trade policies with the Soviet bloc nations. It was absolutely essential to have more such trade, both for our allies and for ourselves. After all, nearly every article of trade between nations has in some sense a usefulness in war. While he did not propose, of course, to send aircraft and weapons to the Soviet bloc, he favored a general expansion of trade in other kinds of commodities.

As for Latin America, said Secretary Humphrey, the United States should make it absolutely clear that we will not tolerate Communism anywhere in the Western Hemisphere. We should therefore stop talking so much about democracy, and make it clear that we are quite willing to support dictatorships of the right if their policies are pro-American.

The President interrupted to say, you mean they’re OK if they’re our s.o.b.’s.

Secretary Humphrey said that was it, and went on to point out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were at least correct in accusing the United States of being much too idealistic in its relations with other nations. Whatever we may choose to say in public about ideals and idealism, among ourselves we’ve got to be a great deal more practical and materialistic.

Finally, said Secretary Humphrey, he was not in the least afraid of co-existence. Our American system was sufficiently strong to undertake such a policy, and in competition with the Soviet Union we could certainly beat them.

The President indicated disagreement with a number of points made by Secretary Humphrey. He pointed out that India contained a population of 350 million, among which was a lot of very good military material. If we were to let this whole South Asian subcontinent fall into the hands of the Communists, we must almost certainly lose the Middle East as well. This was a certain invitation to general war. Secretary Humphrey replied that even so, we could not defend everybody everywhere. We must choose between whether we defend Iran or India. The President answered in turn that Secretary Humphrey was calling in effect for a situation which would necessitate resort to preventive war. The domination of India by the USSR would be certain to cost us the entire Middle East. Secretary Humphrey answered that he had not argued that adoption of his views would outlaw war forever, but if his views were adopted there was a chance of peace lasting for a good many years.

The President then inquired of Secretary Humphrey why Indonesia seemed so much more important to him than India. Secretary Humphrey answered that he felt so because Indonesia protected our whole Pacific position and was therefore worth holding and fighting for.

The President then charged Secretary Humphrey with arguing that except for certain important nations and areas, he was willing to let the whole rest of the free world go by the board. But each time, said the President, that the Soviet Union takes over an additional free country, the rate of the process accelerates. Secretary Humphrey replied that since we will eventually get pushed out of certain areas, would we not be better off if we withdrew from places like Indochina before we were actually pushed out? It was likewise better to get Chiang Kai-shek to withdraw from Quemoy and the other offshore islands before he too was pushed out.

With a smile, the President invited Secretary Humphrey to “take on” Chiang Kai-shek, and Secretary Humphrey reiterated his position that he wanted to know where he was going to be and where he was going to take his stand, in order that he could be just as strongly entrenched as possible in that area.

Mr. Cutler then called on Secretary Wilson for an expression of his views.

Secretary Wilson said that he personally subscribed to the view that the threat posed to the U.S. by the USSR had not lessened, though he believed that the threat of global war had lessened. Starting from this point, Secretary Wilson said he was much impressed by the historical fact that our country had enjoyed great prestige throughout the world in past generations when we had actually possessed very little real military power. Certainly, he added, we cannot counter the Soviet threat by borrowing Soviet methods. It was much wiser to use our own methods. He said that he did not think we should announce any line which, if crossed by the Soviets, would bring on war with the United States. On the other hand, we would be wise ourselves to consider carefully those areas where we can and should make our stand. The continent of Asia has never been an area that the European powers could conquer. Hence he was, for lack of a better word, in favor of containment. We were in a position to hold on to the island chain, to the peninsulas of Korea, India and Malaya. We should therefore draw both a military and an economic line including these areas. We should also try to take the heat off certain hot spots such as was currently provided by the Nationalist-held offshore islands. Secretary Wilson said that he did not agree with Secretary Humphrey’s position on India. Every effort should be made to hold that country. But we must get away from the old colonial approach, both in Africa and in the Middle East. This was the kind of line which the United States should draw.

