To determine the Department’s position concerning the request of February 25
from Mr. Finn Ronne2 (Commander, USNR, and leader of a private expedition
1947–48) for the Department’s support for his proposed Antarctic expedition.
The question divides into (1) whether it should favor the proposed project,
and (2) if so, whether it would be advantageous to give it official
sponsorship. A third question of a tactical nature concerns how the
Department’s position should be expressed.
Any American expedition would convey certain benefits through its
strengthening of United States rights in the area as a whole and its
acquisition of scientific data unavailable anywhere else. Against these
factors must be weighed the potential cost to the Government and the fact
that any expedition would increase tension with other interested powers. All
of these factors would become more important in the event that the
expedition should be officially sponsored.
Because of the commendable record of Mr. Ronne and the location of the area
in which he plans to operate, the favorable factors appear at this time to
greatly outweigh possible objections. In any event, strong political grounds
for objecting to the expedition do not exist and it is very likely that Mr.
Ronne could organize the expedition without the support of the Department.
Until the views of other Government agencies, including the Defense
Department, become known, the question of possible official sponsorship is
difficult to decide. Even thereafter it will be important for the Department
not to become involved in inter-service or personal rivalries concerning the
expedition.
A fuller discussion of these considerations is attached.
It is recommended that for the present Mr. Ronne be informed that the
Department has no objections on political grounds to his proposed expedition
and that he will wish to sound out other departments, particularly
Defense.
[Attachment]
Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European
Affairs3
secret
Washington, [undated]
Discussion of Considerations Affecting
the Department’s Attitude Toward the Proposed Expedition
The benefits to be gained from a U.S. Antarctic expedition relate
primarily to the maintenance and strengthening of the bases for possible
U.S. claims, which inevitably would result from additional U.S.
activities in the area. Official sponsorship would tend to enhance this
effect, if only because it would imply continued official interest in
preserving U.S. rights.
In addition, a general advantage resulting from further expeditions in
the Antarctic, particularly in the unexplored area, would be the
acquisition of scientific knowledge unobtainable anywhere else In such
fields as meteorology, long-range communications, cosmic ray studies, et
cetera, the data available in the Antarctic has immediate significance
even in the temperate zones. The Ronne expedition will be directed at
the satisfaction of the most urgent scientific needs as outlined in the
1948 study prepared for the Department by a Special Committee of the
National Academy of Sciences. Moreover, Ronne has a commendable record
of accomplishment on previous expeditions and, consequently, a solid
reputation both here and abroad.
There are several arguments against encouraging any Antarctic expedition
from the United States. Two factors which exist more or less
independently of time and circumstances are (a) the likelihood that any
U.S. activity in the Antarctic would produce or increase international
tension with either the present or the potential claimants to territory
there and Ob) a certain unavoidable expense to the Government, whether
the expedition is official or private. Since the cost to the Government
in the present project presumably would come from existing funds or
special appropriations for other Government agencies, this potential
obstacle need not be given special weight in the Department’s
preliminary decision.
As regards the risk of increased international tension, the area selected
for the Ronne expedition is one of the two or three in the whole
Antarctic in which activity by the United States would be least likely
to arouse unfavorable reaction abroad. This results [Page 1736] from the fact that the areas in which
Ronne proposes to locate his base and carry on explorations both are
almost wholly unexplored and, on the basis of past experience, are
regarded as highly inaccessible from the sea. Moreover, the base area,
although within the eastern boundaries of the conflicting British and
Argentine sector claims, is not known to be an area of great interest
for them. Explorations would be made in the hinterlands of these and the
Norwegian and Australian claims.
The inaccessibility of the specific areas selected for the expedition
may, however, raise certain other objections. Because of hazardous ice
conditions, any expedition to the Weddell Sea area must reckon with the
possibility of complete failure or at least the chance of miscalculation
requiring rescue operations. On the other hand, overcoming such dangers
could bring correspondingly greater credit for achievement to a U.S.
expedition.
All of the foregoing objections to an expedition tend to have increased
weight if the expedition is official.
Since the area selected for exploration is presently little known and
away from the area of earlier U.S. explorations, further expeditions
there would tend also to expand the bases for any future U.S. claims.
Such a result might be preferred by those who foresee an eventual U.S.
claim taking in the larger part of the Antarctic Continent and who tend
to minimize even the claims of our allies.
On the other hand, some indirect benefit would accrue even though we
might never claim the areas Ronne plans to explore. Whatever U.S.
activity is undertaken in the Antarctic ought to be planned with a view
to reinforcing the bases for the type of claim we intend to make, i.e.,
intensive or extensive, but this issue is not yet fully resolved between
State and Defense.
Antarctic expeditions in the past have sometimes been the subject of
personal rivalries among certain of the experts in this field. While
this is probably insufficient reason for opposing any expedition, it is
a factor requiring careful attention in any effort to avert personal or
inter-service clashes, which in public would seriously damage the U.S.
reputation and even in private would impair the ability of the
Government to act according to the merits of the matter.
The question of the Department’s opposing the Ronne expedition can be
considered largely academic, in view of the likelihood that Ronne would
be able to obtain sufficient material support for his expedition both
within the Government and from private sources even if the Department
should oppose it. In any case, our only grounds for possible strong
opposition—political considerations—are not compelling in this instance.
The remaining factors outlined above, taken together, weigh heavily on
the side of at least permitting [Page 1737] the expedition to proceed and perhaps even giving
it our wholehearted support. The decisive factor in choosing between the
latter alternatives should be the seriousness of our intention to
maintain and strengthen the bases for U.S. claims in the future.
On the basis of recent correspondence, the Defense Department appears to
favor action to strengthen and possibly extend the bases for claims.
While the Department of State last year reached a decision favoring an
early announcement of an official claim, it is questioned whether the
United States should aim to acquire, in competition with friendly
powers, control over the major portion of the Antarctic. However, since
the proposed expedition would add, even if indirectly, to the strength
of existing U.S. rights in the Antarctic, it is not considered advisable
to allow differences of emphasis between this Department and Defense to
interfere with Ronne’s plans.
The question of official sponsorship of the expedition may depend to a
large extent on the actual or potential availability of funds to finance
the entire project. It is therefore not a matter upon which the
Department can make a final decision before it knows the positions of
the other agencies involved. Until the time is ripe to consult the other
agencies, it would be particularly unwise to reveal a strong attitude of
approval which might not be shared by all the services concerned. In the
consideration of our eventual position on the question of official
sponsorship, however, attention should be given to the advantage of
being able, through official sponsorship, to direct the activities of
the expedition in accordance with policy objectives and, conversely, the
risks inherent in permitting a private expedition, even under a
responsible leader like Ronne, to proceed without effective official
control.
