Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 164th Meeting of the National Security Council on Thursday, October 1, 19531

top secret
eyes only

Present at the 164th Meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United [Page 1546] States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Sherman Adams, The Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Brigadier General Paul T. Carroll, Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

[Here follow agenda items 1–3: “Significant World Development Affecting U.S. Security,” “United States Position With Respect to Germany,” and “United States Policy and Courses of Action To Counter Possible Soviet or Satellite Action Against Berlin.”]

4. Reported Decline in U.S. Prestige Abroad (NSC Action No. 867; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 24 and 29, 19532)

After Mr. Cutler had briefly given the background on this report which had been submitted by the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), he asked Mr. C. D. Jackson to speak to the report. Mr. Jackson said that the report really spoke for itself. As far as the work done by people here in Washington, it was a conscientious effort to marshal the facts. Presumably, continued Mr. Jackson, he felt that the report was somewhat dangerous since it painted too pessimistic a picture and conveyed the impression that the fall in U.S. prestige overseas was solely the fault of the United States. In fact, of course, the fall in U.S. prestige was also a function of European neurosis and it was an over-simplification if we judged that the United States was solely to blame. At the present time the United States was actually taking a position of world leadership and it was inevitable that we should run into the difficulties attendant upon such leadership. It was natural, therefore, to try to shift the blame to certain whipping boys as this report tended to do. In conclusion, Mr. Jackson warned the Council that even if the recommendations in the report were promptly carried out we shouldn’t expect to be loved overnight. In point of fact, we don’t want to be loved anyhow but simply to be respected.

The President said that he had almost blown his top when he first read this report. It was obvious to him that many of the individuals [Page 1547] overseas who had sent in the views out of which the report had been made, had been appointed to their jobs when they thought that the only way to assure the prestige of the United States overseas was to hand out money. Many of them were New Dealers with the result that the report was badly overdrawn and colored.

Mr. Jackson expressed hearty agreement with the President’s opinion and pointed out that as there were still termites in Washington so also in our missions overseas there remained a lot of disgruntled eggheads whose last thought is to promote the positive side of this Administration’s policies.

Mr. Allen Dulles noted that the report was as of August 1 and that there had been considerable improvement since that date.

Secretary Dulles said that the analysis in this paper was a correct reflection of the reports which had come in to the State Department from the embassies and missions overseas. It was important to observe, however, the extent of fluctuation in our prestige from week to week and almost day to day. For example, U.S. prestige in France reached its depths during the Rosenberg espionage trial and rebounded to a high point when we took our stand with the French in regard to French action in Morocco. In any case, Secretary Dulles said he wished earnestly to point out the great damage which could be done to the Administration by the opposition if this report ever leaked out. It was also worth pointing out, said Secretary Dulles, that there was another aspect to our prestige which is not the subject of any comment in the present report. This was our prestige at home with our own people. Whatever the present situation with respect to U.S. prestige overseas, the prestige of the Administration with the people at home was higher now than it had been for a long time. With regard to the previous references to termites, Secretary Dulles then read a very bitter letter reporting on the results of his visit to New Delhi. The Secretary feared that individuals of the sort who had written this letter were to be found all through our diplomatic establishments overseas. In conclusion, Secretary Dulles said that he thought on the whole that Council action with respect to this paper should consist of simply noting the report rather than to suggest adoption of precise recommendations. The President expressed agreement not only with Secretary Dulles’ suggestion for appropriate Council action on this paper but also with the view that it should receive no circulation. Indeed, said the President, it would be best to have Mr. Cutler recall all outstanding copies of the report.

After a brief comment on the ephemeral character of gratitude among nations, the President closed consideration of this report by expressing the wish that it might be possible in some fashion to [Page 1548] send to these various foreign countries observers who were really loyal to the new Administration to find out what is going on overseas. It would be very helpful to find out who are the traitors in these various missions.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed the report by the Operations Coordinating Board on the subject transmitted by the reference memorandum of September 24.

[Here follows agenda item 5: “Current Budgetary Situation and Outlook.”]

  1. Drafted on Oct. 1 by S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.
  2. Regarding NSC Action No. 867, see footnote 1, p. 1527; Lay’s Sept. 24, 1953, memorandum is printed ibid.; regarding his Sept. 29 memorandum, see footnote 4, p. 1532.