When it comes to aiding these countries economically, Secretary Wilson said, he was at least in favor of a policy of helping them to help themselves. We must also have sufficient military strength in these areas to assure their internal security, although we should not build up their military forces to a point which would permit them to indulge in any external aggression.

Secretary Wilson then stated that all of us are, of course, conditioned by our own experience. While his was rather limited in international affairs, he had nevertheless had some experience which was useful. Plainly, we must live for the time being with Communism. While we ourselves can’t do very much externally to destroy it, he was sure that ultimately it would destroy itself. The same applied in a slightly different way to China. China had been a dictatorship for centuries; so had the Soviet Union. These countries had new kinds of dictators now, but these dictators still faced the problem of how to control their population.

Secretary Wilson said that he did not like the word “coexistence” much better than he liked the word “containment”, but coexistence was at least better than cohabitation. Basing his judgment on past experiences in dealing with the big labor unions, Secretary Wilson said that the only formula that worked was a formula which called for admitting your own mistakes. Our policy should be strong, but we could no more bully the Soviet Union than we could bully the labor unions. We should, accordingly, deal with the Soviet Union from strength and in the confidence that our own system was much the better, instead of adopting courses of action in imitation of Soviet methods. With respect to trade with the Soviet bloc, Secretary Wilson was sure that progress could be made if once again we could take the heat off of some of the hot spots. Our best course of action in this area was to return to our traditional open-door policy on the basis of the President’s concept of net advantage. We should not, however, offer credits to the USSR or to Communist China in order to stimulate trade.

In conclusion, Secretary Wilson recommended that, once the Council had agreed on a broad new statement of basic policy, we should list the concrete problems which face our country and determine specific courses of action to solve them. That was his broad look at the current picture.

Mr. Cutler then called on General Twining who, however, said that he had nothing in particular to add to the written comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁸

The President commented that, as so often, we had again gone around in a circle and come back to the same place. The problem of the Soviet Union was a new kind of problem, and the old rules simply didn’t apply to our present situation. As regards the proposal to take the heat off the hot spots and to remove irritations in our dealings with the Soviet Union, the President pointed out that every locality in the world is a source of irritation if you are dealing with Communists. There would be no chance whatever of removing irritations unless we were prepared to get off the earth. Our attitude with respect to the offshore islands, said the President, seemed to him perfectly OK. Chiang Kai-shek had been made to realize that we would not go to war over these islands. On the other hand, the President could see no reason why we should press Chiang to get out of the offshore islands. If he were to do so, moreover, the center of Communist irritation would be transferred from the offshore islands to Formosa and the Pescadores.

The President continued that while he could go along with Secretary Humphrey in agreeing that we should not make binding treaties with the nations of South Asia, he certainly could not agree with him that we should let this whole vast area fall into the Communist orbit. There was certainly a good deal of help which the U.S. could provide to these nations. A couple of billions would not be wasted on them if we consider the size of our total defense budget. While, the President said, he did not propose to make the United States an Atlas, bearing the weight of the world, there was still much that we could do. The President concluded by noting with alarm the proposal made by the President of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce for a 25% cut in all Government expenses, including expenditures for defense.

Secretary Humphrey noted that in his travels in Europe he had everywhere observed the same spirit of economy.

Secretary Dulles said that with regard to the question of U.S. assistance to foreign nations, we should recognize that there is tenable ground in between military commitment to save these nations from Communism and total abandonment of the areas to Communism. The verdict of history was that the Soviet leaders had been rather cautious in exercising their power. They were not reckless, as Hitler was; but primarily they rely not on military force but on methods of subversion. This was natural, because the Communist Party was in essence revolutionary and conspiratorial. At the present time they calculate that it is not worth their while to undermine the successful campaign of subversion by indulgence in actions of open brutality. This deterrent is not constituted by our military power, but is based on Soviet reluctance to indulge in actions of aggression which cannot be reconciled with their worldwide propaganda line in favor of peace and co-existence. Hence, if areas exposed to the Communist threat can build up governments capable of maintaining internal security and governments which can’t be overthrown except by overt, brutal acts of aggression, it will be possible to withstand the present Soviet threat. Accordingly, it will be very much worth our while to provide to these vulnerable nations sufficient military and economic assistance as will enable them to provide for their internal security and for the bettering of their economic health. The situation in Vietnam, warned Secretary Dulles, was not a typical case but a special case, and we should not generalize on the basis of Vietnam, where the French had messed up the situation so thoroughly.

