S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167, “Review of Basic Natl
Sec Policy, Sept–Nov, 1954”
Memorandum by the Director of Defense Mobilization
(Flemming)
to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
(Cutler)
top secret
Washington, November 19, 1954.
I am attaching to this memorandum some “Notes on National Security
Policy.”
I am always very hesitant to develop a paper of this kind without having
first had the benefit of discussion with representatives of Departments and
Agencies that are much closer to some of these matters than I am.
I am confident that this does not reflect any final position on my part, but
that my views will change as a result of discussion in the National Security
Council.
I would hope very much that this document would not be circulated through the
staffs of various Departments and Agencies and labeled as an O.D.M. position. I have simply tried to “think
out loud” in an effort to be helpful as far as the discussion next week is
concerned.1
[Page 782]
[Attachment]
Paper Prepared by the Director of Defense
Mobilization (Flemming)
top secret
[Washington, undated.]
Notes on National Security
Policy
1. There appears to be general agreement that since the adoption of
NSC 162/2,2 the time when Soviet Russia will approximate
the strength of the United States in nuclear weapons has been shortened
considerably.
2. Available evidence points to the fact that during the period between
now and the time when Soviet Russia approximates the strength of the
United States in nuclear weapons, both Soviet Russia and Communist China
will continue their efforts to widen their sphere of influence
particularly in Asia and Southeast Asia by such methods as subversion
and the initiation of civil wars.
3. In developing a coordinated action program for the few years remaining
before Soviet Russia does approximate the strength of the United States
in nuclear weapons, consideration must be given to the type of program
it will be necessary to follow after the position of equality is
reached.
. . . . . . .
5. At the same time, the United States should be prepared to react with
force if necessary and advantageous to expansion and subversion
supported and supplied by Communist China which, if carried to a
successful conclusion, would weaken our position in relation to Soviet
Russia. This is an area where no generalized statement of policy can
provide ahead of time the answers to the specific situations that may
arise.
It is clear that we must be prepared to react with armed force against
any belligerent move by Communist China.
6. Between now and the time when Soviet Russia approximates the strength
of the United States in nuclear weapons, the United States should use
its present position of superiority as a backdrop for political,
psychological and economic measures designed to strengthen the
non-Communist nations of Asia and Southeast Asia. This program should be
pressed as relentlessly and with as complete abandon as far as
sacrifices are concerned as if we were engaged in actual
hostilities.
Military situations should be dealt with as they arise in such a manner
as to make it clear that we will not stand idly by and permit
Governments which have moved in the direction of an
[Page 783]
alignment with the Free World to be
undermined by Soviet Russia or Communist China by subversion or by the
initiation of civil war.
7. Coincident with the carrying forward of this type of program between
now and the time when Soviet Russia approximates the strength of the
United States in nuclear weapons, a comprehensive program should be put
into effect which makes it very apparent to both the enemy and the Free
World that we are taking realistic and revolutionary steps which involve
genuine sacrifices in order to put the Free World in a position where it
will not have to adopt a defeatist or fatalistic attitude when Soviet
Russia does approximate the strength of the United States in nuclear
weapons.
One aspect of this total program should involve our mobilization base in
the following manner:
- a.
- As we taper off or bring to an end current defense production
of military end-items that may or may not become obsolete, we
should take steps to provide adequate capacity for production of
new weapons at the rate that would be required immediately
following M Day.
- b.
- We should identify those comparatively small numbers of
end-items that we would need to have in production and keep in
production on M Day, if our retaliatory efforts are to be
successful, and make sure that we have facilities for the
production of such items at locations that are regarded as being
the least vulnerable to attack, and that are subjected to
security measures which would virtually eliminate the
possibility of internal sabotage. Criteria which are utilized in
the establishment and operation of AEC installations should be applied to
installations that must be available in the interest of
effective retaliation. The carrying out of such a policy will
involve either the relocation of some facilities or the
construction of shadow facilities and the development of
detailed plans for putting such facilities into
operation.
