The enclosed tentative draft statement of policy on the subject, prepared by
the NSC Planning Board, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1272–b, is transmitted herewith
for preliminary discussion by the National Security Council at its meeting
on December 21, 1954.7
It is the President’s desire that this preliminary Council discussion of the
enclosed tentative draft take place before delivery to the Congress of the
State-of-the-Union Message. It is recognized that, particularly because of
the absence of certain Council members at the NATO meetings in Europe during the week preceding December 21,
there may not be sufficient opportunity before that Council meeting for
thorough departmental review of the enclosed tentative draft. Accordingly,
the President has approved that final Council action on the enclosed draft
may be deferred to the first Council meeting in January 1955. The President,
however, wishes the Council members and advisers, including the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, to be prepared with their tentative views on the enclosed draft at
the December 21 meeting, reserving final expression of their views if
desired until the January meeting.
The enclosed draft statement of policy, in the form finally adopted and
approved, is intended to supersede NSC 162/2
and NSC 5422/2, and to constitute the basic
guide in the implementation of all other National Security policies,
superseding any provisions in such other policies as may be in conflict with
this basic policy.
[Enclosure]
Draft Statement Prepared by the National Security
Council Planning Board
top secret
[Washington,] December 14, 1954.
Basic National Security
Policy
section a
estimate of the situation
The Soviet-Communist challenge, including the approach of the USSR to
nuclear plenty, constitutes a peril greater than any the United States
has ever before faced.*
I. Relative Communist Bloc and Free
World Capabilities
1. Soviet air-atomic capabilities are rapidly increasing. Already the
USSR has the capacity to inflict widespread devastation on major free
world countries allied to the U.S. and serious damage to the U.S.
itself. Over approximately the next five years the USSR will almost
certainly develop the net capability to strike a
crippling blow at the United States.‡
2. At present the U.S. can inflict massive damage on the Communist bloc
by nuclear striking power. Even when the USSR arrives at the point where
it can strike a crippling blow at the U.S., the U.S. will still be able
to inflict equal or greater damage on the USSR, provided that it takes
adequate measures to protect its effective retaliatory power.
3. The Soviet guided missile program, over the next few years will bring
increasingly longer-range missiles into production. Assuming an
intensive effort, the USSR may develop roughly by 1963 (1960 at the
earliest) operational intercontinental ballistic missiles. The U.S.
program for missiles of this type should approximate this timetable,
provided that intensive effort continues. There is no known defense
against such missiles at this time.
4. Thus a situation is approaching in which a total war involving use by
both sides of available weapons would bring about such extensive
destruction as to threaten the survival of both Western civilization
[Page 809]
and the Soviet system. This
situation could create a condition of mutual deterrence, in which each
side would be strongly inhibited from deliberately initiating general
war or taking actions which it regarded as materially increasing the
risk of general war. In any case, war would remain a possibility, if
only because of the element of miscalculation by either side or because
of a technological break-through by the Soviets leading them to believe
they could destroy the U.S. without effective retaliation.
5. The Communist bloc will maintain and further develop formidable
conventional forces, with improved combat effectiveness and a large
increase in submarines. The principal limitations will be logistic
problems and deficiencies in specialized experience, training and
equipment.
6. The free world can make substantial progress in building military
strength through the continued improvement of NATO forces, the introduction of West German units, some
Japanese rearmament, and the progressive development of new weapons
systems and of production facilities. Introduction of nuclear weapons
into the NATO defense system on the
basis of agreed policy will be of crucial importance. Provided that it has the will to do so, the free world
coalition has the capacity to maintain sufficient armed strength, along
with U.S. strategic nuclear striking power, to constitute a major
deterrent to Communist military aggression and to maximize the chances
of dealing effectively with such aggression if it should occur.
7. The stability of the USSR and its hold over the European satellites
are unlikely to be seriously shaken over the next few years, despite
measures which the U.S. may find it feasible to take to weaken Soviet
control. However, the control system of the USSR will continue to be
faced with important problems (such as discontent in the satellites,
agricultural difficulties, and pressures for satisfying consumer wants),
some of which may be susceptible to a limited degree of exploitation
from outside.
