460.509/4–554
Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of the Embassy in France (Conover)1
Held at: French Ambassador’s Residence, London, March 29, 1954
- Participants:
- French—
- M. Schumann, Under Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- M. Charpentier, Min. of Foreign Affairs and Chairman, CG
- M. Fouchet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and French COCOM Delegate
- M. Sacle, Ministry of Economic Affairs
- American—
- Governor Stassen
- Admiral Delany, Battle Act Administration, Washington
- Mr. Loftus, US Delegate to CG, Paris
- Mr. Goodkind, Department of State
- Mr. Conover, American Embassy, Paris
M. Schumann began the conversation with the comment that he had not, until the week end, had a chance to prepare himself for the coming discussions. He, therefore, was most anxious to hear the American views on the British proposals.
Gov. Stassen stated that the United States fully recognized the advisability at this time of a review of the COCOM lists from the point of view of the long haul concept and for the purpose of eliminating those items not now essential for control. It was not disposed, however, to go as far as the British in reduction of the lists and would wish to have careful examination made of the bases on which any item should be deleted or lowered. He did not, therefore, anticipate that the trilateral discussions at this time would result in detailed review of individual items but rather that the general contour of the criteria to be applied by the COCOM would be agreed upon. For this purpose, the United States had drafted a statement for submission to the CG which might ultimately serve as a guide for the COCOM review. A copy of this statement informally would be transmitted by a member of his Delegation to the French Delegation.
At the same time, Gov. Stassen emphasized, it was the view of the United States, and most particularly of the President, that the [Page 1137] three Governments seek to resolve any differences with respect to individual items among themselves, at the highest level if necessary, and not present divergent detailed lists to the CG for the other participating countries to vote upon. It was most essential that tripartite unity be retained.
Gov. Stassen added it was the US view that no alterations whatsoever should now be made in the control policy with respect to Communist China and that the COCOM should focus on means of effecting improvements in controls over whatever items remain on the lists.
M. Schumann immediately expressed full agreement with the statement made by Gov. Stassen. He asserted that the French Government equally would wish to avoid having any semblance of disunity among the Big Three voiced in the CG. He would, however, underscore the need to avoid creating the impression that the Big Three had, prior to discussions with the other participating countries, formulated a single, unified, firm position. The smaller countries were extremely sensitive on this score, and it would be most unfortunate were they to conclude that they were being met with a fait accompli. He would favor a “concerted” view, not necessarily an “identical”’ one.
As to the necessity for intensifying controls, M. Schumann said that the French Government long had urged this. He felt that improvement in these controls was important, not only from the point of view of the economic defense position of the West, but equally from the point of view of maintaining the prestige of the Western Governments. The existence of a band of “smugglers” operating with impunity to frustrate West Governments’ controls could only impair the respect of the citizenry for their Governments. M. Schumann said that, as he was not a technician, he was not in a position to comment on or evaluate the particular techniques which might be appropriate for such improved enforcement.
M. Schumann indicated that he was currently giving consideration to the advisability of consolidating Lists II and III. He had no firm ideas on this and wished to know the American view. He professed not to have resolved in his own mind whether such a combined list would serve merely for reporting purposes or would be linked with quantitative controls.
Gov. Stassen said that the United States was firmly convinced of the need for quantitative controls over some items, in addition to the list of embargoed items.
M. Schumann inquired whether the Governor had any inkling as to the possibility of the British modifying the viewpoint which they [Page 1138] had expressed in the note of March 1.2 He said that he had been unable to get a sounding on this letter either in Paris or through the French Embassy in London.
Gov. Stassen replied that he had dined yesterday evening with the Prime Minister and other members of the British Cabinet and had the impression that the British were now in a mood for negotiation. He did not think that the British would adamantly maintain the viewpoint earlier expressed by them. In any event, he believed that they, too, would avoid the impression of disunity with the French and the Americans and would not unilaterally table their list proposals in the CG.
M. Schumann then invited M. Charpentier to outline a viewpoint which the latter had yesterday conveyed to him which he thought possessed merit. M. Charpentier said that during the course of his January discussions in Moscow he had conferred with the Swedish Ambassador. The latter had remarked that whereas in 1950 the Russians were intent upon procurement of SKF ball bearings, they now professed to have no interest in these because they had constructed a plant especially designed for production of List I bearings. He therefore thought that in reviewing the present lists consideration should be given to the likelihood that these now merely served to pinpoint for the Russians the bottlenecks and chinks in their war potential. He did not necessarily mean to suggest that we should not have had any ball bearings under embargo, but on the other hand, it would appear that we would have been well advised to permit some embargo types to move to the East.
Gov. Stassen commented that he did not think that the Russians were dependent upon the West and the COCOM lists to learn of their potential weaknesses. At the same time, he thought there was clear evidence that the Russians today were attempting to mislead Westerners by covering up their shortages and professing to have materials in abundance when, in fact, these were in critically short supply. Thus, Western businessmen who had recently visited Russia had on one occasion been shown a warehouse full of copper. These businessmen initially had concluded from this fact that there was no shortage of this material there. Subsequently it had been ascertained that for the purpose of this exhibition the Russians had rounded up all possible stocks from all over the country. The Russians, therefore, were capable of creating “Potemkin villages” for display to visitors and equally capable of offering for sale commodities which they were not really in a position to dispose of and which were, according to our intelligence appraisals, extremely [Page 1139] scarce. He would also note that, if carried to their logical conclusion, the conclusions of M. Charpentier might argue in favor of abolition of all controls. This was a conclusion which he was sure was contrary to the resolve of the three Governments.
M. Schumann said that he had found M. Charpentier’s ideas “intriguing” but he would wish to reflect upon them further. He would emphasize that, given the closer relationship between the economies of Communist China and the Soviet Bloc, increased attention should be accorded to the composition of the goods authorized for Western export to the Bloc. The French, by virtue of the combat in Indo-China, were most intensively and particularly concerned about precluding the delivery of strategic materials to Communist China, directly or indirectly.
Gov. Stassen concluded with the statement that the concept advanced by M. Charpentier would, of course, be further examined in the course of the trilateral meetings.
Mr. Conover thereupon privately gave M. Charpentier a copy of a proposed draft “Instruction from the CG to COCOM on Review of International Lists”, inquiring whether M. Charpentier had any comparable documents informally to offer. M. Charpentier said that the French had not yet recorded in documentary form their tentative ideas. However, he could say that, tentatively, the French would propose for retention on List I approximately 143 items and would urge that Lists II and III be combined. The significance of this combined list had not yet been determined.