Secretary Humphrey interrupted to say that in any case let us not get ourselves again into such a situation as we found ourselves in in Vietnam and from which we ought to get out as quickly as possible.

Secretary Dulles then went on to point out that the value of our programs of economic assistance ought not to be exaggerated. The maintenance of adequate security forces in these vulnerable countries was equally important.

Governor Stassen said it seemed to him that the Council was in agreement on two facts of central priority—the fact of Soviet power on the one hand, and the cohesion of our allies on the other. Our total national security policies should, accordingly, stress both centers of strength, our own confidence and our sustained power. If we manage to do this we will ultimately weaken the enemy’s confidence in himself. When that happened, the internal opposition to Communist control will grow stronger as the peoples of these states lose confidence in the success of their system against ours. Conversely, holding our friends together likewise requires an atmosphere of confidence and success. That was why, continued Governor Stassen, he thought we must not let ourselves get into a position where we seem to be backing away from the challenge. If we backed away from South Asia, the effects would not only be bad in Japan, but in Europe as well. Accordingly, he agreed with the position of the Secretary of State on these areas. We don’t need to give South Asia top priority in our assistance programs, but we certainly don’t need to refuse all assistance. Moreover, we will not need, from now on, to spend so much in Europe.

The President commented that it was good to have such frank discussion, but he did not believe that the practical differences between the members of the Council were very great. It all came down to the kind of help that the United States can provide in order to prevent Communist take-overs through tactics of subversion. Certainly, however, we could not afford to lose such great areas as India. It is in trying to formulate theoretical policy that we encounter such great apparent disagreements.

Mr. Cutler said that while this general discussion had been very useful, he hoped that he could ask the Council for guidance on one specific issue which had caused great concern to the Planning Board. The issue was set forth in paragraph 47 of the basic policy paper, and concerned the attitude that the United States should take with respect to negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were very skeptical of U.S. negotiations with the Soviet Union unless the USSR demonstrated a basic change of attitude which would be conducive to achieving lasting settlements. The State Department, on the other hand, believed that we should actively use negotiation in pursuing our strategy, although we should do so without relaxing our defense posture.

Secretary Dulles inquired if there was not general acceptance at least of the first two sentences of paragraph 47, which read as follows: “The U.S. should be ready to negotiate with the USSR whenever it clearly appears that U.S. security interests will be served thereby. The U.S. should continue to take the initiative in advancing proposals for constructive settlements and international cooperation (i.e., atoms for peace) in order to put the Soviets on the defensive and win public support on both sides of the Iron Curtain.” If everybody could agree to these two sentences, Secretary Dulles suggested stopping the paragraph at that point. Mr. Cutler indicated that this was exactly what the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed in their views. Secretary Wilson proposed adoption of the first sentence of paragraph 47, with the addition of the phrase “in order to advance the cause of world peace.” The rest of the paragraph he likewise thought could be deleted, including the split view.

Dr. Flemming suggested that courses of action involving negotiation should be based on the best available intelligence estimate of what is going on in the Soviet Union.