8. Communist China is likely to continue vigorous and cohesive, but will
face internal problems much greater than those of the USSR. The
Sino-Soviet tie probably will remain strong for the next few years not
only for ideological reasons but also because it furthers the purposes
of both parties.
9. In absolute terms, the growth of the U.S. economy should be greater
than that of the USSR, and U.S. productive capacity in 1959 will still
be more than twice that of the USSR. Nevertheless, the economic growth
of the USSR can be expected to continue at a rate considerably higher
than that of the U.S. or of other major free world countries. The
difference in growth rates will probably be even greater in the
industrial sector, despite some increased
[Page 810]
Soviet emphasis on agriculture and consumer goods.
Moreover, the USSR will be devoting to capital investment, and to uses
contributing to war potential, a much greater proportion of its
resources.
10. Soviet economic progress will be for many peoples with lower living
standards an impressive example, and will probably constitute an
important element in spreading Soviet influence, especially in Asia.
Communist China, if its industrialization continues as expected at a
rate relatively rapid as compared with that of other Asian countries,
will also exert considerable attractive forces on Asian peoples,
especially if economic improvement in free Asia is slow or
non-existent.
11. The existing structure of U.S. alliances can probably be maintained,
and may possibly be extended, particularly in the Middle East. However,
there will be serious strains on these alliances, especially the ties
between the U.S. and its major allies, resulting from growing fears of
atomic war on the part of the allies, differing attitudes on China, and
greater receptivity by the allies to Soviet overtures. Our allies will
probably be more reluctant than the U.S. to participate in actions which
appear to them to involve appreciable risks of war in order to prevent
further Communist advances in areas which do not directly involve their
vital interests.
12. Underdeveloped countries will continue to be a major source of
weakness in the position of the free world, owing to such factors as
political instability, economic backwardness, extreme nationalism, and
the colonial issue. The dangers of subversion will be great, especially
in countries under the shadow of Communist power and subject to direct
Communist pressures and intervention. In Southeast Asia the present
situation is extremely precarious. Failure of the free world to deal
more effectively with the problems of underdeveloped areas will weaken
the free world and benefit international communism, even in countries
where actual Communist take-over is not imminent.
13. As the lines between the Communist bloc and the Western coalition
have come to be more clearly drawn over the last few years, a situation
has arisen in which any further Communist territorial gain would have an
unfavorable impact within the free world that might be out of all
proportion to the strategic or economic significance of the territory
lost.
II. Probable Soviet and Chinese
Communist Intentions and Strategy
14. The USSR has not modified its basic hostility toward the
non-Communist world, and especially toward the U.S. as the power center
of that world, or its belief in the ultimate triumph of Communism. The
Soviet leaders can be expected to seek constantly, by every means they
find advantageous, to extend Communist power
[Page 811]
and to weaken those forces, especially U.S. power
and influence, which they regard as inexorable enemies of their system.
However, they will almost certainly avoid pursuing their long-term goals
in ways which jeopardize the security of the regime or their control of
the Communist bloc. Soviet objectives can be listed as follows, in
descending order of importance:
- a.
- The security of the regime and of the USSR.
- b.
- Maintaining the Soviet hold on the European satellites, and
keeping China within the Communist bloc.
- c.
- Elimination of U.S. influence from Eurasia, and the isolation
of the U.S.
- d.
- Expansion of Soviet Communist power throughout Eurasia.
- e.
- Elimination of the U.S. as a competing power center.
- f.
- The spread of Communism throughout the world.
15. Communist China remains bitterly hostile to the U.S., and ostensibly
committed to the conquest of Formosa. It will attempt to expand its
power on the mainland of Asia and to expel U.S. power and influence
therefrom. In pursuit of this end, it probably will place primary
emphasis on penetration and support of subversion in neighboring
countries.
