S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5422
Memorandum to the National Security Council by the
Executive Secretary (Lay)1
top secret
Washington, October 5, 1954.
- Subject:
- Guidelines for Mobilization
References:
- A.
- NSC 5422/22
- B.
- NSC 5422 and Annexes thereto3
- C.
- NSC 162/2 and Annexes thereto4
- D.
- NSC Action No. 11945
The enclosed statement of policy on the subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board, is transmitted herewith for
consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday,
October [Page 732] 14, 1954.6 The enclosure will, if adopted, form Section III of
NSC 5422/2.
It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed statement of
policy after resolving divergencies contained therein, it be submitted to
the President with the recommendation that he approve it; direct its
implementation as guidelines under NSC 162/2
for the development of national security programs for FY 1956 by the appropriate departments and agencies, including
the preparation of budget requests for normal budgetary review.
[Enclosure]
Statement of Policy Prepared by the National
Security Council Planning Board
top secret
[Washington, undated.]
III. Guidelines for
Mobilization
28. The U.S. matériel mobilization potential (a combination of reserves
of completed military end items and capacity to produce them) is
stronger now than ever before in peacetime. Facilities actively
producing matériel (except nuclear materials) have declined in number in
FY 1954 and, under current plans,
will continue to decline in number through FY 1957. Through 1957 there will be further accretions to
our reserves of completed military end items. [Obsolescence of reserves
is a factor for consideration. The U.S. matériel mobilization potential
will under current plans be weaker in FY
1956.]*
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| Defense–Budget |
ODM |
| 29. The facilities that will remain in production through
FY 1957, even though at
reduced production rates, will be those for the most critical,
hard to make, long lead time items, the producers of which will
have demonstrated a proven capability to produce. While stocks
of such items may be less than full mobilization reserves, the
active production status of such items will provide a strong
industrial mobilization base. |
29. Presently projected production of military hard goods
(excepting nuclear components) will not provide adequate
capacity to produce newer weapons to replace those which have
become obsolete. |
30. Preliminary estimates indicate that developing programs will provide
a military hard-goods production base, in mid-1957, at an annual
delivery rate of about $15 billion,† of
which over half would be aircraft (exclusive of aircraft electronics and
armament) and associated aircraft spares and production equipment. This
compares with actual deliveries of $6 billion in FY 1951; $17 billion in FY
1952; $25.5 billion in FY 1953; $24
billion in FY 1954; and $18 billion
(estimated) in FY 1955.
31. a. From total actual deliveries of $24 billion in FY 1954, it has been estimated that, if war
had commenced at the end of that year, total hard goods deliveries in
the first year of the war (with no reduction for bomb damage) would have
been $55 billion.
b. From an annual rate of deliveries of $16.8 billion in the last quarter
of FY 1955 it has been estimated that,
should war commence at the end of the year, total hard goods deliveries
in the first year of the war (with no reduction for bomb damage) would
be $44 billion.
c. From an annual rate of deliveries of $15 billion in the last quarter
of FY 1957, it has been estimated that,
should war commence at the end of that year, total hard goods deliveries
in the first year of the war (with no reduction for bomb damage) would
be $41 billion.
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| Defense–Budget |
ODM |
| d. This decline in capacity has been designed to take place as
the necessary reserves and slowly obsolescing weapons have been
built up. |
d. The difference in the annual delivery rate between $41
billion in FY 1957 and $55
billion in FY 1954 is premised on
a planned decline in capacity, after making full allowance for
acceleration thereof in wartime. This decline is not at present
being offset adequately by a building up of capacity for new
weapons. |
32. In determining whether or not the mobilization potential in FY 1957 will be adequate, the following must
be taken into account:
- a.
- The hard goods output figures set forth above assume maximum
acceleration in program categories, without regard to the
probable required acceleration for each item.
- b.
- The mobilization base for production of military hard goods is
spotty. Large deficiencies exist in U.S. capacity to produce
important components.
- c.
- The availability of existing capacity does not make allowance
for damage by enemy action for which the USSR has a rapidly
growing capability. 63% of the general industrial capacity of
the U.S. is located in 53 metropolitan target areas. The
forthcoming net capabilities evaluation study will provide
guidance as to this factor.
33. Even if the above estimates of wartime output of hard goods are
accurate, it is not now known whether such output would be adequate to
provide logistic support of our own forces and our essential allies.
Current U.S. logistic planning is handicapped by lack of agreed wartime
requirements. Such planning is now based on unilateral Service
estimates. Mobilization plans do not include provision for the logistic
support of essential allies which may be determined to be necessary. At
present the known production capacity, plus existing stocks, of such
allies is generally inadequate to support their requirements. Until
wartime requirements of U.S. logistic support for our allies can be
determined and combined with more adequate estimates of U.S.
requirements, it will not be known whether the U.S. mobilization base
can provide necessary logistic support in the event of war.
34. The United States should maintain its mobilization potential
generally within the framework of the policy stated in pars. 34 and 40
of NSC 162/2 and in line with the
general considerations stated in pars. 9 and 10 thereof. Effective
implementation of this policy is dependent upon early completion of
wartime plans and the determination [Page 735] and testing of logistic requirements based
thereon; and the determination of allied wartime requirements, so that
the magnitude and composition of the probable demand on U.S. resources
can be identified.
| Defense–Budget |
ODM |
| The implementation of such policy should be related, subject
to Presidential decisions on the Budget, to increases in Soviet
net capabilities and to the specific factors mentioned
above. |
Furthermore, in the implementation of such policy, the United
States, in recognition of the need for increased expenditures,
to adjust to known increases in Soviet net capabilities, should,
subject to Presidential decisions on the budget: |
|
a. Accelerate measures for dispersal to safer areas of
important production capacity and, where that is infeasible,
provide (1) alternative production sources in safer areas or (2)
increase the mobilization reserve of the product by a quantity
measured by the time required to reconstruct the vulnerable
facility. |
|
b. Increase above presently-planned levels mobilization
reserves of the most important military end items. |
|
c. Detect, and remedy, such gaps as exist in the mobilization
base, taking into account probable damage to productive capacity
from enemy action. |
|
d. Accelerate measures to maintain, in a condition which will
permit rapid reactivation or reconversion to war output, the
greatly increased capacity in plant, machine tools, and
production equipment built up since Korea. |
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|
e. Undertake on an urgent basis studies to determine whether
current military hard goods production (“hot lines”) can be
maintained at a level which will meet the full-phased post M–Day
requirements minus (1) post M–Day production capabilities
(obtainable through conversion or reactivation) and (2)
mobilization reserves. |
