Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5422

Memorandum to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)¹

top secret

Washington, October 5, 1954.

• Subject:
• Guidelines for Mobilization

References:

A.

NSC 5422/2²

B.

NSC 5422 and Annexes thereto³

C.

NSC 162/2 and Annexes thereto⁴

D.

NSC Action No. 1194⁵

The enclosed statement of policy on the subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, October 14, 1954.⁶ The enclosure will, if adopted, form Section III of NSC 5422/2.

It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed statement of policy after resolving divergencies contained therein, it be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve it; direct its implementation as guidelines under NSC 162/2 for the development of national security programs for FY 1956 by the appropriate departments and agencies, including the preparation of budget requests for normal budgetary review.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure]

Statement of Policy Prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board

top secret

[Washington, undated.]

III. Guidelines for Mobilization

28. The U.S. matériel mobilization potential (a combination of reserves of completed military end items and capacity to produce them) is stronger now than ever before in peacetime. Facilities actively producing matériel (except nuclear materials) have declined in number in FY 1954 and, under current plans, will continue to decline in number through FY 1957. Through 1957 there will be further accretions to our reserves of completed military end items. [Obsolescence of reserves is a factor for consideration. The U.S. matériel mobilization potential will under current plans be weaker in FY 1956.]^*

Defense–Budget

ODM

29. The facilities that will remain in production through FY 1957, even though at reduced production rates, will be those for the most critical, hard to make, long lead time items, the producers of which will have demonstrated a proven capability to produce. While stocks of such items may be less than full mobilization reserves, the active production status of such items will provide a strong industrial mobilization base.

29. Presently projected production of military hard goods (excepting nuclear components) will not provide adequate capacity to produce newer weapons to replace those which have become obsolete.

30. Preliminary estimates indicate that developing programs will provide a military hard-goods production base, in mid-1957, at an annual delivery rate of about $15 billion,^† of which over half would be aircraft (exclusive of aircraft electronics and armament) and associated aircraft spares and production equipment. This compares with actual deliveries of $6 billion in FY 1951; $17 billion in FY 1952; $25.5 billion in FY 1953; $24 billion in FY 1954; and $18 billion (estimated) in FY 1955.

31. a. From total actual deliveries of $24 billion in FY 1954, it has been estimated that, if war had commenced at the end of that year, total hard goods deliveries in the first year of the war (with no reduction for bomb damage) would have been $55 billion.

b. From an annual rate of deliveries of $16.8 billion in the last quarter of FY 1955 it has been estimated that, should war commence at the end of the year, total hard goods deliveries in the first year of the war (with no reduction for bomb damage) would be $44 billion.

c. From an annual rate of deliveries of $15 billion in the last quarter of FY 1957, it has been estimated that, should war commence at the end of that year, total hard goods deliveries in the first year of the war (with no reduction for bomb damage) would be $41 billion.

Defense–Budget	ODM
d. This decline in capacity has been designed to take place as the necessary reserves and slowly obsolescing weapons have been built up.	d. The difference in the annual delivery rate between $41 billion in FY 1957 and $55 billion in FY 1954 is premised on a planned decline in capacity, after making full allowance for acceleration thereof in wartime. This decline is not at present being offset adequately by a building up of capacity for new weapons.

32. In determining whether or not the mobilization potential in FY 1957 will be adequate, the following must be taken into account:

a. The hard goods output figures set forth above assume maximum acceleration in program categories, without regard to the probable required acceleration for each item.

b. The mobilization base for production of military hard goods is spotty. Large deficiencies exist in U.S. capacity to produce important components.

c. The availability of existing capacity does not make allowance for damage by enemy action for which the USSR has a rapidly growing capability. 63% of the general industrial capacity of the U.S. is located in 53 metropolitan target areas. The forthcoming net capabilities evaluation study will provide guidance as to this factor.

33. Even if the above estimates of wartime output of hard goods are accurate, it is not now known whether such output would be adequate to provide logistic support of our own forces and our essential allies. Current U.S. logistic planning is handicapped by lack of agreed wartime requirements. Such planning is now based on unilateral Service estimates. Mobilization plans do not include provision for the logistic support of essential allies which may be determined to be necessary. At present the known production capacity, plus existing stocks, of such allies is generally inadequate to support their requirements. Until wartime requirements of U.S. logistic support for our allies can be determined and combined with more adequate estimates of U.S. requirements, it will not be known whether the U.S. mobilization base can provide necessary logistic support in the event of war.

34. The United States should maintain its mobilization potential generally within the framework of the policy stated in pars. 34 and 40 of NSC 162/2 and in line with the general considerations stated in pars. 9 and 10 thereof. Effective implementation of this policy is dependent upon early completion of wartime plans and the determination and testing of logistic requirements based thereon; and the determination of allied wartime requirements, so that the magnitude and composition of the probable demand on U.S. resources can be identified.

Defense–Budget	ODM
The implementation of such policy should be related, subject to Presidential decisions on the Budget, to increases in Soviet net capabilities and to the specific factors mentioned above.	Furthermore, in the implementation of such policy, the United States, in recognition of the need for increased expenditures, to adjust to known increases in Soviet net capabilities, should, subject to Presidential decisions on the budget:
	a. Accelerate measures for dispersal to safer areas of important production capacity and, where that is infeasible, provide (1) alternative production sources in safer areas or (2) increase the mobilization reserve of the product by a quantity measured by the time required to reconstruct the vulnerable facility.
	b. Increase above presently-planned levels mobilization reserves of the most important military end items.
	c. Detect, and remedy, such gaps as exist in the mobilization base, taking into account probable damage to productive capacity from enemy action.
	d. Accelerate measures to maintain, in a condition which will permit rapid reactivation or reconversion to war output, the greatly increased capacity in plant, machine tools, and production equipment built up since Korea.
	e. Undertake on an urgent basis studies to determine whether current military hard goods production (“hot lines”) can be maintained at a level which will meet the full-phased post M–Day requirements minus (1) post M–Day production capabilities (obtainable through conversion or reactivation) and (2) mobilization reserves.

1. Copies to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Directors of the Bureau of the Budget and Central Intelligence, the Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.
2. Dated Aug. 7, supra.
3. For NSC 5422, June 14, and its Annexes, see pp. 647 and 667.
4. Dated Oct. 30, 1953, p. 577.
5. For NSC Action No. 1194, see footnote 19, p. 713.
6. Contrary to Lay’s expectation, the statement of policy was not discussed by the NSC prior to Defense Secretary Wilson’s memorandum on the subject, dated Oct. 25 and discussed in footnote 4, p. 759. The subject was discussed at the 219th meeting of the NSC on Oct. 26; for the memorandum of discussion, see p. 762.
7. ODM proposes inclusion; Defense and Budget deletion. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]
8. It is important to distinguish this estimate of total continental U.S. military hard goods production from any estimates for the major functional budget Category III “Procurement and Production”. This total hard goods estimate includes spare parts and equipment for maintenance and operation, organizational equipment, and MDAP (other than off-shore), which the budget category does not. [Footnote in the source text.]