Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 205th Meeting of the National Security Council on Thursday, July 1, 19541
eyes only
Present at the 205th meeting of the Council were the following: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (Items 1–4); the Secretary of Commerce (Item 5); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Items 1–4); the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (Items 1–4); the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers (Item 4). Present for Item 1 only were the Acting Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Acting Secretary of the Air Force; Assistant Secretary of Defense Quarles; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; Mr. Robert C. Sprague, NSC Consultant; the NSC Representative on Internal Security; Messrs. Walters and Hall, NSC Special Staff; Lt. Col. George P. Curtin, USA; Lt. Col. William S. Fultz, USA; Lt. Col. James Bothwell, USAF; Lt. Col. George R. Doerr, USAF; Capt. Thomas P. Wilson, USN; and Capt. Edward E. Grimm, USN. Others present at the meeting were Assistant Secretary of Commerce Anderson (Item 5); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; [Page 1219] Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; Elbert P. Tuttle, Department of the Treasury; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Naval Aide to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
[Here follows discussion concerning continental defense, significant world developments affecting United States security, the President’s conversations with Prime Minister Churchill during the latter’s visit, and tentative guidelines under NSC 162/2 for fiscal year 1956.]
5. East-West Trade Controls (NSC Action No. 11572)
Governor Stassen orally summarized the problem which was set forth in the written report3 which was distributed to the members of the Council at this point. The essence of the problem, as he saw it, was whether, for political reasons, the United States was prepared to make further sacrifices in the list of strategic items. He said that by and large he favored the third alternative course of action, which was “seek disclosure of the UK rock-bottom position and, after very prompt review and appraisal, determine whether it can be accepted as over-all compromise, as submitted, or with a limited number of negotiated changes.”
The President said that he might just as well sit back and listen to what the members of the Council had to say on these problems of East-West trade because, as the members of the Council well knew, he thought they were all wrong on the subject.
Secretary Weeks said that it was the virtually unanimous opinion on all levels, technical and up, that the United States ought not to yield to the British with regard to the 80 disagreed items for inclusion on the International Control Lists. He wanted to point out, in the first place, that if we did yield now to the British, we would in effect have dismantled the whole export control system. Secondly, if we did, Japan and other nations would at once desire to open up trade in strategic items with Communist China. Accordingly, Secretary Weeks said he felt very strongly that the UK was going too far and too fast. No one, he said, in this room was more anxious than the Secretary of Commerce to increase world trade, but not at the cost of national security.
[Page 1220]Turning to Secretary Weeks, the President said, answer me this question: What are we going to do about Japan? If you forbid them to trade with Communist China and if you will not admit their products to the United States, or if you do not find some other way out for them, they will slip into Communism.
Secretary Wilson said that he was a free trader too, and had always been one, but to give in to the British right now would simply be another important Communist victory. For, after all, the Communist nations will buy from the West only those articles which will develop their war potential. Certainly we should not make a move until we see the outcome in Indochina. Secretary Wilson was therefore in favor of holding the line on the 80 disagreed items against the British.
Secretary Humphrey expressed agreement with Secretary Wilson, but the President said that to his way of thinking, barring trade was just about as silly as censorship. Secretary Weeks reminded the President that in talking about the 80 items we were talking about precisely those items which would help the Russians make war if they chose to do so.
Secretary Dulles said that we might as well face the fact that we will not be able very long to hold the dike against the flood of nations who wish to extend their trade with the Communist nations. The British and the rest were ultimately going to trade with the Soviet bloc. We have, however, a kind of temporary veto power over the British, thanks to our “recent love feast” and the British desire not to shatter it too rapidly. Accordingly, and in view of this brief trading position which we have, Secretary Dulles expressed himself as favoring the fourth alternative, which was to strive for a moratorium on the 80 disagreed items for a period of some months, after which the problem would be reviewed. This would at least prevent action until the Indochina situation was clarified.
The President said that maybe he just had a soldier’s abhorrence of issuing orders which he couldn’t enforce. Let us therefore at least enforce what we agree with the United Kingdom to be genuinely strategic. The President said that he would fight the British to the death to keep electronic equipment on the embargo list, but in any event let us pare this strategic list down to its fundamentals.
Governor Stassen then inquired about the precise timing. The British would want to know what we meant by a suitable interval. Do we implement the new lists as soon as a cease-fire is arranged in Indochina? Secretary Dulles answered that if we acted before the achievement at least of a cease-fire, it would be taken to indicate the end of the West’s will to resist. He was pretty sure that [Page 1221] Sir Winston and Mr. Eden would overrule Thorneycroft if he tried the new system prior to the cease-fire.
Secretary Weeks, turning to the President and reminding him that he would hold out to the bitter end on the truly important strategic items such as electronics, assured the President that the remaining 86 disagreed items were every one of them hard-core items of great strategic significance.
Secretary Wilson said that once we had got a peace in Indochina, he’d be willing to see the whole embargo program go by the board. It would be a serious mistake, however, to scuttle the system before a settlement had been reached in Indochina.
The National Security Council:
- a.
- Discussed a report on the subject, dated June 30, 1954, presented at the meeting by the Director, Foreign Operations Administration.
- b.
- Agreed that the United States should oppose decontrol, for the time being, of items agreed for deletion from the International Lists.
- c.
- Agreed that the United States should strive for a moratorium as to the items disagreed for inclusion on the International Lists, whereby the present control level on these items would be maintained for a period of four to six months, at the end of which period the problem would be reviewed in the light of the situation then prevailing.
Note: The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director, Foreign Operations Administration.