Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 154th Meeting of the National Security Council on Tuesday, July 14, 19531
eyes only
Present at this meeting of the Council were: The President of the United States, Presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Under Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director for Mutual Security; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Acting Secretary of the Interior (for Item 3); the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 3); the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Admiral Radford; General Ridgway; Admiral Carney; General Twining. The following were present for Item 3 only: W.G. Donley, Petroleum Administration for Defense; Robert B. Murray, Jr., Department of Commerce; Louis S. Rothschild, Maritime Administrator; Commander J. J. Mooney, Maritime Administration; Captain Weakley, USN; Robert L. Finley, Office of Defense Mobilization. Present also were the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Lewis L. Strauss, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Colonel Paul T. Carroll, Acting White House Staff Secretary; James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, NSC; and S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.
[Here follows discussion of the situation in Korea and of budgetary considerations for FY 1955.]
[Page 995]3. A National Petroleum Program (NSC 97/3 and NSC 97/4;NSC Action No. 798)2
Mr. Cutler outlined the background of the present report and noted that the Council was being asked to act only on paragraph 3–b of NSC 97/4, which would enable a start to be made on the tanker program. Haste was required in order to get Congressional action to provide funds before adjournment of the present session. Mr. Cutler further pointed out the difficulties which the Planning Board had encountered with respect to recommending the speed of the new tankers which it was proposed should be built.
Secretary Wilson stated that the recommendation of the Department of Defense was that the speed of these new tankers should be “between 18 and 19 knots”.
Mr. Flemming inquired the effect on the program if the Council accepted a figure as high as this. Could the companies be expected to build vessels capable of such high rate of speed when this rate was unnecessary for ordinary peaceful commercial enterprise?
Secretary Weeks warned that time was of the essence, and indicated his belief that no recommendation as to the speed of these vessels should be inserted. He felt that that issue could safely be left to negotiation between the Department of Commerce and the major companies. He felt that the negotiations would be likely to eventuate in a speed factor which would be substantially what the Council desired.
Mr. Cutler, however, pointed out that the Planning Board had concluded that some guidance with respect to the speed of these vessels was requisite, and had accordingly adopted the present formula in NSC 97/4 of “approximately 18 knots”. This was more flexible than Secretary Wilson’s suggestion.
Secretary Wilson replied that he was quite sure that some of the companies would be willing to build vessels capable of the speed of 18 knots, which was in any case the lowest figure to which the Defense Department was willing to go.
Mr. Flemming observed that the Consultants had challenged us on this issue of speed of the tankers, and he felt that the matter should be given most serious attention. Whatever the figure was, we must all agree on it.
In view of the unwillingness of Secretary Wilson to go below the 18-knot limit, Mr. Stassen suggested changing the phrase in paragraph 3–b of NSC 97/4 to read “not less than 18 knots”. This proposal was accepted generally, although Secretary Weeks was not [Page 996] certain that the companies could be induced to build vessels of that speed.
It was pointed out to Secretary Weeks that this figure would not have to be inserted in the legislation which would be sought in Congress.
Secretary Humphrey then said he had a question to address to the Secretary of Defense. There were, he said, lots of good things that we would all like to do in the interests of national security. We could not, however, do all of them. What we do must therefore be decided on the basis of something else that we eliminate as a lesser good. In brief, would the Navy rather have this tanker program than some other part of the total Navy program?
In reply, Secretary Wilson pointed out that the sum involved was comparatively small, the objective to be achieved of very great importance, and that we therefore should go ahead and approve it.
To this Secretary Humphrey replied that he was by no means questioning the soundness of the tanker program, but merely inquiring where you save on some other program to compensate for this.
Mr. Dodge observed that it would be necessary to go to the Congress for legislation and new money—a supplemental appropriation—in order to implement this program. Would it not be possible to avoid all this by having the Navy absorb the proposed tanker program and cut out something else?
Secretary Humphrey stated that that was precisely what he meant, but Secretary Anderson informed the Council that no Navy money was involved in this program, but rather funds of the Maritime Administration.
That might well be so, answered Secretary Humphrey, but the tanker program was being undertaken purely in the interests of national defense.
Mr. Cutler pointed out that the program was also being developed with the objective of keeping our shipbuilding yards in operation as part of the mobilization base in the event of war.
Secretary Wilson announced his strong conviction as to the desirability of the program, and warned that we have far too few reserves in this very important area. He was therefore in favor of adopting the program and shuffling our money around later.
Secretary Humphrey replied that if Secretary Wilson decided that he wanted this program more than some other program which he would be willing to forgo, he, as Secretary of the Treasury, hadn’t another word to say. But, he warned, we are facing a new era in regard to Government expenditure. This era could be characterized by the phrase “if you buy something, you don’t buy something else.”
[Page 997]Secretary Weeks suggested the possibility that the Office of Defense Mobilization might have funds available with which to help pay for the tanker program, but Mr. Flemming pointed out that the only ODM funds which could be devoted to such a program would have to come from the revolving fund, and it was a question as to whether such a use of this fund was appropriate. It would certainly be necessary to seek Congressional approval before this fund was drawn upon for the tanker program.
After further discussion of the problem of legislation and of the question as to whether certain of these vessels could be built more cheaply in foreign shipyards, Secretary Wilson again expressed his strong belief in the wisdom of approving the tanker program.
To this Secretary Anderson added that such a program was “absolutely vital” in the event of war.
The National Security Council:
Adopted the recommendation contained in paragraph 3–b on page 2 of NSC 97/4, subject to the substitution in the 6th and 7th lines thereof of “not less than 18 knots” for “approximately 18 knots”.
Note: Paragraph 3–b of NSC 97/4, as amended, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Commerce and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, for implementation.
- This memorandum of discussion was prepared on July 15 by Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Gleason.↩
- NSC 97/3, May 20, p. 963; NSC 97/4, July 7, p. 991. NSC Action No. 798 was the directive issued by the NSC at its meeting of May 27; see the memorandum of discussion, p. 981.↩