16. Provided that the U.S. and free world have at all times an adequate
military posture and the necessary determination, it appears unlikely
that, within the next five years, the USSR or Communist China will
deliberately initiate war, or engage in overt military aggression if in
its judgement such aggression would involve appreciable risk of war with
the U.S.‡ They will try to avoid
courses of action which in their judgment will clearly involve such
risk. However, they probably would not be deterred by the risk of
general war from taking military counteraction against Western actions
considered to be an imminent threat to their security. Moreover, general
war might occur as the climax of a series of actions and counteractions
which neither side originally intended to lead to that result.
17. The Soviet switch to a “soft” line, since the death of Stalin and increasingly in recent
months, is a significant new factor in the situation. The Soviet leaders
almost certainly regard this “peace offensive” as their most effective
present tactic for dividing the free world and isolating the U.S. from
its allies. A principal aim is to prevent the rearmament of West Germany
in association
[Page 812]
with the
Western powers. If this attempt fails, the Soviets may revert to a more
uncompromising and menacing posture. The current “soft” line may also be
motivated, however, by domestic preoccupations and fear of general war,
and the Soviets may therefore desire an extended period of reduced
tensions. Even should that be the case, Soviet policy will mainly seek
tacit understanding not to resort to force to change the present
territorial division between the Communist bloc and the free world. In
any event, whatever Soviet concessions are made will, for some time,
almost certainly be confined to relatively minor issues. Although it
appears very unlikely, the Soviet leaders might be led by the fear of
nuclear destruction to accept an effective system of armaments control,
with whatever changes would thereby be required in their present
practices and concepts.
18. If the Soviet “soft” line is not reversed, our allies will be eager
to explore it seriously, and will probably wish, in seeking a basis of
“coexistence”, to go to further lengths than the U.S. will find prudent.
Even if the USSR offers no real concessions, these tendencies will
probably persist, supported by large segments of public opinion. It will
be a major task, therefore, to maintain the necessary unity and
resolution in the free world coalition if the Soviet “peace offensive”
continues.
19. Despite the talk of “coexistence”, the Communist powers will continue
strenuous efforts to weaken and disrupt free-world strength and unity
and to expand the area of their control, principally by subversion
(including the support of insurrection), while avoiding involvement of
the main sources of Communist power. This strategy will probably present
the free world with its most serious challenge and greatest danger in
the next few years.
20. Attainment by the USSR of the capacity to inflict crippling damage on
the U.S. almost certainly would not tempt the Soviets to initiate
general war, unless they believed that they could neutralize, or by
initial surprise could destroy, U.S. retaliatory power before it could
be used. They will continue to be extremely reluctant to precipitate a
contest in which the USSR would be likely to be subjected even to
limited nuclear attack. After attaining atomic plenty, however, the
Communist powers probably will increase the pace of their attempts at
progressive local expansion, supported by force or threat of force,
provided they estimate that such action can succeed and will not provoke
U.S. counteraction involving appreciable risk of general war.§
[Page 813]
section b
outline of u.s. national
strategy
21. The basic objective of U.S. national security
policy is to preserve the security of the United States, and its
fundamental values and institutions [without seriously weakening the
U.S. economy.]║
22. The basic threat to U.S. security is posed by
the hostile policies and power, including growing nuclear power, of the
Soviet-Communist bloc, with its international Communist apparatus.
23. The basic problem confronting the U.S. is how,
without undermining fundamental U.S. values and institutions or
seriously weakening the U.S. economy to meet [and for the future to keep
within]¶ [and ultimately to diminish
to]** acceptable proportions this threat to U.S.
security.
24. The Soviet bloc–free world conflict can be resolved in accordance
with U.S. security interests only through either (a) overthrow of the
Soviet regime and its replacement by a government with no expansionist
or other objectives inconsistent with U.S. security; or (b) modification
of the Soviet system so that its leaders for practical purposes abandon
expansionist policies and accept either formal or de
facto arrangements consistent with U.S. security interests.
25. The U.S. and its allies have no foreseeable prospect of stopping the
growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities and of reducing Soviet armed
strength—the core of Communist power—[or of significantly reducing other
basic Communist military strength,]‡‡ except by
mutually acceptable agreements with the Soviets or by large-scale
military action. The initiation by the U.S. of such action for this
purpose is not an acceptable course either to the U.S. or its major
allies.
