Truman Library, Truman papers, PSF
Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence
(Smith) to the President
top secret
Washington, May 8, 1952.
There is attached a copy of SE 28 covering
“Consequences of the Future Revelation of the Contents of Certain Government
Documents,” as approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee at its
meeting 6 May 1952.1
This paper, estimating the consequences for US foreign relations and for US
strategic interests of the revelation of the contents of the two-volume
study entitled “Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the International
Petroleum Cartel,” was prepared as a matter of urgency pursuant to the
request made at the National Security Council meeting on Wednesday, 30
April.2
It is planned that final printed copies of this estimate will be forwarded to
the National Security Council on Friday, 9 May.
[Page 1272]
[Attachment]
Special Estimate3
top secret
SE–28
Washington, May 6, 1952.
Consequences of the Future Revelation
of the Contents of Certain Government Documents
the problem
To estimate the consequences for US foreign relations and for US
strategic interests of the revelation of the contents of the two-volume
study entitled “Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the
International Petroleum Cartel.”
scope
This estimate considers the consequences of the revelation of the
contents of the subject report, whether by official publication or
otherwise. The estimate does not consider to what extent the statements
in the Report are accurate or already known, but solely the effect of
their revelation, individually or collectively, as allegations made
under the sponsorship of an arm of the US Government.
estimate
- 1.
- We estimate that official publication of this Report would greatly
assist Soviet propaganda, would further the achievement of Soviet
objectives throughout the world and hinder the achievement of US
foreign policy objectives, particularly in the Near and Middle East,
and would otherwise tend to injure US foreign relations and
strategic interests, as more fully set forth below.
- 2.
- We believe that the manner of the revelation of the report’s
contents, otherwise than by official publication in full in its
present form, would cause the consequences to differ only in degree
from the consequences of official publication estimated herein. The
adverse effects herein estimated might be mitigated to some extent
[Page 1273]
by withholding from
general release certain paragraphs which would particularly provide
propaganda and political ammunition to Soviet and other forces in
the Middle East opposed to the interests of the US.
- 3.
- Assistance to Soviet Propaganda and to the
Achievement of Soviet Objectives Throughout the World.
Publication of the report would:
- a.
- Assist the USSR in pursuing its objective of dividing the
West and specifically of driving a wedge between the US and
UK, and between the US and other European nations.
- b.
- Greatly assist Soviet propaganda designed to discredit the
US and other Western Powers in the Near and Middle East; and
further the Soviet objective of fostering and perverting to
Communist ends the spirit of nationalism in that
area.
- c.
- Assist the current Soviet campaign to induce a relaxation
of East-West trade controls, through distortion of certain
allegations in the Report to support the propaganda argument
that US and Western foreign trade practices are deliberately
restrictive.
- d.
- Assist the world-wide Soviet campaign to represent the US
and other Western Powers as “imperialist” and “colonial”
powers. This effect would be felt not only in the Near and
Middle East but also in the countries of South and Southeast
Asia and to some extent in Latin America.
- 4.
- Specific Adverse Effects on the US Position in
the Near and Middle East. Publication of the Report would:
- a.
- Further prejudice prospects for a settlement of the
Iranian oil controversy, in particular by damaging, perhaps
irreparably, the status of the US as mediator between the UK
and Iran. Publication would thus contribute to the present
economic deterioration and political instability in Iran,
and increase opportunities for Communist subversion.
- b.
- Assist forces in other oil-producing countries in the area
which desire to alter present contractual arrangements with
the international oil companies, and thus jeopardize the
flow of oil, which is of great strategic importance to the
US and its allies.
- c.
- Harm the general position and prestige of the US and other
Western Powers in the area, by providing propaganda
ammunition not only to Communist elements but also to
extreme nationalist and other anti-Western elements.
- d.
- Raise doubts in the UK and France concerning US objectives
in the Near and Middle East and possibly jeopardize
coordination of overall policies for the area.
- e.
- As a consequence of c. and d. above, reduce the prospects
for achieving a Middle East defense organization.
- f.
- Seriously embarrass certain governments in the area, both
in their relations with the US and other Western Powers and
in their internal political situations, thus increasing the
likelihood of disorder and deterioration favorable to
extreme nationalist and anti-Western elements, including
Communists.
- 5.
- Other Adverse Effects on US Interests. In
addition to the consequences listed above, publication of the Report
would:
- a.
- Tend to impair basic relations between the US and UK and
to a lesser extent between the US and the Netherlands and
between the US and France, to the detriment of US interests
in all areas in which close cooperation with these powers is
essential to the achievement of US security objectives. In
addition to the proposed Middle East defense organization,
this would apply to NATO
and to efforts to achieve agreed policies in the Far East
including Southeast Asia.
- b.
- Tend to jeopardize US oil concessions in areas other than
the Middle East and to jeopardize other US commercial and
industrial interests abroad, including private mining
arrangements in South America and elsewhere.
