611.61/3–154
Memorandum by the Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence (Howe) to the Acting Secretary of State
- Subject:
- SNIE–11–2–54: Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US Through 1957
This special estimate was prepared at the request of the NSC Planning Board. It is concerned solely with Soviet gross capabilities for attack on the continental U.S. and does not consider how these capabilities might be reduced by Allied counteractions.
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that the USSR’s greatest capability lies in open military attack with nuclear weapons delivered by long-range aircraft. Present Soviet capabilities for air attack on continental U.S. are limited by dependence on the TU–4 bomber (B–29 equivalent), by the apparent lack of a developed inflight refueling capability, and by the relatively undeveloped character of the Chukotski and Kola base areas. Nevertheless it is estimated that the USSR has sufficient nuclear weapons, long-range bombers, and suitable bases to enable it to attack virtually any target in continental U.S. on one-way missions. (You may wish to look over the maps at the end of the estimate which illustrate the range of Soviet bomber aircraft.)
It is estimated that in 1954 the USSR, by a maximum effort, could launch about 300 aircraft from the Chukotski and Kola areas, 200 to 250 of which might reach their targets. By the end of 1957 it could launch a maximum of about 1000 aircraft in an initial air operation against the U.S. This would require the employment of the entire Soviet heavy and medium bomber force and might result in 450 to 700 mission aircraft reaching their targets.
This special estimate will not be released to any foreign government.