26. Hence, U.S. policies must be designed to affect the conduct of the
Communist regimes, especially that of the USSR, in ways that further
U.S. security interests and to encourage tendencies that lead them to
abandon expansionist policies. In pursuing this general strategy, our
effort should be directed to:
[Page 814]
- a.
- Deterring further Communist aggression, and preventing the
occurrence of total war so far as compatible with U.S.
security.
- b.
- Maintaining and developing in the free world the mutuality of
interest and common purpose, and the necessary will, strength
and stability to face the Soviet-Communist threat and to provide
constructive and attractive alternatives to Communism, which
sustain the hope and confidence of free peoples.
- c.
- Fostering changes in the character and policies of the
Communist regimes by making clear to them available alternatives
which are in their basic interests and do not conflict with
those of the U.S. and by exploiting differences between such
regimes in ways consistent with this strategy.
27. To carry out effectively this general strategy will require a
flexible combination of military, political, economic, propaganda, and
covert actions which enables the full exercise of U.S. initiative. These
actions must be so coordinated as to reinforce one another.
28. Provided that it is resolutely pursued, this general strategy offers
the best hope of bringing about at least a prolonged period of armed
truce, and ultimately a peaceful resolution of the Soviet bloc-free
world conflict and a peaceful and orderly world environment. Failure
resolutely to pursue this general strategy could, within a relatively
short span of years, place the U.S. in great jeopardy.
section c
elements of national strategy
I. Military Problem
29. A central aim of U.S. policy must be to deter the Communists from use
of their military power [while remaining prepared to fight general war
should one be forced upon the U.S.].‡‡
This stress on deterrence is dictated by the disastrous character of
total nuclear war, the possibility of local conflicts developing into
total war, and the serious effect of further Communist aggression. Hence
the Communist rulers must be convinced that aggression will not serve
their interests: that it will not pay.
30. If this purpose is to be achieved, the U.S. and its allies in the
aggregate will have to have, for an indefinite period, military forces
with sufficient strength, flexibility and mobility to enable them to
deal swiftly and severely with Communist overt aggression in its various
forms and to cope successfully with general war should it develop. In
addition, the U.S. and its major allies must show that they are united
in their determination to use military force against such
aggression.
[Page 815]
31. As part of its military forces, the U.S. must develop and maintain
its effective nuclear-air retaliatory power, and must keep that power
secure from neutralization or from a Soviet knockout blow, even by
surprise. So long as the Soviets are uncertain of their ability to
neutralize this power, there is little reason to expect them to initiate
general war or actions which they believe would carry appreciable risk
of general war, and thereby endanger the regime and the security of the
USSR.
32. In addition to its nuclear-air retaliatory power, the United States
will have to have other ready forces. These forces, together with those
of its allies, must be sufficient (a) to help deter any resort to local
aggression, or (b) to punish swiftly and severely any such local
aggression, in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid the
hostilities broadening into total nuclear war. Such ready forces will be
in addition to those assigned to NATO;
must be suitably deployed, highly mobile, and equipped as appropriate
with atomic capability; and must also, along with those assigned to
NATO, be capable of discharging
initial tasks in the event of general war.
33. Such a policy is predicated upon the support and cooperation of
appropriate major allies and certain other free world countries, in
furnishing bases for U.S. military power, especially strategic air, and
in providing their share of military forces. To succeed, the basic
strategy and policy of the U.S. must be believed by our appropriate
major allies generally to serve their security as well as ours. Thus, it
is important for the United States to take the necessary steps to
convince them that such is the case.
34. The ability to apply force selectively and flexibly will become
increasingly important in maintaining the morale and will of the free
world to resist aggression. As the fear of nuclear war grows, the United
States and its allies must never allow themselves to get into the
position where they must choose between (a) not responding to local
aggression and (b) applying force in a way which our own people or our
allies would consider entails undue risk of nuclear devastation.
