Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, General: Economic and Political Matters, Volume I, Part 2

OCB files, lot 61 D 385, “Prestige Project”

Memorandum by the Counselor (MacArthur) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith)

secret

[Washington,] September 22, 1953.

• Subject:
• Draft PSB Report.

Attached is the draft report¹ concerning the status of U.S. prestige abroad, developed by the PSB working group consisting of Mr. Amory (CIA), Mr. Rand (FOA), Admiral Smith (OSD), Mr. Morgan (PSB), and myself. I understand this report will be considered at the OCB² meeting on Wednesday, September 23, at 12:30 in Mr. Allen Dulles’ office.

The contents of this draft have been reviewed by Messrs. Cabot, Bonbright, Byroade, Bowie, and Johnson. Its general content has received their strong endorsement. They proposed a few additions and revisions which I have transmitted to George Morgan and which are being issued in the form of a proposed corrigendum to the OCB members (corrigendum attached¹).

There is one specific point which I should bring to your attention. When the Board meets, I understand the Department of Defense will question the desirability of including paragraph 8 e (page 7) of Recommendations of the attached report. This paragraph was originally included in order to stress the importance, from a political and psychological standpoint, of undertaking early efforts to eliminate the “gap” between existing NATO defense requirements and the actual defense efforts which the U.S. and other NATO countries can reasonably be expected to make during the next several years. The fact that the presently agreed level of military requirements is quite unrealistic in terms of political-economic capabilities is a matter of general knowledge, and has produced doubts in certain quarters about the entire NATO program. It is quite natural that the Department of Defense should prefer to define military requirements purely in terms of military considerations, without regard to current economic, political, and technical capabilities. One can understand their objection to any procedure which suggests “tailoring the coat to fit the cloth”. However, without regard to the method by which a reconciliation between requirements and capabilities may be achieved, the members of the working group have concluded from our reports that the attainment of some kind of reconciliation just as soon as feasible is important.

If you have any comments or questions with respect to the attached report or the corrigendum, I will do my best to answer them.³

Douglas MacArthur II

1. Not found.
2. The Operations Coordinating Board held its first meeting on Sept. 17, 1953, superseding the Psychological Strategy Board. For information on the establishment and functions of the Operations Coordinating Board, see volume ii.
1. Not found.
3. The Operations Coordinating Board at its meeting of Sept. 23, 1953, took up the draft paper containing recommendations to increase U.S. prestige abroad as agenda item 2 and approved it “subject to changes proposed by the Departments of State and Defense.” The OCB then “Directed that in submitting the paper to the National Security Council, special security precautions be requested.” (OCB files, lot 62 D 430, “OCB Minutes, I”)