The President said that the trouble was that we were trying to establish policies in this paper designed to deal with situations which could really only be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. We must always be on the alert for changes and opportunities. The argument of the Defense Department that entering into negotiations with the Soviet Union would cause the free world to let down its military guard seemed to be based on the assumption that the State Department was incapable of distinguishing fraudulent from honest changes in the Soviet attitude. Moreover, said the President, we cannot hope to get the continued support of public opinion in the free world if we always say “no” to any suggestions that we negotiate with the Soviet Union. Accordingly, we should negotiate wherever and whenever it looks profitable. The first two sentences of paragraph 47, said the President, seemed sufficient to him.

Citing the Berlin and Geneva Conferences,⁹ Secretary Dulles pointed out that we did not actually desire to enter into either negotiation, but felt compelled to do so in order to get our allies to consent to the rearmament of Germany. World opinion demanded that the United States participate in these negotiations with the Communists.

After further discussion, it was finally agreed to adopt the first sentence in paragraph 47 as a sufficient statement of the U.S. position on negotiations with the USSR.

The National Security Council:¹⁰

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of the reference report (NSC 5440) in the light of the tentative views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 20, 1954.

b. Tentatively agreed that the first sentence in paragraph 47 of NSC 5440 was a sufficient statement of the U.S. position regarding negotiations with the USSR, and that the remainder of that paragraph could be deleted.

c. Deferred formal consideration of NSC 5440 until the meeting of the Council to be held January 5, 1955.¹¹

d. Requested the Operations Coordinating Board to present to the Council a report on the status and adequacy of the current program to develop constabulary forces to maintain internal security and to destroy the effectiveness of the Communist apparatus in free world countries vulnerable to Communist subversion.

Note: The action in d above, as approved by the President, subsequently referred to the OCB for action.

. . . . . . .

S. Everett Gleason

1. Drafted by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on Dec. 22.
2. For text of NSC 5440, Dec. 13, 1954; NSC 162/2, Oct. 30, 1953; and NSC 5422/2, Aug. 7, 1954, see pp. 806, 577, and 715, respectively. For Lay’s memorandum of Oct. 11, 1954, see p. 738.
3. See footnote 1, supra.
4. For information on NSC Action No. 1251, see footnote 3, p. 738. For NSC Action No. 1272, see footnote 12, p. 800; for NSC Action No. 1279, see the first footnote 4, p. 806. NSC Action No. 1286 is discussed in footnote 5, p. 807.
5. Extracts from NIE–11–4–54, “Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through Mid-1954”, are scheduled for publication in volume viii. NIE–11–6–54, “Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field”, is not printed.
6. The copy of Cutler’s briefing paper has not been found. For information on the minutes of NSC meetings, see footnote 1, p. 394.
7. Reference is apparently to Resolution 93, “Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States Against the Intervention of International Communism”, printed in Tenth Inter-American Conference, Caracas, Venezuela, March 1–28, 1954: Report of the Delegation of the United States of America With Related Documents (Department of State Publication 5692), p. 156. For Resolution 95, titled the “Declaration of Caracas,” dealing with human rights and economic well-being, see ibid., p. 158. For documentation on the Tenth Inter-American Conference held at Caracas, Mar. 1–28, 1954, see vol. iv, pp. 264 ff.
8. Reference is to the memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Wilson, Dec. 17, p. 828.
9. For documentation on the Berlin Conference, Jan. 25–Feb. 18, 1954, see volume vii; for documentation on the Conference on Korea and Indochina held at Geneva, Apr. 26–July 21, 1954, see volume xvi.
10. Paragraphs a–d constitute NSC Action No. 1290. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Records of Action”)
11. NSC 5440 as revised was issued as NSC 5440/1, Dec. 28, 1954. A copy of NSC 5440/1, not printed, is in the S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5440 Series. At its 230th meeting, Jan. 5, 1955, the National Security Council amended and adopted NSC 5440/1. The amended report was issued as NSC 5501, “Basic National Security Policy”, Jan. 6, 1955; and it was approved by President Eisenhower on Jan. 7. NSC 5501 and the pertinent portion of the memorandum of discussion at the 230th meeting of the NSC are scheduled for publication in a subsequent Foreign Relations volume.