However, the United States cannot afford to preclude itself from using
nuclear weapons even in a local situation, if such use will bring the
aggression to a swift and positive cessation, and if, on a balance of
political and military consideration, such use will best advance U.S.
security interests. In the last analysis, if confronted by the choice of
(a) acquiescing in Communist aggression or (b) taking measures risking
either general war or loss of allied support, the United States must be
prepared to take these risks if necessary for its security.
35. The United States and its allies must reject the concept of
preventive war or acts intended to provoke war. [The United States
[Page 816]
and its allies will also have
to forego actions regarded as provocative, if such actions would
foreclose the requisite domestic political support for the use of force
should this become necessary. Moreover, if the Communist rulers should
conclude that the United States is bent on aggressive war, they may feel
that they have no choice but to initiate war themselves at their own
time. Hence, the United States should attempt to make clear, by word and
conduct, that it is not our intention to provoke war.]§§ At the same time the United States and its
major allies must make clear their determination to oppose aggression
despite risk of general war, and the United States must make clear its
determination to prevail if general war eventuates.
II. Strengthening the Free
World
36. The United States should place more stress than heretofore on
building the strength and cohesion of the free world, and take adequate
actions for the purpose of: (a) creating cohesion within and among all
the free nations, remedying their weaknesses, and steadily improving the
relative position of the free world; and (b) destroying the
effectiveness of the Communist apparatus in the free world. Success in
these endeavors will depend heavily on the degree to which the U.S. and
its major allies can attain agreement on basic political objectives and
actions to achieve them.
37. Direct action against the Communist apparatus must rest largely with
the local governments concerned, although the US. should be able to help
significantly, chiefly through covert means. In countries vulnerable to
subversion, the U.S. should, as one of its objectives, assist in the
development of adequate internal security forces. In case of an imminent
or actual Communist seizure of control, the U.S. should take all
feasible political, economic, and covert measures to thwart it, and, if
necessary and appropriate, should take military action.
38. The existence of conditions in the free world which the Communists
can exploit makes it very difficult for the free world to overcome its
divisions, fears, and weaknesses. In many cases, the U.S. faces the
choice of (a) taking timely action to help remedy such conditions, or of
(b) allowing the situation to deteriorate with the prospect of later
trying to prevent Communist gains by more costly and less certain
measures, or even military action. The ability of the free world, over
the long pull, to meet the challenge and competition of the Communist
world will depend in large measure on the capacity to demonstrate
progress toward meeting the basic needs and aspirations of its
peoples.
[Page 817]
39. In the economic field, there are two basic problems: (a) the
industrialized areas require expanding markets and (b) the
underdeveloped areas seek to develop and modernize their economies. It
should be within the capacity of the free world, with U.S. initiative
and leadership, to turn these two problems into mutually supporting
assets for the promotion of appropriate economic strength and
growth.
40. A necessary condition for such strength and growth is a high level of
international trade within the free world. In order to foster this, the
U.S.: (a) should continue to press strongly for a general reduction of
trade barriers; (b) must take the lead by reducing further its own
tariff level over the next few years; and (c) should also support sound
moves to widen the convertibility of currencies.
41. The dangers of free world stability are particularly acute in the
underdeveloped areas. The task of speeding up their economic growth and
promoting stability presents a multitude of problems, political and
social as well as economic. For example, it calls for some changes in
traditional habits and attitudes and for greatly expanded training in
administrative and technical skills. In any case, new capital investment
is a prerequisite to growth. Local capital will have to be supplemented
by the provision of capital from abroad. In addition to external public
and private investment and IBRD loans,
substantial financing from U.S. public funds (including the
Export-Import Bank) will be necessary, in some cases over an extended
period, to help achieve the economic progress essential to U.S.
interests. U.S. financial assistance alone cannot produce satisfactory
economic growth in these areas, and external assistance should be used
in a way to promote and not decrease local incentives and self-help.
