Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, General: Economic and Political Matters, Volume I, Part 2

711.00/1–2954: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

confidential
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Berlin, January 29, 1954—noon.

Dulte 16. Re Tedul 7.¹ Note: For Phleger from Secretary. If you think the following message to President re Bricker amendment contains least error, please wire me urgent before delivery.

Message for President, Information Smith and Phleger from Secretary

“Mr. President: I have examined the so-called ‘Knowland-George’ proposal to amend the Constitution of the United States. Sections 1 and 2 seem to me to make explicit what is already implicit in the Constitution.

“Section 3 deals with international agreements and might diminish somewhat the authority of the President as now interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. However, as I interpret the proposed amendment, it would not impair the powers expressly granted to the President under Article II, Section 2, including his authority as Commander-in-Chief or his power under Article II, Section 3, to receive ambassadors and other public ministers. A question might arise as to whether Section 3 of the proposed amendment would curtail the above-mentioned authority of the President in the event he exercised his authority not unilaterally but pursuant to an agreement. It seems to me that the proposed amendment would not deny legal effect to the Presidential power merely because it was exercised pursuant to an agreement provided the power existed irrespective of the agreement. The proposed amendment, it seems to me is designed to prevent international agreements from serving as a means of enlarging the President’s authority beyond what it would be otherwise under express grants of power to the President. To this extent, but only to this extent, would international agreements require an act of Congress to give them effect as internal law.

“I do not myself feel that the proposed Constitutional amendment is necessary. I believe that possible abuses of power under the Constitution as it is are less of a hazard to our nation than the curtailment of Presidential power or at least the creation of an area of legal doubt, which might not be resolved for many years. This area of doubt would, however, be diminished if the legislative record were clear in the sense I have indicated.

“While, therefore, I would regret seeing a change in our traditional Constitutional method of conducting foreign Relations, I do not believe that the amendment in question, if interpreted as I believe it would be, would seriously impair the capacity of the United States to preserve its vital international interests. Foster Dulles.”²

Dulles

1. Supra.
2. In Tedul 8 to Berlin, Jan. 29, 1954, Acting Secretary of State Smith said that he had presented the Secretary of State’s message to the President that morning in the presence of Phleger and Attorney General Brownell. He said further that the Attorney General had generally supported the Secretary’s views regarding the uncertainties involved. The President had directed Phleger’s and Brownell’s staffs to try to draft a brief phrase to be included in the George amendment which would clarify the authority of the President as Commander in Chief. Acting Secretary Smith also said that the President had telephoned Senator Knowland accordingly. (711.00/1– 2954)