42. In order to promote conditions of sound development in underdeveloped
areas the United States should be prepared to use economic means
available to it where (a) such action serves U.S. objectives, (b) such
development cannot be financed by local or other foreign capital, and
(c) such assistance will be effectively used; and as part of such
assistance the United States should train indigenous leaders, develop
skills, and provide competent advisers. Specifically, the U.S. should
support a new initiative, in which industrialized free world nations and
underdeveloped nations of Asia would both participate, aimed at
significant economic improvement in South and Southeast Asia, where the
Communist threat is especially dangerous. [The total level of U.S.
economic assistance worldwide should, however, be progressively
reduced.]║║
[Page 818]
43. U.S. political policies must be adapted to conditions prevailing in
each underdeveloped area. The U.S. should not exert pressure to make
active allies of those not so inclined. The U.S. should provide
assistance on the basis of the willingness and ability of countries to
strengthen and defend their independence against Communist expansion
rather than on their formal alignment with the U.S. As far as possible,
the U.S. should attempt to work with rather than against those forces,
such as constructive nationalist and reform movements, which are likely
to remain powerful over a long period.
44. Where disputes and tensions between free nations threaten to impair
free world strength and cohesion, the U.S. should exert its best efforts
to help settle them or at least moderate their effects. In addition to
efforts to settle specific current controversies, the U.S. should
develop longterm policies to deal with deep-seated problems (such as
those involved in the evolution of colonial peoples).
III. Political Strategy Against the
Communist Bloc
45. The U.S. should develop a political strategy against the Communist
bloc designed: (a) to reduce the likelihood of aggression; (b) to
influence, in ways favorable to U.S. and free world interests, decisions
and developments within the Communist bloc, such as toward greater
emphasis on internal problems; and (c) to foster long-run trends which
might lead to basic changes in the outlook or character of Communist
regimes.
46. In pursuing this strategy, the U.S. should seek: (a) to convince the
Communist regimes that alternatives exist to their present policies
which would be acceptable to the U.S., and which they might come to
consider compatible with their basic security interests; (b) to give to
the Communist regimes a clear conception of the true U.S. and free world
purposes and uncompromising determination to resist Communist aggressive
moves; (c) to exploit, in ways consistent with this strategy,
differences within the Soviet system or between the USSR and other
members of the Communist bloc.
47. The U.S. should be ready to negotiate with the USSR whenever it
clearly appears that U.S. security interests will be served thereby. The
U.S. should continue to take the initiative in advancing proposals for
constructive settlements and international cooperation (i.e., atoms for
peace) in order to put the Soviets on the defensive and win public
support on both sides of the Iron Curtain.
[Page 819]
| State |
JCS |
| a. Without relaxing its defense posture, the U.S. should
actively use negotiation in pursuing its strategy. By doing so,
the U.S. would be in a position (1) to expose the Communists’
“conciliatory” line and place on them the onus for the
persistence of tension and unsettled problems, or (2) to force
them to substantiate “peace” propaganda with action or
compromises beneficial to free world interests. |
a. For the most part, however, the U.S. must realize it will
be not only fruitless, but perhaps even hazardous, to continue
its efforts to arrive at solutions to world problems through the
normal processes of negotiation with the USSR. |
| b. The U.S. should: (1) seek to settle specific problems,
(such as Germany) compatible with U.S. security, (2) seek to
achieve a modus vivendi which would
reduce world tensions and contribute to free world security; (3)
put forward and seek agreement on proposals which, if accepted,
would reduce the magnitude of the Soviet-Communist threat (such
as an acceptable plan for limitation of armaments with adequate
safeguards). |
b. If the USSR demonstrates a basic change of attitude which
would be conducive to achieving lasting settlements, the U.S.
should then, and only then, endeavor through stepped-up
negotiations to arrive at agreements with the USSR on the
subjects of disarmament, atomic energy or other world
issues. |
48. In applying this strategy to Communist China, the U.S. must take
account of non-recognition of the regime and the regime’s recent and
continuing aggressive policies. However, the U.S. should be ready to
participate in talks including Communist China on specific subjects on
an ad hoc basis, where the general objectives
mentioned in connection with negotiations with the USSR would be served
thereby.
IV. Domestic Strength
49. Sound U.S. Economy
- a.
- A strong, healthy and expanding U.S. economy is essential to the
security and stability of the free world. The level of expenditures
for national security programs must take into full account the
danger to the U.S. and its allies resulting from impairment, through
inflation or the undermining of incentives, of the basic soundness
of the U.S. economy or of the continuing expansion of the U.S.
economy under a free enterprise system.
- b.
- The Federal Government should continue to make a determined effort
to¶¶ bring its
total annual expenditures into balance, or into substantial balance,
with its total annual revenues,¶¶ and should maintain overall credit and fiscal
policies designed to assist in stabilizing the economy.
- c.
- Nevertheless, the U.S. must continue to meet the necessary costs
of the programs essential for its security.*
- d.
- [The aggregate of Federal expenditures, not essential to the
national security, should be minimized.]‡ [Federal expenditures, especially those not
essential for the national security, should be held to a necessary
minimum.]‡ Every effort should be made to eliminate waste,
duplication, and unnecessary overhead in the Federal
Government.
- e.
- The United States should also seek: (1) to maintain a higher and
expanding rate of economic activity at relatively stable price
levels, and (2) to maximize the economic potential of private
enterprise by minimizing governmental controls and regulations and
by encouraging private enterprise to develop natural and
technological resources (e.g. nuclear power).
50. Internal Security
Internal security measures should be adequate to meet the threat to U.S.
security of covert attack by the Soviet bloc on the United States by
means of sabotage, subversion, espionage, and particularly the
clandestine introduction and detonation of nuclear weapons.
51. Civil Defense
An essential ingredient of our domestic strength is an improved and
strengthened civil defense program which seeks to minimize damage from
nuclear attack by both preventive and ameliorative measures.
52. Support by U.S. Citizens
- a.
- No national strategy to meet the Soviet threat can be successful
without the support of the American people. During a time of
increasing Soviet atomic power, the determination of U.S. citizens
to face the risks involved in carrying out such national strategy
will be of increasing importance. Continuing efforts should be made
to inform the American people of the demands on their spiritual and
material resources necessary to ensure U.S. security during a
[Page 821]
period of armed truce,
which may either continue for many years or be broken by an atomic
war.
- b.
- Eternal vigilance is necessary in carrying out the national
strategy, to prevent the intimidation of free criticism. Necessary
protective measures should not be used to destroy national unity,
which must be based on freedom and not on fear.
V. Other National Security
Measures
53. Mobilization Base
- a.
- Essential to the strong security posture required by the national
strategy is a mobilization base adequate to maintain military
readiness and to provide the basis for successful prosecution of
general war, based on (1) an approved military plan, (2) allowance
for estimated bomb damage, and (3) a determination as to U.S.
provision of allied material requirements.
- b.
- The U.S. should continue to seek to achieve [as quickly as
possible]§ minimum stockpile objectives for materials the
shortage of which would affect critically essential security
programs. The stockpiling programs should not normally be used to
help stabilize international markets for exports of underdeveloped
countries; exceptions being made only on a case-by-case basis where
there would be a clear net advantage to the U.S.
54. Intelligence
The United States should develop and maintain an intelligence system
capable of:
- a.
- Collecting and analyzing indications of hostile intentions
that would give maximum prior warning of possible aggression or
subversion in any area of the world.
- b.
- Accurately evaluating the capabilities of foreign countries,
friendly and neutral as well as enemy, to undertake military,
political, economic and subversive courses of action affecting
U.S. security.
- c.
- Forecasting potential foreign developments having a bearing on
U.S. national security.
55. Manpower
The United States should develop an adequate manpower program designed
to:
- a.
- Expand scientific and technical training.
- b.
- Provide an equitable military training system.
- c.
- Strike a feasible balance between the needs of an expanding
peacetime economy and defense requirements.
- d.
- Provide for an appropriate distribution of services and skills
in the event of national emergency.
56. Research and Development
The United States should conduct and foster scientific research and
development so as to insure superiority in quantity and quality
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of weapons systems, with
attendant continuing review of the level and composition of forces and
of the industrial base required for adequate defense and for successful
prosecution of general war.
